Military career of L. Ron Hubbard

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In 1941, writer L. Ron Hubbard, who would later go on to found Dianetics and Scientology, was commissioned as a Lieutenant, Junior Grade in the United States Navy after one of his professors recommended him for service in intelligence and a successful interview with the Office of Naval Intelligence.

The position offered Hubbard the chance at a distinguished career, as intelligence officers were badly needed. It also allowed him to skip the initial officer rank of Ensign. After Pearl Harbor he received orders deploying him to the Philippines, specifically Manila.

While embarked on the SS President Polk Japanese forces cut off the sea route to the Philippines, diverting the ship to Brisbane, Australia. Upon arrival Hubbard asked the Naval Attaché if he could leave the Polk in order to secure faster transport to the Philippines. He was unable to locate other transport, and instead began working as a sort of liaison for a deployed Army unit. This duty had not been ordered and he made himself somewhat of a nuisance by working outside the established chain of command. He was then sent back to the United States, with a note stating: "This officer is not satisfactory for independent duty assignment. ... and will require close supervision for satisfactory performance of any intelligence duty." One Scientology website describes his position in Australia as "Senior Officer Present Ashore", which is not the type of duty ONI officers would have been performing. Nevertheless this part of the CoS maintains he was wounded in action on the Island of Java, and returned on the Secretary of the Navy's airplane to the US as the first "returned" casualty from the Pacific. Other church sources state that during this time he was leading a squadron of corvettes in the North Atlantic.

From the O.N.I. to USS YP-422

The situation cost him an opportunity to work as a Naval Intelligence officer, and he was subsequently made prospective Commanding Officer of USS YP-422. A fishing trawler undergoing conversion into a shipyard patrol vessel at the Boston Naval Shipyard, it had been called Mist by its civilian owners. Shortly after arrival a personality dispute there evolved into a situation which Lt. Hubbard did not feel was handled properly by the Commandant of the shipyard. Ignoring the chain of command, he then spoke with the Commandant's C.O. the Vice Chief of Naval Operations. Subsequently the Commandant requested Hubbard be relieved of command noting he is: "...not temperamentally fitted for independent command." He then repeated his mistake, and asked again for the intervention of the Vice Chief's office. The second request was not acted upon either.These statements are in stark contrast with official Scientologist literature, which often portrays Hubbard as a role model sailor during the war.

PC-815's possible submarine contact

Being relieved of command, he was briefly sent back to the Bureau of Personnel for reassignment. After requesting training in the operation and command of PC class submarine chasers he reported to a naval school in Florida. There he was trained in anti-submarine warfare, and graduated in the bottom half of his class. He was then assigned as prospective Commanding Officer of the USS PC-815. The vessel was in the last stages of construction, near Astoria, Oregon. His first duties were supervising her fitting out, training of the crew, and finally deployment to San Diego, California, her assigned port.

In the early hours of May 19, 1943, the crew of the PC-815 detected what Hubbard evaluated as first one then later two Imperial Japanese Navy submarines approximately 10 miles from the shore of Cape Lookout. Lt. Hubbard, his Executive Officer, Lt. Moulton, and the SONAR operator, all trained in the use of the equipment, evaluated the echo of an active sonar ping, combined with apparent propeller noises ("screws") heard through the ship's hydrophone as indicating contact with a submarine.

Over the next two and a half days, the ship expended 37 depth charges and saw none of the telltale signs of a sunken submarine. Hubbard did identify "orange" oil "erupting" to the surface at one point, however the color and lack of other debris consistent with a pressure hull compromised submarine were not seen. The US Navy blimps K-39 and K-33, the US Coast Guard patrol boats Bonham and 78302, and the subchasers USS SC-536 and USS SC-537, were all summoned to act as reinforcements, and, according to Hubbard's battle report, placed under his command. On May 21, with depth charges exhausted and the presence of a submarine still unconfirmed by any other ship, the PC-815 was ordered back to Astoria.

In his eighteen page after-action report, Hubbard claimed to have "definitely sunk, beyond doubt" one submarine and critically damaged another. However, the subsequent investigation by the Commander NW Sea Frontier, Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher, cast a skeptical light on Hubbard's claims. His summary memorandum to Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, stated:

It is noted that the report of PC 815 is not in accordance with "Anti-Submarine Action by Surface Ship" (ASW-1) which should be submitted to Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.

An analysis of all reports convinces me that there was no submarine in the area. Lieutenant Commander Sullivan states that he was unable to obtain any evidence of a submarine except one bubble of air which is unexplained except by turbulence of water due to a depth charge explosion. The Commanding Officers of all ships except the PC-815 state they had no evidence of a submarine and do not think a submarine was in the area.

