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Battle of Thermopylae
Part of the Greco-Persian Wars
Leonidas at Thermopylae, by Jacques-Louis David (1814)
Date 11 August 480 BC Location Thermopylae Result Persian victory
Belligerents
Greek city-states	Achaemenid Persia
Commanders and leaders
Leonidas I †	Xerxes the Great
Strength
300 Spartans 700 Thespians 6,000 other Greek allies	Estimates vary (See below)
Casualties and losses
300 Spartans 700 Thespians 1,400 Greek allies	60,000-300,000 (Modern estimates) 1,000,000+ (Herodotus)
Out of the initial 7,000-strong Greek army, all but 2,000 were dismissed on the third day.

In the Battle of Thermopylae of 480 BC, an alliance of Greek city-states fought the invading Persian Empire at the pass of Thermopylae in central Greece. Vastly outnumbered, the Greeks held back the Persians for three days in one of history's most famous last stands. A small force led by King Leonidas of Sparta blocked the only road through which the massive army of Xerxes I could pass. After three days of battle, a local resident named Ephialtes betrayed the Greeks by revealing a mountain path that led behind the Greek lines. Dismissing the rest of the army, King Leonidas stayed behind with 300 Spartans and 700 Thespian volunteers. The Persians succeeded in taking the pass but sustained heavy losses, extremely disproportionate to those of the Greeks. The fierce resistance of the Spartan-led army offered Athens the invaluable time to prepare for a decisive naval battle that would come to determine the outcome of the war. The subsequent Greek victory at the Battle of Salamis left much of the Persian Empire's navy destroyed and Xerxes I was forced to retreat back to Asia, leaving his army in Greece under Mardonius, who was to meet the Greeks in battle one last time. The Spartans assembled at full strength and led a pan-Greek army that defeated the Persians decisively at the Battle of Plataea, ending the Greco-Persian War and with it the expansion of the Persian Empire into Europe.

The performance of the defenders at the battle of Thermopylae is often used as an example of the advantages of training, equipment, and good use of terrain to maximize an army's potential, and has become a symbol of courage against overwhelming odds. Even more, both ancient and modern writers used the Battle of Thermopylae as an example of the superior power of a volunteer army of freemen defending native soil. The sacrifice of the Spartans and the Thespians has captured the minds of many throughout the ages and has given birth to many cultural references as a result.

Greek preparations

The geopolitical origins of the battle actually predate Xerxes I, as it was his father, Darius the Great, who initially sent heralds to all Greek cities offering blandishments if they would submit to Persian authority. As was customary, this was signaled by asking for "earth and water", betokening their submission, which was duly kept by the assiduous bureaucrats of the Persian Empire. Many of the 700 Greek states submitted, including the Argives.

The Athenians declined to adhere to their initial agreement, undertaken in 507 BC (as the command in 491 BC from the Great King Darius, through his brother the Satrap of Ionia Artaphernes, was to reinstate Hippias the tyrant, which the newly democratic Athenians were loath to do).

Despite the turbulent nature of Greek politics, the Spartans found themselves on the same side as the newly formed Cleisthenes democracy of Athens; though they didn't just kill their heralds, as the Athenians did, but threw them into a well, answering their demand for 'earth and water' with the retort "Dig it out for yourselves".

Support gathered around these two leading states. A congress met at Corinth in late autumn of 481 BC, and a confederate alliance of Greek city-states was formed. It had the power to send envoys asking for assistance and to dispatch troops from the member states to defensive points after joint consultation. Herodotus calls them simply "οἱ Ἕλληνες" (the Greeks) or "the Greeks who had banded together." Sparta and Athens had a leading role in the congress but interests of all the states played a part in determining defensive strategy. Little is known about the internal workings of the congress or the discussion during its proceedings, though only 70 of the approximately 700 Greek cities sent representatives.

The Persian army first encountered a joint force of 10,000 Athenian and Spartan hoplites led by Euanetus and Themistocles in the vale of Tempe. Upon hearing this, Xerxes I sent the army through the Sarantaporo strait, which was unguarded, and sidestepped them. The hoplites, warned by Alexander I of Macedon, vacated the pass. The allied Greeks judged that the next strategic choke point where the Persian force could be stopped was Thermopylae. They decided to defend it and send a fleet to Artemision, a naval choke point, as Xerxes' army was being supplied and supported by sea. Using the fleet, Xerxes' army might have crossed Maliacos bay and outflanked the Greek army again.

