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It has been suggested that this article be merged into Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. (Discuss)

The Zarqawi PSYOP program refers to a US Psychological operations program, or propaganda campaign exaggerating the importance of Al Zarqawi in Al Qaeda and the Iraq insurgency.

The program was allegedly primarily aimed at, but not limited to, the "Iraqi and Arab media" along with the "U.S. Home Audience," which was part of a "broader propaganda campaign."

One of the presented goals was to alienate local citizens from him by portraying him as a foreigner and key actor in the insurgency. However, Sidney Blumenthal reported that, according to a "military source," this campaign ultimately revolved around "domestic political reasons." Which an article hosted by Information Clearing House describes as:

It builds the case for war out of whole cloth. Zarqawi has become the central justification for the ongoing occupation; a threatening, spectral figure who embodies the evils of terrorism.

Rise to power

Several incidents turned him from an unknown and unimportant terrorist into the well-known voice of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Following the allegation he was a link between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda (used as casus belli), by Colin Powell before the UN Security Council in 2003, he became the embodiment of resistance against the US in the Muslim world. Then the invasion of Iraq by the Bush administration became another boost for his popularity. After the capture of Saddam Hussein the Bush administration accused him of being behind the continuing mishaps in Iraq, or, as Patrick Cockburn commented in an editorial for Counterpunch Newsletter:

"No sooner had Saddam Hussein been captured than the US spokesmen began to mention al-Zarqawi's name in every sentence."

In the wake of his assasination, which had erroneously been reported several times before, the US produced a video showing him to be the opposite of what the media previously advocated him to be. Michel Chossudovsky from the Centre for Research on Globalization made this observation:

The video portrays "Terror Mastermind" Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi acting in a "foolish" and "incompetent" fashion.

The article suggests that this might also be part of "successful propaganda." It continues with:

What is rarely mentioned is that this outside enemy Al Qaeda is a CIA "intelligence asset", used in covert operations.

Program

The Washington Post reported on April 10, 2006, that the role of Zarqawi was magnified by the Pentagon in a psychological operations campaign started in 2004. In the words of the Washington Post:

For the past two years, U.S. military leaders have been using Iraqi media and other outlets in Baghdad to publicize Zarqawi's role in the insurgency. The documents explicitly list the "U.S. Home Audience" as one of the targets of a broader propaganda campaign.

The article goes on to explain:

That slide, created by Casey's subordinates, does not specifically state that U.S. citizens were being targeted by the effort, but other sections of the briefings indicate that there were direct military efforts to use the U.S. media to affect views of the war.

By focusing on his terrorist activities and status as a foreigner the US tried to inflame Iraqi citizens against him. Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, the senior commander in charge, remarked, according to the Washington Post:

"The Zarqawi PSYOP program is the most successful information campaign to date."

Michel Chossudovsky in an editorial for the Centre for Research on Globalization suggested another goal for this campaign; which was the intend to mislead the US public by giving them a tangible enemy in the form of terrorists. He remarks:

"Without Zarqawi and bin Laden, the "war on terrorism" would loose its raison d'être. The main casus belli is to wage a " war on terrorism."

Effect of US PSYOP on domestic audiences

The Smith-Mundt Act, adopted in 1948, explicitly forbids information and psychological operations aimed at the US public. Nevertheless, the current easy access to news and informatioon from around the globe, makes it difficult to guarantee PSYOP programs do not reach the US public. Agence France Presse reported on such US propaganda campaigns that:

The Pentagon acknowledged in a newly declassified document that the US public is increasingly exposed to propaganda disseminated overseas in psychological operations.

US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has approved that document, which is called "Information Operations Roadmap." The document acknowledges the Smith-Mundt Act, but fails to offer any way of limiting the effect this program has on domestic audiences.

Although this Roadmap does not specifically mention the Zarqawi PSYOP program, it shows the dilemma these campaigns pose regarding the effect on the US home audience.

Quotes

The Washington post cites Col. Derek Harvey who said at a meeting by the Army in Fort Leavenworth:

"Our own focus on Zarqawi has enlarged his caricature, if you will - made him more important than he really is, in some ways."

Michel Chossudovsky observed in Centre for Research on Globalization:

The internal military documents leaked to Washington Post confirm that the Pentagon is involved in an ongoing propaganda campaign which seeks to provide a face to the enemy. The purpose is to portray the enemy as a terrorist, to mislead public opinion.

See also

• Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
• Doublespeak
• Information Operations Roadmap
• Iraq war
• Newspeak
• Propaganda
• Psychological operations (United States)
• Psychological warfare
• PSYOP
• Smith-Mundt Act
• War on Terrorism

References

1. ^ Military Plays Up Role of Zarqawi - Jordanian Painted As Foreign Threat To Iraq's Stability By Thomas E. Ricks, The Washington Post, April 10, 2006
2. ^ "Mission Accomplished" in a business suit - Ignoring U.S. intelligence, Bush inflated Zarqawi, then made a pointless trip to Iraq to pose as a heroic dragon slayer. It doesn't work anymore by Sidney Blumenthal, Salon, June 15, 2006
3. ^ Was There a Legal Basis for His Assassination? The Story Behind Zarqawi's Death by Jennifer van Bergen, CounterPunch, June 12, 2006
4. Who was Abu Musab al Zarqawi? by Michel Chossudovsky, Global Research, June 09, 2006,
5. ^ America Put Him in the Big Time The Short, Strange Career of Abu Masab al-Zarqawi by Patrick Cockburn, Counterpunch, June 9, 2006
6. ^ Who is behind "Al Qaeda in Iraq"? Pentagon acknowledges fabricating a "Zarqawi Legend" by Michel Chossudovsky, GlobalResearch, April 18, 2006
7. ^ Hyping Zarqawi by Tim Dickinson, Rolling Stone, April 11, 2006
8. Zarqawi; the Pentagon’s ongoing war of deception By Mike Whitney, Information Clearing House
9. The Myth of Al Qaeda Before 9/11, Osama bin Laden’s group was small and fractious. How Washington helped to build it into a global threat By Michael Hirsh, Newsweek, June 30, 2006
10. ^ Pentagon PSYOP: "Terror Mastermind" Abu Musab Al Zarqawi is "Incompetent" by Michel Chossudovsky, GlobalResearch, May 15, 2006
11. ^ Rumsfeld's Roadmap to Propaganda - Secret Pentagon "roadmap" calls for "boundaries" between "information operations" abroad and at home but provides no actual limits as long as US doesn't "target" Americans by National Security Archive, January 26, 2006
12. ^ Operations as a core competency by Christopher J. Lamb, senior fellow in the Institute for National Security Studies at the National Defense University and has been Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Resources and Plans.HTML version
13. ^ US Propaganda Aimed at Foreigners Reaches US Public: Pentagon Document by Agence France Presse, January 27, 2006
14. US plans to 'fight the net' revealed By Adam Brookes, BBC, January 27, 2006

• Psychological warfare
• Propaganda
• Counter-terrorism
• Anti-terrorism policy of the United States
• George W. Bush administration controversies
• 2003 Iraq conflict
• Iraqi insurgency