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Angolan Civil War
Part of the Cold War and South African Border War
Date 1975 – August 2002 Location Angola Result MPLA victory
Belligerents
MPLA Republic of Cuba AAF Mozambique	File:Ao-unita.gif UNITA FNLA South Africa Republic of Zaire
Commanders and leaders
José Eduardo dos Santos	Jonas Savimbi
Casualties and losses
Over 500,000 militants and hundreds of thousands of civilians

The Angolan Civil War began as soon as Angola won its war for independence in 1975 with the Communist MPLA fighting the anti-Communist UNITA. FLEC, an association of separatist militant groups, fought for the independence of Cabinda from 1975 until the mid-2000s. Formally brought to an end in 2002, an estimated 500,000 people were killed in the 27-year long war.

The conflict was one of the largest Cold War conflicts of the developing world. Three main factions were involved; the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), with a base among the Kimbundu and the mixed-race intelligentsia of Luanda, and links to the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc; the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA), with an ethnic base in the Bakongo region of the north and links to the United States, the People's Republic of China and the Mobutu government in Zaïre; and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), led by Jonas Savimbi with an ethnic and regional base in the Ovimbundu heartland in the center of the country, and supported by the United States, apartheid South Africa and several other African leaders.

1970s

Independence declared

Agostinho Neto, leader of the MPLA, declared the independence of the People's Republic of Angola on November 11, 1975 in accordance with the Alvor Accords. UNITA and the FNLA also declared Angolan independence with the Social Democratic Republic of Angola based in Huambo and the Democratic Republic of Angola based in Ambriz. The FLEC declared Cabinda independent of Portugal and Angola as a republic. The FNLA and UNITA forged an alliance on November 23, proclaiming their own coalition government based in Huambo with Holden Roberto and Jonas Savimbi as co-presidents and José Ndelé and Johnny Pinnock Eduardo as co-Prime Ministers.

The South African government told Savimbi and Roberto in early November that the South African Defense Forces (SADF) would soon end its operations in Angola despite the coalition's failure to capture Luanda and therefore secure international recognition at independence. Savimbi, desperate to avoid the withdrawal of the largest, friendly, military force in Angola, asked General Constand Viljoen to arrange a meeting for him with South African Prime Minister John Vorster, Savimbi's ally since October 1974. On the night of November 10, the day before independence, Savimbi secretly flew to Pretoria, South Africa and the meeting took place. In a remarkable reversal of policy Vorster not only agreed to keep troops through November but promised to withdraw the SADF troops only after the OAU meeting on December 9. The Soviets, well aware of South African activity in southern Angola, flew Cuban soldiers into Luanda the week before independence. While Cuban officers led the mission and provided the bulk of the troop force, 60 Soviet officers in the Congo joined the Cubans on November 12. The Soviet leadership expressly forbid the Cubans from intervening in Angola's civil war, focusing the mission on containing South Africa.

The last elements of the Portuguese military withdrew in 1975.

Cuba's troop force in Angola increased from 5,500 in December 1975 to 11,000 in February 1976.

FNLA forces were crushed by Operation Carlota, a joint Cuban-Angolan attack on Huambo on January 30, 1976. By mid-November the Huambo government had control over southern Angola and began pushing north.

South Africa withdrew in February 1976.

Operation IA Feature and the Clark Amendment

President Gerald Ford approved covert aid to UNITA and the FNLA through Operation IA Feature on July 18, 1975 despite strong opposition from officials in the State Department and the CIA. Ford told William Colby, the Director of Central Intelligence, to "go ahead and do it," with an initial US$ 6 million in funding. He granted an additional $8 million in funding on July 27 and another $25 million in August.

Two days prior to the program's approval Nathaniel Davis, the Assistant Secretary of State, told Henry Kissinger, the Secretary of State, that he believed maintaining the secrecy of IA Feature would be impossible. Davis correctly predicted the Soviet Union would respond by increasing its involvement in Angola, leading to more violence and negative publicity for the United States. When Ford approved the program Davis resigned. John Stockwell, the CIA's station chief in Angola, echoed Davis' criticism saying the program needed to be expanded to be successful, but the program was already too large to be kept out of the public eye. Davis' deputy and former U.S. ambassador to Chile, Edward Mulcahy, also opposed direct involvement. Mulcahy presented three options for U.S. policy towards Angola on May 13, 1975. Mulcahy believed the Ford administration could use diplomacy to campaign against foreign aid to the Communist MPLA, refuse to take sides in factional fighting, or increase support for the FNLA and UNITA. He warned however that supporting UNITA would not sit well with Mobutu Sese Seko, the ruler of Zaire.