The Greek high strategy is confirmed by an oration later in the same century:

But while Greece showed these inclinations , the Athenians, for their part, embarked in their ships and hastened to the defence of Artemisium; while the Spartans and some of their allies went off to make a stand at Thermopylae, judging that the narrowness of the ground would enable them to secure the passage.

Some modern historians, such as Bengtson, claim that the purpose of the land force was to slow down the Persian army whilst the Persian navy was defeated at sea. Another theory is that the land army was expected to hold back the Persian forces in the north and defeat it through attrition, epidemics, and food deprivation.

Some have argued that the Athenians were confident that a small Greek force led by Leonidas would be enough to hold back the Persians; otherwise, they would have already vacated their city and sent their whole army to Thermopylae. There is one known case in which a small force did stop a larger invading force from the north: in 353 BC/352 BC the Athenians managed to stop the forces of Philip II of Macedon by deploying 5,000 hoplites and 400 horsemen.

Herodotus writes:

The force with Leonidas was sent forward by the Spartans in advance of their main body, that the sight of them might encourage the allies to fight, and hinder them from going over to the Medes, as was likely they might have done had they seen that Sparta was backward. They intended presently, when they had celebrated the Carneian Festival, which was what now kept them at home, to leave a garrison in Sparta, and hasten in full force to join the army. The rest of the allies intended to act similarly; for it happened that the Olympic Festival fell exactly at this same period. None of them looked to see the contest at Thermopylae decided so speedily; wherefore they were content to send forward a mere advance guard. Such accordingly were the intentions of the allies.

The legend of Thermopylae as told by Herodotus has it that Sparta consulted the Oracle at Delphi before setting out to meet the Persian army. The Oracle is said to have made the following prophecy in hexameter verse:

O ye men who dwell in the streets of broad Lacedaemon!
Either your glorious town shall be sacked by the children of Perseus,
Or, in exchange, must all through the whole Laconian country
Mourn for the loss of a king, descendant of great Heracles.
He cannot be withstood by the courage of bulls nor of lions,
Strive as they may; he is mighty as Jove; there is naught that shall stay him,

Till he have got for his prey your king, or your glorious city.

In essence, the Oracle's warning was that either Sparta would be conquered and left in ruins or one of her two hereditary kings, descendant of Heracles, must sacrifice his life to defend her.

Leonidas took charge of his personal fighting unit, the 300 Spartans, and headed to Thermopylae. Herodotus writes that Leonidas was idolized by his men. He was convinced that he was going to certain death and his forces were not adequate for a victory, and so selected only men who had fathered sons who were old enough to take over the family responsibilities. Plutarch mentions in his Sayings of Spartan Women that, after encouraging him, Leonidas' wife Gorgo asked what she should do on his departure. He replied, "Marry a good man, and have good children."

Battle

Arrival of the Persians

Herodotus attests a conversation that took place early in the expedition between Xerxes and Demaratus, an exiled Spartan king in his employ. The King of Kings asked Demaratus whether he thought that the Greeks would put up a fight, for in his opinion neither the Greeks nor even all peoples of Europe together would be able to stop him because they were disunited. Demaratus replied:

"First then, no matter what, the Spartans will never accept your terms. This would reduce Greece to slavery. They are sure to join battle with you even if all the rest of the Greeks surrendered to you. As for Spartan numbers, do not ask how many or few they are, hoping for them to surrender. For if a thousand of them should take the field, they will meet you in battle, and so will any other number, whether it is less than this, or more."

Xerxes laughed at this answer, claiming that "free men" of any number would never be able to stand against his army which was unified by a single ruler, and that obedience to one single master would make his troops extremely courageous, or they would be led into battle "by the whip" even against an army of any size. He added that "even if the Greeks have larger numbers than our highest estimate, we still would outnumber them 100 to 1", claiming that his army too contained men as tough as the ones Demaratus had described.

On the Persian Empire army's arrival at Thermopylae, Greek troops instigated a council meeting. Some Peloponnesians suggested withdrawal to the Isthmus and blocking the passage to Peloponnesus. They were well aware that the Persians would have to go through Athens in order to reach them there. The Phocians and Locrians, whose states were located nearby, became indignant and advised defending Thermopylae and sending for more help. Leonidas and the Spartans agreed to defend Thermopylae.

