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Ukrainian Insurgent Army

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Ukrainian Insurgent Army
Flag of the UPA
LeadersVasyl Ivakhiv, Dmytro Klyachkivskyy, Roman Shukhevych, Vasyl Kuk
Dates of operation1943-1949
Active regionsprimarily in territories of prewar Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia populated with Ukrainian majority, with raids in 1943-45 to Eastern regions of Ukraine
Alliestemporary arrangements with Nazi Germany
OpponentsNazi German SS, the Polish Armia Krajowa, Soviet partisans, the Soviet Red Army, NKVD
Battles and warsmainly guerrilla activity

The Ukrainian Insurgent Army (Template:Lang-ua) was a Ukrainian military formation formed at spring-summer 1943 in Volhynia (located in north-western Ukraine). UPA was the military branch of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and formed to be the base for a future Ukrainian Army in Ukrainian Independent State. UPA was responsible for the killing and ethnic cleansing of much of western Ukraine's Polish population

During its existence, the UPA fought a large variety of military forces, including:


After World War II, UPA partisans continued fighting against Poland until 1947 and the Soviet Union until the 1949. It was especially strong in the Carpathian Mountain and Volhynia regions until spring 1946. According to Canadian Ukrainian historian, UPA was unique among practically all resistance movements in Nazi-occupied Europe in that it had no significant foreign support. Its growth and strength reflected its popularity among the Ukrainian people. While core majority peoples of Ukraine, with exempt of Western region, assume Ukrainian nationalists (OUN/UPA) as collaborators of Germans occupants. [

(Note: Another UPA also existed in Volhynia. It was nominally formed earlier in late November 1941 before initially known as the Polissian Sich and had no connections with the OUN(B) but tied with OUN(M) and OUN(UNR). This UPA, led by Taras Bulba-Borovets & had links to the UNR in exile. It was renamed to the Ukrainian People's Revolutionary Army in July 1943 before being later partially and forcibly absorbed and disbanded by the UPA of the OUN(B). )

Background

1941

In Memorandum from August, 14 1941 OUN (B) proposed to Germans to create an Ukrainian Army “which join the German army … until last will win”, if Germans will recognize allied Ukrainian independent state Ukrainian Army planned to be formed on the base of DUN (detachments of Ukrainian nationalists - druzhyny ukrainskykh natsinalistiv) and specifically on the base of “Ukrainian legion” currently composed from two battalions (kurins) “Nachtigal” and “Roland” which by the time were included in Abwehr special regiment “Brandenburg-800”. However such propositions were not adopted by Germans. Moreover, by mid of September 1941 Germans started a repression campaign against most proactive OUN members which has awesome results. On First OUN Conference which held at the beginning of October 1941 was adopted an OUN strategy for future, which expect moving some part of organizational structure to underground, no conflicts with Germans and no anti-Germans propaganda activities. At same time in some areas OUN tried to establish own network in Auxiliary Police. By end of November 1941 remains of “Ukrainian Legion” (approximately 650 persons) signed contract for military service with Germans and transferred to Germany for military training for further usage at Eastern Front. At same time (end of November 1941) Germans started second wave of repression at Reichskommissariat Ukraine specially targeted on OUN (B) members. However, most of captured OUN activists at Reichskommissariat Ukraine belong to OUN (M) wing.

1942

In April 1942 at Second OUN(B) Conference was adopted policy of “creation, build-up and development of own political and future military forces”, “action against own partisan activity inflicted by Moscow”, main enemy to fight – Soviet partisans. German policy was criticized, but no more. July 1942 OUN (B) issued a statement in which main enemy was mentioned “Moscow”, while Germans was ephemerally criticized for their policy concerning Ukrainian independent state. Till December 1942 OUN(B) main activity was propaganda and own network development, at same time any actions against Germans mentioned as undesirable and provocative. At beginning of December 1942 near Lviv was held “Military conference of OUN(B)” which result was an adopted a speed-up the build-up process for creation of Military forces of OUN(B). Conference Statement underlined what “all combat capable population must stand straight under OUN banners for fight against dreadful bolsheviks enemy”. From beginning of December 1942 till beginning of January 1943 Germans relocated to General Government disbanded “Ukrainian Legion” which used as battalion in 201 Wehrmacht Guard (Defense) Division at Belarus against soviet partisans . During service from May till October 1942 Ukrainian battalion in 201 Wehrmacht Guard (Defense) were Shukhevych was deputy commander lost 49 killed and 40 wounded (all of them in 5 clashes with soviet partisans) while claimed more than 2000 killed soviet partisans. Later most of them joined the UPA or Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (galizische Nr.1) at spring 1943.

Organization of UPA

File:UPA.jpg
UPA propaganda poster. OUN/UPA formal greetings is written in Ukrainian bold on two horizontal lines Glory to Ukraine (Glory to (her) Heroes)

UPA's command structure overlapped with that of the OUN in a sophisticated and highly centralized way. UPA was responsible for operations while the OUN was in charge of administrative duties; each had their own chain of command. The six main departments were military, political, security service, mobilization, supply, and the Ukrainian Red Cross. There was overlap between OUN and UPA posts and the local OUN and UPA leader were frequently the same person. Organizational methods were borrowed and adapted from German, Polish and Soviet armed forces, while UPA units trained based on a modified Red Army field unit manual. The General Staff consisted of operations, intelligence, training, logistics, personnel and political education departments. UPA's largest units, Kurins, consisting of 500-700 soldiers [, were equivalent to battalions in a regular army, and its smallest units, Riys, with 8-10 soldiers [, were equivalent to squads. Occasionally, and particularly in Volyn, during some operations three or more Kurins would unite and form a Zahon or Brigade [.

File:Shukhewich.jpg
Roman Shukhevych

UPA's leaders were: Vasyl Ivakhiv (spring – 13 of May 1943), Dmytro Klyachkivskiy, Roman Shukhevych (January 1944 until 1950) and finally Vasyl Kuk. In November 1943, UPA adopted a new structure, creating a Main Military Headquarters and three areas (group} commands: UPA-West, UPA-North and UPA-South. Three military schools for low-level command staff were established.

