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1953 coup d'état
Tank-riding anti-Mosaddeq demonstrators in Tehran on August 19 1953.
Date 1953 Location Iran Result Deposition of Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq, and his replacement by Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi on 19 August 1953.

The 1953 Iranian coup d'état deposed the government of Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq and his cabinet, and was effected by Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi, SIS, and CIA agents working with anti-government civilians and army officers. The attempt to encourage a coup d'état, Operation Ajax required CIA man Kermit Roosevelt, Jr.'s bribing government officials, the news media, and businessmen, to allow imposing retired Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi and Imperial Guard Col. Nematollah Nassiri as the government.

This deposition of a formally-elected civil government was "a critical event in post-war world history", because it re-installed the unpopular Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, leading a pro-Western dictatorship, that, in the event, contributed to his deposition by the anti-Western Islamic Republic in 1979.

In the U.S., Operation Ajax was originally viewed as a triumph of covert action, but in 2000 Madeleine Albright, Secretary of State to President Bill Clinton, called it a "setback for democratic government" in Iran, and one journalist has even described it as having left "a haunting and terrible legacy".

In Iran, motivations for the coup are said to have included significant domestic dissatisfaction with the Mossadegh government (especially within the Iranian military), and the CIA propaganda campaign. Motivations for the foreign coup planners included a desire to control Iranian oil fields and, to a lesser extent, concerns over Iran coming under the control of the Soviet bloc of Iran's traditional enemy Russia.

Background

The principal cause (among others) of Operation Ajax (the coup d'état) was Western (American and European) dispute over the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company between the Imperial British government and the civil Iranian government.

Early oil development

In May 1901, Mozzafar al-Din Shah Qajar, the Shah of Persia, sought to pay debts owed to Britain by granting a 60-year petroleum search concession to William Knox D'Arcy. The exploration took seven years, was almost canceled, but yielded an enormous oil field — from which Persia would receive only 16 percent of the future profits.

The company slowly grew, until World War I, when Persia's strategic importance led the British Government to buy a controlling share in the company, essentially nationalizing British oil production in Iran for a short time, becoming the Royal Navy's chief fuel source in defeating the Central Powers; British soldiers occupied Persia's strategic parts.

Post-World War I

The Persians were dissatisfied with the British oil concession and the royalty terms, whereby Persia only received 16 per cent of net profits. The dissatisfaction was exacerbated by British involvement in the Persian Constitutional Revolution and their using Persia to attack Russia to overturn the Bolshevik Revolution's deposition of Tsar Nicholas II.

In 1921, a military coup, "widely believed to be a British attempt to enforce at least the spirit of the Anglo-Persian agreement," and to have been provided "financial and logisti­cal support of British military personnel," led to the emergence of Reza Pahlavi on the political scene of Iran, eventually placing him on the throne as Shah of Iran, four years later, in 1925. The new Shah undertook a number of modernization measures, many of which were advantageous not only to the British but the Iranians as well, such as the Persian Corridor railroads for military and other transportation.

In the 1930s, Nazi Germany courted the Shah in order to secure access to oil, for use in their war effort. The Shah terminated the APOC concession. The concession was resettled within a year, covering a reduced area with an increase in the Persian government's share of profits.

On 21 March 1935, Reza Shah Pahlavi, issued a decree asking foreign delegates to use the term Iran instead of Persia in formal correspondence, and so, APOC became the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC).

In 1941, following the German invasion of the USSR, the British and Commonwealth forces and the Soviet Union invaded Iran, to secure supply lines (see Persian Corridor) for the Soviets fighting against Germany on the Eastern Front and Iranian oil fields for the allies. They deposed Reza Shah accusing him of being "sympathetic to the Nazis" and installed Reza's 22-year-old son Crown Prince Mohammad Reza Pahlavi to replace him.