Dick Clark, a Democratic Senator from Iowa, discovered the operation during a fact-finding mission in Africa, but it was Seymour Hersch, a reporter for The New York Times, who revealed IA Feature to the public on December 13, 1975. Clark proposed an amendment to the Arms Export Control Act, barring aid to private groups engaged in military or paramilitary operations in Angola. The Senate passed the bill, voting 54–22 on December 19, 1975 and the House passed the bill, voting 323–99 on January 27, 1976. Ford signed the bill into law on February 9, 1976. Even after the Clark Amendment became law, then-Director of Central Intelligence, George H. W. Bush, refused to concede that all U.S. aid to Angola had ceased. According to foreign affairs analyst Jane Hunter, Israel stepped in as a proxy arms supplier for the United States after the Clark Amendment took effect.

The U.S. government vetoed Angolan entry into the United Nations on June 23, 1976. Zambia forbid UNITA from launching attacks from its territory after Angola became a member of the UN on December 1, 1976.

Vietnam

The Vietnam War tempered foreign involvement in Angola's civil war as neither the Soviet Union nor the United States wanted to be drawn into an internal conflict of highly debatable importance in terms of winning the Cold War. CBS Newscaster Walter Cronkite spread this message in his broadcasts to "try to play our small part in preventing that mistake this time." The Politburo engaged in heated debated over the extent to which the Soviet Union would support a continued offensive by the MPLA in February 1976. Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Premier Alexey Kosygin led a faction favoring less support for the MPLA and greater emphasis on preserving détente with the West. Leonid Brezhnev, the then head of the Soviet Union, won out against the dissident faction and the Soviet alliance with the MPLA continued even as Neto publicly reaffirmed its policy of non-alignment at the 15th anniversary of the First Revolt.

Angolan government and Cuban troops had control over all southern cities by 1977, but roads in the south faced repeated UNITA attacks. Savimbi expressed his willingness for rapprochement with the MPLA and the formation of a unity, socialist government, but he insisted on Cuban withdrawal first. "The real enemy is Cuban colonialism," Savimbi told reporters, warning, "The Cubans have taken over the country, but sooner or later they will suffer their own Vietnam in Angola." Government and Cuban troops used flame throwers, bulldozers, and planes with napalm to destroy villages in a 1.6 mile wide area along the Angola-Namibia border. Only women and children passed through this area, "Castro Corridor," because government troops had shot all males ten years of age or older to prevent them from joining the UNITA. The napalm killed cattle to feed government troops and to retaliate against UNITA sympathizers. Angolans fled from their homeland; 10,000 going south to Namibia and 16,000 east to Zambia where they lived in refugee camps.

Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington of the United Kingdom expressed similar concerns over British involvement in Rhodesia's Bush War during the Lancaster House negotiations in 1980.

Shaba invasions

The African National Congress and 1,500 members of the Front for the National Liberation of the Congo (FNLC) invaded Shaba, Zaire from eastern Angola on March 7, 1977. The FNLC wanted to overthrow Mobutu and the Angolan government, suffering from Mobutu's support for the FNLA and UNITA, did not try to stop the invasion. The FNLC failed to capture Kolwezi, Zaire's economic heartland, but took Kasaji, and Mutshatsha. Zairian troops were defeated without difficulty and the FNLC continued to advance. Mobutu appealed to William Eteki of Cameroon, Chairman of the Organization of African Unity, for assistance on April 2. Eight days later the French government responded to Mobutu's plea and airlifted 1,500 Moroccan troops into Kinshasa. This troop force worked in conjunction with the Zairian army and the FNLA of Angola with air cover from Egyptian pilots flying French Mirage fighter aircrafts to beat back the FNLC. The counter-invasion force pushed the last of the militants, along with a number of refugees, into Angola and Zambia in April.

Mobutu accused the Angolan government, as well as the Cuban and Soviet governments, of complicity in the war. While Neto did support the FNLC, the Angolan government's support came in response to Mobutu's continued support for Angola's anti-Communists.

The Carter Administration, unconvinced of Cuban involvement, responded by offering a meager $15 million-worth of non-military aid. American timidity during the war prompted a shift in Zaire's foreign policy from the U.S. to France, which became Zaire's largest supplier of arms after the intervention.

Neto and Mobutu signed a border agreement on July 22, 1977.