Meanwhile, the Persians entered the pass and sent a mounted scout to reconnoiter. The Greeks allowed him to come up to the camp, observe them, and depart. When the scout reported to Xerxes the size of the Greek force and that the Spartans were indulging in calisthenics and combing their long hair, Xerxes I found the reports laughable. Seeking again the counsel of Demaratus, Xerxes was told that the Spartans were preparing for battle and that it was their custom to adorn their hair when they were about to risk their lives. Demaratus called them "the bravest men in Greece" and warned the Great King that they intended to dispute the pass. He emphasised that he had tried to warn Xerxes earlier in the campaign, but the King had refused to believe him. He added that if Xerxes ever managed to subdue the Spartans, no other nation in the world would dare to defend themselves against him.

Xerxes remained incredulous, finding it unbelievable for such a small army to contend with his own. Plutarch informs that he then sent emissaries to the Greek forces. At first, he asked Leonidas to join him by offering the kingship of all Greece. Leonidas answered: "If you knew what is good in life, you would abstain from wishing for foreign things. For me it is better to die for Greece than to be monarch over my compatriots."

Then Xerxes I asked him more forcefully to surrender their arms. To this Leonidas gave his noted answer:

Μολών Λαβέ (pronounced in the Erasmus accent: /mo'lɔːn la'be/, Byzantine accent:mo'lon la've),

meaning "Come and get them". This quote has been repeated by many later generals and politicians in order to express an army's or nation's determination to not surrender without a battle. It also was taken by the Greek First Army Corps as their emblem.

Despite their extremely disproportionate numbers, Greek morale was high. Herodotus writes that when Dienekes, a Spartan soldier, was informed that Persian arrows would be so numerous as "to blot out the sun", he remarked with characteristically laconic prose, "So much the better, we shall fight in the shade." (Taken by the Greek 20th Armored Division as their motto).

Xerxes I waited four days for the Greek force to disperse. On the fifth day he sent Medes and Cissians, along with relatives of those who had died 10 years earlier in the battle of Marathon to take the Greeks prisoner and bring them before him. According to Ctesias, the first wave numbered 10,000 soldiers and were commanded by Artapanus. They were "cut to pieces" with only two or three Spartans dead.

Failure of the frontal assault

Xerxes I sent in the Medes who had been only recently conquered by the Persians, perhaps, as Diodorus Siculus suggested, because he wanted them to bear the brunt of the fighting. The Medes soon found themselves in a frontal assault. The Greeks had camped on either side of the rebuilt Phocian wall. That the wall was guarded shows that the Greeks were using it to establish a reference line for the battle, but they fought in front of it.

Details of the tactics are scant. The Greeks probably deployed in a phalanx, a wall of overlapping shields and layered spearpoints, spanning the width of the pass. Herodotus says that the units for each state were kept together. The Persians, armed with arrows and short spears, could not break through the long spears of the Greek phalanx, nor were their lightly armoured men a match for the superior armour, weaponry, and discipline of the Greek hoplites. Glotz has argued that three Persian Empire soldiers were necessary to put down one hoplite. In this way they killed so many Medes that Xerxes is said to have started up off the seat from which he was watching the battle three times.

According to Herodotus and Diodorus, the Persian emperor, having taken the measure of the enemy, threw his best troops into a second assault: the Immortals, an elite corps of 10,000 men. However, according to Ctesias, the Immortals did not attack until the second day. Ctesias tells that Xerxes sent another 20,000 troops against the Greeks, after the first 10,000 were defeated, who also failed to open the pass even though they were flogged by their leaders to keep on attacking. On his side, Leonidas had arranged a system of relays between the hoplites of the various cities so as to constantly have fresh troops on the front line. In the heat of the battle, however, the units did not get a chance to rotate. Able to approach the Greek line only in such numbers as the space allowed, the Immortals fared no better than the Medes, and Xerxes had to withdraw them as well. The first day of battle probably ended there.

