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It has been suggested that this article be merged into Falun Gong and Talk:Falun_Gong#Merge_criticism_into_main_article. (Discuss) Proposed since August 2009.

Falun Gong has received a range of scholarly attention. Academics have examined Falun Gong's participation and finance issues, and have examined the discourse surrounding how the practice is characterized.

In relation to qigong and its roots in Chinese culture

In 1992, Li Hongzhi introduced Falun Gong and along with teachings that touched upon a wide range of topics, from detailed exposition on qigong related phenomenon and cultivation practice to science and morality. In the next few years, Falun Gong quickly grew in popularity across China to become the most popular qigong practice in Chinese History. Falun Gong was welcomed into the state-controlled Scientific Qigong Research Association, which sponsored and helped to organize many of his activities between 1992 and 1994, including 54 large-scale lectures. In 1992 and 1993 he won government awards at the Beijing Oriental Health Expos, including the "Qigong Master most acclaimed by the Masses" and "The Award for Advancing Boundary Science."

According to academics, Falun Gong originally surfaced in the institutional field of alternative Chinese science, not religion. The debate between what can be called "naturalist" and "supernaturalist" schools of qigong theory has produced a considerable amount of literature. Xu Jian stated in The Journal of Asian Studies 58 (4 November 1999): "Situated both in scientific researches on qigong and in the prevailing nationalistic revival of traditional beliefs and values, this discursive struggle has articulated itself as an intellectual debate and enlisted on both sides a host of well-known writers and scientists — so much so that a veritable corpus of literature on qigong resulted. In it, two conflicting discourses became identifiable. Taking “discourse” in its contemporary sense as referring to forms of representation that generate specific cultural and historical fields of meaning, we can describe one such discourse as rational and scientific and the other as psychosomatic and metaphysical. Each strives to establish its own order of power and knowledge, its own “truth” about the “reality” of qigong, although they differ drastically in their explanation of many of its phenomena. The controversy centers on the question of whether and how qigong can induce “supranormal abilities” (teyi gongneng). The psychosomatic discourse emphasizes the inexplicable power of qigong and relishes its super-normal mechanisms or which causative factors which go beyond wht canbe explained by presentday scietific models, whereas the rational discourse strives to demystify many of its phenomena and to situate it strictly in the knowledge present day modern science." The Chinese government has generally tried to encourage qigong as a science and discourage religious or supernatural elements. However, the category of science in China tends to include things that are generally not considered scientific in the West, including qigong and traditional Chinese medicine.

David Aikman has written in American Spectator (March 2000): "Americans may believe that qigong belongs in a general category of socially neutral, New Age-style concepts that are merely subjective, not necessarily harmful, and incapable of scientific proof. But China's scientific community doesn't share this view. Experiments under controlled conditions established by the Chinese Academy of Sciences in the late 1970s and early 1980s concluded that qi, when emitted by a qigong expert, actually constitutes measurable infrared electromagnetic waves and causes chemical changes in static water through mental concentration. Qi, according to much of China's scientific establishment, for all intents existed."

Li Hongzhi states in Falun Buddha Fa Lectures in Europe:

"Since the time Dafa was made public, I have unveiled some inexplicable phenomena in qigong as well as things that hadn’t been explained in the qigong community. But this isn’t the reason why so many people are studying Dafa. It’s because our Fa can truly enable people to Consummate, truly save people, and allow you to truly ascend to high levels in the process of cultivation. Whether it’s your realm of mind or the physical quality of your body, the Fa truly enables you to reach the standards of different levels. It absolutely can assume this role."

Andrew P. Kipnis is quoted as stating: "...to the Western layperson, qigong of all sorts may seem to be religious because it deals with spiritual matters. Because Li Hongzhi makes use of many concepts from Buddhism and Taoism in his writings, this may make Falun Gong seem even more like a religion to the outsider; bur Falun Gong grew initially into a space termed scientific , but was mostly insulated from the spaces formally acknowledged as institutionalized science in Western countries"

The term 'qigong' was coined in the early 1950s as an alternative label to past spiritual disciplines rooted Buddhism or Taoism, that promoted the belief in the supernatural, immortality and pursuit of spiritual transcendence. The new term was constructed to avoid danger of association with ancient spiritual practices which were labeled "superstitious" and persecuted during the Maoist era. In Communist China, where spirituality and religion are looked-down upon, the concept was "tolerated" because it carried with it no overt religious or spiritual elements; and millions flocked to it during China's spiritual vacuum of the 1980s and 1990s. Scholars argue that the immense popularity of qigong in China could, in part, lie in the fact that the public saw in it a way to improve and maintain health. According to Ownby, this rapidly became a social phenomenon of considerable importance.