Post-World War II

In Iran, a constitutional monarchy since 1906, nationalist leaders became powerful in seeking reduction of long-term foreign intervention in their country — especially the greatly-profitable British oil concession. In particular, the AIOC's refusal to allow auditing of accounts to determine whether or not the Iranian government was being paid its due royalties in full. The AIOC's refusal escalated nationalist demands to: an equal share of petroleum revenue. Finally, the crisis was the AIOC's closing rather than accepting Iranian government "interference" in its business. The AIOC and the Iranian government resisted nationalist pressure to a renewed deal in 1949.

1950s

Support for nationalization

In 1951, the AIOC's resistance to re-negotiating their petroleum concession — and increasing the royalty paid to Iran — created popular support for nationalising the company; the nationalisation impulse was not only strong, but passionate. In March, the pro-Western P.M. Ali Razmara was assassinated; the next month, the parliament legislated the petroleum industry's nationalisation, by creating the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). This legislation was guided by the Western-educated Dr. Mohammed Mosaddeq, then a member of the Iranian parliament and leader of the nationalisation movement; by May, the Shah had appointed Mosaddeq Prime Minister.

That summer, American diplomat Averell Harriman went to Iran to negotiate an Anglo-Iranian compromise, asking the Shah's help; his reply was that "in the face of public opinion, there was no way he could say a word against nationalization". Harriman held a press conference in Tehran, calling for reason and enthusiasm in confronting the "nationalisation crisis". As soon as he spoke, a journalist rose and shouted: "We and the Iranian people all support Premier Mossadegh and oil nationalization!" Everyone present began cheering and then marched out of the room; the abandoned Harriman shook his head in dismay.

Nationalization

The National Iranian Oil Company suffered decreased production, because of Iranian inexperience and the AIOC's orders that British technicians not work with them, thus provoking the Abadan Crisis that was aggravated by the Royal Navy's blockading its export markets to force Iran to not nationalise its petroleum. The Iranian revenues were greater, because the profits went to Iran's national treasury rather than to private, foreign oil companies. By September 1951, the British had virtually ceased Abadan oil field production, forbidden British export to Iran of key British commodities (including sugar and steel), and had frozen Iran's hard currency accounts in British banks.

The United Kingdom took its anti-nationalisation case against Iran to the International Court of Justice at The Hague; P.M. Mossadegh said the world would learn of a "cruel and imperialistic country" stealing from a "needy and naked people". Representing the AIOC, the U.K. lost its case, yet, worried about its other Iranian interests, believed the misconception that Iran's nationalism was Soviet-backed. In the event, they persuaded Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that Iran was falling to the Soviets — effectively exploiting the narrow, American Cold War mindset — yet President Harry S. Truman never agreed to their overthrowing of Prime Minister Mohammed Mosaddeq; but, later, in 1953, when Dwight D. Eisenhower became president, they convinced him to a joint coup d'état deposing Iran's only democratically-elected government in order to re-establish foreign (British) control of Iran's petroleum.

Although nationalization of the oil industry increased Iranian revenues, it inevitably resulted in a socialist style economy, addicted to subsidization and impervious to taxation. With all revenues flowing into the national treasury, the Iranian people now saw the central government as the answer to all their needs. The government — rather than independent industries — became responsible for providing jobs, building the infrastructure and providing education. Moreover, the expectation grew that the government should provide heavy subsidization on almost all essential needs. However, the lack of effective mechanisms for distribution of subsidies or enforcing taxation lead to extremely poor distribution of wealth and an unsustainable economy — and became a main source of widespread dissatisfaction with both the Pahlavi regime and the Islamic republic .

Origins

Overthrowing Mosaddegh's government was a British idea for which they asked President Truman's aid; he refused. Later, in 1953, when Eisenhower became president, the British asked him and he agreed to their jointly deposing the elected Iranian civil government.