On the second day Xerxes sent, according to Ctesias, another 50,000 to assault the pass. Again they failed. The account of the slain gives some indication why: the wall of bodies must have broken up the Persian line and detracted from their morale. Climbing over the bodies, they could see that they had stepped into a killing machine but the officers behind prevented them from withdrawing. Xerxes at last stopped the assault and withdrew to his camp, totally perplexed. By now he concluded that a head-on confrontation against Spartan-led troops in a narrow place was the wrong approach.

Encirclement of the Greeks

Late on the second day of battle, as the Persian king was pondering what to do next, he received a windfall: a Malian Greek traitor named Ephialtes informed him of a path around Thermopylae and offered to guide the Persian army through the pass. Ephialtes was motivated by the desire of a reward. For this act, the name of Ephialtes received a lasting stigma, coming to mean "nightmare" and becoming the archetypal term for a "traitor" in Greek.

Xerxes I sent his commander Hydarnes through the pass with the Immortals and other troops (a force of about 40,000), according to Ctesias. The path led from east of the Persian camp along the ridge of Mt. Anopaea behind the cliffs that flanked the pass. It branched with one path leading to Phocis and the other down to the Gulf of Malis at Alpenus, first town of Locris. Leonidas had stationed 1,000 Phocian volunteers on the heights to guard that path.

Despite their indignation in not being on the front lines and their determination to defend Thermopylae, the Phocians were not expecting an attack on the rear guard: there were no advance positions, sentinels, or patrols. Their first warning of the approach of the Immortals under Hydarnes was the rustling of oak leaves at first light on the third day of the battle. Herodotus says that they "jumped up" (suggesting that the Greek force was still asleep) and were "greatly amazed" (which no alert unit should have been). Hydarnes was perhaps as amazed to see them hastily arming themselves as they were to see him and the Persian forces. He feared that they were Spartans, but was enlightened by Ephialtes and proceeded by firing "showers of arrows" at them. The Phocians retreated to the crest of the mountain to make their stand, not realizing that this strategy would allow the Persians to take the left branch of the pass to Alpenus and hence circle behind the main Greek force.

Final stand of the Spartans and Thespians

Before first light, Leonidas learned that the Phocians had not held and he called a council of war at dawn. During the council some Greeks argued for withdrawal in the face of the overwhelming Persian advance, while others pledged to stay. After the council, many of the Greek forces did choose to withdraw. Herodotus believed that Leonidas blessed their departure with an order, but he also offered the alternate point of view that those retreating forces departed without orders. The Spartans had pledged themselves to fight to the death, while the Thebans were held as hostage against their will. However, a contingent of about 700 Thespians, led by general Demophilus, the son of Diadromes, refused to leave with the other Greeks, but cast their lot with the Spartans. Unknown and unremembered by most, 900 Helots (Spartan slaves) also died fighting alongside their masters in the last stand.

Ostensibly, the Spartans were obeying their oath and following the oracle of Delphi (see below). However, it might also have been a calculated strategy to delay the advance of the Persians and cover the retreat of the Greek army. Once the pass was cleared the Persians could use their cavalry to pursue and stop the retreat of the Greek infantry in the more open terrain. The heavily armed Greek infantry could not have outrun Persia's cavalry; once halted in the open, the Greeks could be overwhelmed by superior numbers and a cavalry charge. In fact, with the Persians so close at hand, the decision to stand and fight was probably a tactical requirement only made more palatable by the oracle.

At dawn Xerxes I made libations. He paused to allow the Immortals sufficient time to descend the mountain, and then began his advance.

The Greeks this time sallied forth from the wall to meet the Persians in the wider part of the pass in an attempt to slaughter as many Persians as they could. They fought with spears until every spear was shattered and then switched to xiphoi (short swords). In this struggle, Herodotus tells us that two brothers of Xerxes I fell: Abrocomes and Hyperanthes. Leonidas also died in the assault.

Receiving intelligence that Ephialtes and the Immortals were advancing toward the rear, the Greeks withdrew and took a stand on a small hill behind the wall. The Thebans deserted to the Persians but a few were slain before their surrender was accepted. While some of the remaining Greeks fought with their xiphoi, some were left with only their hands and teeth. Tearing down part of the wall, Xerxes I ordered the hill surrounded and the Persians rained down arrows until the last Greek was dead. Modern archaeologists have found evidence of the final arrow shower.

