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Falun Gong (Chinese: 法輪功) is a spiritual practice founded in China by Li Hongzhi (李洪志) in 1992. The movement emerged at the end of China's "qigong boom" as a traditional qigong cultivation practice. Its teachings are influenced by both Taoism and Buddhism.

The number of Falun Gong practitioners is unknown, and the group has no organized membership system. In 1998, the Chinese government published a figure of 70 million practitioners in China. Falun Gong claims over 100 million practitioners of Falun Dafa in "114 countries and regions around the world". The movement distributes large amounts of material via the Internet free-of-charge.

The group differed from competing qigong groups through its absence of daily rituals of worship, its self-consciousness about outside critics, its greater emphasis on morality and the apparently theological nature of its teachings. There is on-going debate about Falun Gong's classification as a religion, cult, or new religious movement (NRM).

In April 1999, over ten thousand Falun Gong practitioners gathered at Communist Party of China headquarters, Zhongnanhai, in a silent protest following an incident in Tianjin. Two months later the Chinese government banned the practice through a crackdown and began a large propaganda campaign. Since 1999, Falun Gong practitioners in China have been reportedly subject to torture, illegal imprisonment, beatings, forced labor, organ harvesting, and psychiatric abuses. Falun Gong has responded with their own media campaign, and have emerged as a notable voice of dissent against the Communist Party of China, by founding organizations such as the Epoch Times, NTDTV and the Shen Yun Performing Arts to publicize their cause.

Beliefs and teachings

Falun Gong was introduced to the public by Li Hongzhi(李洪志) in Changchun, China, in 1992. Its teachings cover spiritual, religious, mystical, and metaphysical topics. Falun Gong is an introductory book that discusses qigong, which introduces the principles and provides illustrations and explanations of the exercises involved in Falun Gong practice.

The main body of teachings is articulated in the core book Zhuan Falun (轉法輪), published in late 1994. According to the texts, Falun Gong (or Falun Dafa) is a complete system of mind-body "cultivation practice" (修煉). Truthfulness (眞 Zhen), Compassion (善 Shan), and Forbearance (忍 Ren) are regarded as the fundamental characteristics of the cosmos—an omnipresent nature that permeates and encompasses everything. In the process of cultivation, the practitioner is supposed to assimilate himself or herself to these qualities by letting go of "attachments and notions," thus returning to the "original, true self." In Zhuan Falun, Li Hongzhi said that "As a practitioner, if you assimilate yourself to this characteristic, you are one that has attained the Tao—it's just such a simple principle."

Falun Gong draws on oriental mysticism and traditional Chinese medicine, criticizes self-imposed limits of modern science, and views traditional Chinese science as an entirely different, yet equally valid knowledge system, according to Yuezhi Zhao, professor in the University of California. Concomitantly, it borrows the language of modern science in representing its cosmic laws; she says: "Falun gong is not conceptualized as a religious faith; on the contrary, its practitioners, which include doctorate holders from prestigious American universities, see it as 'a new form of science.'"

Theoretical background

Qigong refers to a wide variety of traditional "cultivation" practices that involve movement and/or regulated breathing designed to be therapeutic. Qigong is practiced for health maintenance purposes, as a therapeutic intervention, as a medical profession, a spiritual path, or a component of Chinese martial arts. Unlike in the West, where many may believe that qigong is a socially neutral, subjective, New Age-style concept incapable of scientific proof, much of China's scientific establishment believes in the existence of qi. Controlled experiments by the Chinese Academy of Sciences in the late 1970s and early 1980s concluded that qi, when emitted by a qigong expert, "actually constitutes measurable infrared electromagnetic waves and causes chemical changes in static water through mental concentration."

Falun Gong also borrows from Buddhist and Taoist teachings. Theories about the cultivation of elixir (dan), "placement of the mysterious pass" (xuanguan shewei), among others, are also found in ancient Chinese texts such as The Book of Elixir (Dan Jing), Daoist Canon (Tao Zang) and Guide to Nature and Longevity (Xingming Guizhi). Falun Gong's teachings tap into a wide array of phenomena and cultural heritage that has been debated for ages. However, the definitions of many of the terms used differ somewhat from Buddhist and Daoist traditions. Francesco Sisci says that Falun Gong "re-elaborated old, well-known Taoist and Buddhist routines, used the old vocabulary that people found familiar, and revamped them in a simple, persuasive way."