UPA's membership is estimated to have consisted of 60% peasants, 20-25% industrial working class most of them from rural lumber and food industries, and 15% from the intelligentsia (students, urban professionals). The latter group provided a large portion of UPA's military trainers and officer corps. However, according to one of UPA commander data referred to 1944, UPA predominantly composed from peasants (poor and moderate in wealth) from western Ukraine (60% from Galicia and 30% from in Volhynia and Podolia). According to post war claims OUN(B)/UPA by late 1943 and early 1944, the UPA controlled much of the territory of Volyn, outside of the major cities, and was able to organize basic services for the villagers such as schools, hospitals, and the printing of newspapers, while Institute of Ukrainian History by Academy of Sciences of Ukraine mentioned what (Armia Krajowa) and Soviet partisans controlled a significant percentage of territory of Volyn by early 1944. The number of UPA fighters varied with time. A German Abwehr report from November 1943 estimated that UPA had 20,000 soldiers; other estimates at that time placed the number at 40,000. By the summer of 1944, estimates of UPA membership varied from 25-30 thousand fighters up to 100,000 soldiers., while last figure assumed as unreal by historians from Institute of Ukrainian History by Academy of Sciences of Ukraine.

UPA military gendarmerie and security service (SB)

Further information: Sluzhba_Bezbeky

According to the plans adopted December 1942 “Military conference of OUN(B)” there will be expected to development of intelligence and counterintelligence service (SB) and military gendarmerie). However should be noted what OUN(B) already has SB which acted since 1941 under command of M.Arsenych. By the 15 of May 1943 order of D.Klaychkivskyy in UPA established “revolutionary tribunals” and military courts, death sentences can be applied for persons since 17 years old. Military gendarmerie of UPA were established in June 1943, amongst other relevant for such service duties, it was responsible for mobilization – because mobilization (in most case non voluntary and even forcible) was a main source of manpower of UPA – man at age 15-50 years. Main activities in 1943 – arrests (and in most case extermination) of suspected “agents of soviets” and OUN(M), disarming of “shuma”- policeman, clashes with Poles and OUN(M) units, etc. By end of 1943 there was established a disciplinary companies and even concentration camp “Centaur”. Since 1944 military gendarmerie was acted as more separate authority (before if was under directly command by SB), but still under SB order. Most activities in late 1944 targeted to handle a mass desertion from UPA and on mobilization (predominantly forcible) to UPA, with common usage of terror. As for instance, during November 1944 – May 1945 only in one area for “unwillingness to be in UPA” were executed up to 240 persons. Due the heavy losses, and significant shortage of UPA manpower military gendarmerie was liquidated in April 1945.

As regards to the UPA-SB here would be noted the words of one of the OUN(M) commander – “it’s hard to distinct were ended UPA and begins OUN under Bandera…”. Almost same situation with UPA and OUN SB. In 1941-42 main OUN SB activities were targeted “internal threat” – it’s name of OUN (B) for their political opponents (mainly from Melnyk wing of OUN) and those “who act against party line”. . From the date of UPA establishing SB became a responsible authority for intelligence and counterintelligence actions – however numerous attempts to infiltrate agents into soviet partisans detachments has very limited success. On other hand, on the “Polish- thread” field they have a much more success. For instance at one of the SB report for beginning of September 1943 mentioned ”during reporting period (1-10 Sept) 17 Poles families liquidated (58 persons)… Area in generally clean. There no pure-breed Poles. Issues of mixed families under resolving” ; At same time actions against “internal threat” were not halted – all absorbed non OUN (B) military formation and especially their commanders has own “SB-Angels with hanging wire in hands.” Such terror also not excluded SB and UPA itself – only in one military area at autumn 1943 were liquidated several units of SB and almost 70 insurgents. After the Soviet Army approaching main target of SB activities becomes a “soviet agents and collaborates” as also their families – as such they were exterminated (in many case in sadistic way). Same fate awaited the families of man which don’t want “to take an arms in hands and join the struggle”, as only for one instance, 26 November 1944 in village Ispas (Chernivetska region) were exterminated 15 families (41 persons) because of village men refusal to join UPA. ; Soviet investigative files are filled with references to follow-up investigations of brutal reprisals carried out by SB units against women suspected of “pro- Soviet sympathies” - heartily welcoming of Red Army soldiers, feeding them, allow them to stay in house, be a family member of mobilized Red Army soldiers etc . While targets of SB violence were certainly not exclusively women and girls, a close look at patterns of rebel violence against local citizens suggests that reprisals against “collaborators” was a euphemism for violence against ethnic Poles during World War II and the first two postwar years, when three quarters of the violence against “locals” was directed against ethnic Poles. Following the forced deportation of over 800,000 ethnic Poles from West Ukrainian oblasti in 1945-1946, however, available evidence suggests that as many as four of five of victims of rebel violence against suspected “collaborators” were ethnic Ukrainian women, especially young women allegedly suspected of sexually fraternizing with men of the Soviet occupation. Soviet authorities successfully used paranoia spy-mania of OUN/UPA SB – they posed known for collaboration with OUN/UPA persons like as if they worked for NKVD and SB, without any delay liquidated such “suspected”. As for instance from January 1, 1945 till spring 1945 only in one area of OUN/UPA activity from 938 suspected 889 were liquidated. Despite the fact what the SB has able to conduct some counterintelligence actions against soviet agents and even to infiltrate few former UPA members which worked in the militia in 1945 it actions has “ compromise the Movement” even by own OUN/UPA vision The repeated OUN/UPA SB violence against women was certainly noticed and feared by the local population. As peasant A. V. Vasilev wrote from Stryi raion to his cousin on 1 September 1946: “Bandits cut the throats of six women in one night! It’s horrifying here now — you go to sleep and don’t know if you’ll ever wake up again.” Brutality action were not halted until full extermination of OUN/UPA SB units – even in 21 June 1948 at Lviv State University stable Soviet investigators uncovered eighteen naked and mutilated corpses — seventeen women and one adolescent boy which were killed since November 1947 by OUN/UPA SB unit. Nearly all of the corpses were so badly decomposed that only six could be identified by family members (mainly through personal objects or clothing). In each case, the victim had been beaten to death on the back of the skull with an ax, hammer, or pipe. As a reflection of the macabre ritual interrogation that usually preceded SB executions of “suspected collaborators”, one corpse still had more than a meter of noose around her neck. SB assassination squad responsible for such crime had nine members, and acted on the direct instructions of the commander of an UPA regiment based in a nearby forest. All of the executions had been perpetrated under orders. One of the SB unit members had been recruited into the unit by an old friend, an officer from the Ukrainian SS Galicia Division, who was arrested in 1946. Information of OUN(B)/UPA SB terror and atrocities hard to find in post-war Ukrainian Diaspora publication,- only traces of them and only in publications by opposed to OUN(B) OUN wings (Melnik, UNR). However many persons of involved in mass and brutal civil population extermination still listed as “fallen heroes for Ukrainian liberation” at nationalistic publications.