John Stockwell, the Central Intelligence Agency's station chief in Angola, resigned after the invasion, explaining in an article for The Washington Post, Why I'm Leaving the CIA, published on April 10, 1977 that he had warned Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that continued American support for anti-government rebels in Angola could provoke a war with Zaire. He also said covert Soviet involvement in Angola came after, and in response to, U.S. involvement.

The FNLC invaded Shaba again on May 11, 1978, capturing Kolwezi in two days. While the Carter Administration had accepted Cuba's insistence on its non-involvement in Shaba I, and therefore did not stand with Mobutu, the U.S. government now accused Castro of complicity.

This time, when Mobutu appealed for foreign assistance, the U.S. government worked with the French and Belgian militaries to beat back the invasion, the first military cooperation between France and the United States since the Vietnam War. The French Foreign Legion took back Kolwezi after a seven-day battle and airlifted 2,250 European citizens to Belgium, but not before the FNLC massacred 80 Europeans and 200 Africans. In one instance the FNLC killed 34 European civilians who had hidden in a room. The FNLC retreated to Zambia and back to Angola, vowing to return. The Zairian army then forcibly evicted civilians along Shaba's 65-mile long border with Angola and Mobutu ordered them to shoot on sight.

U.S. mediated negotiations between the Angolan and Zairian governments led to a peace accord and an end to support for insurgencies in each others' respective countries. Zaire temporarily cutoff support to FLEC, the FNLA, and UNITA and Angola forbid further activity by the FNLC.

Nitistas

Neto's Interior Minister, Nito Alves, had successfully put down Daniel Chipenda's Eastern Revolt and the Active Revolt during Angola's War of Independence. Factionalism within the MPLA became a major challenge to Neto's power by late 1975 and he gave Alves the task of once again clamping down on dissension. Alves shut down the Cabral and Henda Committees while expanding his influence within the MPLA through his control of the nation's newspapers and state-run television. Alves visited the Soviet Union in October 1976. When he returned Neto began taking steps to neutralize the threat he saw in the Nitistas, followers of Alves.

Neto called a plenum meeting of the Central Committee of the MPLA. Neto formally designated the party Marxist-Leninist, abolished the Interior Ministry and DOM, the official branch of the MPLA used by the Nitistas, and established a Commission of Enquiry. Neto used the commission, officially created to examine and report factionalism, to target the Nitistas, and ordered the commission to issue a report of its findings in March 1977. Alves and Chief of Staff José Van-Dunem, his political ally, began planning a coup d'état against dos Santos.

Alves represented the MPLA at the 25th Soviet Communist Party Congress in February 1977 and may have then obtained support for the coup from the Soviet Union. Alves and Van-Dunem planned to arrest Neto on May 21 before he arrived at a meeting of the Central Committee and before the commission released its report. The MPLA changed the meeting's location shortly before its scheduled start, throwing the plotters' plans into disarray, but Alves attended the meeting and faced the commission anyway. The commission released its report, accusing him of factionalism. Alves fought back, denouncing Neto for not aligning Angola with the Soviet Union. After twelve hours of debate the party voted 26 to 6 to kick Alves and Van-Dunem out of power.

Ten armored cars with the FAPLA's 8th Brigade broke into São Paulo prison at 4 a.m. on May 27, killing the prison warden and freeing more than 150 supporters, including 11 who had been arrested only a few days before. The brigade took control of the radio station in Luanda at 7 a.m. and announced their coup, calling themselves the MPLA Action Committee. The brigade asked citizens to show their support for the coup by demonstrating in front of the presidential palace. The Nitistas captured Bula and Dangereaux, generals loyal to Neto, but Neto had moved his base of operations from the palace to the Ministry of Defence in fear of such an uprising. Cuban troops retook the palace at Neto's request and marched to the radio station. After an hour of fighting the Cubans succeeded and proceeded to the barracks of the 8th brigade, recaptured by 1:30 p.m. While the Cuban force captured the palace and radio station the Nitistas kidnapped seven leaders within the government and the military, shooting and killing six.

The government arrested tens of thousands of suspected Nitistas from May to November and tried them in secret courts overseen by Defense Minister Iko Carreira. Those who were found guilty, including Van-Dunem, Jacobo "Immortal Monster" Caetano, the head of the 8th Brigade, and political commissar Eduardo Evaristo, were then shot and buried in secret graves. The coup attempt had a lasting effect on Angola's foreign relations. Alves had opposed Neto's foreign policy of non-alignment, evolutionary socialism, and multiracialism, favoring stronger relations with the Soviet Union, which he wanted to grant military bases in Angola. While Cuban soldiers actively helped Neto put down the coup, Alves and Neto both believed the Soviet Union supported Neto's ouster. Raúl Castro sent an additional four thousand troops to prevent further dissension within the MPLA's ranks and met with Neto in August in a display of solidarity. In contrast, Neto's distrust in the Soviet leadership increased and relations with the USSR worsened. In December, the MPLA held is first party Congress and changed its name to the MPLA-PT. The Nitista coup took a toll on the MPLA's membership. In 1975, the MPLA boasted of 200,000 members. After the first party congress, that number decreased to 30,000.