History

Beginnings

Falon Gong was founded by Li Hongzhi. In his spiritual biography in early versions of Zhuan Falun, Li Hongzhi claims that he was taught ways of "cultivation practice" (xiulian) by several masters of the Dao and Buddhist schools of thought starting at a very young age. The biography indicates that he was trained by Quan Jue, the 10th Heir to the Great Law of the Buddha School, at age four. He was then trained by a Taoist master at age eight. This master left him at age twelve, and from then on, he was trained by a master of the Great Way School with the Taoist alias of True Taoist, who came from the Changbai Mountains. Li also claimed numerous supernatural feats, including invisibility, levitation, and weather modification.

Li Hongzhi introduced Falun Gong to the public on May 13, 1992, in Changchun, Jilin. Early versions of Zhuan Falun claims that the system was tested extensively before its introduction, between 1989 and 1992, while the Chinese government claims that Falun Gong was based on existing Qigong systems, namely Chanmi Gong and Jiugong Bagua Gong. Like many qigong masters at the time, Li toured major cities in China from 1992 to 1994 to teach the practice. Falun Gong websites say that during this time, Li was granted several awards by Chinese governmental organizations. Neither Li nor Falun Gong were particularly controversial in the beginning. Li and the Falun Dafa Research Society were welcomed into the Scientific Qigong Research Association.

After teaching publicly in Changchun, Li began to make his lectures more widely accessible and affordable, charging less than competing qigong systems for lectures, tapes, and books. On 4 January 1995, Zhuan Falun, the main book on Falun Gong, was published and became a best-seller in China. Owing to its emphasis on morality, low cost, and its benefits to practitioners' health, Falun Gong quickly spread via word-of-mouth. Falun Gong was usually practiced in the morning in parks like many other forms of exercise in China. It attracted retired persons, factory workers, farmers, state enterprise managers, entrepreneurs, party members, intellectuals, and students.

In 1994, Falun Gong was taught at the Chinese consulate in New York as part of the Party's "cultural propaganda to the West", alongside Chinese silk craft and cooking. The consulate at that time also set up Falun Gong clubs at MIT and Columbia University which are active to this day. Starting in 1995, Li himself taught the practice outside of China, chairing a series of conferences at the Chinese embassy in Paris, upon invitation by China's ambassador to France, according to David Ownby.

Ideological and social context

Falun Gong's growth in China took place to the backdrop of contradictions in China's "technocratic-oriented modernization drive" and comparative lacking in spiritual fulfillment. Following the suppression of pro-democracy forces during the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, China experienced deep and widespread ideological and identity crises. In the early 1990s, Deng Xiaoping called for an end to debates about the political and social meaning of the economic reforms, urging the populace to participate in commercialism and the pursuit of material wealth. Falun Gong, in contrast, "insisted on the search for meaning and called for a radical transcendence of materialism in both the mundane and philosophical senses." In this context, Falun Gong was a Chinese manifestation of "a worldwide backlash against capitalist modernity" Though it is grounded in Chinese cultural traditions and responds to unique post-1989 Chinese realities, Falun Gong also addressed wider concerns, asking for a re-examination of existing the value system.

Zhao Yuezhi opines that, while Chinese authorities condemn Falun Gong as having "fallen prey to premodern superstitions," the practice "articulates a mixture of premodern, modern, and postmodern sensibilities." In Zhao's view, Falun Gong has established a 'resistance identity', resisting prevailing pursuits of wealth, power, scientific rationality and "the entire value system associated with the project of modernization".

Li Hongzhi addresses precisely the actors and aspects of subjectivity bruised by the ruthless march of Chinese modernity... and provides an alternative meaning system within which individuals can come to terms with their experience. The multiple unfolding struggles over this resistance identity match, both in speed and intensity, the wider social transformation in China.

Growth in China

In a reversal from the 1989 outpouring of desire for political participation, many Chinese turned to Falun Gong precisely because they saw it as an apolitical response to existing individual and social concerns. Zhao regards the required discipline as a form of religious fundamentalism, and is subsequently not "a purveyor of 'a social project'". Yet, she says, it has turned out to be "the most politicized and highly mobilized form of social contestation in post-1989 China." No other disenfranchised social group has staged a mass protest near Zhongnanhai, she says. And while the post-Mao Chinese state attempted to avert ideological struggles, " ended up having to wage a Maoist-style ideological campaign against the movement. Such is the dialectic of China's 'economic' reforms."