Fletcher added that "there is a known magnetic deposit in the area in which depth charges were dropped", as the responding blimps were equipped with a Magnetic Anomaly Detector for submarine detection and had registered an undetermined anomaly. It should be noted that the Imperial Japanese Navy did not operate its submarines near the West Coast on a regular basis. They were criticized by their German allies for not pursuing a policy of commerce raiding, which would target cargo ships and oil tankers, rather than adhering to their practice of fleet warfare which caused them to attack only large warships and aircraft carriers. Japanese submarines were in fact so dedicated to attacking warships instead of merchant vessels, that the shipping lanes in the Pacific did not use the convoy system necessitated in the Atlantic caused by u-boats. After the war, British and American analysis of captured Japanese Navy records further confirmed that no Japanese submarines had been lost off the Oregon coast. Hubbard, however, continued to claim that he had engaged the enemy, as did his Executive Office, Lt. Moulton, in later testimony. Years later, Hubbard told Scientologists:

I dropped the I-76 or the Imperial Japanese Navy Trans-Pacific Submarine down into the mouth of the Columbia River, dead duck. And it went down with a resounding furor. And that was that. I never thought about it again particularly except to get mad at all the admirals I had to make reports to because of this thing, see? This was one out of seventy-nine separate actions that I had to do with. And it had no significance, see? But the other day I was kind of tired, and my dad suddenly sprung on me the fact that my submarine had been causing a tremendous amount of difficulty in the mouth of the Columbia River. Hadn't thought about this thing for years. Of course, it's all shot to ribbons, this thing. It's got jagged steel sticking out at all ends and angles, and it's a big submarine! It's a -- I don't know, about the size of the first Narwhal that we built. And the fishermen coming in there and fishing are dragging their nets around in that area, and it's just tearing their nets to ribbons -- they've even hired a civilian contractor to try to blow the thing up and get it the devil out of there -- and has evidently been raising bob with postwar fishing here for more years than I'd care to count.

Coronado Islands incident

A month later, the PC-815 was assigned to guard the new escort aircraft carrier USS Croatan (CVE-25) as it proceeded to San Diego, which would also become home port for PC-815. She arrived there on June 2, 1943 and at the end of the month was ordered to participate in an anti-submarine training exercise. Held on June 28, the exercise ended early and Hubbard took the apparent opportunity to order an impromptu gunnery exercise. Compounding what would later be revealed a huge blunder, was his choice to do this while anchored just off the Mexican territory of South Coronado Island. He would come to regret this decision as his orders included no mention of gunnery practice, staying at sea, or anchoring in Mexican waters. PC-815 was expected that evening in San Diego, according to his orders. The Mexican government also sent an official protest to the US Navy, as no gunnery operations had been authorized. Evidently Hubbard had seen two USMC F4F fighters bombing a set up practice target and assumed he would also be allowed to make use of it, which was incorrect.

On June 30 a Board of Investigation was convened concerning PC-815 which concluded that Hubbard had disregarded orders, by conducting gunnery practice, failing to return when expected, and by anchoring in Mexican territorial waters without proper authority. His orders stated that the PC-815 was supposed to return after completing that days training exercises, regardless of how early they ended. Hubbard argued that his crew was inexperienced, it was foggy, and he was tired so he was unable to follow his orders and return that evening. A month earlier in his after action report concerning the submarine fiasco off Cape Lookout, he had described the same men as "experienced" and "highly skilled" Vice Admiral Fletcher, who both chaired the board and read the prior month's after action report, rated Hubbard "below average". His fitness report by Admiral Braisted noted:

Consider this officer lacking in the essential qualities of judgment, leadership and cooperation. He acts without forethought as to probable results. He is believed to have been sincere in his efforts to make his ship efficient and ready. Not considered qualified for command or promotion at this time. Recommend duty on a large vessel where he can be properly supervised.

Hubbard was relieved of command effective July 7, 1943 and given a letter of admonition. This is essentially the opposite of a letter of commendation, something he would later claim among other honors in a forged release form years later.

This time his new post appears to have been decided after taking into account the advice of Admiral Fletcher as well as the previous officers, by placing him as a subordinate rather than commanding officer. His final ship was the attack transport USS Algol (AKA-54), where he served as the Navigation, Training officer, and Ship's censor until a bizarre security incident caused yet another transfer. Lt. Hubbard said he had found a firebomb he believed a saboteur had placed in one of the ship's holds, consisting of a coke bottle filled with gasoline and topped with a cloth wick. The circumstances surrounding the apparent discovery of this sabotage attempt, by the ship's navigation officer aroused suspicion enough that he was removed soon after. This was an unfortunate turn for Lt. Hubbard, as his C.O. had given him a mostly positive fitness report with the only issue being a tendency to be temperamental and easily offended.

After the war

The remainder of Hubbard's wartime service was spent ashore in the continental United States. He was mustered out of the active service list in late 1945 while still in the hospital. He continued to draw disability pay for arthritis, his ulcer, and conjunctivitis for years afterwards, long after he claimed to have discovered the secret of how to cure these ailments. About the time of his discharge, Hubbard was petitioning the Veterans Administration for psychiatric care to treat "long periods of moroseness and suicidal inclinations." He was also arrested for petty theft in connection with checks. When he wrote to the FBI that communist spies were after him, an agent attached a note to one of his letters: "Make 'appears mental' card."

