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This article focuses on ethnic minorities in Iran and their related political issues and current realities.
Overview
Iran is an ethnically diverse country, with Persians forming the majority of the population. However, historically the terms "Iran" and "Persia" have refereed to a confederation of all groups native to the Iranian Plateau, and the speakers of Iranian languages, whether located in Iran or not (e.g. Tajiks, Ossetians, etc.). Therefore, historically, the use of the term "Persian" has included all the various regional dialects and subgroups of Iran.
While many Iranians identify with a secondary ethnic, religious, linguistic, or regional background in some way, the primary identity unifying virtually all of these sub-groups is their distinctly Iranian language, and/or culture. The main ethno-linguistic minority groups in Iran are the Azeris, Kurds, Arabs, Baluchis, Turkmen, Armenians, Assyrians, and Georgians. The tribal groups include the Bakhtiaris, Khamseh, Lurs, Qashqai, as well as others. Though many of the tribal groups have become urbanized over the decades, some continue to function as rural tribal societies. According to the CIA World Factbook and other Western sources, ethnicity/race in Iran breaks down as follows: Persian 51%, Azeri 24%, Gilaki and Mazandarani 8%, Kurd 7%, Arab 3%, Lur 2%, Baloch 2%, Turkmen 2%, other 1%. However, these statistics are largely discredited and viewed as flawed by Iranians themselves, because the Western data ignores considerable intermarriage rates over centuries between these groups, and the fact that almost all of these groups speak Persian as their first language, and identify with their sub-identity only secondarily.
Moreover, there is debate as to what the definition of a Persian is. According to Western sources, such as the CIA World Factbook, anyone in Iran who associates with a regional linguistic sub-identity is deemed an "ethnic minority", even though the individual speaks Persian as their first language, and is ethnically indistinguishable from the rest of Iranians, including Persians. Conversely, Western sources erroneously define the "Persian" "ethnicity" as basically anyone living in Iran who does not claim a secondary regional linguistic identity.
While, many of these ethnic groups have their own languages, cultures, and often literature, their languages and cultures are essentially regional variations of Persian and are all native to Iran, similar to the relationship between Welsh, Scottish, and English cultures, which are all similar and are native to Britain. Despite their overwhelming similarities, in modern times, their differences occasionally emerge as political ambitions, largely as a result of provocation from outside powers. Some of these groups are also religious minorities. For instance, the majority of Kurds and Baluchis are Sunni Muslims, while the state religion in Iran is Shi'a Islam. The overwhelming majority of Persians and Azeris are Shi'a.
One of the major internal policy challenges during the centuries up until now for most or all Iranian governments has been to find the appropriate and balanced approach to the difficulties and opportunities caused by this diversity, particularly as this internal diversity has often been readily utilized by foreign powers.
According to Professor Richard Frye:
Thus the mosaic of peoples living in Iran today reflects the central geographical situation of the country throughout history, frequently described as a crossroads of Eurasia. Although many languages and dialects are spoken in the country, and different forms of social life, the dominant influence of the Persian language and culture has created a solidarity complex of great strength. This was revealed in the Iran-Iraq War when Arabs of Khuzestan did not join the invaders, and earlier when Azeris did not rally to their northern cousins after World War II, when Soviet forces occupied Azerbaijan. Likewise the Baluch, Turkmen, Armenians and Kurds, although with bonds to their kinsmen on the other side of borders, are conscious of the power and richness of Persian culture and willing to participate in it.
Current policy
The Constitution of Iran guarantees freedom of cultural expression and linguistic diversity. Many Iranian provinces have radio and television stations in local language or dialect. School education is in Persian, the official language, but use of regional languages is allowed under the constitution of the Islamic Republic, and Azeri language and culture is studied at universities and other institutions of higher education. Article 15 of the constitution states:
The Official Language and script of Iran, the lingua franca of its people, is Persian. Official documents, correspondence, and texts, as well as text-books, must be in this language and script. However, the use of regional and tribal languages in the press and mass media, as well as for teaching of their literature in schools, is allowed in addition to Persian
Further, Article 19 of the Iranian constitution adds:
All people of Iran, whatever the ethnic group or tribe to which they belong, enjoy equal rights; color, race, language, and the like, do not bestow any privilege.