Aftermath

When the body of Leonidas was recovered by the Persians, Xerxes I, in a rage at the loss of so many of his soldiers, ordered that the head be cut off and the body crucified. This was very uncommon for the Persians; they had the habit of treating enemies that fought bravely against them with great honor, as the example of Pytheas captured earlier off Skyros shows. However, Xerxes I was known for his rage, as when he had the Hellespont whipped because it would not obey him.

Xerxes I was curious as to why there was such a small Greek force guarding Thermopylae and interrogated some Arcadian prisoners. The answer was that all the other men were participating in the Olympic Games, a very important event for them. When Xerxes I asked what the prize for the winner was, "an olive-wreath" came the answer. Upon hearing this, Tritantaechmes, a Persian general, said to Mardonius: "Good heavens! Mardonius, what kind of men are these against whom you have brought us to fight? Men who do not compete for money, but for honor".

After the departure and defeat of the Persians, the Greeks collected their dead and buried them on the hill. A stone lion was erected to commemorate Leonidas. Forty years after the battle, Leonidas' body was returned to Sparta where he was buried again with full honours and funeral games were held every year in his memory.

The simultaneous naval Battle of Artemisium was a stalemate, whereupon the Athenian navy retreated. The Persians were now in control of the Aegean Sea and all of peninsular Greece as far south as Attica. The Spartans prepared to defend the Isthmus of Corinth and the Peloponnese, while Xerxes I sacked an evacuated city of Athens, whose inhabitants had already fled to Salamis Island. In September, the Greeks defeated the Persians at the naval Battle of Salamis, which led to the rapid retreat of Xerxes I. The remaining Persian army, left under the charge of Mardonius, was defeated in the Battle of Plataea by a combined Greek army again led by the Spartans, under the regent Pausanias.

Topography of the battlefield

At the time, the pass of Thermopylae consisted of a track along the shore of the Gulf of Malis so narrow that only one chariot could pass through. On the southern side of the track stood the cliffs, while on the north side was the gulf. Along the path was a series of three constrictions, or "gates" (pylai), and at the center gate a short wall that had been erected by the Phocians in the previous century to aid in their defense against Thessalian invasions. The name "hot gates" comes from the hot springs that were located there.

Today, the pass is not near the sea but is inland due to infilling of the Gulf of Malis. The old track appears at the foot of hills around the plain, flanked by a modern road. It still is a natural defensive position to modern armies.

Detailed maps of the region are to be found at these sites:

• Map 1,
• Map 2,

Pictures showing the terrain are to be found at these sites:

• View from the east at livius.org. On the left are the cliffs to the south; on the right, the road and the edge of the agricultural region that once were the Gulf of Malis.
• Modern monument at siu.edu
• Spartan burial mound at coloradocollege.edu
• Artemisium at prigsbee.com

Size of the Persian army

Primary sources

Xerxes I, King of Persia, had been preparing for years to continue the Greco-Persian Wars started by his father Darius. In 481 BC, after four years of preparation, the Persian army and navy arrived in Asia Minor. A bridge of ships had been made at Abydos. This allowed the land forces to cross the Hellespont. Herodotus of Halicarnassus, who wrote the first history of this war, gave the size of Xerxes's army as follows:

This is the account for the land armies present at Thermopylae. Regarding the total number of forces Xerxes I assembled to invade Greece (land army, fleet crew, etc.), this number is nearly doubled in order to account for support troops and thus Herodotus reports that the total Persian force numbered 5,283,220 men, a figure which is regarded as erroneous by modern estimations. The poet Simonides, who was a near-contemporary, talks of four million. Ctesias of Cnidus, Artaxerxes II of Persia's personal physician, wrote a history of Persia according to Persian sources one century later that unfortunately has not survived, and gives 800,000 as the total number of the original army that met in Doriskos, Thrace, after crossing the Hellespont.

Modern estimates

Modern scholars have given different estimates based on knowledge of the Persian military systems, their logistical capabilities, the Greek countryside, and supplies available along the army's route. Modern estimations tend to consider the figures given in ancient texts as miscalculations or exaggerations on the part of the victors.

