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Winter War
Part of World War II
Finnish machine gun crew during the Winter War.
Date 30 November 1939 – 13 March 1940 Location Eastern Finland Result Interim Peace Territorial changes Moscow Peace Treaty
Belligerents
Finland	Soviet Union
Commanders and leaders
Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim	Kliment Voroshilov Kirill Meretskov Semyon Timoshenko
Strength
337,000–346,500 men 32 tanks 114 aircraft	Finnish estimates: 1,000,000 men (total) 6,541 tanks 3,880 aircraft Soviet archive data: 425,640 men (at the start of the invasion)
Casualties and losses
25,904 dead or missing 43,557 wounded 1,000 captured 957 civilians in air raids 20-30 tanks 61 aircraft	84,994–126,875 dead or missing 248,090–264,908 wounded 5,486 captured 2,000+ tanks (destroyed, damaged, captured, etc.) 1,000 aircraft (estimated)

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The Winter War (Template:Lang-fi, Template:Lang-ru, Template:Lang-sv) was a military conflict between the Soviet Union and Finland. It began with a Soviet offensive on 30 November 1939, three months after the German invasion of Poland and the start of World War II, and ended on 13 March 1940 with the Moscow Peace Treaty. The League of Nations deemed the attack illegal, and the Soviet Union was expelled from the League on 14 December.

The Soviet forces had four times as many soldiers as the Finns, 30 times as many aircraft and 218 times as many tanks. However, the Red Army had recently been crippled by a drastic purge in 1937, reducing its morale and efficiency shortly before the outbreak of hostilities. With up to 50 percent of army officers executed or imprisoned, including the vast majority of those of the highest rank, the Red Army in 1939 had many inexperienced senior officers. Due to a combination of these factors and an extremely high commitment and morale in the Finnish forces, Finland was able to successfully resist the Soviet invasion for far longer than the Soviets had expected.

Hostilities ceased in March 1940 with the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty. Finland ceded about 9 percent of its pre-war territory and 20 percent of its industrial capacity to the Soviet Union. Soviet losses on the front were heavy and the country's international standing also suffered. Moreover, the war cast doubt on the fighting ability of the Red Army, a factor that may have contributed to Adolf Hitler's decision to launch Operation Barbarossa. Finally, the Soviet forces did not accomplish their objective of the conquest of Finland, but did gain sufficient territory along Lake Ladoga to provide a buffer for Leningrad. The Finns retained their sovereignty and gained considerable international goodwill.

The peace treaty thwarted a half-hearted Franco–British plan to send troops to Finland through northern Scandinavia. One of the Allied operation's major goals was to take control of northern Sweden's iron ore and cut deliveries to Germany.

Background of the Winter War

Background of Finnish politics before the War

Finland comprised the eastern part of the Swedish kingdom for centuries until 1809, during the Napoleonic Wars, when Imperial Russia conquered and converted it into an autonomous buffer state within the Russian Empire to protect Saint Petersburg, the imperial capital. Finland enjoyed wide autonomy and its own Senate until the turn of the century, when Russia began attempts to assimilate Finland as part of a general policy to strengthen the central government and unify the Empire by Russification. These attempts ruined relations and increased the support of Finnish movements vying for self-determination.

The outbreak of the First World War and the collapse of the Russian Empire gave Finland a window of opportunity, and on 6 December 1917, the Senate of Finland declared the country's independence. The new Bolshevik Russian government was weak, and soon the Russian Civil War would break out. Soviet Russia recognized the new Finnish government just three weeks after the declaration of independence. In 1918, the Finns fought a short civil war.

In 1920, Finland joined the League of Nations. Finland sought security guarantees from the League, but its prime goal was cooperation with the Scandinavian countries. The Finnish and Swedish militaries engaged in wide-ranging cooperation, but it was more focused on the exchange of information and defence planning for the Åland islands than on military exercises or matériel. The Government of Sweden was aware of the military cooperation, but carefully avoided committing itself to Finnish foreign policy. There was also top secret military cooperation. between the Finns and the Estonians.

The 1920s and 1930s were politically unstable time. The Communist Party of Finland was declared illegal in 1931, and the far-right Lapua Movement staged a failed uprising in 1932. Thereafter the ultra-nationalist Patriotic People's Movement (IKL) had a minor presentation of fourteen seats in the 200-seat parliament. By late 1930s the export-oriented Finnish economy was growing, the country had almost solved its "right-wing problem" as Finland was preparing for the 1940 Summer Olympics.

Soviet–Finnish relations and politics before the War

In 1918 and 1919, Finnish volunteer forces conducted two military incursions, the Viena and Aunus expeditions, across the Russian border. These incursions were unsuccessful and on 14 October 1920, Finland and Soviet Russia signed the Treaty of Tartu, confirming the new Finnish-Soviet border as the old border between the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland and Imperial Russia proper. In addition, Finland received Petsamo, with its ice-free harbour on the Arctic Ocean. Despite signing the treaty, relations between the two countries remained strained; the Finnish government allowed volunteers to cross the border to support the East-Karelian Uprising in 1921 and also expatriated a number of Finnish communists following the attempted "Pork mutiny".

In 1932, the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact with Finland, which was reaffirmed in 1934 for ten years. However, relations between the two countries remained largely de minimis. While foreign trade in Finland was booming, less than one percent of it was with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union joined the League of Nations in 1934.

During the 1920s, Joseph Stalin was disappointed with the Soviet Union's inability to foment a successful revolution in Finland. Later in the Stalin era, Soviet propaganda used cross-border comparisons with Finland, to paint a picture of the country as a "vicious and reactionary Fascist clique". The Finnish Marshal C.G.E. Mannerheim and the leader of the Finnish Social Democrat Party Väinö Tanner were particularly hate figures.

With Stalin raised to near-absolute power by the Great Purge of 1938, Stalin's Soviet Union changed its foreign policy toward Finland in the late 1930s, which now pursued the aim of recovering the provinces of Tsarist Russia lost during the chaos of the October Revolution and the Russian Civil War. The Soviet leadership believed that the old Empire was imbued with an optimal balance of security and territory. Their thoughts were also shaped by history, as the Treaty of Nystad of 1721 was intended to protect Tsarist Saint Petersburg from the Swedes. The Soviets wished to secure the same security for the newly-christened Leningrad.

Soviet-Finnish prewar negotiations

In April 1938 a NKVD-agent, Boris Yartsev, contacted the Finnish foreign minister Rudolf Holsti and prime minister Aimo Cajander, stating that the Soviets did not trust Germany and war was considered possible between the two countries. The Red Army would not wait passively behind the border but would rather "advance to meet the enemy". Finnish representatives assured Yartsev that Finland was committed to a policy of neutrality and that the country would resist any armed incursion. Yartsev suggested that Finland cede, or lease, some islands in the Gulf of Finland along the seaward approaches to Leningrad. Finland refused.

Negotiations continued during the year without results. However, the Finnish reception of Soviet entreaties proved to be cool, as the violent collectivization, purges, trials, and death penalties in Stalin's Soviet Union had given the country a bad reputation. In addition, most of the Finnish Communist elite in the Soviet Union had been executed during the Great Purge, further undermining the Soviet position. Finland was at the same time trying to negotiate a military co-operation with Sweden, hoping for a joint defense of the Ålands islands.

The Soviet Union and Nazi Germany signed the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact in August 1939. Nominally, the pact was a non-aggression treaty, but it included a secret protocol in which the Eastern European countries were divided into spheres of interest. Finland fell into the Soviet sphere of interest. On 1 September 1939, Germany began its invasion of Poland and Great Britain and France declared war against Germany. Shortly afterwards, the Soviets invaded eastern Poland, and the Baltic states were later forced to accept treaties to allow the Soviets to establish military bases and to station troops on their soil. The government of Estonia accepted the ultimatum, signing the corresponding agreement in September. Latvia and Lithuania followed in October.