However, some human rights groups have accused the Iranian government of violating the constitutional guarantees of equality. In a report entitled "Iran: New government fails to address dire human rights situation", published in February 2006, Amnesty International says:
Despite constitutional guarantees of equality, individuals belonging to minorities in Iran, who are believed to number about half of the population of about 70 millions, are subject to an array of discriminatory laws and practices. These include land and property confiscations, denial of state and para-statal employment under the gozinesh criteria and restrictions on social, cultural, linguistic and religious freedoms which often result in other human rights violations such as the imprisonment of prisoners of conscience, grossly unfair trials of political prisoners before Revolutionary Courts, corporal punishment and use of the death penalty, as well as restrictions on movement and denial of other civil rights .
Nevertheless, representatives of various ethnic minorities have enjoyed a successful political career in Iran. For example Ali Khamenei the current Supreme Leader is Azeri and Ali Shamkhani the former defense minister is Arab. Many, if not most, members of the national cultural and political elite have mixed ethnic roots, with many Iranians in Tehran of mixed Persian and Azeri origin. Most provincial governors and many members of the local ruling classes and clergy are members of the relevant ethnic groups. Many, if not most, members of the national cultural and political elite have mixed ethnic roots.
Separatist tendencies, led by some groups such as the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran and Komalah in Iranian Kurdistan, for example, had led to frequent unrest and occasional military crackdown throughout the 1990s and even to the present . In Iran, Kurds have twice had their own autonomous regions independent of central government control: The Republic of Mahabad in Iran which was the second independent Kurdish state of the 20th century, after the Republic of Ararat in modern Turkey; and the second time after the Iranian Revolution in 1979.
Similar tendencies have been observed in other provinces such as Balochistan, Khuzestan (see Politics of Khuzestan) and Iranian Azerbaijan. However, many have been suspected of being instigated by foreign colonial powers.
Other observers point to various problems with ethnic minorities in Iran. John Bradley opines
Iran’s ethnic minorities share a widespread sense of discrimination and deprivation toward the central Tehran government. Tehran’s highly centralized development strategy has resulted in a wide socioeconomic gap between the center and the peripheries, where there is also an uneven distribution of power, socioeconomic resources, and sociocultural status. Fueled by these long-standing economic and cultural grievances against Tehran, unrest among the country’s large groups of ethnic minorities is increasing.
Foreign interference
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The Soviet Union had long attempted to divide Iran along ethnic lines. Moscow's policies were devised "inorder to sponsor regional powerbases, if not to annex territory". For example, in a cable sent on July 6th 1945 by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Secretary of the Communist Party of Soviet Azerbaijan was instructed as such:
TOP SECRET
To Cde. Bagirov
Measures to Organize a Separatist Movement in Southern Azerbaijan and Other Provinces in Northern Iran
- Consider it advisable to begin preparatory work to form a national autonomous Azerbaijan district with broad powers within the Iranian state. At the same time develop a separatist movement in the provinces of Gilan, Mazandaran, Gorgan, and Khorasan.
- Establish a democratic party in Southern Azerbaijan under the name “Azerbaijan Democratic Party” with the objective of guiding the separatist movement. The creation of the Democratic Party in Southern Azerbaijan is to be done by a corresponding reorganization of the Azerbaijani branch of the People’s Party of Iran and drawing into it supporters of the separatist movement from all strata of the population.
- Conduct suitable work among the Kurds of northern Iran to draw them into the separatist movement to form a national autonomous Kurdish district.
- Establish in Tabriz a group of responsible workers to guide the separatist movement, charging them with coordinating their work with the USSR General Consulate in Tabriz.
Overall supervision of this group is entrusted to Bagirov and Yakubov.