Membership and finances

Sociologist Susan Palmer writes that, "...Falun Gong does not behave like other new religions. For one thing, its organization - if one can even call it that - is quite nebulous. There are no church buildings, rented spaces, no priests or administrators. At first I assumed this was defensive now, I'm beginning to think that what you see is exactly what you get - Master Li's teachings on the Net on the one hand and a global network of practitioners on the other. Traveling through North America, all I dug up was a handful of volunteer contact persons. The local membership (they vehemently reject that word) is whoever happens to show up at the park on a particular Saturday morning to do qigong."

Finances

In his thesis, Noah Porter takes up the issue of Falun Gong and finance in Mainland China. He quotes and responds to some of the allegations of the Chinese Communist Party that Li benefited financially from teaching the practice. Porter writes that when teaching seminars, there was an admission of 40 yuan per new practitioner and 20 yuan for repeat practitioners--with the repeat practitioners making up for 50-75% of the admissions. He goes on to say with respect to the CCP's claims: "...but the Chinese government figures for the profits of the seminars counted all attendees as paying the 40-yuan fee charged to newcomers. Also, the Chinese Qigong Research Society received 40% of admission receipts from July 1993 to September 1994. Falun Gong's first four training seminars took in a total of 20,000 yuan, which is only 10% of the 200,000 figure cited by the Chinese government. Finally, from that 20,000 yuan, they had several operating expenses..."

Ian Johnson points out that during the greatest period of Falun Gong book sales in China, Li Hongzhi never received any royalties because all publications were bootleg.

James Tong writes about the competing claims by Falun Gong and the Chinese government in 'The China Quarterly' journal, 2003. He writes that the government has attempted to portray Falun Gong as being financially savvy with a centralized administration system and a variety of mechanisms for deriving profit from the practice. He also looks over Falun Gong's claims of having no hierarchy, administration, membership or financial accounts, and that seminar admission was charged at a minimal rate. Tong writes that it was in the government's interest, in the post-crackdown context, to portray Falun Gong as being highly organised: "The more organized the Falun Gong could be shown to be, then the more justified the regime's repression in the name of social order was." He writes that the government's charges that Falun Gong made excessive profits, charged exorbitant fees, and that Li Hongzhi led a lavish lifestyle "...lack both internal and external substantiating evidence" and points out that that despite the arrests and scrutiny, the authorities "had disclosed no financial accounts that established the official charge and credibly countered Falun Gong rebuttals."

Li Hongzhi stipulates in his books Falun Gong and Zhuan Falun that practitioners should only voluntarily help others learn the exercises and that this could never be done for fame and money, and also stipulates that practitioners must not accept any fee, donation or gift in return for their voluntarily teaching the practice. According to Falun Gong, Li's insistence that the practice be offered free of charge caused a rift with the China Qigong Research Society, the state administrative body under which Falun Dafa was initially introduced. Li subsequently withdrew from the organization.

Falun Gong website often state on their pages that "All Falun Gong Activities Are Free of Charge and Run by Volunteers"

In an interview in Sydney on May 2, 1999, mentioning his financial status, Li said : "In mainland China I published so many books, but added together, they haven't exceeded twenty thousand Renminbi (equivalent to US $ 2,469). This is what the publishing company gave me. When publishing books in other countries of the world, you know there is a rule, which pays 5 or 6% royalties to the author, so each time I can only get a little bit, a few hundred, or a few thousand dollars."

The Cult Debate

Chinese government view

Falun Gong related sources say the 'cult' label was first used of Falun Gong by the Chinese Communist Party three months after the onset of the persecution campaign. They point out that "it was not arrived at by scholars of religion, nor sociologists, or psychologists. Nor was it the consensus of the government.". A November 9, 1999, report by the Washington Post states, “It was Mr. Jiang who ordered that Falun Gong be branded a ‘cult,’ and then demanded that a law be passed banning cults.” Former Canadian Secretary of State David Kilgour and human rights lawyer David Matas, authors of investigative reports on alleged organ harvesting from Falun Gong practitioners in China, profess that the 'cult' label "is a manufactured tool of repression, but not its cause." They state that the "cult" label was used as a tool to incite hatred and dehumanize practitioners and is merely a pretext for the government's persecution of the practice. "