War preparations

On 5 October, the Soviet Union invited Finland to Moscow for negotiations. Unlike the Baltic countries, the Finns had started a gradual mobilization under the guise of "additional refresher training". The Finnish government sent its ambassador in Stockholm, J.K. Paasikivi. The Soviets demanded the border between the USSR and Finland on the Karelian Isthmus be moved westward to a point only 30 kilometres (19 mi) east of Viipuri and that the Finns destroy all existing fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus. The Finns would cede islands in the Gulf of Finland. In the north, the Soviets demanded the Kalastajansaarento peninsula. Furthermore, the Finns would lease the Hanko Peninsula for the thirty years and permit the Soviets to establish a military base there. In exchange, the Soviet Union would cede two parishes with twice the territory demanded from Finland. The Soviet offer divided the Finnish government, but was eventually rejected. On October 31, in the assembly of the Supreme Soviet, Molotov announced Soviet demands in public. The Finns made two counteroffers whereby Finland would cede the Terijoki area to the Soviet Union, far less than Soviets had demanded.

As a result of the failure to receive what they wanted by negotiation, Soviets started an intensive rearmament near the Finnish border in 1938–1939. Necessary assault troop deployments were not initiated until October 1939, though operation plans made in September called for the invasion to start in November.

Shelling of Mainila

On 26 November, a border incident near the village of Mainila occurred. The Soviet Union claimed it was a Finnish artillery attack and that it had killed Soviet border guards, demanding that the Finns apologize for the incident and move their forces 20–25 kilometres away from the border. Finland denied any responsibility for the attack and rejected the demands, calling for a joint Finnish-Soviet commission to examine the incident. The Soviet Union, claiming that the Finnish response was hostile, renounced the non-aggression pact. The shelling became the official casus belli for the Soviet Union. Later research of Soviet archives has determined that the shelling was, in all likelihood, staged by the Soviet side in order to gain a pretext for withdrawing from the non-aggression pact.

First Soviet offensive

On 30 November, Soviet forces invaded Finland with 27 divisions, totaling 630,000 men, bombed Helsinki, and quickly reached the Mannerheim Line. Legally, the Soviet attack without declaration of war violated three different non-aggression pacts: the Treaty of Tartu signed in 1920, the Non-aggression Pact between Finland and the Soviet Union signed in 1932 and again in 1934, and also the Charter of the League of Nations, signed in 1934. C.G.E. Mannerheim was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Defense Forces after the Soviet attack. In further reshuffling, the Finnish government named Risto Ryti as the new prime minister and Väinö Tanner as foreign minister.

On 1 December, the Soviet Union formed a puppet government intended to rule Finland once the war was over. Called the Finnish Democratic Republic, it was headed by O. W. Kuusinen. The government was also called "The Terijoki Government", since the village of Terijoki was the first place "liberated" by the Red Army. The puppet regime was unsuccessful, and it was quietly disbanded during the winter of 1940. From the beginning of the regime, the working-class Finns stood behind the legal government. The national unity against the Soviet invasion was later called the spirit of the Winter War.

Soviet advance to the Mannerhein Line

Soviet order of battle

At the beginning of the war, Stalin expected a total victory within a few weeks. The Red Army had just finished the invasion of the eastern Poland at a cost of less than a thousand casualties. Stalin's expectations of a quick Soviet triumph were backed up by Andrei Zhdanov and Kliment Voroshilov, but some generals had their doubts. The chief of staff of the Red Army, Boris Shaposhnikov, advocated a serious buildup, extensive logistical and fire support preparations, and a rational order of battle, deploying the army's best units. Zhdanov's military commander Kirill Meretskov reported at the start of the hostilities: "The terrain of coming operations is split by lakes, rivers, swamps, and is almost entirely covered by forests... The proper use of our forces will be difficult". However, these doubts did not show in his troop deployments. Meretskov announced publicly that the Finnish campaign would take at the most, two weeks. Soviet soldiers had even been warned not to cross the border into Sweden by mistake.

Stalin's purges had decimated the officer corps of the Red Army; those purged included 3 of its 5 marshals, 220 of its 264 division-level commanders or higher, and 36,761 officers of all ranks. Fewer than half of the officers remained in total. They were commonly replaced by soldiers who were less competent but more loyal to their superiors, one of the intents of the purge, since Stalin had superseded his commanders with political commissars or officers.

Soviet generals were impressed by the success of the German blitzkrieg tactics. However, the blitzkrieg had been tailored to central European conditions with a dense, well-mapped road network. Armies fighting in central Europe had clearly recognized supply and communications centers, which could be easily targeted by armored vehicle regiments. Finnish army centers were deep inside the country. The Red Army failed to meet the level of tactical coordination and local initiative required to execute blitzkrieg tactics in the Finnish theatre. In addition, battlefield decisions had to be seconded by a "politruk," or political commissar. This system of dual command destroyed the independence of commanding officers.

The Soviet forces were positioned as follows:

• The Seventh Army was located on the Karelian Isthmus. Comprising nine divisions, a tank corps and three tank brigades, its objective was the city of Viipuri. The force was later divided into the Seventh and Thirteenth armies.
• The Eighth Army was located north of Lake Ladoga. Comprising six divisions and a tank brigade, its mission was to execute a flanking maneuver, going around Lake Ladoga to strike at the rear of the Mannerheim Line.
• The Ninth Army was positioned to strike into central Finland. It was comprised of three divisions with one additional division on its way. Its mission was to thrust westwards and to cut Finland in half.
• The Fourteenth Army was based in Murmansk. Comprising three divisions, its objective was to capture the Arctic port of Petsamo and then advance to the town of Rovaniemi.

Finnish order of battle

The Finnish strategy was dictated by geography. The frontier with the Soviet Union was more than 1,000 kilometres (620 mi) long, and it was mostly impassable except along a handful of unpaved roads. In prewar calculations, the Finnish General staff estimated there were seven Soviet divisions on the Isthmus and no more than five along the whole border north of Lake Ladoga. In that case the manpower ratio would favor the attacker by a ratio of 3:1. The true ratio was much higher; for example, twelve Soviet divisions were deployed to the north of Lake Ladoga.

An even greater problem than lack of men was the lack of materiél. Foreign shipments of antitank weapons and aircraft were arriving only in small quantities. The ammunition situation was alarming, as stockpiles had cartridges, shells and fuel only for 19–60 days. The ammunition shortage meant the Finns could seldom afford counterbattery or saturation fire. Finnish tank forces were operationally nonexistent. The Finns established their wartime headquarters in the town of Mikkeli.

The Finnish forces were positioned as follows:

• The Army of the Isthmus had six divisions under the command of Hugo Österman. The II. Army Corps was positioned on its right flank and the III. Army Corps on its left flank.
• The IV. Army Corps was located north of Lake Ladoga; comprising two divisions under Juho Heiskanen, who was soon replaced by Woldemar Hägglund.
• The North Finland Group was a collection of Civic Guards, border guards, and drafted reservist units under W. E. Tuompo.

First battles on the Karelian Isthmus

The Finnish Main Defense Line, which soon became known as the Mannerheim Line, was located on the Karelian Isthmus about 30 to 75 kilometres (19 to 47 mi) distant from the old Soviet/Finnish border. Red Army soldiers on the Isthmus numbered 250,000, against which were matched 130,000 Finns. The Finnish command had deployed covering forces of about 21,000 men into the area in front of the Mannerheim Line in order to delay and damage the Red Army. In combat, the biggest cause of confusion among Finnish soldiers were Soviet tanks. The Finns had few anti-tank weapons and insufficient training in modern anti-tank tactics. However, the favored Soviet armored tactic was a simple frontal charge, which left weaknesses that could be exploited. The Finns learned that at close range, tanks could be dealt with in many ways; for example, logs and crowbars jammed into the bogie wheels would often immobilize a tank. Soon, Finns fielded a better ad hoc weapon, the Molotov Cocktail. It contained a bottled blend of gasoline, kerosene, tar and chloride with a ampule of sulfuric acid taped to the bottle's neck. Molotov cocktails were eventually mass-produced by the Finnish Alko corporation at its Rajamäki distillery and bundled with matches with which to light them. Eighty Soviet tanks were destroyed in the border-zone fighting.

By 6 December, all the Finnish covering forces had withdrawn to the Mannerheim Line. The Soviets began their first major attack against the Line in Taipale – the area between the shore of Lake Ladoga, the Taipale river and the Suvanto waterway. Along the Suvanto sector, the Finns had a slight advantage of elevation and dry ground to dig into. The Finnish artillery had also scouted the area and made fire plans in advance, anticipating a Soviet assault. The Battle of Taipale began with a heavy Soviet artillery preparation. After a forty hour barrage, the Red infantry attacked, but was repulsed with heavy casualties from the open ground. From 6 December to 12 December the Red Army tried to engage using only one division. The Red Army next strengthened its artillery and brought tanks and the 10th Rifle Division to the Taipale front. On 14 December, the bolstered Soviet forces launched a new attack, but were pushed back again. A third Soviet division entered the fight, but performed poorly and panicked under shell fire. The assaults continued without success and caused heavy losses. For example, one typical Soviet attack during the battle lasted just an hour, but left 1,000 dead and twenty-seven tanks strewn on the ice.