It is assumed that if Herodotus' 300,000 estimate at Plataea were to be accepted, then the land army at Thermopylae may not have surpassed 500,000, which accounts for one fifth of Herodotus' record. Others give an upper limit of 250,000 total land forces and 500,000 for the expedition. One of the main reasons often given for these values is a lack of water. Sir Frederick Maurice, was among the first to estimate that the army could not have surpassed 175,000 due to this reason, at a time when hydrological data on Greek rivers was unavailable. Another reason he suggested was that it may have been impossible for an army of 210,500 (150,500 combatants and 60,000 non-combatants) to camp in an area of a few square miles. A widely supported view holds that Herodotus may have confused the Persian terms for chiliarchy and myriarchy (one thousand and ten thousand). The topic has been controversial but modern estimates for the land force figures range from 60,000 to 300,000, though higher and lower estimates have been suggested by several scholars, but more popular views support ranges between 100,000-150,000 or 150,000-200,000. The topic has been hotly debated but the general consensus revolves around the figure of 200,000. All these estimates concern the land forces alone, whereas the entire Persian presence in Greece, including support troops and fleet crew, would almost double the number.

The numbers given by Herodotus on the Persian fleet are considered largely realistic. It is generally maintained that Herodotus or his sources had access to official Persian Empire records of the forces involved in the expedition, and it is more likely the numbers on the fleet were given precisely, whereas the contingent of the army may have been listed in general terms rather than exact figures. Whatever the real numbers were, it is clear that Xerxes I was anxious to ensure a successful expedition by mustering an overwhelming numerical superiority by land and by sea.

Size of the Greek army

According to Herodotus, the Greek army included the following forces:

To this number must be added 1,000 other Lacedemonians mentioned by Diodorus Siculus and perhaps 800 auxiliary troops from other Greek cities, bringing the total up to 7,000. Diodorus gives 4,000 as the total of Greek troops, and Pausanias 11,200. Modern historians, who usually consider Herodotus more reliable, prefer his claim of 7,000 men. This changed later on in the battle as, under orders, the entire army, save the Spartans, Helots, Thespians, and Thebans, retreated.

Date of the battle

Based on information from Herodotus' The Histories Book VII, the date of Ephialtes' betrayal and use of the mountain path by the Immortals can be narrowed to a few days in September of 480 BC, as follows. Not knowing the terrain, they would have needed some form of light, but torches would have given away their intent. They therefore traversed the path when light from the moon would be the greatest - the full moon. In Book VII Herodotus mentions the solar eclipse that occurred at the crossing of the Hellespont by the Persians. By estimating the distance the Persian army could move each day, it can be established that the battle took place around September of 480 BC. Tracing back via a lunar calendar, the date of the betrayal can be narrowed to September 18, 19, or 20, 480 BC.

Monuments at site

Epitaph of Simonides

Simonides composed a well-known epigram, which was engraved as an epitaph on a commemorative stone placed on top of the burial mound of the Spartans at Thermopylae. It is also the hill on which the last of them died. Spyridon Marinatos discovered large numbers of Persian arrowheads there. The original stone has not been preserved. Instead the epitaph was engraved on a new stone erected in 1955. The text is

Template:Polytonic

Template:Polytonic.

Ō xein', angellein Lakedaimoniois hoti tēide

keimetha tois keinōn rhēmasi peithomenoi.

An ancient alternative rendering substitutes πειθόμενοι νομίμοις for ῥήμασι πειθόμενοι.

The form of this ancient Greek poetry is an elegiac couplet. Some English translations are given in the table below.

Ruskin said of this epitaph that it was the noblest group of words ever uttered by man. Its purpose is not to attract attention, but rather to show that they fear that Sparta may become suspicious that their soldiers left their duties, and they wished to ask travelers to tell Sparta the truth.

Leonidas monument

Additionally, there is a modern monument at the site, called the "Leonidas Monument" in honour of the Spartan king.

It features a bronze statue of Leonidas. A sign, under the statue, reads simply: "Μολών λαβέ" ("Come and take them!"). The metope below depicts battle scenes. The two marble statues on the left and the right of the monument, represent respectively the river Evrotas and the mount Taygetus, hallmarks of Sparta.

Thespians monument

In 1997, a second monument was officially unveiled by the Greek government, dedicated to the 700 Thespians who fought with the Spartans. The monument is made of marble and features a bronze statue depicting god Eros, who was worshiped in ancient Thespiae. Under the statue a sign reads "In memory of the seven hundred Thespians".