Rise of dos Santos

On July 5, 1979 Neto issued a decree requiring all citizens to serve in the military for three years upon turning the age of eighteen. The government gave a report to the UN estimating $293 million in property damage from South African attacks between 1976 and 1979, asking for compensation on August 3, 1979. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Cabinda, a Cabindan separatist rebel group, attacked a Cuban base near Tshiowa on August 11.

President Neto died from inoperable cancer in Moscow on September 10, 1979. Lúcio Lara and Pascual Luvualo flew to Moscow and the MPLA declared 45 days of mourning. The government held his funeral at the Palace of the People on September 17. Many foreign dignitaries, including Organization of African Unity President William R. Tolbert, Jr. of Liberia, attended. The Central Committee of the MPLA unanimously voted in favor of José Eduardo dos Santos as President. He is sworn in on September 21. Under dos Santos' leadership Angolan troops crossed the border into Namibia for the first time on October 31, going into Kavango. The next day the governments of Angola, Zambia, and Zaire signed a non-aggression pact.

1980s

In the 1980s fighting spread outward from southeastern Angola, where most of the fighting took place in the 1970s, as the African National Congress and SWAPO increased their activity. The South African government responded by sending troops back into Angola, intervening in the war from 1981 to 1987, prompting the Soviet Union to deliver mass amounts of military aid from 1981 to 1986. In 1981 newly elected United States President Ronald Reagan's U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Chester Crocker, developed a linkage policy, tying Namibian independence to Cuban withdrawal and peace in Angola.

Cuba increased its 35,000-strong troop force in Angola from 35,000 in 1982 to 40,000 in 1985. South African forces tried to capture Lubango, capital of Huíla province, in Operation Askari in December 1983.

American conservative activists held the Democratic International, a meeting of anti-Communist militants, at UNITA's headquarters in Jamba, Angola on June 2, 1985. Primarily funded by Rite Aid founder Lewis Lehrman and organized by anti-Communist activists Jack Abramoff and Jack Wheeler, participants included Savimbi, Adolfo Calero, leader of the Nicaraguan Contras, Pa Kao Her, Hmong Laotian rebel leader, U.S. Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North, South African security forces, Abdurrahim Wardak, Afghan Mujahideen leader, Jack Wheeler, American conservative policy advocate, and many others.

While the Reagan administration privately supported the meeting, it did not publicize its position. The governments of Israel and South Africa supported the idea, but both respective countries were deemed inadvisable for hosting the conference.

The participants released a communiqué stating,

We, free peoples fighting for our national independence and human rights, assembled at Jamba, declare our solidarity with all freedom movements in the world and state our commitment to cooperate to liberate our nations from the Soviet Imperialists.

The United States House of Representatives voted 236 to 185 to repeal the Clark Amendment on July 11, 1985. The Angolan government began attacking UNITA later that month from Luena towards Cazombo along the Benguela Railway, taking Cazombo on September 18. The government tried unsuccessfully to take UNITA's supply depot in Mavinga from Menongue. While the attack failed, very different interpretations of the attack emerged. UNITA claimed Portuguese-speaking Soviet officers led government troops while the government said UNITA relied on South African paratroopers to defeat the government. The South African government admitted to fighting in the area, but said its troops fought SWAPO militants.

The Soviet Union gave an additional $1 billion in aid to the Angolan government and Cuba sent an additional 2,000 troops to the 35,000 strong force in Angola to protect Chevron oil platforms in 1986. Savimbi had called Chevron's presence in Angola, already protected by Cuban troops, a "target" for UNITA in an interview with Foreign Policy magazine on January 31. Savimbi met with President Reagan, who spoke of UNITA winning a victory that "electrifies the world," at the White House in January 1986. Two months later Reagan announced the delivery of Stinger surface-to-air missiles as part of the $25 million in aid UNITA received from the U.S. government. Fidel Castro made Crocker's proposal, the withdrawal of foreign troops from Angola and Namibia, a prerequisite to Cuban withdrawal from Angola on September 10. UNITA forces attacked Camabatela in Cuanza Norte province on February 8, 1987. ANGOP alleged UNITA massacred civilians in Damba in Uíge Province on February 26. The South African government agreed to Crocker's terms in principle on March 8. Savimbi proposed a truce regarding the Benguela railway on March 26, saying MPLA trains could pass through as long as an international inspection group monitored trains to prevent their use for counter-insurgency activity. The government did not respond. The Angolan and American governments began negotiating in June 1987.