North of Lake Ladoga, on the Ladoga Karelia front, the defending Finnish units relied on the terrain. Ladoga Karelia, as a large forest wilderness, did not have road networks for the modern Red Army. However, the Soviet Eighth Army had extended a new railroad line to the border, which could double the supply capability on the front. The Soviet 139th Rifle Division, supported by the 56th Rifle Division, attacked the roads at Tolvajärvi.

In central and northern Finland, roads were few and the terrain hostile. The Finns did not expect large-scale Soviet attacks but the Soviets sent eight divisions, heavily supported by armor and artillery. The 155th Rifle Division attacked at Lieksa and further north, the 44th attacked at Kuhmo. The Soviets deployed the 163rd Rifle Division at Suomussalmi, charged with cutting Finland in half by marching the Raate Road. In Finnish Lapland, the Soviet 88th and 122nd Rifle Divisions attacked at Salla. The arctic port of Petsamo was attacked by the 104th Mountain Rifle Division by sea and land, supported by naval gunfire.

At the start of the Winter War, Finland brought up the matter of the Soviet invasion before the League of Nations. The League expelled the Soviet Union on 14 December 1939 and exhorted its members to aid Finland.

Defense of Finland

Weather conditions

The winter of 1939–1940 was exceptionally cold. One location on the Karelian Isthmus experienced a record low temperature of −43 °C (−45 °F) on 16 January 1940. At the beginning of the war, only those Finnish soldiers who were in active service at the time had uniforms and weapons. The rest had to make do with their own clothing, which for many soldiers was their normal winter clothing with some semblance of an insignia added. Finnish soldiers were also skilled in cross-country skiing.

The cold, the snow, the forest, and the long hours of darkness were factors that the Finns could turn to their advantage. The Finns dressed in layers and the ski troopers wore a lightweight white snow cape. This snow-camouflage made the ski troopers almost invisible as the Finns executed guerrilla attacks against Soviet columns. At the beginning of the war, Soviet tanks were painted in standard olive drab and men dressed in regular khaki uniforms. Not until late January 1940 did the Soviets paint their equipment in white and issue snowsuits to their infantry.

The Soviets on the whole had proper winter clothes, but this was not the case with every unit. For example, in the battle of Suomussalmi, many Soviet soldiers died of frostbite. The Soviet troops lacked skill in skiing, so soldiers were restricted to movement by road and were forced to move in long columns. Furthermore, the Red Army lacked proper winter tents and men had to sleep in improvised shelters. Some Soviets units had frostbite casualties as high as 10 percent even before crossing the Finnish border. On the other hand, the cold weather did confer one advantage: Soviet tanks were able to move more easily over frozen terrain and bodies of water, rather than being immobilized in swamps and mud.

For many of the encircled Soviet troops in a pocket, (motti in Finnish), just staying alive was an ordeal comparable to combat. The men were freezing and starving, and endured poor sanitary conditions. The Soviet soldier had no choice. If he refused to fight, the politruk would shoot him. If he tried to sneak through the forest, he would freeze to death. And surrender was no option for him; Soviet propaganda had told him how the Finns would torture prisoners to death.

Defense of the Mannerheim Line

On the front line from the north of Lake Ladoga to the arctic port of Petsamo, the Finns used guerrilla tactics on a massive scale. The Red Army was superior in men and material, but the Finns used the advantages of speed, daring, and economy of force. However, the terrain on the Karelian Isthmus did not allow the exercise of guerrilla tactics, so the Finns were forced to resort to more conventional tactics: a fortified line with its flanks protected by large bodies of water, which was later named the Mannerheim Line. Soviet propaganda claimed that it was as strong as or even stronger than the Maginot Line. Finnish historians, for their part, have belittled the line's strength, insisting that it was mostly conventional trenches and log-covered dugouts.

The Finns had built 221 strongpoints along the Karelian Isthmus, mostly in the early 1920s. Many were extended in the late 1930s. Despite these defensive preparations, even the most fortified section of the Mannerheim Line had only one reinforced concrete bunker per kilometer. Overall, the line was weaker than similar lines in mainland Europe. According to the Finns, the real strength of the line was "stubborn defenders with a lot of sisu" – a Finnish idiom roughly translated as "guts".

On the eastern side of the Isthmus, the Red Army attempted to break through the Mannerheim line in the battle of Taipale. On the western side, Soviet units faced the line at Summa, near the city of Viipuri, on 16 December. The Finns had built 41 reinforced concrete bunkers in the Summa area, making the defensive line in this area stronger than anywhere else on the Karelian Isthmus. However, due to a mistake in planning, the nearby Munasuo swamp had a kilometre-wide gap in the line. In the battle of Summa a number of Soviet tanks broke through the thin line on 19 December, but the Soviets could not benefit from the situation because of insufficient cooperation between branches of service. The Finns remained in their trenches, allowing the Soviet tanks to move freely behind the Finnish line, as the Finns had no proper anti-tank weapons. However, the Finns succeeded in repelling the main Soviet assault. The tanks, now stranded behind enemy lines, attacked the strongpoints at random until over twenty tanks were destroyed, eliminating the threat they posed. By 22 December, the battle had ended in a Finnish victory.

The Soviet advance was stopped at the Mannerheim Line. Red Army troops suffered from poor morale and a shortage of supplies, eventually refusing to participate in more suicidal frontal attacks. The Finns, led by General Harald Öhquist decided to launch a counterattack and encircle three Soviet divisions into a pocket, or motti, near Viipuri on 23 December. Öhquist's plan was bold, but it failed. The Finns lost 1,300 men and the Soviets were later estimated to have lost a similar number.

Battles in Ladoga Karelia

The strength of the Red Army north of Lake Ladoga (Ladoga Karelia), surprised the Finnish general staff. Two Finnish divisions were deployed there: the 12th Division led by Lauri Tiainen and the 13th Division led by Hannu Hannuksela; they also had a support group of three brigades, bringing their total strength to over 30,000. The Soviets had deployed a division for almost every road leading west to the Finnish border. The Eighth Army was led by Ivan Khabarov, who was replaced by Vladimir Kurdyumov on 4 December. The Soviets' mission was to destroy the Finnish troops in the area of Ladoga Karelia and advance into the area between Sortavala and Joensuu within ten days. The Soviets had a three-to-one advantage in manpower and five-to-one advantage in artillery as well as air supremacy.

Finnish forces panicked and retreated in front of the overwhelming Red Army. The commander of the Finnish Fourth Army was replaced by Woldemar Hägglund on 4 December. On the 7th of December, in the middle of the Ladoga Karelian front, Finnish units retreated near the small stream of Kollaa. The waterway itself did not offer any protection, but alongside there were ridges up to 10 metres (33 ft) high. The battle of Kollaa lasted until the end of the war. A memorable quote, "Kollaa lasts" (Template:Lang-fi), or "They shall not pass", became a legendary motto among the Finns. Further contributing to the legend of Kollaa was the sniper Simo Häyhä, dubbed "the White Death" by Soviets, who served in the Kollaa front. To the north, the Finns retreated from Ägläjärvi to Tolvajärvi on 5 December and then repelled a Soviet offensive in the battle of Tolvajärvi on December 12.

In the south, two Soviet divisions were united on the northern side of the Lake Ladoga coastal road. As before, these divisions were trapped as the more mobile Finnish units were able to successfuly counterattack from the north to flank the Soviet columns. Although the Finns made counterattacks on all fronts, not all were successful; however, the Red Army was now forced to the defensive. On 19 December the Finns temporarily ceased their assaults, as the soldiers were exhausted. It was not until the period 6 January to 16 January 1940 that the Finns went on the offensive again, cutting Soviet division into smaller groups of different sized mottis.

Contrary to Finnish expectations, the encircled Soviets divisions did not try to break through to the east, but instead stayed put and entrenched themselves. They were expecting reinforcements and supplies to arrive by air. However, efforts to resupply the encircled troops mostly failed. As the Finns lacked the necessary heavy artillery equipment and were short of men, they often did not directly attack the mottis they had created; instead, they focused on eliminating only the most dangerous threats. Some specialist Finnish soldiers were called in to attack the mottis; the most famous of them was Major Matti Aarnio, or "Motti-Matti" as he became known.

