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Revision as of 08:02, 3 March 2006 by Ghirlandajo (talk | contribs) (largest tank battle in history)(diff) ← Previous revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)Battle of Prokhorovka (July 12, 1943) was the largest tank battle in human history and the pivotal battle of Operation Citadel (the German offensive to encircle Soviet forces in the Kursk salient, also known as the Battle of Kursk of the Great Patriotic War.
From July 4-11, 1943 Generaloberst Hermann Hoth's 4.Panzer-Armee, spearheaded by the SS-Panzerkorps, had fought through 10-15 miles of Soviet defenses consisting of high-density minefields, entrenched infantry and anti-tank guns arranged in elaborate kill zones (see pakfront).
By the end of July 11, SS-Panzerkorps was close to driving a wedge between the Soviet 1st Tank Army and 69th Army. Unknown to the Germans, the Soviets released two fresh armies 5th Guards Tank Army under General Pavel Rotmistrov and 5th Guards Army from their strategic reserve to meet the German threat. After forced road marches, the Soviet forces reached Prokhorovka on the night of July 11th. The stage was now set for the largest and most decisive single tank battle of World War II.
On July 12 the Luftwaffe and artillery units bombed the Soviet positions as the SS divisions formed up. On the morning of July 12, SS-Panzerkorps advanced on Prokhorovka at the same time that 5th Guards Tank Army launched a series of attacks in an attempt to catch the Germans off balance. The SS and Guards units collided west of Prokhorovka in open country punctuated by farms, rolling hills and gullies. What happened next is open to debate with the release of new information from archives.
Traditionally the description of this battle goes like this:
- The German advance started and they were astonished to see masses of Soviet armor advancing towards them. What followed was the largest tank engagement ever, with over 1,500 tanks in close contact. The air forces of both countries flew overhead, but they were unable to see anything through the dust and smoke pouring out from destroyed tanks. On the ground, commanders were unable to keep track of developments and the battle rapidly degenerated into an immense number of confused and bitter small-unit actions, often at close quarters. The fighting raged on all day, and by evening the last shots were being fired as the two sides disengaged. German lost 60 tanks and assault guns with the Soviets losing at least eight to ten times that number.
In the most famous action of the day the T-70 and T-34 tanks of the Red Army's 18th and 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army charged headlong at the SS's tanks. The T34s were faster but more lightly armoured and armed - they aimed to exploit weaknesses in the German machines' armour at close range. A series of disjointed engagements went on for much of the day with high losses on both sides, although it is likely the Germans inflicted more losses than they themselves sustained.
The battle can best be described as a very costly tactical draw but an operational success for the Soviets. Neither the Fifth Guards Tank Army nor the II SS Panzer Corps accomplished their missions that day. Tank losses have been a contentious subject ever since. Soviet losses have been claimed as low as 200 or as high as 822 tanks. Likewise, German loss claims have reached as low as 80 or into the hundreds, including "dozens" of Tigers. While the exact losses on each side cannot be established beyond reasonable doubt, the outcome is clearer. The 5th Guards Tank Army accomplished part of its mission of stopping the German attack, but did not take its terrain objectives or destroy the II SS Panzer Corps. Both units were weakened although both were committed to combat the following day.
Many books written in the 1970's and '80's depict the Battle of Prokhorovka as waves of speedy Soviet T-34 tanks closing with the heavier German Tiger and Panther tanks and then blasting them at point-blank range. This depiction is now accepted as incorrect for several reasons.
- First, the Waffen SS units involved at Prokhorovka mostly consisted of Panzer III tanks, up-gunned Panzer IV tanks and only a handful of Tigers (certainly less than 100). The Waffen SS did not have any of the new Panther tanks at Prokhorovka (These had been issued exclusively to Heer Panzer formations, most noteably Panzergrenadier-Division Großdeutschland. The Soviets were handicapped as well with some tank formations consisting of inferior British tanks (Valentines and Churchills).
- Second, while the Germans did suffer casualties when 5th Guards Tank Army's attack hit their first echelon of tanks, SS Panzerkorps was able to set up quick defensive positions and repulse the 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Armies. The Soviets suffered considerably heavier losses than the Germans. According to German tank strength reports, their heaviest tank losses occurred in the first four days of Operation Citadel when 4.Panzer-Armee was fighting through Soviet minefields and pakfronts (not to mention mechanical breakdowns; especially with the Panther-equipped units).
The reality is that the sudden and violent attack by strong Soviet reserves and the failure of the German Ninth Army on the northern end of the Kursk salient broke the will of Adolf Hitler to continue an attack, the implications of which made him sick to his stomach when he considered it (conversation with Generaloberst Heinz Guderian in the spring of 1943). Hitler also had to draw on German troops at the Eastern Front to bolster Mussolini's tottering regime in Italy (Anglo-American forces invaded Sicily on July 10th, 1943).
The Battle of Prokhorovka was a critical psychological victory for the Red Army as it had stopped a major German offensive dead in its tracks. The German advantage in quality of officers and men was now eroding and the self-confident Soviets were ready to drive out the invaders. From this point forward, the strategic initiative would remain with the Red Army.
Sources
- Cross, Robin (1993). Citadel: The Battle of Kursk, Barnes & Noble Edition (1998).
- Zetterling, Niklas and Anders Frankson. Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis, London: Frank Cass, 2000.
External links
- Kursk Reconsidered: Germany's Lost Victory from Historynet.com.
- Review of Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis with a detailed comparison with the statistics provided by Walter Dunn's "Kursk: Hitler's Gamble, 1943", George Nipe's "Decision in the Ukraine", "The Battle of Kursk" by David Glantz and Jonathan House, and "The Battle for Kursk, 1943" from the Soviet General Staff.