The Soviet Union's "tentacles" also "extended into Iranian Kurdistan". The interests of The Soviet Union however clashed at many points with that of Great Britain. "The Strangling of Persia" was in fact a direct result of this competition to divide Persia into respective "spheres of influence": Russia in Azarbaijan, and Britain in the southern provinces.
Iranian governments, both before and after the revolution have thus accused western governments, especially the USA and Great Britain, of attempting to de-stabilize Iran through the formation of ethnic tensions. Western newspapers and Western editors as well as reports that quote former CIA operative have confirmed this accusation. Seymour Hersh brought widespread attention to claims of covert operations in Iran when he reported in an April 2006 New Yorker article that US troops in Iran were recruiting local ethnic populations, including the Azeris, to encourage local tensions that could undermine the regime. According to Seymour Hersh:
As of early winter, I was told by the government consultant with close ties to civilians in the Pentagon, the units were also working with minority groups in Iran, including the Azeris, in the north, the Baluchis, in the southeast, and the Kurds, in the northeast...
Former United Nations weapons inspector Scott Ritter has recently suggested that the US military is setting up the infrastructure for an enormous military presence in Azerbaijan that will be utilized for a land-based campaign designed to capture Tehran . He also believes CIA paramilitary operatives and US Special Forces are training Azerbaijani forces into special force units capable of operating within Iran in order to mobilize the large Azeri ethnic minority within Iran ..
In September 7, 2004, in a veiled threat to Iran , Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage said:
Iran is much more difficult. There are some things internal to Iran that one has to look at. Demographics are one. The Persians are almost a minority in their own country now -- they're like 52% or something. There are many more Azeris in Tabriz than there are in Azerbaijan , just for the record. So that has an effect over time of changing things.
Pentagon officials have also met with Azerbaijani Separatist Mahmudali Chehregani. The Republic of Azerbaijan is also suspected of encouraging ethnic divisions in the Iranian region of Azerbaijan. According to James Woolsey, former director of CIA,, in Iran only a bare majority are Persian. Furthermore, James Woosely suggests that Washington should also need to pay attention to its geographic and ethnic fissures - for example, a large share of Iran's oil is located in the restive Arab-populated regions in Iran's south. Iason Athanasiadis, in his article "stirring the ethnic pot" quotes a CIA operative:
I continuously scripted possible covert action mischief in my mind. Iranian Azerbaijan was rich in possibilities. Accessible through Turkey and ex-Soviet Azerbaijan , eyed already by nationalists in Baku , more Westward-looking than most of Iran , and economically going nowhere, Iran 's richest agricultural province was an ideal covert action theater.
Iason Athanasiadis continues, saying:
In his book Know Thine Enemy, Gerecht penetrates Iran with the help of an Azeri-Iranian accomplice as he mulls over ways to destabilize its clerical regime. From cultivating high-ranking Azeris to inciting separatist Kurds to fostering divisive clerical rivalry between the holy Shi'ite cities of Najaf in Iraq and Qom in Iran , Gerecht constantly mentally prods methods of destabilizing the Islamic republic.
The Newspaper Sunday Telegraph of the UK , in an article titled "US funds terror groups to sow chaos in Iran" written on February 25, 2007, has said:
In a move that reflects Washington's growing concern with the failure of diplomatic initiatives, CIA officials are understood to be helping opposition militias among the numerous ethnic minority groups clustered in Iran's border regions. The operations are controversial because they involve dealing with movements that resort to terrorist methods in pursuit of their grievances against the Iranian regime… Funding for their separatist causes comes directly from the CIA's classified budget but is now "no great secret", according to one former high-ranking CIA official in Washington who spoke anonymously to The Sunday Telegraph. His claims were backed by Fred Burton, a former US state department counter-terrorism agent, who said: "The latest attacks inside Iran fall in line with US efforts to supply and train Iran 's ethnic minorities to destabilise the Iranian regime.