According to a survey of practitioners conducted by Professor Scott Lowe, Chair of Philosophy and Religious Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire, practitioners believed its rapid growth within China was related to "family ties and community relationships," which still retain great power. Lowe says the "tremendously positive" word-of-mouth generated by practitioners naturally led to the rapid spread of the teachings within close-knit Chinese communities.

The Economist asserts that much of Falun Gong's success in the 1990s was due to claims that it could heal without costly medicine, as many citizens had lost medical benefits and services due to changing economic conditions. Some in China maintained that Falun Gong was the most popular qigong practice in the country, and that many professors from Peking University practiced the exercises every day on the campus grounds until the crackdown in 1999.

Lowe acknowledges sociological "macro-issues," such as economic insecurity, free time, the collapse of moral standards, worries about health and medical care, the desire for existential certitude, and other factors as explanations for Falun Gong's rise. He constests, however, that these were secondary considerations to the growth of Falun Gong. Falun Gong appeals to individuals on several levels of understanding, he says: "For beginners, health benefits seem to be a primary concern. Over time, as good health comes to be a given and as their study of Master Li’s books deepens, the metaphysical system of Falun Gong seems to take precedence as cultivators work to shed their attachments and move to higher levels..." Over time, followers appear to find in the teachings an "intricate, orderly, and internally consistent understanding of the cosmos," he writes. Other qigong practices were unable to provide "clear, unambiguous explanations of life’s deepest mysteries" and such a "complete and intellectually satisfying picture of the universe," as practitioners see it, he says.

Skeptics, Tianjin, and Zhongnanhai

Falun Gong's rapid growth in China garnered widespread attention from the media, academics, and members of China's religious community. As early as 1995, critics called Falun Gong "superstitious" and were skeptical of its claimed health benefits. By 1996, the Buddhist Association and Buddhist journals were issuing in-depth critiques of Falun Gong.

Skeptic and journalist Sima Nan spoke out against Falun Gong in 1999. In his critiques, Sima alleged that Li Hongzhi used psychological manipulation and a questionable mixture of traditional thought and modern science to sustain his teachings. In April 1999, physicist and pseudoscience critic He Zuoxiu published an article in the Tianjin Normal University’s Youth Reader magazine, entitled “I Do Not Agree with Youth Practicing qigong,” and criticized Falun Gong, raising concerns about the practice's teachings and its negative effects on practitioners' health, and about Li Hongzhi's psychological control over practitioners. Practitioners regarded the treatment unfair and subsequently gathered in large numbers to protest the article in Tianjin. Falun Gong organizers sent an appeal to the Tianjin Municipal party headquarters and government. Subsequently the police were called. Dissatisfied with the treatment received in Tianjin, on April 25, around ten thousand Falun Gong practitioners lined the streets near Zhongnanhai in silence, seeking legal recognition and protection of the practice in light of the alleged beatings and arrests in Tianjin. A few months later, on 20 July 1999, thousands of practitioners were arrested in the middle of the night, the media campaign to vilify the practice began, and the persecution was officially underway.

Julia Ching from the University of Toronto suggested that it was the Zhongnanhai incident which led to "fear, animosity and suppression." A World Journal article suggested that certain high-level Party officials had wanted to crack down on the practice for several years, but lacked sufficient pretext until the protest at Zhongnanhai—which it claims may have been partly orchestrated by Luo Gan, a long-time opponent of Falun Gong. Jiang Zemin is held by Falun Gong to be largely personally responsible for the final decision. Cited motives include suspected personal jealousy of Li Hongzhi, anger at Falun Gong's widespread appeal, and ideological struggle. The nature of Communist Party rule and a perceived challenge to it is also a commonly understood reason for the persecution.

The ban

On 20 July 1999, following seven years of rapid growth of the practice within mainland China, Xinhua issued a statement saying the government was banning Falun Gong:

China today banned the Research Society of Falun Dafa and the Falun Gong organization under its control after deeming them to be illegal.

In its decision on this matter issued today, the Ministry of Civil Affairs said that according to investigations, the Research Society of Falun Dafa had not been registered according to law and had been engaged in illegal activities, advocating superstition and spreading fallacies, hoodwinking people, inciting and creating disturbances, and jeopardizing social stability.

The decision said that therefore, in accordance with the Regulations on the Registration and Management of Mass Organizations, the Research Society of Falun Dafa and the Falun Gong organization under its control are held to be illegal and are therefore banned.