Ian Johnson of the Wall Street Journal and Pulitzer Prize winner in 2001 for his writing on the plight of Falun Gong practitioners, writes that declaring Falun Gong a cult was the most "brilliant" move: the Party quickly erected websites with "overnight experts" likening Li Hongzhi to Jim Jones or L. Ron Hubbard, effectively putting Falun Gong on the defensive, cloaking the crackdown with the "legitimacy of the West's anti-cult movement," forcing practitioners to prove their innocence. The CCP controlled media portrayed Li as a "charlatan", while snapshots of manufactured accounting records were shown on television, "purporting to prove that made huge amounts of money off his books and videos." Ian Johnson points out that those, the CCP controlled media projected as purported "victims", were never allowed to be interviewed independently, making their claims "almost impossible to verify"; during the greatest period of Falun Gong book sales in China, Li Hongzhi never received any royalties because all publications were bootleg; and fundamentally, "the group didn't meet many common definitions of a cult," since Falun Gong practitioners do not live isolated from society; they marry outside the group; they have non-practitioner friends; they hold normal jobs; they do not believe that "the world's end is imminent"; they do not give over large amounts of money for Falun Gong, and most importantly, they believe that "suicide is not accepted, nor is physical violence."

Julia Ching opines that calling Falun Gong an "cult" after the crackdown had already begun made previous illegal arrests and imprisonments constitutional. She states that "cult" was defined by an atheist government "on political premises, not by any religious authority" , and that the pronouncement was made without defining what a good cult, or a good religion would be.

The American anti-cult movement

Following the Chinese Communist Perty's declaration that Falun Gong is a "cult", some members of the American "anti-cult movement" (ACM), including Rick Ross and Margaret Singer, also criticised Falun Gong. They suggested that it is indeed (or at least shares some characteristics of) a cult.

Bryan Edelman and James T. Richardson stated that "Over the years, the CCP has also become more sensitive to international criticisms concerning China's human rights record. In this context, the anti-cult movement and its ideology have served as useful tools, helping efforts by the party to try to maintain a delicate balance and create the illusion that the rule-of-law has been upheld, even as actions in violation of international customary law are being taken against the Falun Gong. The social construction of the cultic threat posed to Chinese society and the rest of the world, the subsequent government's response to that threat, and its lax definition of the term 'cult" has armed the CCP with the weapons necessary to attack any religious, qigong, or sectarian movement its sees as a potential threat to its authority. By applying the label and embracing theories that posit passive followers under the mental control of a dangerous leader, the government can aggressively destroy the group, all the while claiming to be protecting religious freedom. In this respect, the Western Anti-Cult Movement has served, unwittingly or not, as a lackey in the party's efforts to maintain its political dominance."

Ian Johnson writes that the Communist Party's claim that Falun Gong was a "cult" gave the western anti-cult movement a new cause. People external to the events in China would spend their time "debating obscure definitions of Master Li's works, trying to prove that the group was potentially dangerous." He says that one western academic published a paper which pleaded for an understanding of the Party's response to Falun Gong over concerns related to its teachings, and that there was a "legitimate right to fear the group." "This, even though the government had only interested itself in Falun Gong because of its demonstration in downtown Beijing, not because of its teachings." Most fundamentally, he contends, "what was often forgotten in the learned discourse was that the government, not Falun Gong, was killing people."

Edelman and Richardson, writing in the Journal of Church and State, state that despite a lack of "empirical verification or general acceptance in the scientific community," the doctrines and theories behind the ACM have strongly influenced, and been largely adopted by the China Anti Cult Association (CACA), and employed specifically to assist in the persecution of Falun Gong in China. Edelman and Richardson see the "cult" label in this context as no more than a "convenient political tool" for the Chinese Communist Party to repress Falun Gong under false pretences. David Kilgour and David Matas have come to similar conclusions in their report, and see the "cult" label as a means of attempting to make the persecution appear legitimate.

The Falun Dafa Information centre states that the cult label was, first, "meant to undercut public sympathy for the beleaguered Falun Gong, turning empathy instead into suspicion. Second, it would shift the spotlight away from the unlawful acts of the Party-state to instead the victim, calling into question his integrity. Thirdly, it would serve to dehumanize the Falun Gong, paving the way for more drastic violations of rights; indeed, torture and violence increased greatly in the years following"

Refutations of the cult label

Several North American researchers such as Susan Palmer, David Ownby and Noah Porter have engaged in both ethnographic and textual studies of Falun Gong, and published findings which contradict those of the Anti-Cult Movement, stating that Falun Gong does not have the characteristics of a cult, has no formal organisation, no obligations of any kind, and that practitioners live normal lives and "participate in Falun Gong as much or as little as they like."