In spite of the cold and hunger, the Soviet troops did not surrender easily, but fought bravely, often entrenching their tanks to be used as pillboxes.

In northern Karelia, the Soviets were outmaneuvered at Ilomantsi and Lieksa. The Finns used effective guerrilla tactics, taking special advantage of superior skiing skills and snow-white layered clothing and made many surprise ambushes and raids. By the end of December, the Soviets decided to retreat and transfer resources to more critical fronts.

Suomussalmi–Raate double operation

The Suomussalmi–Raate was a double operation, which would later be used by military academics as a classic example of what well-led troops and innovative tactics can do against a much larger adversary. Suomussalmi was a small provincial town of 4,000 inhabitants. The area has long lakes, many wild forests, and few roads. The Finnish command believed that the Soviets would not attack here, but the Red Army committed two divisions. The Soviet objective was to cut through the wilderness, capture the city of Oulu and effectively cut Finland in two. There were two roads leading to Suomussalmi from the frontier: the northern Juntusranta road and the southern Raate road.

The battle of Raate road, which occurred during the month-long battle of Suomussalmi, resulted in one of the most remarkable losses in military history. The Soviet 44th and 163rd Infantry Divisions, comprising 25,000 troops, were almost completely destroyed by a Finnish ambush as they marched along the forest road. A small unit blocked the Soviet advance while Finnish Colonel Hjalmar Siilasvuo and his 9th Division of 3,600 troops cut off the retreat route, split the enemy force into smaller fragments, and then proceeded to destroy the remnants as they retreated. The Soviets suffered nearly 18,000 casualties, while the Finnish lost only 250 men. In addition, the Finnish troops captured 85 tanks, 437 trucks, 1,620 horses, 92 artillery pieces, 78 anti-tank guns, 20 tractors, 13 anti-aircraft guns, over 6,000 rifles, one airplane, and much-needed ammunition and medical supplies. Colonel Siilasvuo was later promoted to General in recognition of his leadership.

Finnish Lapland

In Finnish Lapland the forests gradually thin out until in the north, there are no trees at all. Thus, the area offers more room for tank deployment, but it is also vastly underpopulated and experiences copious snowfalls. The Finns expected nothing more than raiding parties and reconnaissance patrols, but instead the Soviets sent full divisions. On 11 December, the Finns rearranged the defense of Lapland and detached the Lapland Group from the North Finland Group. The Group was placed under the command of Kurt Wallenius.

In southern Lapland, near the tiny rural village of Salla, the Soviet force advanced with two divisions, the 88th and 112th, totaling 35,000 men. In the battle of Salla the Soviets advanced easily to Salla, where the road forked. The northern branch moved toward Pelkosenniemi while the rest pushed on toward Kemijärvi. On 17 December, the Soviet northern group, comprising an infantry regiment, a battalion, and a company of tanks, was outflanked by a Finnish battalion. The 112nd retreated, leaving much of its heavy equipment and vehicles behind. Following this success, the Finns shuttled reinforcements down to the defensive line in front of Kemijärvi. The Soviets hammered the defensive line without success. The Finns counterattacked and the Soviets were pushed back to a new defensive line where they stayed for the rest of the war.

To the north was Finland's only ice-free port in the Arctic, Petsamo. The Finns did not have the manpower to defend it fully as the main front was down the Karelian Isthmus. In the battle of Petsamo, the Soviet 104th division attacked the Finnish 104th Independent Cover Company. The Finns gave up Petsamo easily and concentrated on delaying actions. The area was treeless, windy and relatively low, offering little defensible terrain. However, during the winter, the Finnish Lapland had the advantage of almost constant darkness and extreme temperatures. The Finns executed guerrilla attacks against Soviet supply lines and patrols. As a result, the Soviet movements were almost literally frozen solid by the efforts of one-fifth as many Finns.

Red Army reforms and starts massive preparations

Joseph Stalin was not pleased with the results of the first month of the Finnish campaign. The Red Army had been humiliated. By the third week of the war, Soviet propaganda worked hard to explain the failures of the Soviet army to the populace, blaming bad terrain, harsh climate, claiming that the Mannerheim Line was stronger than the Maginot Line, and that the Americans had sent 1,000 of their best pilots to Finland. Chief of Staff Boris Shaposhnikov was given full authority and ordered the suspension of frontal assaults in late December. Kliment Voroshilov was replaced with Semyon Timoshenko as the commander of the Soviet forces in the war on 7 January. He would later become the People's Commissar of Defense.

The main focus of the Soviet attack would now be on the Karelian Isthmus. Timoshenko and Zhdanov reorganized and tightened control between different branches of service in the Red Army. They also changed tactical doctrines to meet the reality of the situation. All Soviet forces on the Karelian Isthmus were divided into two corps: the 7th Army and the 13th Army. The 7th Army, now under Kirill Meretskov, would concentrate three-fourths of its strength against the 16-kilometre (10 mi) stretch between Taipale and the Munasuo swamp in the Mannerheim Line. The tactics would be basic: an armored wedge for the initial breakthrough, followed by the main infantry and vehicle assault force. The Red Army prepared by pinpointing the Finnish frontline fortifications. The 123rd Assault Division then rehearsed the assault on life-size mockups. The Soviets shipped massive quantities of new tanks and artillery pieces to the theatre. Troops were increased from ten divisions to 25–26 divisions, 6–7 tank brigades and several separate platoons, totaling 600,000 men. On 1 February 1940, the Red Army began a massive offensive, driving 300,000 shells into the Finnish line in the first 24 hours of the bombardment.

Breakthrough of Mannerheim Line

Soviet all-out offensive on the Karelian Isthmus

Although the Karelian Isthmus front was less active than in December, the Soviets began increasing bombardments, wearing down the defenders and softening their fortifications. During daylight hours, the Finns took shelter inside their fortifications from the bombardments and repaired damaged during the night. The situation led quickly to war exhaustion among the Finns, who lost over 3,000 men during the trench warfare. The Soviets also made occasional small infantry assaults with one or two companies. Due to the shortage of ammunition, Finnish artillery emplacements were under orders to fire only against directly threatened ground attacks. On 1 February, the Soviets further escalated their artillery and air bombardments.

Although the Soviets had refined their tactics and morale had improved, the generals were willing to accept massive losses in order to reach their objectives. Some attacks were screened by smoke, heavy artillery, and armor support, but the infantry still charged in the open and in dense formations. Contrary to their tactics in December, the Soviet tanks advanced in smaller numbers. The Finns could not easily eliminate tanks if infantry troops protected them. After ten days of round-the-clock artillery barrages, the Soviets achieved a breakthrough on the western Karelian Isthmus in the battle of Summa.

On 11 February, the Soviets had about 460,000 men, over 3,350 artillery, about 3,000 tanks, and about 1,300 aircraft deployed on the Karelian Ishtmus. Opposing them Finns had 8 divisions, totaling about 150,000 men. Furthermore, the Red Army was constantly receiving new recruits after the breakthrough. One by one, the defenders' strongholds crumbled under the Soviet attacks and the Finns were forced to retreat. On 15 February, Mannerheim authorized a general retirement of the Second Corps to the Intermediate Line. On the eastern side of the Isthmus, the Finns continued to resist Soviet assaults, repelling them in the battle of Taipale.

Peace negotiations

Although the Finns attempted to re-open negotiations with Moscow by every means during the war, the Soviets did not respond. In early January the Finnish Communist and feminist playwright Hella Wuolijoki offered to contact Moscow through the Soviet Union's ambassador to Sweden, Alexandra Kollontai. Wuolijoki departed for Stockholm and met Kollontai secretly at a hotel. Moscow's response was cautious. Molotov soon decided to extend recognition to the Ryti–Tanner government as the legal government of Finland and put an end to the puppet regime Terijoki Government of Kuusinen that the Soviets had set up.

By the end of the winter, it had become clear that the Finnish forces were rapidly approaching exhaustion. For the Soviets, casualties had been high, the situation was a source of political embarrassment of the Soviet regime, and there was a risk of Franco–British intervention. Furthermore, with the spring thaw approaching, the Soviet forces risked becoming bogged down in the forests. The Finnish foreign minister Väinö Tanner arrived in Stockholm on 12 February and negotiated the peace terms with the Soviets through the Swedes. German representatives, not knowing that the negotiations were already ongoing, suggested on 17 February that Finland should negotiate with the Soviet Union.