A plate, below the statue, explains its symbolism :

• The headless male figure symbolizes the anonymous sacrifice of the 700 Thespians to their country.
• The outstretched chest symbolizes the struggle, the gallantry, the strength, the bravery and the courage.
• The open wing symbolizes the victory, the glory, the soul, the spirit and the freedom.
• The broken wing symbolizes the voluntary sacrifice and death.
• The naked body symbolizes Eros the most important god of the ancient Thespians, the god of creation, beauty and life.

The monument of Thespians is placed beside the one of the Spartans.

Thermopylae in popular culture

Primary Sources

• Herodotus, Histories
• Diodorus Siculus, Library
• Ctesias, Persica

Notes

1. ^ Cite error: The named reference Green was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
2. Ctesias on the other hand estimated over 80,000 Persian casualties.
3. Bury, J. B. (2000). A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great (4th Revised Edition ed.). Palgrave Macmillan. pp. page 271. ISBN 0333154932. {{cite book}}: |edition= has extra text (help); |pages= has extra text (help); Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)
4. E. Friedell, Kulturgeschichte Griechenlands
5. ^ http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/96summer/eiken.htm
6. . . . almost immediately, contemporary Greeks saw Thermopylae as a critical moral and culture lesson. In universal terms, a small, free people had willingly outfought huge numbers of imperial subjects who advanced under the lash. More specifically, the Western idea that soldiers themselves decide where, how, and against whom they will fight was contrasted against the Eastern notion of despotism and monarchy — freedom proving the stronger idea as the more courageous fighting of the Greeks at Thermopylae, and their later victories at Salamis and Plataea attested. http://www.victorhanson.com/articles/hanson101106.html
7. "Thermopylae: The Battle That Changed the World", Paul Cartledge

8. The Athenians, having sought Persian assistance against Cleomenes back in 507 BC, had come bitterly to regret their gift of earth and water. In what Cleomenes himself could only regard as the most exquisite poetic justice, Artaphernes, that instinctive tyrant-sponsor, had ordered the Athenians to take back Hippias, the Pisistradid exiled in 510 BC. The Athenians, naturally, had refused. As a result, from that moment on, to all intents and purposes they had been at war with Persia.

   Tom Holland, Persian Fire, p159

9. Fabulously intricate though the democratic reforms were, their potential appeared to Cleomenes ominously clear. No longer divided among themselves, the citizens of a democratic Athens would at last be able to present a united front to their neighbours. the sheer size of Attica would give them a truly fearsome capability. for centuries a military pygmy, Athens appeared on the verge of becoming, almost overnight, a heavyweight. And most wounding of all for Cleomenes was the fact that he, by deposing the Pisistratids, had effectively served as the midwife of the Athenians' rogue regime.