UPA's History

Strategy of beginning of warfare was adopted at 3-d Conference of OUN which was held near Lviv 17-21 Febuary 1943. According to visions of D.Klyachkivskyy and R.Shukhevych, the main threat were Soviet partisans and Poles while actions against German should be conducted in form of “self defense for people”.

Initially military formation of OUN under Bandera lead was called "military detachment of OUN (SD)". Initial talks at February and April 1943 on cooperation with already existed UPA under Bulba-Borovets more oriented to UNR has no success because he not accept exclusive Bandera power and proposed plans for actions (against Poles). However since April 1943 as official name for OUN-SD by decree D.Klyachkivskyy of was adopted UPA , a name more known and popular among Ukrainians.

According to OUN under Bandera orders - OUN (B) members who had joined in 1941-42 the German auxiliary police, deserted with their weapons to join the units of UPA at Volhynia. Their number was estimated from 4 to 5 thousands .

No later then 20 of March UPA submit an order “to form Ukrainian national army from policeman, Cossacks and local Ukrainians oriented for OUN(B) and UNR”. Such formation in large extent include a forcible acquire of other then Bandera groups of Ukrainian nationalist.

May, 1943 General Command (Головна команда,ГК, військова Влада) of UPA started) their work under command of Klyachkivskiy.

In June 1943 established military gendarmerie service of UPA – UPA-SB.

June-July 1943 UPA consist of 3 groups – First (North), South and Group “Ozero” (Lake).

In July 1943 in Galicia begins formation of first UNS (Ukrainian National Self-defense) detachment which should oppose to Soviet Partisans, by end of 1943 – beginning of 1944 UNS transformed into UPA units.


At Third Great Extraordinary Meeting of OUN in August 1943 was adopted a “two front warfare – against German Imperialism and Moscow Bolshevizm”, while last was mentioned as major threat.

By August, 18 1943 decree Klyachkivskiy disband Ukrainian People's Revolutionary Army and some of their remains forcibly absorbed by UPA, some commanders were killed.

August- end of 1943 UPA enlarged to 4 groups (military areas): “Turiv” (North-West), “Zagrava” (North), “Eney”- later “Bogun” (South) and “Vereschaky – later “Tyutyunnyk” (East). August, 27 1943 General Command issued a decree on military ranks in UPA – all UPA personnel should be called “kozaks” and divided on 3 groups– “kozaky-striltsi”( privates) , “pidstarshyny”( sub commanders) and “starshyny” (commanders); military ranks and grades established - pidstarshyny, starshyny and generals.

In November, 1943 adopted new structure of UPA - created Main Military Headquarter and three area (group} commands UPA-West (based on UNS), UPA-North and UPA-South. Tactical units were: brigades, kurins (batallions), sotnya (companies), choty (platoons) and royi (squads). New military structure were adopted: a) privates b) sub commanders c) commanders d) generals. There exist three military schools for low-level command staff. Also established a system of military honors – Bronze Cross of Military Honors, Silver Cross of Military Honors (I and II grade) and Gold Cross of Military Honors (I and II grade).

From end of 1943 till summer 1944 there 2 group of UPA – UPA- North (Volhynia, UPA-West (General Government). (under UPA-South and UPA-East acted detachments belonged to UPA-West and UPA-South respectively).

From January –March 1944 UPA in many areas started cooperation with Wehrmacht. In March OUN/UPA representatives negotiated with SS and SD officials. Not later than beginning of May, 1944 OUN submitted instructions to "switch the struggle, which was conducted against Germans, completely into a struggle against the Soviets."

At spring- early summer 1944 UPA reached highest military strength 25.000-30,000 of active fighters.

In July 1944 UPA and OUN established Ukrainian General Liberation Council (Українська головна визвольна рада – УГВР). First meeting of UGLC conducted 11-14 of July 1944.


After 5-6 February 1945 meeting of OUN/UPA High command staff was been adopted a new strategy: a) “clearing of UPA” from weak elements, through demobilization, liquidate kurins (battalions) and sotnya’s (companies) and act predominantly by choty’s (platoons). Main units of UPA should be relocated to more calm territories of Poland, Belarus and east Ukraine.

In February 1945 created 5 General Areas (generalni Okrugy), each of it consist of 3 military areas (VO- viyskovi okrugy). During spring-summer 1945 reorganization of OUN/UPA continued –gendarmerie and military intelligence were liquidated; military areas were transformed into “UPA-groups”. etc.

At spring 1945 OUN(b) issued an order to use wording “Ukrainian rebel” (Український повстанець in Ukrainian) naming for UPA members – instead “banderivets”.

In August 1945 UPA units transferred under command of regional centers of OUN.

During Great Blockade by MVD troops from January 11 till April 10 1946 UPA in Carpathian region suffered main losses and from this time end it existence as combat unit.”

At spring 1946 OUN/UPA established contacts with Intelligence services of France, Great Britain and USA.

May 30, 1947 R.Shukhevych issued instructions joining the OUN and UPA in underground warfare.

On May 30, 1947 the Main Ukrainian Liberation Council (Головна Визвольна Рада) adopted the date of October 14, 1942 as the official day for celebrating UPA's creation.

September 3, 1949 R.Shukhevych issued an order, According with the decision of UGLC, about liquidation of UPA units and headquarters as combat and managing structures. All their personnel should be joining the OUN (B) undergrounds.

UPA's relations with Germany

Hostilities

According to the OUN/UPA, under German occupation, since spring 1943, the UPA conducted hundreds of raids on German police stations and military convoys.

However, Erich Koch in his November 1943 report and New Year 1944 speech mentioned what “nationalistic bands in forests does not have any major threat” for Germans Cite error: The <ref> tag has too many names (see the help page)..