David Ownby, Director of the Centre of East Asian studies at the University of Montreal and a specialist in modern Chinese history, concludes as part of his key fieldwork-based findings, that Falun Gong is "by no means a cult," and that Falun Gong practitioners in North America are well-educated and tend to live in nuclear families. "Many work with computers or in finance; some are engineers." It is further contended that practitioners do not have "financial obligations to their faith community," and that they do not "live in isolation" and are "law-abiding."

David Kilgour suggests that Ownby's conclusion is similar to that of many independent observers, including that of himself and David Matas, co-author of the organ harvesting report. Kilgour says that in their experience, practitioners appear to be "…good citizens and exemplary members of their respective civil societies." Kilgour and Matas further opine that Falun Gong shares none of the characteristics of a cult, having no membership, offices or officials. They again draw on Ownby's research, and say that there is no penalty for leaving Falun Gong, "since there is nothing to leave." Practitioners are said to be free to engage in Falun Gong practice "as little or as much as they see fit. They can start and stop at any time. They can engage in their exercises in groups or singly." Li Hongzhi is referred to as the "author of the books which inspired Falun Gong practitioners," and is "not worshipped," nor receives money from practitioners. "He is a private person who meets rarely with practitioners," and transmits his "advice to practitioners" in the form of "conference lectures" and "published books"--which is "publicly available information."

Li Hongzhi emphasizes in his lectures the importance of maintaining normal relationships in society. In Zhuan Falun Li states "The majority of people in our school will practice cultivation in ordinary human society, so you should not distance yourself from ordinary human society and you must practice cultivation with a clear mind. The relationships among one another should remain normal."

Chinese public figure and freelance journalist Sima Nan asserts that Chinese history was full of charismatic masters like Li Hongzhi, and that Chairman Mao was also "quite similar to these masters." The late psychologist Margaret Singer derided Falun Gong as a "cult". However, the proponents of such views have come under criticism within the academic community, their claims are disputed, and, according to Edelman and Richardson writing in the Journal of Church and State, "have been taken up by the PRC to create a sense of legitimacy around its campaign against the Falun Gong..."

References

1. ^ "Falungong as a Cultural Revitalization Movement: An Historian Looks at Contemporary China." Professor David Ownby, Department of History, University of Montreal, , accessed 31/12/07
2. The Past, Present and Future of Falun Gong, A lecture by Harold White Fellow, Benjamin Penny, at the National Library of Australia, Canberra, 2001, , accessed 31/12/07
3. American Spectator, March 2000, Vol. 33, Issue 2
4. Porter 2003, pp. 38-39. Available online:
5. Porter 2003, p 197
6. ^ Johnson, Ian. Wild Grass: three stories of change in modern China. Pantheon books. 2004. pp 23-229 Cite error: The named reference "wildgrass" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
7. James Tong, "An Organizational Analysis of the Falun Gong: Structure, Communications, Financing", The China Quarterly, 2002, 636-660: p 636
8. Tong 2002, p 638
9. Tong 2002, p 657
10. Learning the Practice, , accessed 21 July 2007
11. Li Hongzhi, Lecture in Sydney, 1999, , accessed 21 July 2007
12. The Falun Dafa Information Centre
13. ^ BLOODY HARVEST: Revised Report into Allegations of Organ Harvesting of Falun Gong Practitioners in China, retrieved May 21, 2007
14. p. 9
15. Journal of Church and State, Spring 2005, Vol. 47 Issue 2, p265-267
16. ^ Brian Edelman and James T. Richardson, "Imposed limitations of Freedom of Religion in China: A Legal Analysis of the Crackdown on the Falun Gong and other "Evil Cults," Journal of Church and State (Vol. 47, Issue 2), pp. 243-268
17. The Falun Dafa Information Center
18. David Kilgour, notes for address At a conference of the International Society for Human Rights, Konigstein (near Frankfurt), Germany, 30 March 2007
19. Hongzhi, Li "Attachment to Zealotry" in Zhuan Falun Third Translation Edition (Updated March, 2000) USA Internet Version retrieved June 14, 2006
20. James Randi, INCREDIBLE CITY, SAD NEWS, MORE GELLER PROTESTATIONS, AND POLK COUNTY STILL IN HOT WATER. accessed 20/5/08
21. China - Falun Gong, Voice of America, 1 November 1999
22. Don Lattin, Falun Gong Derided as Authoritarian Sect by Anti-Cult Experts in Seattle, San Francisco Chronicle, April 29, 2000
23. An Interview with Dr. Margaret Thaler Singer, Chinese Embassy in the USA

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