Jeremias Chitunda, UNITA's representative to the U.S., became the Vice President of UNITA in August 1986 at the sixth party congress.

Cuito Cuanavale and New York

UNITA and South African forces attacked the MPLA's base at Cuito Cuanavale in Cuando Cubango province from January 13 to March 23, 1988, in the second largest battle in the history of Africa, after the Battle of El Alamein, the largest in sub-Saharan Africa since World War II. Cuito Cuanavale's importance came not from its size or its wealth but its location. Capturing the city would allow UNITA and South Africa to proceed to Moxico and the Benguela railway. UNITA and South Africa retreated after a 15-hour battle on March 23.

The Cuban government joined negotiations on January 28, 1988 and all three parties held a round of negotiations on March 9. The South African government, weakened from its decisive lost at Cuito Cuanavale, joined negotiations on May 3 and the parties met in June and August in New York and Geneva. All parties agreed to a ceasefire on August 8. Representatives from the governments of Angola, Cuba, and South Africa signed the New York Accords, granting independence to Namibia and ending the direct involvement of foreign troops in the civil war, in New York City, United States on December 22, 1988. The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 626 later that day, creating the United Nations Angola Verification Mission, a UN peacekeeping force. UNAVEM troops began arriving in Angola in January 1989.

Ceasefire

Howard Phillips, Chairman of The Conservative Caucus, and Michael Johns tried to persuade Savimbi to come to the United States in the spring of 1989. The TCC lobbied for greater funding on behalf of UNITA and Phillips advised Savimbi on lobbying Congress.

President Mobutu invited eighteen African leaders, Savimbi, and dos Santos to his palace in Gbadolite in June 1989 for negotiations. Savimbi and dos Santos met for the first time and agreed to the Gbadolite Declaration, a ceasefire, on June 22, paving the way for a future peace agreement.

President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia said a few days after the declaration that Savimbi had agreed to leave Angola and go into exile, a claim Mobutu, Savimbi, and the U.S. government disputed. Dos Santos agreed with Kaunda's interpretation of the negotiations, saying Savimbi had agreed to temporarily leave the country.

On August 23 Dos Santos complained that the U.S. and South African governments continued to fund UNITA, warning such activity endangered the already fragile ceasefire. The next day Savimbi announced UNITA would no longer abide by the ceasefire, citing Kaunda's insistence that Savimbi leave the country and UNITA disband. The government responded to Savimbi's statement by moving troops from Cuito Cuanavale, under government control, to UNITA-occupied Mavinga. The ceasefire broke down with dos Santos and the U.S. government blaming each other for the resumption in armed conflict.

1990s

Government troops wounded Savimbi in battles in January and February 1990. Namibia declared independence on April 1. The MPLA ended the one-party system in June and rejected Marxist-Leninism at the MPLA's third Congress in December, formally changing the party's name from the MPLA-PT to the MPLA. Savimbi went to Washington, D.C. in December and met with President George H. W. Bush. The National Assembly passed law 12/91 in May 1991, coinciding with the withdrawal of the last Cuban troops, defining Angola as a "democratic state based on the rule of law" with a multi-party system.

Bicesse Accords

President dos Santos met with Savimbi in Lisbon, Portugal and signed the Bicesse Accords, the first of three major peace agreements, on May 31, 1991 with the mediation of the Portuguese government. The accords laid out a transition to multi-party democracy under the supervision of the United Nations' UNAVEM II mission with a presidential election in a year.

The accords attempted to demobilize the 152,000 active fighters and integrate the remaining government troops and UNITA rebels into a 50,000-strong Angolan Armed Forces (FAA). The FAA would consist of a national army with 40,000 troops, navy with 6,000, and air force with 4,000. While UNITA largely did not disarm, the FAA complied with the accord and demobilized, leaving the government disadvantaged.

Angola held the first round of its 1992 presidential election on September 29–30. Dos Santos officially received 49.57% of the vote and Savimbi won 40.6%. As no candidate received 50% or more of the vote, election law dictated a second round of voting between the top two contenders. Savimbi, along with many other election observers, said the election had been neither free nor fair, but he sent Jeremias Chitunda, Vice President of UNITA, to Luanda to negotiate the terms of the second round.