Same information mentioned in top secret report as of January 21 1944 from famous soviet partisan commander General-Major Feodorov: “while acting from July 1943 till January 1944 in Volynskaya and Rovenskaya regions we did have any facts, were Ukrainian nationalists, excluding numerous brave reports in own press, conduct any action against German occupants”

In general OUN and UPA actions on anti-German front do not play an important role in liberation of Ukrainian territory from Germans occupants. [ At same time, despite post war OUN/UPA claims (1947), they unable to prevent German deportation for slave works 500,000 of Ukrainians from west regions of Ukraine, nor “Ukrainian peoples looting” by Germans since OUN/UPA does not control German road and especially railways communication network. [

Collaboration

OUN under Bandera actively cooperate and acted in favors of Germans military and intelligence authorities before and few months after German invasion to Soviet Union in 1941 [

In autumn 1943 some detachments of UPA began to find rapprochement with Germans. Although doing so was condemned by an OUN/UPA order from November 25, 1943 such actions were not halted

In order to fight the mutual Soviet enemy in early January-February 1944, UPA forces in some regions engaged in cooperation with the German Wehrmacht (as for instance with 4-th Tanks Army) . In March UPA detachments concluded a deal with Germans SD and SS in selected regions. In March-July senior leader of OUN(B) in Galicia conducted negotiations with SD and SS officials, which has as a result German decision to supply UPA with arms and ammunitions. However, in the winter and spring of 1944 it would be incorrect to state that there was a complete cessation of armed conflict between UPA and Nazi forces because UPA continued to defend Ukrainian villages against repressive actions of the German administration. For example, According to OUN/UPA data, on January 20th, 200 German soldiers on their way to the Ukrainian village of Pyrohivka were forced to retreat after a several-hours long firefight with a group of 80 UPA soldiers after having lost 30 killed and wounded.Cite error: The <ref> tag has too many names (see the help page).. While, at German document dated March 13, 1944 mentioned “Bandera group preserve full loyalty to all German interests” In a top secret memorandum, General-Major Brigadefuhrer Brenner wrote in mid-1944 to SS- Obergruppenfuhrer General Hans Prutzmann, the highest ranking German SS officer in Ukraine, that “The UPA has halted all attacks on units of the German army. The UPA systematically sends agents, mainly young women, into enemy-occupied territory, and the results of the intelligence are communicated to Department 1c of the Army Group” on the southern Front. By the autumn of 1944, the German press was full of praise for UPA for their Anti-Bolshevik successes, referring to the UPA fighters as "Ukrainian fighters for freedom" Germans released all OUN commands including S.Bandera and Y. Stetsko.


UPA's actions against Polish civilians and Polish Nazi-resistance formations

Further information: Wartime Massacres of Poles in Volhynia

Accordingly to documents presented to the International Military Tribunal documents Ukrainian organizations (OUN(B)) which are working with Amt Abwehr have same (as Nazi’s) “objectives”, namely, the Poles and the Jews . Such “objects” described as “all farms and dwelling of the Poles should go up in flames, and all Jews be killed” . The UPA was active in the ethnic cleansing of Poles from areas that it regarded as indigenously Ukrainian. The methods used included terrorist acts and mass-murder of Polish civilians. Massacres of Polish civilians began on a large scale in February-March 1943 in Volhynia region and since autumn 1943 spread over the Galicia and other territories of General Government. Soviet partisans in the Rivne region reported that mass terror committed by “nationalists” against the Polish population started in April 1943). According to the vision of the Polish historians decision about “cleaning of Volhynia from Polish element” was adopted at February 1943 at Third Conference of OUN(B), however According to the vision of some modern Ukrainian historians it was happened by the sole order of Klym Savur (D.Klyachkivskyy) and must be adopted at least on regional level of OUN (B). Professor Władysław Filar from Polish Institute of National Remembrance, an eyewitness to the massacres, claims that it is impossible to establish whether these events were ever planned. Although in August 1943 UPA placed notices in every Polish village stating "in 48 hours leave beyond the Buh or the Sian river - otherwise Death" no known documents exist proving that UPA-OUN made a decision to exterminate Poles in Volhynia. In addition to UPA, Ukrainian peasants also participated in the violence , and large groups of armed "bandit" marauders unaffiliated with UPA brutalized civilians. so the exact number of Poles killed specifically by UPA is unknown. However, UPA also killed ethnic Ukrainians, those who did not cooperate with them, as well as those Ukrainians who had Polish wives. Brutal methods such as beheadings, disemboweling, and killing with knives and axes were employed against Polish villagers. OUN(B) war-time (1943-44) claims as a reasons for anti-polish actions mentioned the AK action against Ukrainians which worked in German Occupancy Administration at end of 1942. Later OUN(B) blamed Poles for cooperation with Germans and Soviet Partisans and since the approaching of Soviet Army – with such. In anti-polish actions since autumn 1943 in Galicia UPA conducted cooperative actions with detachments of regiments of Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (galizische Nr.1) ).. The estimates of the number of Poles murdered in Ukraine range from 100,000 to 500,000; many more Poles left the area because of the UPA actions.

The UPA actions provoked some of the Polish self-defense units and some of Armia Krajowa detachments for retaliation actions, which involve similar methods, however in much less extent.

The post war claims what UPA's activities can be seen as a reaction to past policies and actions of the inter-war Polish government, such as shutting down Ukrainian schools and churches or encouraging Polish settlement in the regions considered by OUN to be "ethnically Ukrainian". That statement was dismissed by recent conclusion by Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, work were main reason of such action given as both party chauvinism. ).

Estimates of the death tolls from the retaliatory actions of the Polish Home Army forces include 2 thousand Ukrainian civilians., as little as eight hundred, while some Western Ukrainian Diaspora historians prefer to allegedly claim as high as 20 thousand in Volhynia alone.


