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Physical determinism generally refers to the assertion of a deterministic physical universe (greater physical system). Physical determinism holds that a complete description of the physical state of the world at any given time and a complete statement of the physical laws of nature together entail every truth as to what physical events happen after that time. Physical determinism is therefore synonymous for nomological determinism, that all future events are governed by the past or present according to all-encompassing deterministic laws.

Physical determinism has also been considered more broadly as a position in philosophy, in which all physical events occur as described by physical laws, but this definition is at odds with the definition of physical indeterminism (which is only the opposite of physical determinism in its common sense above).

Causal completeness

Physical determinism is related to the question of causal completeness of science, the idea that every real event has a scientific explanation, that science need not search for explanations beyond itself. If causal completeness does not apply to everything in the universe, then the door is open to events that are not subject to physical determinism (see causal closure below). For example, a relatively common view of mental events is that they are an epiphenomenon produced as a by-product of neurological activity, and without causal impact. In this case, only a failure of physical determinism would allow room for their causal significance.

The scope of physical determinism is also related to the question of causal closure, the idea that no physical event has a cause outside the physical domain. The notion of causal completeness (physical system integrity) has been claimed to be maintainable even when rejecting causal closure if the physical system is indeterministic.

Other theories

A peculiar formulation of physical determinism skirts the issue of causal completeness. It is based upon connections between 'events' supplied by a theory:

"a theory is deterministic if, and only if, given its state variables for some initial period, the theory logically determines a unique set of values for those variables for any other period."

— Ernest Nagel, Alternative descriptions of physical state p. 292

This quote replaces the idea of 'cause-and-effect' with that of 'logical implication' according to one or another theory that connects events. In addition, an 'event' is related by the theory itself to formalized states described using the parameters defined by that theory. Thus, the details of interpretation are placed where they belong, fitted to the context in which the chosen theory applies. Using the definition of physical determinism above, the limitations of a theory to some particular domain of experience also limits the associated definition of 'physical determinism' to that same domain. That limitation leaves open the question whether there is a physical "theory of everything" waiting to be invented.

See also

• Determinism
• Epistemological pluralism
• Free will
• Mind–body problem
• Model-dependent realism
• Subject–object problem

References

1. David Papineau (2002). Thinking About Consciousness. Oxford University Press. p. 240. ISBN 978-0-19-924382-2. Retrieved 6 February 2013.
2. Hoefer, Carl (Apr 1, 2008). "Causal Determinism". In Edward N. Zalta, ed (ed.). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 edition). {{cite encyclopedia}}: |editor= has generic name (help) See also Popper, K (1978). p. p212. Newton himself may be counted among the few dissenters, for he regarded the solar system as imperfect, and consequently as likely to perish (citing, Henry Pemberton's A View of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophy) {{cite book}}: |page= has extra text (help); Missing or empty |title= (help); Unknown parameter |name= ignored (help)
3. This definition is from Carl Ginet (1990). On Action. Cambridge University Press. p. 92. ISBN 052138818X.
4. Steven W Horst (2011). Laws, Mind, and Free Will. MIT Press. p. 98. ISBN 0262015250.
5. Robert C Bishop (2011). "Chapter 4: Chaos, indeterminism, and free will". In Robert Kane, ed (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Free Will: Second Edition (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press. p. 84. ISBN 0195399692. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)
6. See for example, Sahotra Sarkar, Jessica Pfeifer (2006). "Physicalism: The causal impact argument". The Philosophy of Science: N-Z, Index. Taylor & Francis. p. 566. ISBN 041597710X.
7. Robert C Bishop, Harald Atmanspacher (2011). "Chapter 5: The causal closure of physics and free will". In Robert Kane, ed (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of Free Will: Second Edition (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press. p. 101. ISBN 0195399692. {{cite book}}: |editor= has generic name (help)
8. Lewis, C.S. (1947). Miracles. p. 24. ISBN 0-688-17369-1.
9. Ernest Nagel (1999). "§V: Alternative descriptions of physical state". The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation (2nd ed.). Hackett. pp. 285–292. ISBN 0915144719.

• Determinism
• Free will
• Causality
• Metaphysics
• Philosophical problems