Xinhua further declared that Falun Gong was a highly organised political group "opposed to the Communist Party of China and the central government, preaches idealism, theism and feudal superstition." It sought to make a distinction between "ordinary core members" and the leaders, which it referred to as "a small number of behind-the-scenes plotters and organizers who harbor political intentions." It struck a warning-bell against some important Party and government officials who were practitioners. Xinhua also affirmed that "the so-called 'truth, kindness and forbearance' principle preached by Li has nothing in common with the socialist ethical and cultural progress we are striving to achieve."

Li Hongzhi responded with a "Brief Statement of Mine" on July 22:

Falun Gong is simply a popular qigong activity. It does not have any particular organization, let alone any political objectives. We have never been involved in any anti-government activities. I am a cultivator myself, and I have never been destined to be involved in political power. I am just teaching people how to practice cultivation. If one wants to practice qigong well, he/she must be a person of high moral standards...

We are not against the government now, nor will we be in the future. Other people may treat us badly, but we do not treat others badly, nor do we treat people as enemies.

We are calling for all governments, international organizations, and people of goodwill worldwide to extend their support and assistance to us in order to resolve the present crisis that is taking place in China.

Persecution

A nationwide crackdown ensued with the exception of the special administrative regions of Hong Kong and Macau. In October 1999, four months after the ban, legislation was created to outlaw "heterodox religions" and applied to Falun Gong retroactively. The Chinese authorities branded Falun Gong, along with some other practices, movements or organizations xiejiao (Chinese: 邪教), which was given in English as "cult" or "evil cult", and introduced a barrage of media material criticizing Falun Gong.

The campaign against Falun Gong extended to many aspects of society, including the media apparatus, police force, military, education system, and workplaces. An extra-constitutional body, the "6-10 Office" was created to oversee the suppression campaign which was allegedly driven by large-scale propaganda through television, newspapers, radio and internet. Families and workplaces were urged to cooperate with the government's position on Falun Gong, while practitioners themselves were subject to severe coercive measures to have them recant.

Since Falun Gong's ban in China, there have also been reports of torture, illegal imprisonment including forced labour, and psychiatric abuses. Falun Gong related cases comprise 66% of all reported torture cases in China, and at least half of the labour camp population. China's policies on Falun Gong are considered human rights abuses by numerous international organizations, including Amnesty International, who also called the crackdown and persecution "politically motivated" and violating fundamental human freedoms.

Response in China

Protests in Beijing were frequent for the first few years following the 1999 edict, though they have largely been silenced since. Practitioners' presence in mainland China has become more low-profile, as they opt for alternative methods of informing the citizenry, such as through overnight letterbox drops of CD-ROMs. They have occasionally hacked into state television channels to broadcast their material, with harsh repercussions. Practitioners are also globally active in appealing to governments, media, and the people of their respective countries about the situation in China.

Worldwide Appeals

Due to its ban in mainland China, Falun Gong practitioners have taken to their cause internationally, especially in Australia, Canada, the United States, New Zealand, and Britain. Practitioners engage in promotional activities aimed by handing out flyers in the subway or at the mall, leaving Falun Gong literature in stores, libraries, laundries etc. Although some of the literature deal with Falun Gong's situation in China, other publications also include the Nine Commentaries of the Communist Party, a critical editorial of the Communist Party of China, which are distributed by practitioners in both DVD and book form. Falun Gong members also openly participate in activities such as marches, parades, and celebrations of Chinese culture. Response to these appeals have been mixed.

Since 2006, a central part of the Falun Gong campaign focused on alleged organ harvesting from living practitioners. The Coalition to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong, alongside Canadian parliamentarian David Kilgour and human rights lawyer David Matas, produced a report on the allegations, relying on circumstantial evidence. The United States Congressional Research Service regarded the report as inconsistent with the findings of other investigations, and Chinese dissident Harry Wu also voiced doubts. The Christian Science Monitor considered the report persuasive, and criticized the Chinese government for a lack of openness in investigating the claims. Likewise, U.N. special rapporteur Manfred Nowak, said the report "shows a coherent picture that causes concern." In November 2008, the United Nations Committee Against Torture noted that an increase in organ transplant operations coincided with “the beginning of the persecution of ” and demanded an explanation. The Chinese government has repeatedly denied these allegations, saying that the report was based on "rumors and false allegations".