UPA's action against Soviet Union citizens and Institutions

At controlled by German territories

Soviet partisans mentioned as the main threat at OUN (B) Congresses decisions since April, 1942. In 1942-beginning 1943 OUN (B) military formations or proponents killed parachuted individual Soviet commandos and betrayed Soviet partisans underground and small units to Germans. Since UPA creation OUN (B) military formations and first UPA detachments became more active in attacks on Soviet partisans units. After several unsuccessful actions against well armed and experiences Soviet partisans they adopt tactics to attack only small detachments of partisans and gain awesome success, - so soviet partisans lost ability to use small commando units against German communications and infrastructure in summer 1943-early 1944. During Ukrainian partisan leader Sydir Kovpak June-September raid deeply into German rear the OUN proponents (by the time there no UPA in Galicia) and with detachments of regiments of Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (galizische Nr.1) used by German commands as scouts and target designators for air and artillery attacks, on returning small units of Kovpak’s also suffered losses from OUN/UPA ambushes. Since late 1943 – early 1944 Soviet partisans reported what UPA units acts against them in cooperation with Germans units and prevent partisans actions against German military infrastructure . .

In 1944, famous Soviet intelligence agent Nikolai Kuznetsov was captured and executed by UPA members, after unwittingly entering their camp while wearing a Wehrmacht officer uniform.

Fighting the Soviet Army (1944-45)

As the Red Army succesfully liberated most of Ukraine, the UPA tried to avoid clashes with the regular units of the Soviet military fearing their offensive action would annihilate them. Soviet archival data shows that UPA attacks were focused on small units and groups of Soviet Army soldiers, commonly ending with brutal killing (burning alive, cutting noses and ears etc) of the captured and wounded. UPA also acted against the mobilization of able-bodied men into the Soviet Army through the extermination of whole families of those who joined. First significant sabotage operations against communications of Soviet Army before their offensive against Germans and Allies UPA-South conducted in April-May 1944. However such actions were promptly solved by Soviet Army and NKVD troops. After initial defeat OUN/UPA submitted an order “to halt all activities, no clashes with forces, preserve old and training the new personnel, prepare to act against soviet in the future.”


In March 1944, UPA insurgents mortally wounded front commander Army General Nikolai Vatutin, who led the liberation of Kiev. According to OUN/UPA claims, several weeks later an NKVD battalion was annihilated by UPA near Rivne, beginning the full-scale struggle in the spring and summer of 1944, involving 30,000 Soviet troops against UPA in Volyn. However Soviet sources for same place and date mentioned Soviet Army communication battalion (women and non fully combat able men) suffered a heavy losses due the “nationalists band” unexpected attack . Estimates of casualties vary depending on the source. In a letter to the state defense committee of the USSR, Lavrentiy Beria stated that 21-27 of April 1944 in 26 clashes between Soviet forces and UPA resulted in 2018 killed and 1570 captured UPA fighters and 11 Soviet killed and 46 wounded. At same time, Soviet archives show that a captured UPA member, responsible for only on battle report compilation, stated that he received a reports about UPA losses of 200 fighters while their Soviet enemies lost 2,000. New large scale actions of UPA, especially in Ternopilska region, lunched in July-August 1944, when Soviet Army advanced to West, while remain only few battalions in UPA activities areas


In November 1944, Khrushchev launched the first of several large-scale Soviet assaults on UPA throughout western Ukraine, involving according to OUN/UPA estimates at least 20 NKVD combat divisions supported by artillery and armored units. They blockaded villages and roads and set forests on fire. Soviet archival data states that on October 9, 1944 1 NKVD Division, eight NKVD brigades, and an NKVD cavalry regiment with the total number of 26, 304 NKVD soldiers stationed in Western Ukraine. In addition, 2 regiments with 1500 and 1200 persons, 1 battalion (517 persons) and three armored trains with 100 additional soldiers each, as well as 1 border guards regiment and 1 unit were starting to relocate there in order to reinforce them.

According to post-war OUN/UPA claims, in November 1944, Khrushchev launched the first of several large-scale Soviet assaults on UPA throughout western Ukraine, involving according to OUN/UPA estimates at least 20 NKVD combat divisions supported by artillery and armored units. They blockaded villages and roads and set parts of the forests on fire. Soviet archival data states that on October 9, 1944 1 NKVD Division, eight NKVD brigades, and an NKVD cavalry regiment with the total number of 26, 304 NKVD soldiers stationed in Western Ukraine. In addition, 2 regiments with 1500 and 1200 persons, 1 battalion (517 persons) and three armored trains with 100 additional soldiers each, as well as 1 border guards regiment and 1 unit were starting to relocate there in order to reinforce them. During late 1944 and the first half of 1945, according to Soviet data, UPA suffered approximately 89,000 killed, approximately 91,000 captured, and approximately 39,000 surrendered while the Soviet forces lost approximately 12,000 "killed or hanged", approximately 6,000 wounded and 2,600 MIA. In addition, during this time, according to Soviet data UPA actions resulted in the killing of 3,919 civilians and disappearance of 427 othersExact statistics of UPA casualties by the Soviets and Soviet casualties by UPA, in specific time periods, according to data compiled by the NKVD of the Ukrainian SRR: during February - December 1944 “OUN –bandits” suffered the following casualties: 57,405 killed; 50,387 captured; 15,990 surrendered. During the period from January 1, 1945 until May 1,1945 the following casualties were reported: 31,157 killed; 40,760 captured; 23,156 surrendered. “OUN –bandits'” actions numbered 2,903 in 1944, and from January 1, 1945 until May 1, 1945 - 1,289. During February until December 1944 Soviet losses were: 9,521 "killed and hanged"; 3,494 wounded; 2,131 MIA; amongst them NKVD-NKGB suffered 401 killed and hanged, 227 wounded, 98 MIA and captured. From January 1, 1945 until May 1, 1945 the NKVD and Soviet Army troops suffered 2,513 killed, 2,489 wounded, 524 MIA and captured. Soviet Authorities personnel suffered 1,225 killed or hanged, 239 wounded, 427 MIA or captured. In addition, 3,919 civilians were killed or hanged, 320 wounded, and 814 MIA or captured. According to Canadian historian vision, despite the heavy losses, as late as summer 1945, many battalion-size UPA units still continued to control and administer large areas of territory in western Ukraine. However in February 1945 UPA HQ order to liquidate kurins (battalions) and sotnya’s (companies) and act predominantly by choty’s (platoons).