Prime Minister Mosaddegh, having decided that Iran must profit from its own petroleum, acted to nationalise that natural resource previously controlled by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. Britain complained the Iranian government was violating the AIOC's legal rights and headed a worldwide boycott of Iranian petroleum, provoking a financial crisis for Iran's economy. The monarchy, supported by the U.S. and the U.K. invited Western oil companies back to exploit Iran's petroleum.

"The crushing of Iran's first democratic government ushered in more than two decades of dictatorship under the Shah, who relied heavily on U.S. aid and arms", wrote Dan De Luce in The Guardian in reviewing All the Shah's Men, by New York Times reporter Stephen Kinzer, who, for the first time, reveals the details of the coup d'état.

Cold War

The neutrality of this article is disputed. Relevant discussion may be found on the talk page. Please do not remove this message until conditions to do so are met. (April 2008) (Learn how and when to remove this message)

Contemporary controversy about the Operation Ajax coup d'état is whether or not the Americans and the British had legitimate fears of Communist influence in Iran that might have limited their access to its petroleum. After WWII, the U.S.S.R.'s Allied-agreed domain included Central Asia and much of Eastern Europe. As the Iranians nationalised their country's petroleum, on 26th June 1950, North Korea, with Soviet approval, crossed the 38th parallel and invaded South Korea in a reunification war known in the West as the Korean War. Three years later (just before the Anglo-American coup d'état against P.M. Mossadegh) the Soviets crushed an uprising of strikes and protests in East Germany.

The United States, challenged by what most Americans saw as a relentless communist advance, slowly ceased to view Iran as a country with a unique history that faced a unique political challenge.

From the Anglo-American perspective, Iran's internal affairs crisis, featuring the large and popular pro-Soviet Tudeh (Communist) Party, became just another part of the Cold War between Communism and "the Free world". British diplomat Sam Falle says:

1952 was a very dangerous time. The Cold War was hot in Korea. The Soviet Union had tried to take all Berlin in 1948. Stalin was still alive. On no account could the Western powers risk a Soviet takeover of Iran, which would almost certainly have led to World War III.

Per Prof. Ervand Abrahamian, the “Communist threat” was a smokescreen hiding external Western intervention in Iran, the coup d'état imposing the Shah upon the people; Secretary of State Dean Acheson so admitted in responding to Pres. Eisenhower's claim that the Tudeh party was about to assume power.

Throughout the crisis, the “communist danger” was more of a rhetorical device than a real issue — i.e. it was part of the cold-war discourse . . . Despite 20,000 members and 110,000 sympathizers, the Tudeh was no match for the armed tribes and the 129,000-man military. What is more, the British and Americans had enough inside information to be confident that the party had no plans to initiate armed insurrection. At the beginning of the crisis, when the Truman administration was under the impression a compromise was possible, Acheson had stressed the communist danger, and warned if Mossadeq was not helped, the Tudeh would take over. The (British) Foreign Office had retorted that the Tudeh was no real threat. But, in August 1953, when the Foreign Office echoed the Eisenhower administration’s claim that the Tudeh was about to take over, Acheson now retorted that there was no such communist danger. Acheson was honest enough to admit that the issue of the Tudeh was a smokescreen.

As part of the post–coup d'état political repression of the Tudeh, the imposed imperial government revealed that the party had 477 members in the Iranian armed forces: "22 colonels, 69 majors, 100 captains, 193 lieutenants, 19 noncommissioned officers, and 63 military cadets", however, none was member of the tank divisions, stationed around Tehran, that might have participated in the Shah's anti-democratic coup d'état; he had carefully screened them.

Besides fear of Soviet influence in Iranian internal affairs, the Cold War influenced the U.S. to support — or not oppose — Britain's anti-Mossadegh policy towards Iran; using British support of the U.S., the P.M. Winston Churchill insisted they not undermine his campaign to isolate Iranian P.M. Mossadegh: "Britain was supporting the Americans in Korea, he reminded Truman, and had a right to expect Anglo-American unity on Iran".