Both the Germans and the Swedish were keen to see an end to the Winter War, the Swedes fearing the collapse of their neighbor. As Finland's Cabinet hesitated in the face of the harsh Soviet conditions, Sweden's King Gustav V made a public statement on 19 February in which he confirmed having declined Finnish pleas for support from Swedish troops. On 25 February, the Soviet peace terms were spelled out in detail. On 29 February, the Finnish government accepted the Soviet terms in principle and was willing to enter into negotiations..

Last days of war

On 5 March, the Red Army had advanced 10 to 15 kilometres (6 to 9 mi) past the Mannerheim Line and had entered the suburbs of Viipuri. That same day, the Red Army also established a beachhead on the western Gulf of Viipuri. The Finns proposed an armistice on that day, but the Soviets, wanting to keep the pressure on the Finnish government, declined the offer the next day. The Finnish peace delegation went to Moscow via Stockholm and arrived on 7 March. The Soviets made further demands as their military position was strong and improving. On 9 March, the Finnish military situation on the Karelian Isthmus was dire as troops were experiencing heavy casualties. In addition, artillery ammunition supplies were exhausted and weapons were wearing out. The Finnish government, noting that the hoped-for Franco–Anglo military expedition would not arrive in time, as Norway and Sweden did not give the right of Allied passage, had little choice but to accept the harsh Soviet terms. The formal peace treaty was signed in Moscow on 12 March. A cease-fire took effect the next day at noon Leningrad time, 11 a.m. Helsinki time.

Aerial warfare

Soviet bombings

Aerial activity in the Winter War was a one-sided struggle. The Soviet Air Force, supporting the Red Army's invasion with about 2,500 aircraft, the most common of which was the Tupolev SB-2, was not as effective as the Soviets might have hoped. The material damage by the bomb raids was slight, as Finland did not offer many valuable targets for strategic bombing. Very often, targets were small village depots with little value. The country had only a few modern highways in the interior, therefore making railway systems the main targets for bombers. The rail tracks were cut thousands of times, but they were easy to repair and Finns usually had trains running again in a matter of hours.

The capital of Finland, Helsinki, received its worst bombing attacks on the first day of the war, and was the target of raids only a few times thereafter. All in all, Finland lost only 5 percent of total man-hour production time due to Soviet bombings. Nevertheless, Soviet air attacks affected thousands of civilians as the Soviets recorded 2,075 bombings attacks in 516 localities. Air raids killed 957 Finnish civilians. The city of Viipuri, a major Soviet objective close to the Karelian Isthmus front, was almost leveled by nearly 12,000 bombs.

Finnish Air Force

At the beginning of the war, Finland had a very small air force, with only 114 combat airplanes fit for duty. Because of this, missions were very limited and fighter aircraft were mainly used to repel Soviet bombers. Strategic bombings could also double as opportunities for military observation. Old-fashioned and few in number, aircraft could not offer support for Finnish ground troops. In spite of losses, the number of planes in the Finnish Air Force had risen by over 50 percent by the end of the war. Most new aircraft shipments arrived during January 1940.

Finnish fighter pilots would often fly their motley collection of planes into Soviet formations that outnumbered them ten or even twenty times. Finnish fighters shot down a confirmed 240 Soviet aircraft, losing 26 of their own. Many times a Finnish forward air base consisted of a frozen lake, a windsock, a telephone set and some tents. Air-raid warnings were given by Finnish women organized by the Lotta Svärd. Finnish anti-aircraft brought down between 314 to 444 enemy aircraft. In addition, it is estimated that the Soviet air force lost about 400 aircraft due to freezing or otherwise inclement weather, lack of fuel and tools, and during transportations to front. The Soviet air force learned from their early mistakes, and by the late February they had instituted more effective tactics.

Naval warfare

Navies in frost

Naval activity during the Winter War was low. The Baltic Sea had started to freeze by the end of December, which made the movement of warships very difficult and in mid-winter only ice-breakers and submarines could still move. The other reason for low naval activity was the nature of Soviet Navy forces in the area. The Baltic Fleet was a provincial coastal defense force which did not have the training, logistical structure, or landing craft to undertake large-scale operations. Furthermore, the Soviet Navy was technologically inferior to the British Royal Navy or the German Kriegsmarine. Still, the Baltic Fleet was strong; it possessed two battleships, one heavy cruiser, almost twenty destroyers, 50 motor torpedo boats, and 52 submarines in addition to other miscellaneous vessels. The Soviets used naval bases in Paldiski, Tallinn and Liepāja for their attacks.

The Finnish Navy was a coastal defense force with two coastal defence ships, five submarines, four gunboats, seven motor torpedo boats, one minelayer and six minesweepers. The two coastal defence ships, Ilmarinen and Väinämöinen, were moved to the harbour in Turku where they were used to stiffen the air-defences. Their anti-aircraft guns knocked down one or two planes over the city, and the ships remained there for the rest of the war. In addition to their role in coastal defense, the Finnish Navy also protected the Åland islands and Finnish merchant vessels in the Baltic sea, as only a minor part of the fleet could execute offensive warfare maneuvers.

Soviet aircraft bombed Finnish vessels, harbours, and dropped mines into Finnish seaways. Still, Finnish losses were relatively low, numbering 26 merchant vessels, only four of which were lost inside the Finnish territorial waters.

Coastal artillery

In addition to its navy, Finland had its coastal artillery batteries to defend important harbours and naval bases along its coast. Most batteries were left over from the Russian period, with 15.2 cm guns being the most numerous. However, Finland had attempted to modernize its old guns and had installed a number of new batteries, the largest of which featured a 305 mm gun battery originally intended to block the Gulf of Finland to Soviet ships with the help of batteries on the Estonian side.

The first naval battle took place on 1 December, near the island of Russarö, 5 kilometres (3 mi) south of Hanko. That day, the weather was fair and visibility excellent. The Finns spotted the Soviet cruiser Kirov and two destroyers. After the ships were at a range of 24 kilometres (15 mi), the Finns opened fire with 234 mm coastal guns. After five minutes of firing by four coastal guns, the cruiser had been damaged by near misses and retreated. The destroyers remained undamaged, but the Kirov lost 17 dead and 30 wounded. It would later be repaired at a Soviet naval base. The Soviets already knew the locations of the Finnish coastal batteries, but it came as a surprise that their firing range was much longer than expected. Although coastal artillery was old-fashioned, but the Finns managed to modernize and improve it.

The coastal artillery had its greatest effect upon the land war. Batteries near the front were in well-protected fixed positions, with a higher rate of fire and greater accuracy than mobile artillery. Land batteries near the coast helped steady the defence of the Karelian Isthmus in conjunction with army artillery. In March, as the Soviets had broken through the front, all reserves were thrown into the fighting near Viipuri (Viborg). The Soviets tried to cross the ice of the Gulf of Viipuri and come up behind the city, but the Finnish coastal artillery fired its heaviest guns to break the ice under the Soviets and prevent a clean breakthrough.

Foreign support

World opinion largely supported the Finnish cause. The World War had not yet begun in earnest and was known to the public as the Phony War; at that time, the Winter War was the only real fighting in Europe besides the German and Soviet invasion of Poland, and thus held major world interest. The Soviet aggression was generally deemed unjustified. Various foreign organizations sent material aid, such as medical supplies. Finnish immigrants in the United States and Canada returned home, and many volunteers traveled to Finland to join Finland's forces: 1,010 Danes, 8,700 Swedes, about 1,000 Estonians , 725 Norwegians, 372 Ingrians, 346 Finnish expatriates, 366 Hungarians, and 210 volunteers of other nationalities made it to Finland before the war was over. Foreign correspondents in Helsinki wrote and often greatly exaggerated reports of Finnish ingenuity and successes in combat. Nazi Germany allowed some arms to pass through to Finland until a Swedish newspaper broke the story and Adolf Hitler initiated, as an ally of the Soviet Union, a policy of silence towards Finland.