The end of the UPA Spring 1945- spring 1947

Despite a heavy losses and disorganization UPA managed to conduct some actions in 1945 but during the Great Blockade by MVD troops from January 11 until April 10, 1946 UPA in the Carpathian region suffered very heavy losses and ceased to exist as a combat unit.

In one county in Lviv region alone, from August 1944 until January 1945 Ukrainian rebels killed ten members of the Soviet activ and a secretary of the county Communist party, and kidnapped four other officials. UPA travelled at will throughout the area. In this county, there were no courts, no prosecutor's office, and the local NKVD only had three staff members. According to a 1946 report by Khrushchenv's deputy for West Ukrainian affairs A.A. Stoiantsev, out of 42,175 operations and ambushes against UPA by Destructive Battalions in Western UKraine, only 10 percent had positive results - in the vast majority there was either no contact or the individual unit was disarmed and pro-Soviet leaders murdered or kidnapped.


By 1946, OUN/UPA was reduced to a core group of 5-10 thousand members, and large-scale UPA activity shifted to the Soviet-Polish border (at Poland territory). Here, in 1947, they allegedly killed the Polish Communist deputy defense minister General Karol Świerczewski. In spring 1946, the OUN/UPA established contacts with the Intelligence services of France, Great Britain and the USA. Although the OUN/UPA obtained assistance from the CIA and British intelligence during the latter phase of its struggle, the operation was betrayed by Kim Philby. </ref>

The turning point in the struggle against UPA did not come until 1947, when the Soviets were able to establish their own spy network within UPA and when they shifted their struggle from one of mass terror to one of infiltration and espionage. On May 30, 1947 Shukhevych issued instructions joining the OUN and UPA in underground warfare . Only in 1947-1948 was UPA resistance broken enough to allow the Soviets to implement large-scale collectivization throughout western Ukraine. Official Soviet figures for the losses inflicted by all types of "Ukrainian nationalists" during the period 1944-1953 referred to 30,676 persons; amongst them were 687 NKGB-MGB personnel, 1,864 NKVD-MVD personnel, 3,199 Soviet Army, Border Guards, and NKVD-MVD troops, 241 communist party leaders, 205 komsomol leaders and 2,590 members of self-defense units. According to Soviet data the remaining losses were among civilians, including 15,355 peasants and kolkhozniks. Soviet archives state that between February 1944 and January 1946 the Soviet forces conducted 39,778 operations against UPA, during which they killed a total of 103,313, captured a total of 8,370 OUN members and captured a total of 15,959 active insurgents.

UPA and OUN (B) underground (may 1947-early 1950)

May 30, 1947 R.Shukhevych issued instructions joining the OUN and UPA in underground warfare. On May 30, 1947 the Main Ukrainian Liberation Council (Головна Визвольна Рада) adopted the date of October 14, 1942 as the official day for celebrating UPA's creation. September 3, 1949 R.Shukhevych issued an order, According with the decision of UGLC, about liquidation of UPA units and headquarters as combat and managing structures. All their personnel should be joining the OUN (B) undergrounds.


Simultaneously the Soviet authorities tried to win over the local population by investing largely into the Western Ukraine, and also setting up a quick dispatch groups in many regions to quickly combat UPA. According to one retired MVD major, by 1948 idiologically we had the support of most population.

Thus after 1947 UPA's activity began to die down. UPA's leader, Roman Shukhevych, was killed in an ambush near Lviv on March 5, 1950. Although sporadic OUN/UPA underground minor activity continued until the mid 1950's, after Shukhevich's assassination OUN/UPA underground apidly lost its fighting capability. An assessment of OUN/UPA's underground manpower by Soviet authorities in April 17, 1952 indicated that UPA/OUN underground had only 84 fighting units consisting of 252 persons. OUN/UPA's last commander, Vasyl Kuk, was captured on May, 24 1954. Despite the existence of some insurgent (approximately 100 persons) , according to a report by the MGB of the Ukrainian SSR, the "liquidation of armed units and OUN underground was accomplished at the beginning of 1956". .

A controversy exists that there were NKVD units dressed as UPA fighters and committed atrocities in order to demoralize the civilian population.; which were those composed of former UPA fighters working for the NKVD. The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) recently published information about 150 such special groups consisting of 1,800 people operated until 1954. However in Institute of Ukrainian History work related to UPA published in 2004 mentioned what in March 1949 such groups were reorganized and usage of such in Western Ukraine were forbidden. ref> Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army p.427 </ref>

Prominent people killed by the UPA insurgents during the anti-Soviet struggle included Metropolitan Oleksiy (Hromadsky) of the Ukrainian Autonomous Orthodox Church and pro-Soviet writer Yaroslav Halan who was hacked dead by an ax.

In 1951 CIA covert operations chief Frank Wisner estimated that some 35,000 Soviet police troops and Communist party cadres had been eliminated by guerrillas connected with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army after the end of World War II. Official Soviet figures for the losses inflicted by all types of "Ukrainian nationalists" during the period 1944-1953 referred to 30,676 persons; amongst them were 687 NKGB-MGB personnel, 1,864 NKVD-MVD personnel, 3,199 Soviet Army, Border Guards, and NKVD-MVD troops, 241 communist party leaders, 205 komsomol leaders and 2,590 members of self-defense units. According to Soviet data the remaining losses were among civilians, including 15,355 peasants and kolkhozniks. Soviet archives state that between February 1944 and January 1946 the Soviet forces conducted 39,778 operations against UPA, during which they killed a total of 103,313, captured a total of 8,370 OUN members and captured a total of 15,959 active insurgents.

OUN/UPA's and Jews

Accordingly to documents presented to the International Military Tribunal Ukrainian organizations (OUN(B)) which are working with Amt Abwehr have same (as Nazi’s) “objectives”, namely, the Poles and the Jews . Such “objects” described as “all farms and dwelling of the Poles should go up in flames, and all Jews be killed” .