The election process broke down on October 31, when government troops in Luanda attacked UNITA. Civilians, using guns they had received from police a few days earlier, conducted house-by-house raids with the Rapid Intervention Police, killing and detaining hundreds of UNITA supporters. The government took civilians in trucks to the Camama cemetery and Morro da Luz ravine, shot them, and buried them in mass graves. On November 2 assailants attacked Chitunda's convoy, pulling him out of his car and shooting him and two others in their faces.

In a series of stunning victories, UNITA regained control over Caxito, Huambo, M'banza Kongo, Ndalatando, and Uíge, provincial capitals it had not held since 1976, and moved against Kuito, Luena, and Malange. Although the U.S. and South African governments had stopped aiding UNITA, supplies continued to come from Mobutu in Zaire. UNITA tried to wrest control of Cabinda from the MPLA in January 1993. Edward DeJarnette, Head of the U.S. Liaison Office in Angola for the Clinton Administration, warned Savimbi that if UNITA hindered or halted Cabinda's production the U.S. would end its support for UNITA. On January 9 UNITA began a 55-day long battle over Huambo; the War of the Cities. Hundreds of thousands fled and 10,000 were killed before UNITA gained control on March 7. The government engaged in an ethnic cleansing of Bakongo, and, to a lesser extent Ovimbundu, in multiple cities, most notably Luanda, on January 22 in the Bloody Friday massacre. UNITA and government representatives met five days later in Ethiopia, but negotiations failed to restore peace. The United Nations Security Council sanctioned UNITA through Resolution 864 on September 15, 1993, prohibiting the sale of weapons or fuel to UNITA. By late 1993 UNITA had gained control over 70% of Angola, but the government's military successes in 1994 forced UNITA to sue for peace. By November 1994 the government had taken control of 60% of the country. Savimbi called the situation UNITA's "deepest crisis" since its creation.

Executive Outcomes (EO), a private military company which had fought on behalf of UNITA prior to the 1992 elections, switched sides after the election. EO played a major role in turning the tide for the MPLA with one U.S. defense expert calling the EO the "best fifty or sixty million dollars the Angolan government ever spent." Heritage Oil and Gas hired EO to protect its operations in Angola. EO trained 4,000 to 5,000 troops and 30 pilots in combat in camps in Lunda Sul, Cabo Ledo, and Dondo .

FLEC militants stopped buses, forcing Chevron Oil workers out, and setting fire to the buses on March 27 and April 23, 1992. A large scale battle took place between FLEC and police in Malongo on May 14 in which 25 rounds of mortar accidentally hit a nearby Chevron compound.

Lusaka Protocol

Savimbi, unwilling to personally sign an accord, had former UNITA Secretary General Eugenio Manuvakola represent UNITA in his place. Manuvakola and Angolan Foreign Minister Venancio de Moura signed the Lusaka Protocol in Lusaka, Zambia on October 31, 1994, agreeing to integrate and disarm UNITA. Both sides signed a ceasefire as part of the protocol on November 20.

Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe and South African President Nelson Mandela met in Lusaka on November 15, 1994 to boost support symbolically for the protocol. Mugabe and Mandela both said they would be willing to meet with Savimbi and Mandela asked him to come to South Africa, but Savimbi did not come.

Under the agreement the government and UNITA would ceasefire and demobilize. 5,500 UNITA members, including 180 militants, would join the Angolan National police, 1,200 UNITA members, including 40 militants, would join the rapid reaction police force, and UNITA generals would become officers in the Angolan Armed Forces. Foreign mercenaries would return to their home countries and all parties would stop acquiring foreign arms. The agreement gave UNITA politicians homes and a headquarters. The government agree to appoint UNITA members to head the Mines, Commerce, Health, and Tourism ministries in addition to seven deputy ministers, ambassadors, the governorships of Uige, Lunda Sul, and Cuando Cubango, deputy governors, municipal administrators, deputy administrators, and commune administrators. The government would release all prisoners and give amnesty to all militants involved in the civil war.

The agreement created a joint commission, consisting of officials from the Angolan government, UNITA, and the UN with the governments of Portugal, the United States, and Russia observing, to oversee its implementation. Violations of the protocol's provisions would be discussed and reviewed by the commission. The protocol's provisions, integrating UNITA into the military, a ceasefire, and a coalition government, were similar to those of the Alvor Agreement which granted Angola independence from Portugal in 1975. Many of the same environmental problems, mutual distrust between UNITA and the MPLA, loose international oversight, the importation of foreign arms, and an overemphasis on maintaining the balance of power, led to the protocol's collapse.