Franco–British plans for intervention

France had been one of the earliest supporters of Finland during the Winter War. By attacking the Soviet Union, the French saw an opportunity to weaken Germany's major ally. France had also other motives, as it deemed it better to have a major war in a remote part of the Europe than on French soil. The plan was to re-arm the Polish exile units and transport them to the Finnish Arctic port of Petsamo. A different scheme was to make a massive air strike with Turkish co-operation, against the Caucasus oil fields. The British, for their part, wanted to block the flow of iron ore from Swedish mines to Germany, as the Swedes supplied up to 40 percent of Germany's need. Due to this heavy German reliance on Swedish iron, Hitler had made it clear to the Swedish government in December that any Allied troops on Swedish soil would immediately provoke a German invasion.

The British revealed this plan on 16 December, but the cabinet decided to back away from French proposals of immediate intervention two days later. Instead, the plan was given to the chiefs of staff. The Supreme War Council did elect to send notes to Norway and Sweden on 27 December, in which they urged the Norwegians and Swedes to help Finland and offer the Allies their support. Norway and Sweden rejected the offer on 5 January 1940. The Allies then came up with a new plan, in which they would demand that Norway and Sweden give them right of passage by citing the League of Nations resolution as justification. The expedition troops would disembark at the Norwegian port of Narvik and proceed by rail toward Finland, passing through through the Swedish ore fields on the way. This demand was made in new notes sent to Norway and Sweden on 6 January, but these too were rejected six days later.

The plan did have some drawbacks, however, so the Allies formulated a new plan on 29 January. First, the Finns would make a formal request for assistance. Then the Allies would ask Norway and Sweden for permission to move the "volunteers" across their territory. Finally, in order to protect the supply line from German actions, the Allies would send additional units ashore at Namsos, Bergen, and Trondheim. The operation would require 100,000 British and 35,000 French soldiers with naval and air support. The supply convoys would sail on 12 March and the landings would begin on 20 March.

Through Soviet agents in the French and British governments, indications of Franco-British plans reached Stalin, and may have contributed heavily to his decision to increase military pressure on the Finnish Army while at the same time offering to negotiate an armistice.

Peace of Moscow

The Moscow Peace Treaty was signed on 12 March 1940 and took effect on 13 March. Finland ceded its portion of Karelia – the entire Karelian Isthmus as well as a large slice of Karelia north of Lake Ladoga. The area included the city of Viipuri, the country's second largest, much of Finland's industrialized territory, and significant parts still held by Finland's army, all in all, over 10 percent of pre-war Finland. Some 422,000 Karelians, 12 percent of Finland's population, lost their homes.

Finland also had to cede a part of the region of Salla, the Kalastajansaarento peninsula in the Barents Sea, and four islands in the Gulf of Finland. The Hanko Peninsula was also leased to the Soviet Union as a military base for 30 years. While the Soviet troops had captured Petsamo during the war, they returned it to Finland according to the treaty.

As a whole, the peace terms were harsh for Finland. Sympathy from the League of Nations, the Allies, and from the Swedes in particular, were of little value.

Aftermath

Finnish views

The 105-day war had a profound and depressing effect in Finland. Useful international support was minimal, arrived late, and the German blockade prevented most armament shipments.

At the end of the war, the situation of the Finnish army on the Karelian Isthmus had been the subject of some debate. The orders were already given to prepare a retreat to the next line of defence in the Taipale sector. The estimates of how long the enemy could have been held in these kinds of retreat-and-stand operations varied from a few days to a couple of months, most averaging around a few weeks.

During the Interim Peace, Karelian local governments, parishes and provincial organizations established Karjalan Liitto, an interest group, in order to defend the rights and interests of Karelian evacuees and to find a solution for returning Karelia.

Soviet views

During the period between the war and the perestroika in late 1980s, Soviet historiography leaned solely on Vyacheslav Molotov's speeches on the Winter War. In his radio speech of 29 November 1939, Molotov argued that the Soviet Union had tried for two months to negotiate guarantees of security for Leningrad. However, the Finns had taken a hostile stance to "please foreign imperialists". The Finns had undertaken military provocation and the Soviets could no longer hold to nonaggression pacts. According to Molotov, the Soviets did not want to occupy or annex Finland; the goal was purely to secure Leningrad.

Another source, later used widely in Soviet historiography, was the Molotov speech in front of the Supreme Soviet on 29 March 1940. Molotov blamed Western countries for starting the war and argued that they had used Finland as a proxy to fight the Soviet Union. The Western Allies had furthermore tried to take neutral Sweden and Norway along with them. The main "villains" for the Soviets were the United Kingdom and France, but also Sweden, the United States, and Italy, who had issued massive amounts of materiél, money, and men to Finland. According to Molotov, the Soviet Union was merciful in peace terms, as the problem of Leningrad security had been solved.

It is speculated that Stalin had practically wiped out his intelligence apparatus during the purges, thus damaging the effectiveness of spies in Finland and other countries, as well as cowing operatives into writing the kind of reports they thought Stalin wanted to read. Thus, he was not aware of the real situation in Finland and amongst the Allies. Soviet intelligence sources were informing their leadership of Allied plans to intervene in the war, but not of the details or the Allies' actual unpreparedness. Therefore, the Soviets felt forced to seek a premature end to the war before the Allies intervened and declared war on the Soviet Union.

In 1948, Stalin wrote in Falsifiers of History that "there could hardly be any doubt that the leading circles of Finland were in league with the Hitlerites and that that they wanted to turn Finland into a springboard for Hitler Germany's attack on the U.S.S.R." Regarding the start of the war, Stalin also wrote, "In the war which the Finnish reactionaries started against the Soviet Union, Britain and France rendered the Finnish militarists every kind of assistance. The Anglo-French ruling circles kept inciting the Finnish Government to continue hostilities."

Nikita Khrushchev, who had been a party leader during the war, remembered later on: "In our war against the Finns we could choose the location of the war and the date of its start. In number we were superior to the enemy, we had enough time to get ready for the operation. But on these most favourable terms we could only win through huge difficulties and incredibly great losses. In fact this victory was a moral defeat. Our people certainly never got knowledge of it because we never told them the truth."

In 1994, the President of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, denounced the Winter War, agreeing that it was a war of aggression.

Military consequences

The Supreme Military Soviet met in April 1940, sifted through the lessons of the Finnish campaign, and recommended reforms. The role of frontline political commissars was reduced and old-fashioned ranks and forms of discipline were reintroduced. Clothing, equipment and tactics for winter operations were improved. However, not all of these reforms had been completed when the Germans started Operation Barbarossa fifteen months later.

In June 1940, the Soviet Union occupied the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and Occupation of the Baltic states. During 1940, the Finns and Swedes successfully negotiated a military alliance, but the negotiations ended once it became clear that both Germany and the Soviet Union opposed such an alliance.

Germany

The Winter War was a success for the Germans. Both the Red Army and the League of Nations were humiliated and furthermore, the Allied Supreme War Council had been revealed to be chaotic and powerless. However, the German policy of neutrality was not popular in the homeland and relations with Italy had also suffered badly. After the Peace of Moscow, the Germans did not hesitate to move to improve ties, and within two weeks, Finno-German relations were at the top of the agenda.

During the Interim Peace, the Finns allied with Germany for a chance to reclaim areas ceded to the Soviet Union. Two days after the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, Soviet–Finnish hostilities resumed with start of the Continuation War.

Western Allies

The Winter War put in question the organisation and effectiveness of not only the Red Army, but also that of the Western Allies. The Supreme War Council did not manage its way through the situation, but revealed its total unsuitablity to make effective war in either Britain or France. This failure led to the collapse of the Daladier government in France, and later, after the failure in the Norwegian Campaign, the fall of Chamberlain government in the United Kingdom.

Casualties of the war

During the four months of fighting, the Soviet Army suffered massive losses. One Red Army General, looking at a map of the territory just conquered, is said to have remarked: "We have won just about enough ground to bury our dead." The official Soviet figure, issued just after the war, listed 48,745 dead and 150,863 wounded.

According to Nikita Khrushchev, 1.5 million men were sent to Finland and one million of them were killed, while 1,000 aircraft, 2,300 tanks and armored cars and an enormous amount of other war materials were lost. Finland's losses were limited to 25,904 dead or missing and 43,557 wounded

In 1990, professor Mikhail Semiryaga used the Red Army Casualty Notifications to publish a book in which he gave exact figures: 53,522 dead, 16,208 missing, 163,772 wounded and 12,064 frostbitten. Meanwhile, professor N. I. Baryshikov estimated 53,500 dead, a figure close to that of Semiryaga. In 1999, the Finnish historian Ohto Manninen estimated Red Army casualties to have been 84,994 dead or prisoners, 186,584 wounded or disabled, 51,892 sick and 9,614 frostbitten. The Russian historian Grigoriy Krivosheyev calculated 126,875 dead and 264,908 wounded.