   Tom Holland, Persian Fire, p136

10. Herodotus VII, 133
11. Herodotus VII,145. He does not use the term "congress" or any ancient equivalent. He only says that they exchanged pledges and consulted together.
12. Herodotus VII, 160-062
13. Herodotus VII,173
14. Herodotus VII,175
15. ^ Despotopoulos, Ιστορία του Ελληνικού Έθνους (History of the Greek Nation) volume B
16. Lysias, Funeral oration 30, translated by W.R.M. Lamb, M.A.
17. Bengtson, Hermann (1969). Griechische Geschichte von den Anfängen bis in die rö̈mische Kaiserzeit. Munich: Beck.
18. Diodorus Siculus book 16 chapter 38
19. Herodotus VII.206 entire.
21. Herodotus VII.204
22. Lacaenarum apophthegmata, Plutarch.
23. ^ Herodotus, Hist. VII
24. (Plutarch, Moralia, 225, 10)
25. For the insignia with the motto on it see
26. For the insignia with the motto on it, see army.gr.
27. Herodotus VII,210, Diodorus Siculus, Library, XI,6,4
28. ^ Photius, Myriobiblon code 72: Ctesias Persica par. 26
29. Diodorus Siculus, Library, XI,6,3
30. Herodotus VII,208
31. Herodotus VII,204
32. Diodorus Siculus, Library, XI,7
33. Glotz G., Roussel P., Cohen R., Histoire Grecque vol. I-IV, Paris 1948
34. Herodotus VII,212
35. Herodotus VI,211, Diodorus Siculus, Library, XI,7
36. Diodorus Siculus, Library, XI,7
37. Tegopoulos-Fytrakis dictionary of modern Greek, word:Εφιάλτης
38. Herodotus VII,217
39. ^ Herodotus VII,218
40. Herodotus VII,219-220
41. Herodotus VII,222
42. Herodotus VII,223
43. Herodotus VII,224
44. Herodotus VII:223
45. Herodotus, Book VII, 225.
46. Reed College's Thermopylae describes the excavations by Spyridon Marinatos.
47. See Herodotus VII,181
48. Herodotus 7.35.
49. Herodotus, VIII, 26
50. Pausanias 3.14.1
51. Herodotus book IX
52. Herodotus VII 175
53. Herodotus VII,176
54. Herodotus VII,7
55. Herodotus VII,60
56. Herodotus VII,87
57. Herodotus VII,184
58. Herodotus VII,186
59. A History of Greece: From the Time of Solon to 403 B. C. (p. 214) - George Grote, John Malcolm Mitchell, Max Cary, Paul Cartledge
60. ^ Maurice, F (1930). "The size of the army of Xerxes I in the invasion of Greece 480 B.C.". Journal of Hellenic Studies. 50: 115–128. doi:10.2307/626811. {{cite journal}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |month= (help)
61. ^ The Cambridge companion to Herodotus p. 217, Carolyn Dewald, John. Marincola
62. Thomas Kelly (University of Minnesota) (2003). "Persian Propaganda - A Neglected Factor in Xerxes' Invasion of Greece and Herodotus", Iranica Antiqua 38, p. 198.
63. Livio C. Stecchini. The Size of the Persian Army, The Persian Wars.
64. ^ "The Greek and Persian Wars, 499-386 BC" - Philip De Souza, p. 41
65. VII, 202 and also 203.
66. book XI,5
67. Pausanias 10,20,2
68. The text is given in Herodotus' work The Histories (7.228)
69. The source of this version as well as Cicero's translation into Latin is given in Michael Hendry's site, Curculio.

Further reading

• Barkworth, Peter R. The Organization of Xerxes' Army, Iranica Antiqua 27, p. 149-167, 1993.
• Bradford, Ernie. Thermopylae: The Battle for the West. Da Capo Press, 1980 (paperback, ISBN 0-306-81360-2).
• Cartledge, Paul. Thermopylae: The Battle That Changed the World. Woodstock, NY; New York: The Overlook Press, 2006 (hardcover, ISBN 1-58567-566-0).
  • Reviewed by Noel Malcolm in The Telegraph, October 1, 2006.
  • Reviewed by Christopher Hart in The Independent, November 19, 2006.
  • Reviewed by Charles Freeman in the History Today, December 2006, Vol. 56, Issue 12, pp. 65–65.
• Hammond, Nicholas G.L. "Sparta at Thermophylae", Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Vol. 45, No. 1. (1996), pp. 1–20.
• Matthews, Rupert. The Battle of Thermopylae: A Campaign in Context. Stroud, Gloucestershire, UK: Tempus Publishing, 2006 (hardback, ISBN 1-86227-325-1).
• Morris, Ian Macgregor. "To Make a New Thermopylae: Hellenism, Greek Liberation, and the Battle of Thermopylae", Greece & Rome. Vol. 47, No. 2. (2000), pp. 211–230.

See also

• Molon labe
• Battles of macrohistorical importance involving invasions of Europe
• Battle of Thermopylae in popular culture
  • The 300 Spartans (1962 film)
  • 300 (2007 film)

External links

• Last Stand of The 300: History Channel
• The battle in Herodotus' Histories
• Map of the battlefield
• Size of the Persian Empire army
• Livius Picture Archive: the battle of Thermopylae (480 BCE)
• The 300 Spartans (1962) film by Rudolph Maté
• 300 (2007) film adaptation of Frank Miller's graphic novel about the battle
• Free 2 player Thermopylae online game
• Ctesias fragment from Photius' Myriobiblion
• 300 Spartan Warriors.com lists additional web sites about the battle and its protagonists.
• Xerxes I .htm A Commentary on Xerxes I at herodotuswebsite.co.uk.
• In Our Time with link to the program

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• Battle of Thermopylae
• Battles of the Greco-Persian Wars
• 480 BC