Fighting resumes

The United Nations agreed to send a peacekeeping force on February 8, 1995. In August Savimbi agreed to serve as Vice President under President dos Santos.

The Angolan government bought six Mil Mi-17 from Ukraine in 1995.

The UN extended its mandate on February 8, 1996. In March Savimbi and dos Santos formally agreed to form a coalition government. The government deported 2,000 West African and Lebanese Angolans in Operation Cancer Two in August 1996 on the grounds that dangerous minorities were responsible for the rising crime rate. In 1996 the Angolan government bought military equipment from India, two Mil Mi-24 attack helicopters and three Sukhoi Su-17 from Kazakhstan in December, and helicopters from Slovakia in March.

A Government of Unity and National Reconciliation was installed in April 1997, but UNITA did not allow the regional MPLA government to take up residence in 60 cities. The UN Security Council voted on August 28, 1997 to impose sanctions on UNITA through Resolution 1127, prohibiting UNITA leaders from traveling abroad, closing UNITA's embassies abroad, and making UNITA-controlled areas a no-fly zone. The Security Council expanded the sanctions through Resolution 1173 on June 12, 1998, requiring government certification for the purchase of Angolan diamonds and freezing UNITA's bank accounts.

The government bought L-39 attack aircrafts from the Czech Republic in 1998 along with ammunition and uniforms from Zimbabwe Defence Industries and ammunition and weapons from Ukraine in 1998 and 1999.

In late 1998 several UNITA commanders, dissatisfied with Savimbi's leadership, formed UNITA Renovada, a breakaway militant group. Thousands more deserted UNITA in 1999 and 2000.

The UN spent $1.6 billion from 1994 to 1998 in maintaining a peacekeeping force. The Angolan military attacked UNITA forces in the Central Highlands on December 4, 1998, the day before the MPLA's fourth Congress. Dos Santos told the delegates the next day he believed war to be the only way to ultimately achieve peace, rejected the Lusaka Protocol, and asked MONUA to leave. In February 1999 the Security Council withdrew the last MONUA personnel.

UNITA purchased more than 20 FROG-7 scuds and three FOX 7 missiles from the North Korean government in 1999.

The Angolan military launched Operation Restore, a massive offensive, in September 1999, recapturing N'harea, Mungo and Andulo and Bailundo, the site of Savimbi's headquarters just one year before. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 1268 on October 15, instructing United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan to update the Security Council to the situation in Angola every three months. Dos Santos offered an amnesty to UNITA militants on November 11. By December Chief of Staff General João de Matos said the Angolan Armed Forces had destroyed 80% of UNITA's militant wing and captured 15,000 tons of military equipment.

Following the dissolution of the coalition government, Savimbi retreated to his historical base in Moxico and organized a resistance movement.

2000s

A Russian freighter delivered 500 tons of Ukrainian 7.62mm ammunition to Simportex, a division of the Angolan government, with the help of a shipping agent in London on September 21, 2000. The ship's captain declared his cargo "fragile" to minimize inspection. The next day the MPLA began attacking UNITA, winning victories in several battles from September 22–25. The government gained control over military bases and diamond mines in Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul, hurting Savimbi's ability to pay his troops.

Angola agreed to trade oil to Slovakia in return for arms, buying six Sukhoi Su-17 attack aircraft on April 3, 2000. The Spanish government in the Canary Islands prevented a Ukrainian freighter from delivering 636 tons of military equipment to Angola on February 24, 2001. The captain of the ship had inaccurately reported his cargo, falsely claiming the ship carried automobile parts. The Angolan government admitted Simportex had purchased arms from Rosvooruzhenie, the Russian state-owned arms company, and acknowledged the captain might have violated Spanish law by misreporting his cargo, a common practice in arms smuggling to Angola.

Government troops captured and destroyed UNITA's Epongoloko base in Benguela province and Mufumbo base in Cuanza Sul in October 2001. The Slovak government sold fighter jets to the Angolan government in 2001 in violation of the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports.