Despite that fact what by the time of UPA establishing at Reichskommissariat Ukraine (spring-summer 1943) and General Government (summer-winter 1943) almost all Jewish population of that areas were exterminated by Nazi’s there is a lack of consensus among historians about the involvement of UPA in the massacre of western Ukraine's Jews. However should be noted the OUN (B) General Instruction adopted in 1941 “UPA Fights and activities during the war” stated “enemies to us are: moskali (Russians), Poles, Jews…” and thus them must be“… exterminated in fight, especially whom which protect regime: remove to their land, assassinate, predominantly intelligentsia… Jews assimilation is impossible.” , moreover, in minutes of OUN (B) July 1941 Conference of OUN (B) clear visible a plan for partially Jewish population extermination and “ghettoizetion”. Captured SD and SIPO reports till end of October 1941, which were presented at Nurmberg_Trial noted about active role especially of OUN (B) groups in “communists and Jewish extermination” at Reichskommissariat Ukraine . Also Ukrainian Auxiliary Police and some Schutzmannschaftsbataillons in 1941-42 also consist significant number of OUN (B) proponents. However, according to a report to the Chief of the Security Police in Berlin dated March 30, 1942, "...it has been clearly established that the Bandera movement provided forged passports not only for its own members, but also for Jews." Such fact also confirmed by few survivors from Lviv Ghetto – they noted what Ukrainian Auxiliary Police Guards of Ghetto sold faked documents for most richest Jewish families, and some of them able to escape from ghetto, but after some of them were looted and killed by Ukrainian Police, while some returned to ghetto and executed Numerous accounts ascribe to UPA a role in the tragic fate of the Ukrainian Jews under the German occupation. However some historians (especially from Canadian Ukrainian Diaspora) , do not support the claims that UPA was involved in anti-Jewish massacres.

It has proven to be difficult to ascribe the particular numbers of Jews alleged to have been killed specifically by UPA. Ukrainians fought in many German military and paramilitary forces such as the Ukrainian Auxiliary Police , Schutzmannschaftsbataillons and military formation under SS and SD and SIPO command. However should be noted what on initial stage of UPA formation (late March – beginning of April 1943), it was absorbed from 4 to 6 thousands of Ukrainian Auxiliary Police as from Reichskommissariat Ukraine, as from General Government. Also many high ranked UPA commanders (as also a Roman Shukhevych) served in under German command in same areas (Ukraine, Belarus) and in a same time were Holocaust actions taken place.


According to Canadian Ukrainian historian, by the time of UPA's formation over a year later, the OUN was already at war against Germany and its stance towards national minorities had changed. By 1944, it formally "rejected racial and ethnic exclusivity" However, amongst list of “friendly nations”, adopted on III Extraordinary meeting of OUN at August 1943, with which UPA planned to fight “Moscow imperialism” still there no Jews nor Poles nor Russians. Even more, in late 1944 in UPA commanders reports were used Nazi’s propaganda words construction - “Jew-Communist-Bolsheviks” .

There were few cases of Jewish participation within the UPA. Most of such cases reveled in the pro-UPA articles or published by Wester Ukrainian Diaspora, but in same time reliability of such information widely criticized in Jewish community media Jewish participation was particularly visible among its medical personnel. These included Dr. Margosh, who headed UPA-West's medical service, Dr. Marksymovich, who was the Chief Physician of the UPA's officer school, and Dr. Abraham Kum, the director of an underground hospital in the Carpathians. The latter individual was the recipient of UPA's Golden Cross of Merit. Isolated reports of the Jewish families being sheltered by UPA have also surfaced. One can conclude that the relationship between UPA and Ukraine's Jews was complex and not one-sided.

Aftermath

File:The Monument to the Victims of Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA-OUN) Simferopol, Ukraine. 2007..jpg
Monument to the Victims of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Simferopol, Ukraine
File:320px-Szuchewycz naPolskiejSzkole weLwowie.jpg
Monument in Lviv honouring Roman Shukhevych

According to Columbia University professor John Armstrong "If one takes into account the duration, geographical extent, and intensity of activity, the UPA very probably is the most important example of forceful resistance to an established Communist regime prior to the decade of fierce Afghan resistance beginning in 1979...the Hungarian revolution of 1956 was, of course, far more important, involving to some degree a population of nine million...however it lasted only a few weeks. In contrast, the more-or-less effective anti-Communist activity of the Ukrainian resistance forces lasted from mid-1944 until 1950.".

During the period of Soviet Ukraine before 1970, UPA was mentioned by Soviet officials and historians as “German-Ukrainian nationalist bands”, since 1970 word of “UPA” removed from usage and replaced with words “banderovtsy” or “Ukrainian nationalists”. Facts which were provided listed OUN/UPA as Nazi puppet organization with similar methods and ideology. After Ukraine gained independence in 1991, there have been heated debates to give former UPA members an official recognition as legitimate combatants, with the accompanying pensions and benefits due to war veterans. They have also striven to hold parades and commemorations of their own, especially in Western Ukraine. This, in turn, led to opposition from the Ukrainian veterans of the Soviet Army and many Ukrainian politicians particularly in the south and east of the country. Many governments such as Russia and Poland have negatively reacted to this.

So far the attempts to reconcile the two groups of veterans have made little progress. An attempt to hold a joint parade in Kiev in May, 2005, to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II, proved unsuccessful. The assessment of the historical role of UPA remains a controversial issue in Ukrainian society, although Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko joined several public Ukrainian organizations in calls for reconciliation, pensions, and other benefits for UPA veterans that would equate them in status with the veterans of the Soviet Army, and aid the understanding of their role in the chaotic times of UPA operations. In 2007, president Yushchenko awarded the title "Hero of Ukraine", the country's highest honour to captain , of the German Nachtigall Battalion, and later UPA leader Roman Shukhevych.

File:Former UPA and SS-Galizien members in Berezhany 2006.jpg
Former UPA and UNA members with Plast Scout Organization pose for photos shortly after the Anniversary of the UPA ceremony in Berezhany, Ukraine

Recently, attempts to reconcile former Armia Krajowa and UPA soldiers have been made by both the Ukrainian and Polish sides. Individual former members UPA have expressed their readiness for mutual apology. Some of the past soldiers of both organisations have met and asked for forgiveness for the past misdeeds.

Restoration of graves and cemeteries in Poland, where fallen UPA soldiers were placed have been agreed to by the Polish side.

In late 2006 the Lviv city administration announced the future transference of the tombs of Stepan Bandera, Yevhen Konovalets, Andriy Melnyk and other key leaders of OUN/UPA to a new area of Lychakivskiy Cemetery specifically dedicated to Ukrainian nationalists.