Possible other scenarios

In the years since the Winter War, there has been speculation surrounding Finnish–Soviet negotiations during 1938 and 1939. Could the Winter War have been avoided, if Finland agreed to Soviet demands for bases and had agreed to conclude the friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance treaty between countries? Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania agreed with the Soviet demands and a year after that the countries were occupied and annexed. Could Finland have been an exception?

According to the Finnish historian Timo Vihavainen, there are many views against these speculations. Stalin trusted only the Red Army, and he used it to consolidate his control of neighbouring countries. Pieces of paper like nonagression pacts interested him little. Neutrality, when it ran counter to the interests of the Soviet Union, was "objectively" its opposite and therefore served the interests of Germany. The Soviet Union German influence in Finalnd. This has been convincingly shown by Finnish historians to be a myth. The same applies to Finnish public opinion and the press, in which the general attitude towards Germany and Stalin's Soviet Union was overwhelmingly negative.

There has been also speculation of Soviet intent: did the Soviets really try to occupy all of Finland, or just strategic areas near Leningrad? According to the document approved in 1939 by Zhdanov, Molotov and Kuusinen, the Finnish political system was meant to be changed after the Soviet occupation by establishing people's republic and capturing "enemies of the state". Marshal Ivan Konev wrote that he was informed of a conversation between Stalin, Kliment Voroshilov, and Ivan Isakov. Stalin is alleged to have said during the beginning of the Winter War: "The Finns have to relocate elsewhere --. There are fewer inhabitants in Finland than in the city of Leningrad, so the task will be easy."

See also

Notes

1. At the beginning of the war, the Finns had 337,000 men. The Finnish army had only 250,028 rifles (total 281,594 firearms), but White Guards brought their own rifles (over 114,000 rifles, total 116,800 firearms) to the war. The Finnish army reached its maximum strength at the beginning of March 1940 with 346,000 men in uniform.
2. Since 1919, the Finns had had 32 French Renault tanks and few lighter tanks. These were unsuitable for the War, and they were subsequently used as fixed pillboxes. The Finns bought 32 British Vickers tanks during 1936–39, but without weapons, as these were meant to be manufactured and installed in Finland. Only ten tanks were fit for combat at the beginning of the war.
3. Situation for the 1st of December, 1939. The Finns had 114 combat airplanes fit for duty and 7 airplanes for communication and observation purposes. There were also less than a hundred planes for flight training purposes, not suitable for combat, and some planes were under repair. In total, the Finns had 235 aircraft.
4. Finnish detailed death casualties: Dead, buried 16,766; Wounded, died of wounds 3,089; Dead, not buried later declared as dead 3,503; Missing, declared as dead 1,712; Died during prisoner of war 20; Other reasons (diseases, accidents, suicides) 677; Unknown 137
5. After the War, the Soviet Union returned home 847 Finns. Finnish and Russian researchers have estimated total number of POWs between 800–1,100 Finns, and the number of deaths 10–20. See more: Finnish prisoners of war in the Soviet Union
6. A Soviet division consists of 17,500 men, 14,000 rifles, 419 light machine guns, 200 machines guns, 261 infantry mortars, 40 mortars, 48 anti-tank guns. A Finnish division consists of 14,200 men, 11,000 rifles, 250 submachine guns, 250 light machine guns, 116 machine guns, 18 mortars, 18 anti-tank guns. A Soviet division had more men and was better equipped.