Historical notes
Iran (then called Persia) traditionally was governed over the last few centuries in a fairly decentralised way with much regional and local autonomy. In particular, weaker members of the Qajar dynasty often did not rule much beyond the capital Tehran, a fact exploited by the imperial powers Britain and Russia in the 19th century. For example, when British cartographers, diplomats, and telegraph workers, traveled along Iran's southern coast in the early 19th century laden with guns and accompanied by powerful ships, some local chieftains quickly calculated that their sworn allegiance to the Shah in Tehran with its accompanying tax burden might be optional. When queried, they proclaimed their own local authority.
Reza Shah Pahlavi, and to a lesser degree his son Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, successfully strengthened the central government by using reforms, bribes and suppressions. In particular, the Bakhtiaris, Kurds, and Lurs until the late 1940s required persistent military measures to keep them under governmental control.
In studying the history of ethnicity in Iran, it is important to remember that "ethnic nationalism is largely a nineteenth century phenomenon, even if it is fashionable to retroactively extend it."
References
- http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=53543
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HF08Ak02.html
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FI28Ak01.html - Encyclopaedia Iranica. R. N. Frye. Peoples of Iran.
- Amnesty International, "Iran: New government fails to address dire human rights situation", AI Index: MDE 13/010/2006, February 16, 2006
- Iran’s Ethnic Tinderbox
- Patrick Clawson et al., Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos. Palgrave MacMillan. 2005. ISBN 1403962758 p.59
- Decree of the Central Committee of CPSU Politbureau on "Measures to Organize a Separatist Movement in Southern Azerbaijan and Other Provinces of Northern Iran", GAPPOD Republic of Azerbaijan, f. 1, op. 89, d. 90, ll. 4-5, obtained by Jamil Hasanli, translated for the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars by Gary Goldberg
- Patrick Clawson, Eternal Iran: Continuity and Chaos. Palgrave MacMillan. 2005. ISBN 1403962758 p.59
- The Strangling of Persia: Story of the European Diplomacy and Oriental Intrigue That Resulted in the Denationalization of Twelve Million Mohammedans, Morgan Shuster, 1987 edition. ISBN 093421106X
- See Russia and Britain in Persia: A study in Imperialism. F. Kazemzadeh. Yale University Press.
- Iran slams US comments on detainees , Tue, 05 Jun 2007 , Press TV detail.aspx? id=12131§ionid=351020101
- (Seymour M. Hersh, the Iran Plam, the New York , April 2006) .
- Simon Whelan, Bush courts Azerbaijani President as Part of Build-Up against Iran , Global Research, May 9, 2006
- Iran: A Tougher Nut than North Korea September 7, 2004, s.com/world/ 20030603- 103140-3533r. htm
- Sharon Behn and Khadija Ismayilova, "Pentagon officials meet with regime foe", THE WASHINGTON TIMES, 2003
- Asia Times Online
- David Eshel, Ethnic Opposition on the rise in Iran,
- Iason Athanasiadis, "Stirring the ethnic pot", Asian Times, April 29, 2005
- William Lowther in Washington DC and Colin Freeman, Sunday Telegraph, 25/02/2007, wiran25.xml
- "Memorandum by the Rev. George Percy Badger on the Pretensions of Persia in Beloochistan and Mekran, drawn up with special reference to Her Claim to Gwadur and Charbar," London, Dec. 23, 1863, FOP 60/287.
- Patrick Clawson. Eternal Iran. Palgrave Macmillan. 2005 ISBN 1-4039-6276-6 p.23
See also
- Religious minorities in Iran
- Iranian Kurdistan
- Iranian Kuwaitis
- Anti-Persianism by Arabs
- Armenian-Iranians
- Georgians in Iran
- Demographics of Iran
- Azarbaijan (Iran)
- Iranian Azeris
- Human rights in Iran
- Koreans in Iran
External links
- Ethnic groups of Iran
- (Video) A series of lectures hosted by The American Enterprise Institute
- Khuzestan: The First Front in the War on Iran? by Zoltan Grossman