Under the Shah, a pro-American government gave the U.S. a double, geographic and strategic advantage, as Turkey, also bordering the U.S.S.R., was part of NATO.

Planning Operation Ajax

As a condition for restoring the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, the U.S. required collapsing the AIOC's monopoly; five American petroleum companies, Royal Dutch Shell, and the Compagnie Française des Pétroles, were to draw Iran's petroleum after the successful coup d'état — Operation Ajax.

As part of that, the CIA organized anti-Communist guerrillas to fight the Tudeh Party if they seized power in the chaos of Operation Ajax. Per released National Security Archive documents, Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell Smith reported that the CIA had agreed with Qashqai tribal leaders, in south Iran, to establish a clandestine safe haven from which U.S.-funded guerrillas and spies could operate.

Operation Ajax's formal leader was senior CIA officer Kermit Roosevelt, Jr., while career agent Donald Wilber was the operational leader, planner, and executor of the deposition of P.M. Mossadegh. The coup d'état depended on the impotent Shah's dismissing the popular and powerful Prime Minister and replacing him with Gen. Fazlollah Zahedi, with help from Col. Abbas Farzanegan — a man agreed by the British and Americans after determining his anti-Soviet politics.

The BBC spearheaded Britain's propaganda campaign, broadcasting the go-code launching the coup d'état against Iran's elected government. At the start, the coup d'état briefly faltered — and the Shah fled from Iran, however, after a short Italian exile, the CIA successfully returned him to Iran. Gen. Zahedi replaced the deposed Prime Minister Mosaddeq, who was arrested, given a show trial, and condemned to death. Showing "generosity of spirit", the Shah commuted Mossadegh's death sentence to three-years' solitary confinement in a military prison, followed by perpetual house arrest.

In 2000, The New York Times newspaper partially published a censored version of the CIA document Clandestine Service History — Overthrow of Premier Mosaddeq of Iran — November 1952–August 1953 describing the planning and execution of the Anglo-American coup d'état. The newspaper published this as a scanned image, not as machine-readable text; in the event, the document was properly published uncensored. The Clandestine Service History — Overthrow of Premier Mosaddeq of Iran — November 1952–August 1953 is at web published. Linguistically, in this document the word 'blowback' publicly appears for the first time.

Aftermath

Iran

An immediate consequence of the coup d'état was the political repression of National Front opposition and especially of the (Communist) Tudeh party, and concentration of political power in the Shah and his courtiers. Another effect was sharp improvement of Iran's economy; the British-led oil embargo against Iran ended, and oil revenue increased significantly beyond the pre-nationalisation level. Despite Iran not controlling its national oil, the Shah agreed to replacing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company with a consortium — British Petroleum and eight European and American oil companies; in result, oil revenues increased from $34 million in 1954-1955 to $181 million in 1956-1957, and continued increasing, and the United States sent development aid and advisors.

Moreover, the sight of the Shah of Iran fleeing the country until foreigners re-enthroned as Shah of Iran was the major cause of his deposition in the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The occupation of the U.S. embassy by the religious revolutionaries severed American-Iranian relations. Remembering the embassy's command-centre role in the 1953 coup d'état led them to its preventive occupation in 1979.

Jacob G. Hornberger, founder and president, of The Future of Freedom Foundation, said, "U.S. officials, not surprisingly, considered the operation one of their greatest foreign policy successes — until, that is, the enormous convulsion that rocked Iranian society with the violent ouster of the Shah and the installation of a virulently anti-American Islamic regime in 1979". According to him, "the coup, in essence, paved the way for the rise to power of the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and all the rest that's happened right up to 9/11 and beyond".

Internationally

The 1953 coup d'état was the first time the U.S. had openly overthrown an elected, civil government. In the U.S., Operation Ajax was a success, with "immediate and far-reaching effect. Overnight, the CIA became a central part of the American foreign policy apparatus, and covert action came to be regarded as a cheap and effective way to shape the course of world events" — a coup against the elected Guatemalan government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, which had nationalised farm land owned by the United Fruit Company, followed the next year.