Government troops killed Savimbi on February 22, 2002 in Moxico province. UNITA Vice President Antonio Dembo took over, but died from diabetes twelve days later on March 3, and Secretary-General Paulo Lukamba became UNITA's leader. After Savimbi's death the government came to a crossroads over how to proceed. After initially indicating the counter-insurgency might continue, the government announced it would halt all military operations on March 13. Military commanders for UNITA and the MPLA met in Cassamba and agreed to a cease-fire. However, Carlos Morgado, UNITA's spokesman in Portugal, said he UNITA's Portugal wing had been under the impression General Kamorteiro, the UNITA general who agreed to the ceasefire, had been captured more than a week earlier. Morgado did say that he had not heard from Angola since Savimbi's death. The military commanders signed a Memorandum of Understanding as an addendum to the Lusaka Protocol in Luena on April 4, Dos Santos and Lukambo observing.

The United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1404 on April 18, extending the UNAVEM III mission by six months. Resolutions 1412 and 1432, passed on May 17 and August 15 respectively, suspended the UN travel ban on UNITA officials for 90 days each, finally abolishing the ban through Resolution 1439 on October 18. UNAVEM III, extended an additional two months by Resolution 1439, ended on December 19.

In August 2002 UNITA declared itself a political party and officially demobilized its armed forces. That same month the United Nations Security Council replaced the United Nations Office in Angola with the United Nations Mission in Angola, a larger, non-military, political presence.

Legacy

The civil war internally displaced four million people, one-third of Angola's population. The government spent $187 million settling IDPs between April 4, 2002 and 2004, after which the World Bank gave $33 million to continue the settling process. Militant forces laid approximately 15 million landmines by 2002. The HALO Trust charity began demining in 1994, destroying 30,000 by July 2007. There are 1,100 Angolans and seven foreign workers who are working for HALO Trust in Angola, with operations expected to finish sometime between 2011 and 2014.

Human Rights Watch estimates UNITA and the government employed more than 6,000 and 3,000 child soldiers respectively, some forcibly impressed, during the war. Human rights analysts found 5,000 to 8,000 underage girls married to UNITA militants. Some girls were ordered to go and forage for food to provide for the troops. If the girls did not bring back enough food as judged by their commander, then the girls would not eat. After victories UNITA commanders would be rewarded with women who were often then sexually abused. The government and U.N. agencies identified 190 child soldiers in the Angolan army and relocated seventy of them by November 2002, but the government continued to knowingly employ other underage soldiers.

Cultural influence

John Milius's 1984 film Red Dawn explores a future in which the United States loses a nuclear war with the Soviet Union and is invaded by a joint Cuban-Soviet force, similar to the contemporary reality in Angola. One of the officers depicted in the film, a Cuban named Bella, is said to have fought in the Cold War-conflicts in Angola, El Salvador, and Nicaragua.

Anti-communist activist Jack Abramoff wrote and co-produced the film Red Scorpion with his brother Robert in 1989. Dolph Lundgren played Nikolai, a Soviet agent sent to assassinate an African revolutionary in a country modeled on Angola. The film has a strongly anti-Communist message, and goes to great lengths to depict the sadism and violence of the Soviets, including a scene in which chemical weapons are used. The South African government financed the film through the International Freedom Foundation, a front-group chaired by Abramoff, as part of its efforts to undermine international sympathy for the African National Congress.

Fernando Vendrell produced, and Zézé Gamboa directed, The Hero, a film about the life of average Angolans after the civil war, in 2004. The film follows the lives of three individuals; Vitório, a war veteran crippled by a landmine who returns to Luanda, Manu, a young boy searching for his soldier father, and Joana, a teacher who mentors the boy and begins a love affair with Vitório. The Hero won the 2005 Sundance World Dramatic Cinema Jury Grand Prize. A joint Angolan, Portuguese, and French production, Gamboa filmed The Hero entirely in Angola.

See also

• Republic of Cabinda

Further reading

• Victoria Brittain, Death of Dignity, Red Sea Press, 1998. ISBN 0-86543-636-3. Presents an account of the conflict from the MPLA point of view.
• John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story, W.W. Norton, 1978
• "Savimbi's Elusive Victory in Angola", by Michael Johns, U.S. Congressional Record, October 26, 1989.
• Ryszard Kapuściński, Another Day of Life, Penguin, 1975. ISBN 014118678X. A Polish journalist's classic account of the withdrawal of the Portuguese and the beginning of the war.

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External links

• Armed Conflict Events Data: Angolan Civil War 1975–1991
• Excerpts from In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story, by John Stockwell (the CIA officer who headed up the CIA's Angola Task Force)

• African Civil Wars
• Cold War
• Guerrilla wars
• History of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
• Military history of Angola
• Military history of Cuba
• UNITA
• Wars involving Cuba
• Wars involving South Africa