File:100 0810.JPG
Tomb of the Unknown Soldier and other UPA graves in the Ukrainian Orthodox Cemetary in South Bound Brook, New Jersey.

Without waiting for official Kiev notice, many regional authorities have already decided to approach the UPA history on their own. In many western cities and villages monuments, memorials and plaques to the leaders and troops of the UPA have sprung up, including the statue of Stepan Bandera himself which opened in October 2007. In response to this, many eastern provinces responded with opening of memorials to their victims, the first one of which opened in Simferopol, Crimea in September 2007.

On January 10, 2008 Viktor Yushchenko, Presidents of Ukraine submitted a draft law "On the Official Status of Fighters for Ukraine’s Independence in 20s-90s of the 20th century". Under the draft, persons who took part in political, guerrilla, underground and combat activities for the freedom and independence of Ukraine from 1920 -1990 as part of the:

  • Ukrainian Military Organization (UVO)
  • Karpatska Sich
  • OUN
  • UPA
  • Ukrainian Main Liberation Army,

as well as persons who assisted these organizations shall be recognized as war veterans.

In 2007, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) set up a special working group to study archive documents of the activity of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) in order to make public original sources. This will help to determine what is the "truth" and what is "fabrication".

See also

Footnotes

References

  1. Військово-польова жандармерія - спеціальний орган Української повстанської армії
  2. Ukrainian Insurgent Army Encyclopedia of Ukraine
  3. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, [http://www.history.org.ua/oun_upa/oun/index.htm Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army
  4. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, [http://www.history.org.ua/oun_upa/oun/index.htm Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army
  5. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, [http://www.history.org.ua/oun_upa/oun/index.htm Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army
  6. Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5
  7. Ukrainian Insurgent Army Encyclopedia of Ukraine
  8. Військово-польова жандармерія - спеціальний орган Української повстанської армії
  9. Subtelny, p. 474 Subtelny, Orest (1988). Ukraine: A History. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. p. 800. ISBN 0802083900.
  10. ^ Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 4, p. 180
  11. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army Chapter 1 p.89
  12. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army Chapter 2 P.92
  13. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army Chapter 2 P.95-97.
  14. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army Chapter 1,2,3
  15. ^ [http://yurizhukov.com/doc/070900_Zhukov_UPA_Final.pdf Yuri Zhukov, "Examining the Authoritarian Model of Counter-insurgency: The Soviet Campaign Against the Ukrainian Insurgent Army", Small Wars and Insurgencies, v.18, no. 3, pp.439-466] Cite error: The named reference "Zhukov" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  16. ^ Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 12, p. 169
  17. Пастка для «Щура» 4 листопада одному з засновників УПА Дмитрові Клячківському виповнилося 95 років in Ukrainian-Russian "Zerkalo Nedeli" Magazine
  18. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 12, p. 127
  19. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 14, p. 188
  20. ^ Magoscy, R. (1996). A History of Ukraine. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
  21. Petro Sodol - Ukrainian Insurgent Army 1943-1949. Handbook. New – York 1994 p.28
  22. Військово-польова жандармерія - спеціальний орган Української повстанської армії http://warhistory.ukrlife.org/5_6_02_4.htm
  23. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 5, p. 249-250
  24. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 4, p. 374
  25. http://www.history.neu.edu/fac/burds/Gender.pdf
  26. Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5
  27. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 4, p. 375
  28. http://www.history.neu.edu/fac/burds/Gender.pdf
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  30. http://warhistory.ukrlife.org/5_6_02_3.htm
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  42. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 4, p. 199
  43. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 1, p. 15-47
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  50. IMT Vol II p.448
  51. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 16
  52. Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 p.391
  53. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 16
  54. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, Chapter 11, pg. 24
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  61. J. Turowski, Pożoga. Walki 27 Wołyńskiej dywizji AK, Warszawa 1990, p. 513
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  63. Analysis: Ukraine, Poland Seek Reconciliation Over Grisly History, Jan Maksymiuk, RFE/RL, May 12, 2006
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  66. Ihor Sundiukov, "The Other Side of the Legend: Nikolai Kuznetsov Revisited", 24 Jan. 2006. Retrieved on 18 December 2007.
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  68. Grenkevich, L., translated by David Glantz. (1999). The Soviet Partisan Movement, 1941-1944: Critical analysis of. Routledge. p. 134.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
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  71. Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 pp.549-570
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  73. According to Soviet archives, the NKVD units located in Western Ukraine were: the 9th Rifle division; 16, 20, 21, 25, 17, 18, 19, 23rd brigades; 1 cavalry regiment. Sent to reinforce them: 256, 192nd regiments; 1 battalion three armored trains (45, 26, 42). The 42nd border guard regiment and another unit (27th) were sent to reinforce them. From Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kiev Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 P.478-482
  74. According to Soviet archives, the NKVD units located in Western Ukraine were: the 9th Rifle division; 16, 20, 21, 25, 17, 18, 19, 23rd brigades; 1 cavalry regiment. Sent to reinforce them: 256, 192nd regiments; 1 battalion three armored trains (45, 26, 42). The 42nd border guard regiment and another unit (27th) were sent to reinforce them. From Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 P.478-482
  75. Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kyiv Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 pp.604-605
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  77. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army
  78. Institute of Ukrainian History, Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army After the huge winter 1945/46 operation OUN/UPA fielded 479 units and had 3,735 fighters, according to an NKVD/M estimate from April 1, 1946. By January 1, 1947 MGB estimated OUN and UPA as having 530 fighting units with 4,456 fighters. From areas were UPA was most active were deported , based on officially Soviet archives state that between 1944 and 1949 a total of 115,820 “supporters of bandits” Theses include deported (1944-47): families of OUN/UPA members–– 15,040 families (37,145) persons; OUN/UPA underground families – 26,332 (77,791 persons) taken from: Ivan Bilas. Repressive-punishment system in Ukraine. 1917-1953 Vol.2 Kiev Lybid-Viysko Ukrainy, 1994 ISBN 5-325-00599-5 P.545-546
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  82. http://history.org.ua/oun_upa/upa/24.pdf p.439
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  86. Ukrainian Weekly, July 28, 2002, written by Dr. Taras Kuzio
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  105. Yushchenko pushes for official recognition of OUN-UPA combatants
  106. SBU to study archive documents on activity of Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists / News / NRCU

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