Conspiracy theories

In the Islamic Republic of Iran, the main exposé of the 1953 coup d'état, All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, by Stephen Kinzer, has been censored of descriptions of Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem Kashani's activities during the Anglo-American coup d'état. Mahmood Kashani, the son of Abol-Ghasem Kashani, "one of the top members of the current, ruling élite" whom the Council of Guardians have twice approved to run for the presidency, denies there was a coup d'état in 1953, saying Mossadegh, himself, was obeying British plans:

In my opinion, Mossadegh was the director of the British plans and implemented them . . . Without a doubt Mossadegh had the primary and essential role

in the August 1953 coup. Kashani says Mossadegh, the British and the Americans worked against the Ayatollah Kashani to undermine the role of Shia clerics. Per Masoud Kazemzadeh, this theory is contradicted by the fact that "the second person who spoke on Radio Tehran announcing and celebrating the overthrow of Mossadegh was Ayatollah Kashani’s son, who was hand-picked by Kermit Roosevelt".

This allegation also is posited in the book Khaterat-e Arteshbod-e Baznesheshteh Hossein Fardoust (The Memoirs of Retired General Hossein Fardoust), by Hossein Fardoust, a former SAVAK officer, that Mohammad Mossadeq was not a mortal enemy of the British, but had always favored them, and his nationalisation campaign of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was inspired by "the British themselves". Scholar Ervand Abrahamian suggests that the Islamic Republican authorities had Fardoust tortured; they announced his death before the publication of his book.

See also

• Abadan Crisis
• Abadan Crisis timeline
• Asadollah Rashidian
• Mohammed Reza Pahlavi
• False flag operations