In later years, Hubbard made a number of claims about his military record that do not reconcile with the government's documentation of his service years. For example, Hubbard claimed he had sustained wounds "in combat on the island of Java", but his service record offers no indication he came anywhere near Java, and places him in New York on the day (7 December, 1941, the day of the attack on Pearl Harbor) he was supposedly landed on Java by a naval destroyer. He also claimed to have received 21 medals and awards, including a Purple Heart and a "Unit Citation". The Church of Scientology has circulated a US Navy notice of separation (a form numbered DD214, completed on leaving active duty) as evidence of Hubbard's wartime service. However, the US Navy's copy of Hubbard's DD214 is very different, listing a much more modest record. The Scientology version, signed by a nonexistent Lt. Cmdr. Howard D. Thompson, shows Hubbard being awarded medals that do not exist, boasts academic qualifications Hubbard did not earn, and places Hubbard in command of vessels not in the service of the US Navy. The Navy has noted "several inconsistencies exist between Mr. Hubbard's DD214 and the available facts".

References

Hubbard endorsements record, page 4
Subject: Lieutenant (jg) L. Ron Hubbard, U.S.N.R.; Suggestion as to nature of duty assigned. 14 February 1942
Document indicating Hubbard's transfer from SW Pacific area and reason why.
Hubbard's service as described by a CoS site: http://www.ronthepoet.org/poet/thewar1.htm
About L. Ron Hubbard http://www.scientology.org/en_US/l-ron-hubbard/founder/pg018.html
About L. Ron Hubbard http://aboutlronhubbard.org/eng/wis3_1r.htm
Commandant's request to relieve Hubbard.
^ Atack, Jon (1990). A Piece of Blue Sky. New York, NY: Carol Publishing Group. ISBN 0-8184-0499-X.
Hubbard's request for intervention of Vice Chief of Naval Operations.
^ Cite error: The named reference MBTR was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
"About the Life Story of L. Ron Hubbard (LRH) The Founder of Scientology continued". About the Life Story of L. Ron Hubbard (LRH) The Founder of Scientology. Church of Scientology International. Retrieved 2006-07-31.
"The War". Church of Scientology. Retrieved 2007-04-18.
Image of request to attend PC school - Wikimedia Commons
"Proceeding southward just inside the steamer track an echo ranging contact was made by soundman then on duty, <NAME REDACTED>,Soundman third class. The Commanding Officer had the conn and immediately slowed all engines to ahead one third to better echo ranging conditions, and placed the contact dead ahead, 500 yards away." and "Screw noises, fluttering and without pulsation, were distinct on the bearing and quite different from the pulsations of our screws." Page 1 of Hubbard's report Image: Page one of Lt. Hubbard's report
Hubbard, ANTI-SUBMARINE ACTION BY SURFACE SHIP, REPORT OF, 24 May 1943.Page 1 of 18 Hubbard's report
Example of form ASW-1 filled by another subchaser of the PC-416 class where a submarine was actually sunk and the report submitted properly
"Battle Report - Submission of.", A16-3(3)/PC815, Vice Adm. Frank Jack Fletcher, Commander NW Sea Frontier, 8 June 1943; Image of document
Interrogation of: Vice Admiral Paul H Weneker, German Naval Attaché Japan - Hyperwar project - Admiral Weneker speaks about Japanese tactics and submarines over the course of the war, as well as the IJN High Command's attitude toward submarine warfare.
HM Admiralty, German, Italian and Japanese U-Boat Casualties during the War: Particulars of Destruction, Cmd. 6843 (June 1946); US Navy, Japanese Naval and Merchant Shipping Losses during World War II by All Causes (February 1947)
Hubbard, "Auditing Techniques - Games Conditions", lecture of 1 February 1957
Hubbard's report.
Image of fitness report following Coronados incident Page 2(with quote) - Wikimedia Commons and Image of fitness report following Coronados incident page 1 - Wikimedia Commons
Image of Hubbard's Letter of Admonition - Wikimedia Commons
Miller, p. 106
Image of Hubbard's orders assigning him to the USS Algol - Wikimedia Commons
Hubbard Hospital history 1943 and 1945
Image of Hubbard's medical claim, page 1 from Wikimedia: Commons.
Image of Hubbard's medical claim, page 2 from Wikimedia: Commons.
Image of Navy report on Hubbard's medical claim, page 1 from Wikimedia: Commons.
Image of Navy report on Hubbard's medical claim, page 2 from Wikimedia: Commons.
Reader's Digest May 1980 - Scientology
^ image of Hubbard's fake DD-214 image of Hubbard's actual DD-214 Cite error: The named reference "fake" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
My Philosophy by L. Ron Hubbard
Navy: Official - Hubbard's "record" *is* forged
Ron the War Hero: Hubbard's Medal's

External links

Category:

L. Ron Hubbard