Organizational Structure

Membership

Falun Gong does not have an organized membership system, and eschews the term 'membership'. As a result, estimates vary over Falun Gong's membership numbers. At the time of the ban, the government estimated to be 70 million Falun Gong practitioners in China - a number greater then membership in the Communist Party. Falun Gong website clearwisdom.net claims over 100 million practitioners in 114 countries around the world.

Media branches and appeals

Since 1999, Falun Gong practitioners around the world have conducted activities aimed at raising awareness about their plight in China. These include lobbying, passing out of flyers, participating in sit-ins in front of Chinese consulates, as well as participating in show, parades and demonstrations.

Falun Gong is largely organized via the Internet. Falun Gong websites include clearwisdom.net, faluninfo.net, mingui, pureinsight etc. In addition, Falun Gong practitioners have also set up international media organizations to promote their cause and criticize policies of the Communist Party of China. These include The Epoch Times newspaper, NTDTV, Sound of Hope radio station, and the Shen Yun Performing Arts troupe. Together these organizations also promote the Chinese New Year Spectacular, another Falun Gong-affiliated event.

Falun Gong have set up groups CIPFG and WOIPFG to lobby foreign governments/legislators, human rights organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, who now expressed their concerns over allegations of torture and ill-treatment of Falun Gong practitioners in China. They have also urged the United Nations and international governments to intervene and bring an end to the ongoing persecution.

Falun Gong practitioners in the United States routinely file cases in U.S. federal courts against PRC leaders, once they step upon foreign soil. According to International Advocates for Justice, Falun Gong has filed the largest number of human rights lawsuits in the 21st century and the charges are among the most severe international crimes defined by international criminal laws.

The 'cult' debate

Some debate exists over whether Falun Gong should be classified as a 'cult', and this classification is more common in some social contexts than in others. Since the 1999 ban the Chinese government has repeatedly classified them as a xiejiao, which means "evil cult" in English.

Supporters of the 'cult' term

The government uses the term to classify groups deemed harmful to social stability in China. They also claim that Falun Gong damages people's physical and mental health and have compared the group to the Branch Davidians and Aum Shinrikyo.

Following the stance taken by the Chinese government, western anti-cult groups and scholars like Margaret Singer have also considered Falun Gong a cult based upon on their perception that the group is authoritarian and that it's practitioners are influenced by forms of brainwashing. Journalism professor Heather Kavan also believes Falun Gong demonstrates what she considers to be cult-like characteristics such as having an idolised manipulative leader and a manipulative doctrine.

Western media's response was initially similar to that of the anti-cult movement. Rupert Murdoch described Falun Gong as a "dangerous" and "apocalyptic cult" that "clearly does not have China's success at heart". However, media eventually started using less loaded terms to describe the movement. The perspectives of western media of Falun Gong play a large role in shaping the public's perceptions of the practice and sets the stage for scholarly debate, according to Adam Frank. Soon after the April 25 appeal, those in the media industry with training in Chinese language and history made the connection between Falun Gong and the Taiping Rebellion and Boxer Uprising. This may have been related to the Western press's long history of representing China as "exotic," according to Frank.

Critics of the 'cult' term

According to the State Department official, whether or not a group is classified as a cult depends on the Chinese authorities and is "based on no discernible criteria other than the Government’s desire to maintain control."

The word “cult” frequently used in English by the Chinese government to translate the label used against Falun Gong is misleading. In Chinese legislation the official statement is “Xiejiao zuzhi” which refers to "unorthodox religious or spiritual organizations" which do not meet official approval. It is worth noting that there is no precise legal definition for “heretical organization” in China. Furthermore, the government’s current crackdown on these groups raises the question of who is entitled to determine which group is “heretical”.

Moreover most social scientists and scholars of religion reject "brainwashing" theories and do not use the term "cult" the way Singer does. For example, Cheris Shun-ching Chan considers cults to be new religious movements that focus on the individual experience of the encounter with the sacred rather than collective worship; that cults are less demanding of their members and more tolerant of other religions than sects are; that have a strong charismatic leadership and that they lack clear boundaries of membership. Chan claims that Falun Gong is neither a cult nor a sect, but a New Religious Movement with Cult-like characteristics. Other scholars avoid the term "cult" altogether because "of the confusion between the historic meaning of the term and current pejorative use" These scholars prefer terms like "spiritual movement" or "new religious movement" to avoid the negative connotations of "cult" or to avoid mis-categorizing those which do not fit mainstream definitions. Others see political ramifications in the term: Edelman and Richardson argue that, over the years, the CCP has become sensitive to criticism of its human rights record and in this context the anti-cult movement have been "useful tools," helping create the illusion that the rule-of-law has been upheld, the government can aggressively destroy the group, all the while claiming to be protecting religious freedom."