References

Citations

1. ^ Palokangas, Markku (1999). "Suomalaisjoukkojen aseistus ja varustus". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (in Finnish) (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 299–335. ISBN 951-0-23536-9.
2. Juutilainen, Antti; Koskimaa, Matti (2005). "Maavoimien joukkojen perustaminen". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Jatkosodan pikkujättiläinen (in Finnish) (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 77–88. ISBN 951-0-28690-7.
3. ^ Peltonen, Martti (1999). "Ilmasota talvisodassa". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (in Finnish) (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 606–649. ISBN 951-0-23536-9.
4. Kantakoski, Punaiset panssarit—Puna-armeijan panssarijoukot 1918–1945, p. 260
5. ^ Ries 1988
6. Ohto Manninen, Talvisodan salatut taustat, 1994, ISBN 952-90-5251-0, Using declassified Soviet archive material, Manninen found 12 previously unrecognized infantry divisions ordered to the Finnish front
7. РГВА. Ф.37977. Оп.1. Д.595. Л.57—59, 95; Д.722. Л.414—417; Зимняя война. Кн.1. С.150.
8. ^ Kurenmaa, Pekka; Lentilä, Riitta (2005). "Sodan tappiot". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Jatkosodan pikkujättiläinen (in Finnish) (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 1150–1162. ISBN 951-0-28690-7.
9. ^ Lentilä, Riitta; Juutilainen, Antti (1999). "Talvisodan uhrit". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (in Finnish) (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 816–828. ISBN 951-0-23536-9.
10. Malmi, Timo (1999). "Suomalaiset sotavangit". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (in Finnish) (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 792–802. ISBN 951-0-23536-9.
11. ^ Manninen, Ohto (1999). "Venäläiset sotavangit ja tappiot". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (in Finnish) (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 811–815. ISBN 951-0-23536-9.
12. ^ Krivosheyev, Grigoriy (1997). Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century (1st ed.). Greenhill Books. ISBN 1853672807.
13. Roger R. Reese. Lessons of the Winter War: A Study in the Military Effectiveness of the Red Army, 1939-1940. The Journal of Military History, v. 72 (July 2008): 825–852.
14. Template:Ru icon В.Н. Барышников. От прохладного мира к Зимней войне. Восточная политика Финляндии в 1930-е годы. Санкт-Петербург, 1997.; В.Н. Барышников, Э. Саломаа. Вовлечение Финляндии во Вторую Мировую войну. In: Крестовый поход на Россию. М., 2005.; О.Д. Дудорова. Неизвестные страницы Зимней войны. In: Военно-исторический журнал. 1991. №9.; Зимняя война 1939-1940. Книга первая. Политическая история. М., 1998. – ISBN 5-02-009749-7; Эрик Ковалев. Зимняя война балтийских подводных лодок (1939–1940 гг.). In: Короли подплава в море червонных валетов. М., 2006.; М. Коломиец. Танки в Зимней войне 1939-1940. In: «Фронтовая иллюстрация», 2001; Александр Широкорад. Северные войны России. М., 2001.; Владимир Холодковский. Эта Зимняя война. In: Ленинская правда. 1990. 4 янв., c. 3.
15. The name Soviet–Finnish War 1939-1940 (Template:Lang-ru) is often used in Russian historiography.
16. "League of Nations' expulsion of the U.S.S.R." League of Nation. 14 December 1939. Retrieved 24 July 2009.
17. Bullock 1993, page 489
18. Glanz 1998, page 58
19. ^ Trotter 2002, pp. 3–7
20. Turtola, Martti (1999). "Kansainvälinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. pp. 21–24.
21. Turtola, Martti (1999). "Kansainvälinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. pp. 33–34.
22. Edwards 2006, pp. 26–27
23. Edwards 2006, p. 18
24. ^ Turtola, Martti (1999). "Kansainvälinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. pp. 30–33.
25. ^ Edwards 2006, pages 28–59
26. Edwards 2006, pp. 32–33
27. ^ Turtola, Martti (1999). "Kansainvälinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. pp. 32–33.
28. ^ Trotter 2002, pp. 12–13
29. Turtola, Martti (1999). "Kansainvälinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. pp. 34–35.
30. Engle and Paananen 1985, p. 6
31. ^ Turtola, Martti (1999). "Kansainvälinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. pp. 38–41.
32. D. W. Spring. 'The Soviet Decision for War against Finland, 30 November 1939'. Soviet Studies, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Apr., 1986), pp. 207-226
33. Trotter 2002, pages 14–16
34. Turtola, Martti (1999). "Kansainvälinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. pp. 41–43.
35. Manninen, Ohto (1999). "Neuvostoliiton tavoitteet ennen talvisotaa ja sen aikana". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (in Finnish) (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 141–148. ISBN 951-0-23536-9.
36. Tanner 1950
37. Edwards 2006, p. 105–106
38. Aptekar, Pavel. "Casus belli" (in Russian). Rabotse-Krestyanskaya Krasnaya Armiya. Retrieved 2 September 2009.
39. Turtola, Martti (1999). "Kansainvälinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. pp. 44–45.
40. ^ Trotter 2002, pages 48–57
41. ^ Trotter 2002, pages 58–61
42. Soikkanen, Timo (1999). "Talvisodan henki". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. p. 235.
43. ^ Trotter 2002, pages 33–47
44. Conquest 2007, page 450
45. Edwards 2006, p. 189
46. ^ Kilin and Raunio 2007, page 13
47. Geust and Uitto 2006, page 54
48. ^ Trotter 2002, pages 67–84
49. ^ Paulaharju, Jyru (1999). "Pakkastalven kourissa". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (in Finnish) (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 289–298. ISBN 951-0-23536-9.
50. ^ Trotter 2002, pages 143–149
51. ^ Trotter 2002, pages 62–66
52. Vuorenmaa, Anssi; Juutilainen, Antti (1999). "Myytti Mannerheim-linjasta". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (in Finnish) (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 494–500. ISBN 951-0-23536-9.
53. ^ Laaksonen, Lasse (1999). "Kannaksen taistelut". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (in Finnish) (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 385–478. ISBN 951-0-23536-9.
54. Trotter 2002, pages 85–90
55. ^ Juutilainen, Antti (1999). "Laatokan karjalan taistelut". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (in Finnish) (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 501–529. ISBN 951-0-23536-9.
56. ^ Vuorenmaa, Anssi (1999). "Korpitaistelujen rintamat". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (in Finnish) (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 543–579. ISBN 951-0-23536-9.
57. ^ Trotter 2002, pages 150–170
58. Ilo, Juha. "The Finnish Winter War 1939-1940". Feldgrau. Retrieved 24 July 2009.
59. Bell, Morgan. "Hjalmar Siilasvuo". World War II Database. Retrieved 24 July 2009.
60. ^ Trotter 2002, pages 171–184
61. Trotter 2002, pages 203–209
62. ^ Trotter 2002, pages 213–220
63. Geust and Uitto 2006, page 77
64. Trotter 2002, pages 234–241
65. ^ Trotter 2002, pages 246–254 Cite error: The named reference "Trotter18" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
66. ^ Trotter 2002, pages 187–193
67. ^ Elfvegren, Eero (1999). "Merisota talvisodassa". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (in Finnish) (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 677–693. ISBN 951-0-23536-9.
68. Silvast, Pekka (1999). "Merivoimien ensimmäinen voitto: Russarö". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (in Finnish) (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 694–696. ISBN 951-0-23536-9.
69. Kossila, Tapani. "Foreign volunteers in the Winter War". Axis History Factbook. Retrieved 24 July 2009.
70. ^ Trotter 2002, pages 234–241
71. Engle and Paananen 1985, pp. 142–143
72. Edwards 2006, pp. 272–273
73. Laaksonen, Lasse (2005) . Todellisuus ja harhat (in Finnish). Ajatus kirjat. ISBN 951-20-6911-3.
74. Halsti, Wolfgang Hallstén (1955). Talvisota 1939-1940 (in Finnish). Otava.
75. Paasikivi, Juho Kusti (1959). Toimintani Moskovassa (in Finnish). WSOY.
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77. Van Dyke 1997
78. Rentola, Kimmo, Residenttimme ilmoittaa..., Suomen Historiallinen Seura, 2002
79. Soviet Information Bureau 1948, page 48
80. Soviet Information Bureau 1948, page 50
81. Heller, Mihail; Nyekrics, Alekszandr (2003). Orosz történelem, II. kötet: A Szovjetunió története (in Hungarian). Budapest: Osiris Publ. Ltd. p. 320. ISBN 963-389-546-4.
82. In a joint press conference with President of Finland Martti Ahtisaari at Kremlin May 18, 1994. (See: Nevalainen, Pekka (11-2001). "Many Karelias". Virtual Finland. Retrieved 2009-08-20. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help))
83. ^ Trotter 2002, pages 263–270
84. ^ Turtola, Martti (1999). "Katkera rauha ja Suomen ulkopoliittinen asema sodan jälkeen". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (in Finnish) (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. pp. 843–863. ISBN 951-0-23536-9.
85. Edwards 2006, pp. 277–279
86. Edwards 2006, pages 13–14
87. Maddock, Robert K. (1 March 2007). "The Finnish Winter War". Kutri's Corner. Retrieved 24 July 2009.
88. Mosier, John, The Blitzkrieg Myth: How Hitler and the Allies Misread the Strategic Realities of World War II, HarperCollins, 2004, ISBN 0-06-000977-2, page 88
89. ^ Vihavainen, Timo (12-2001). "Finland, Stalin and Germany in the 1930s". Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Department for Communication and Culture/Unit for Public Diplomacy. Retrieved 30 August 2009. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
90. Manninen 2002, pp. 16–17

Bibliography

• Bullock, Alan (1993). Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. Vintage Books. ISBN 978-0679729945.
• Conquest, Robert (2007) . The Great Terror: A Reassessment. Oxford University Press, USA; 40th anniversary edition. ISBN 978-0195317008.
• Edwards, Robert (2006). White Death: Russia's War on Finland 1939–40. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. ISBN 13 978 0 297 84630 2. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: length (help)
• Engle, Edwards; Paananen, Lauri (1985) . The Winter War: The Russo-Finnish Conflict, 1939–40. United States: Westview Press. ISBN 0-8133-0149-1.
• Geust, Carl-Fredrik; Uitto, Antero (2006). Mannerheim-linja: Talvisodan legenda (in Finnish). Ajatus kirjat. ISBN 951-20-7042-1.
• Glanz, David (1998). Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War. University Press of Kansas. ISBN 978-0700608799.
• Kilin, Juri; Raunio, Ari (2007). Talvisodan taisteluja (in Finnish). Karttakeskus. p. 322. ISBN 978-951-593-068-2.
• Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti, eds. (1999). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (in Finnish) (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. p. 976. ISBN 951-0-23536-9.
• Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti, eds. (2005). Jatkosodan pikkujättiläinen (in Finnish) (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. p. 1276. ISBN 951-0-28690-7.
• Manninen, Ohto (2002). Stalinin kiusa – Himmlerin täi (in Finnish). Helsinki: Edita. ISBN 951-37-3694-6.
• Ries, Tomas (1988). Cold Will: The Defense of Finland (1st ed.). London: Brassey's Defence Publishers. ISBN 0080335926.
• Soviet Information Bureau (1948). Falsifiers of History (Historical Survey) (1st ed.). Moscow: Gospolitizdat (Russian 1st ed.) Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House (English 1st. ed). Edited and partially re-written by Joseph Stalin
• Tanner, Väinö (1950). The Winter War: Finland against Russia 1939-1940 (1st ed.). California: Stanford University Press.
• Trotter, William R. (2002, 2006) . The Winter war: The Russo–Finnish War of 1939–40 (5th ed.). New York (Great Britain: London): Workman Publishing Company (Great Britain: Aurum Press). ISBN 1 85410 881 6. First published in the United States under the title A Frozen Hell: The Russo–Finnish Winter War of 1939–40 {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |year= (help)CS1 maint: year (link)
• Van Dyke, Carl (1997). The Soviet Invasion of Finland, 1939-40. Routledge. ISBN 0714643149.

External links

• The Battles of the Winter War comprehensively covered by Sami H. E. Korhonen
• Telegrams from each day of the Winter War Template:Fi icon Template:Sv icon Template:En icon
• USSR expulsion from League of Nations from the League of Nations' Official Journal
• The Front Museum on the Hanko Peninsula, documenting the lease of Hanko to the USSR
• Finnish wartime photos and history website Stories by veterans, historians, and wartime pictures.
• Those Burly Finns, History House magazine article

Template:Link FA Template:Link FA Template:Link FA

• Winter War
• Wars involving Finland
• Wars involving the Soviet Union
• World War II
• League of Nations
• Barents Sea
• Karelian Isthmus
• 1939 in Finland
• 1940 in Finland
• 1939 in the Soviet Union
• 1940 in the Soviet Union
• Sweden during World War II
• Occupation of the Baltic states