Footnotes

1. How to Overthrow A Government Pt. 1 on March 5, 2004
2. "A Very British Coup" (radio show). Document. British Broadcasting Corporation. 2005. Retrieved 2006-06-14.
3. International Journal of Middle East Studies, 19, 1987, p.261
4. "U.S. Comes Clean About The Coup In Iran", CNN, 04-19-2000.
5. Stephen Kinzer: All the Shah's Men. An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, John Wiley and Sons, 2003, p.215
6. Nasr, Vali, The Shia Revival, Norton, (2006), p.124
7. Review by Jonathan Schanzer of All the Shah's Men by Stephen Kinzer
8. Mackay, Sandra, The Iranians, Plume (1997), p.203, 4
9. Nikki Keddie: Roots of Revolution, Yale University Press, 1981, p.140
10. Kinzer, Stephen, All the Shah's Men : An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, Stephen Kinzer, John Wiley and Sons, 2003, p.48
11. COUP D’ETAT OF 1299/1921 In Encyclopaedia Iranica Retrieved on July 8, 2008.
12. Mackey, Iranians, Plume, (1998), p.178
13. Kinzer, Stephen, All the Shah's Men : An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, Stephen Kinzer, John Wiley and Sons, 2003, p.106
14. Kinzer, Stephen, All the Shah's Men : An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, Stephen Kinzer, John Wiley and Sons, 2003, p.106
15. Kinzer, All the Shah's Men (2003) p.110
16. Abrahamian, (1982) p.268
17. Time, "Shah on a shoestring" (01 March 1976) p.268
18. Washington Post, "Iran Confronts an 'Economic Evolution'" (04 December 2008) p.268
19. The spectre of Operation Ajax | Guardian daily comment | Guardian Unlimited
20. Book review of Stephen Kinzer's All the Shah's Men by CIA historian David S. Robarge
21. ^ "The spectre of Operation Ajax". Article. Guardian Unlimited. 2003. Retrieved 04-02-2007. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help)
22. "Revolt of Islam" by Bernard Lewis, New Yorker 11-19-2001, p.54
23. Stephen Kinzer: All the Shah's Men. An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, John Wiley and Sons, 2003, p.84
24. "Books And Arts: How to change a regime in 30 days; Iran", The Economist. London: Aug 16, 2003. Vol. 368, Iss. 8337; pg. 74
25. Stephen Kinzer: All the Shah's Men. An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, John Wiley and Sons, 2003, p.84
26. Stephen Kinzer: All the Shah's Men. An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, John Wiley and Sons, 2003, p.205
27. The 1953 Coup in Iran, Science & Society, Vol. 65, No. 2, Summer 2001, pages 182–215
28. The 1953 Coup in Iran, Science & Society, Vol. 65, No. 2, Summer 2001, pages 182–215
29. Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran Between Two Revolutions, Princeton University Press, 1982, p.92
30. Stephen Kinzer: All the Shah's Men. An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, John Wiley and Sons, 2003, p.145
31. Abrahamian, Ervand, Tortured Confessions, (University of California 1999)
32. Abrahamian, Ervand, Iran between Revolutions, (Princeton University Press, 1982), p.419-20
33. ^ Washington's wise advice. Ralph R. Reiland. Pittsburgh Tribune Review July 30, 2007.
34. Stephen Kinzer: All the Shah's Men. An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, John Wiley and Sons, 2003, p.x
35. Stephen Kinzer: All the Shah's Men. An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror, John Wiley and Sons, 2003, p.209
36. ISNA (Iranian Students News Agency) November 2003 interview in Persian with Mahmood Kashani
37. Review Essay of Stephen Kinzer's All the Shah's Men, By: Masoud Kazemzadeh, Ph.D., MIDDLE EAST POLICY, VOL. XI, NO. 4, WINTER 2004
38. See page 71 at: http://cryptome.org/cia-iran-all.htm Cryptome was unable to recover the redactions in the section that deals with the religious leaders. The following is page 20 of the secret history that can be found at: http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/mideast/041600iran-cia-index.html
39. Abrahamian, Ervand, Tortured Confessions, (University of California Press, 1999), p.160-1
40. Abrahamian, Ervand, Tortured Confessions, (University of California Press, 1999), p.160-1

References

• Kinzer, Stephen (2003). All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 0-471-26517-9. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
• Kapuściński, Ryszard (1982). Shah of Shahs. Vintage. ISBN 0-679-73801-0. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
• Roosevelt, Kermit (1979). Countercoup: The struggle for the control of Iran. McGRAW-Hill Book Company. ISBN 0-07-053590-6. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)

External links

• The 1953 Coup in Iran by Professor Ervand Abrahamnian Science & Society, Vol. 65, No. 2, Summer 2001, 182–215
• 50 Years Later—a look back at the 1953 U.S.-backed coup in Iran
• The C.I.A. in Iran—New York Times report based on uncovered CIA documents
• The Secret CIA History of the Iran Coup, 1953—Provided by the National Security Archive
• Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 Coup in Iran—new book from the National Security Archive reexamines the coup
• How to Overthrow a Government—interview with Stephen Kinzer, author of All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror
• US-Iranian Relations, the 1953 CIA Coup in Iran and the Roots of Middle East Terror—Interview with Stephen Kinzer, author of All the Shah’s Men
• All The Shah’s Men—interview with Steven Kinzer
• Review of All the Shah's Men by David S. Robarge
• A Very Elegant Coup—critique of All the Shah’s Men
• The spectre of Operation Ajax by Guardian Unlimited

• Misplaced Pages neutral point of view disputes from April 2008
• Articles with specifically marked weasel-worded phrases from July 2008
• Central Intelligence Agency operations
• United Kingdom intelligence operations
• History of Iran
• Conflicts in 1953
• 1953 in the United Kingdom
• 1953 in the United States
• History of the United States (1945–1964)
• Iran–United States relations
• Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
• Battles involving Iran
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