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58. Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment: MISSION TO CHINA, Manfred Nowak, United Nations, Table 1: Victims of alleged torture, p. 13, 2006, accessed October 12 2007
59. International Religious Freedom Report 2007, US Department of State, Sept 14, 2007, accessed 28th Sept 2007
60. Matas, David & Kilgour, David (2007). Revised Report into Allegations of Organ Harvesting of Falun Gong Practitioners in China
61. CRS Report for Congress (August 11, 2006)
62. The Monitor's View, "Organ harvesting and China's openness", The Christian Science Monitor, August 3, 2006, retrieved 2006-08-06
63. An Interview with U.N. Special Rapporteur on Organ Harvesting in China
64. Canadian Press (July 7, 2006) "Report claims China kills prisoners to harvest organs for transplant", canada.com, retrieved July 8, 2006
65. FAISON, SETH (27 April 1999). "In Beijing: A Roar of Silent Protesters". The New York Times. Retrieved 8 September 2009.
66. FALUN GONG IN THE UNITED STATES: AN ETHNOGRAPHIC STUDY, Noah Porter
67. Wall Street Journal Kathy Chen: "Chinese Dissidents Take On Beijing Via Media Empire"
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80. ^ Frank, Adam. (2004) Falun Gong and the threat of history. in Gods, guns, and globalization: religious radicalism and international political economy edited by Mary Ann Tétreault, Robert Allen Denemark, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004, ISBN 1588262537, pp 241-243
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84. Melton, J. Gordon (1999-12-10). "Brainwashing and the Cults: The Rise and Fall of a Theory". CESNUR: Center for Studies on New Religions. Retrieved 2009-09-05. Since the late 1980s, though a significant public belief in cult-brainwashing remains, the academic community-including scholars from psychology, sociology, and religious studies-have shared an almost unanimous consensus that the coercive persuasion/brainwashing thesis proposed by Margaret Singer and her colleagues in the 1980s is without scientific merit.
85. Chan, Cheris Shun-ching (2004). The Falun Gong in China: A Sociological Perspective. The China Quarterly, 179 , pp 665-683
86. Bainbridge, William Sims 1997 The sociology of religious movements, Routledge, 1997, page 24, ISBN 0415912024
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88. Edelman and Richardson, Imposed Limitations on Freedom of Religion in China and the Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: A Legal Analysis of the Crackdown on Falun Gong and other "Evil Cults", Journal of Church and State, Spring 2005, Vol. 47 Issue 2, p265-267

Further reading

• David Ownby, Falun Gong and the Future of China (Oxford University Press, 2008) ISBN 978-0-19-532905-6
• Maria Hsia Chang, Falun Gong: The End of Days (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2004) ISBN 0-300-10227-5
• Li Hongzhi, Falun Gong (Law Wheel qigong) (1993)
• Li Hongzhi, Zhuan Falun (English translation 2000)
• Danny Schechter, Falun Gong's Challenge to China (Akashic Books, 2000) hardback ISBN 1-888451-13-0, paperback ISBN 1-888451-27-0

External links

Sites run by Falun Gong practitioners

• FalunDafa.org
• FalunInfo.net
• Falun Gong Human Rights Working Group

Critical sites

• Condemn Falun Gong Cult — a series of anti-Falun Gong articles of the state-run Xinhua news agency
• Falungong Part 1: From Sport to Suicide, Francesco Sisci, Asia Times, January 27, 2001

Other sites

• Articles on the Falun Gong, (Pulitzer Prize winner) Ian Johnson, Wall Street Journal, 2001
• Falun Gong: Cult or Culture?, Produced by Chris Bullock, Radio National, 22 April 2001
• Center for Studies on New Religions press archives
• Carrying a Torch for China, Ethan Gutmann, The Weekly Standard, 21 April 2008
• Spiritual Society or Evil Cult?

• Misplaced Pages neutral point of view disputes from July 2009
• Falun Gong
• Culture of the People's Republic of China
• Religion in the People's Republic of China
• Society of the People's Republic of China
• Victims of Communist repressions in China
• New religious movements