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This is an old revision of this page, as edited by Byrgenwulf (talk | contribs) at 13:28, 13 July 2006 (→Factual disputes). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

Factual disputes

There are a number of factual-type claims made in this article which need references. Moreover, in some cases factual claims made are actually correct. For example, nowhere in the A New Kind of Reality paper is mention made of a "sum over futures" interpretation of quantum mechanics, and no citation is given as to where substantiation of this idea can be found. Are we to take peoples' word for things? Also, the article claims that the paper "references, and indeed includes" a whole lot of complex mathematical concepts, when it does no such thing, at least according to its own bibliography. Furthermore, if one reads Misplaced Pages's policy on valid sources for scientific articles, one finds that the popular media should not be included. I therefore think that information relying on these sources should be removed. Likewise, self-published sources are not valid, so these must also be removed. Additionally, this is an article about a scientific theory, and biographical information about Langan ought to be put under his biographical article. Finally, any further reverts over the edits performed here, which any reasonable person must admit are verifiable, balanced, and an attempt to make this article scholarly as opposed to an advertisement and exercise in glorification, will result in a request for the page being locked for editing. This infantile behaviour is not becoming.--Byrgenwulf 13:28, 13 July 2006 (UTC)

NPOV policy

Does this conform to the NPOV policy? ... I don't think so! =P --Cosmic girl 17:59, 17 February 2006 (UTC)

To the best of my knowledge, what's there is factually accurate. Notice that qualifiers like "Langan argues" and "holds Langan" appear every few sentences to indicate that we are describing the theory, rather than asserting it as truth. I admit, though, that the article could use a "Reception" section covering reactions to the theory and the nature of any criticism. I may write such a section eventually, but anyone who knows the subject is welcome to beat me to it! Tim Smith 19:10, 20 February 2006 (UTC)

It does smack of an advert, given the obscurity of the theory and the salesman-like way it's promoted by the initiating author. I made a few edits needed to differentiate Langan's claims about or related to his theory from any widely accepted view about or related to his theory. CaveBat

I think that this whole thing should be entirely rewritten. The CTMU is not a real scientific theory, and it is misleading to the reader who may not be clued up on these things to intimate that it might be. I have added a small "criticism" section, and links to pseudoscience and crackpot as an attempt to balance the scales a bit.--Byrgenwulf 13:36, 10 July 2006 (UTC)

The material has already been neutrally presented. In fact, it was revised to insure this. As the CTMU is a relatively new theory, criticism from verifiable sources is hard to come by. I would suggest holding off on a criticism section pending the availability of well-reasoned criticism from credible, reliable sources. DrL 22:05, 12 July 2006 (UTC)

Another attempt for NPOV; I introduced a bit about the nature of the publication status of this theory, fully backed up with references borrowed from the ID page. I also removed "blue-collar" from "cosmologist" because one's social class it first, a matter of opinion, and second, should have no bearing on a scientific theory. Now, instead of reverting to previous versions, would people wishing to dispute this edit please place a "disputed" tag on the article and discuss this here? --Byrgenwulf 10:22, 13 July 2006 (UTC)

Unverified Claims

Tim, first, there are no wikipedia pages on "axiomatizable" or "formalizable", so the links you provide go nowhere. That's why I changed them to relevant pages that do exist, axiom and formal.

Second, you need to consider the difference between talk about advanced mathematics and advanced mathematics. Nothing in Langan's postings or his paper constitute anything more than talk about abstract concepts, with a few symbolic expressions thrown in here and there. It is not even clear that the CTMU constitutes a valid theory under the mathematico-linguistic domain in which it purports to reside wherein a theory is defined as a set of statements that are closed under logical consequence. And were the CTMU that (and thereby axiomatizable and formalizable), it would be more widely published than only in the ISCID journal. CaveBat 18:06, 20 March 2006 (UTC)

Misplaced Pages convention allows—even encourages—red links to viable articles-to-be; it's a way to signal that those articles are missing and need to be created. "Axiomatizable" and "formalizable" are not just affixed derivatives of "axiom" and "formal"; they are important concepts in their own right, and not adequately covered in those articles. Better candidates would be axiomatization and formal system, but until they at least mention the terms in question, I'm hesitant to pipe or redirect. Similarly for dual-aspect monism: delinking is sweeping the problem under the rug.

As I noted above, qualifiers appear every few sentences to indicate that we are describing, not asserting, the theory. For example, instead of saying "reality takes the form of an SCSPL", we say "in the CTMU, reality takes the form of an SCSPL", thereby localizing the claim to the theory. Further qualification is unnecessary; we don't need to say "according to Langan, in the CTMU reality takes the form of an SCSPL". The extra qualifier is redundant.

If Langan has argued a point, "argues Langan" is more precise than "according to Langan". That cognition is a form of information processing is a standard view (our own article calls cognition "a facility for the intelligent processing of information"), and the "generalized cognitive" nature of reality is not a bald assertion, but a point he has argued, for example on page 19 of "A New Kind of Reality Theory".

On mathematics in the CTMU, Langan has said that "ctually, it’s all mathematics, mainly advanced logic including a lot of model theory and algebra", and that he "can reduce that entire 56 page paper to variables and functional, operational and relational symbols". His public work is meant to be relatively accessible: "Rather than encumber you and others with strings of math symbols that you might not be able to decipher, I have chosen to convert these strings to verbal explanations in more or less plain language." We already acknowledge that Langan's public writings are relatively informal, but I see little reason to doubt the mathematical nature of the CTMU. (Whether the math is correct and proves what he says it does is, of course, another question.)

The CTMU has been published not only in PCID, but in the anthology Uncommon Dissent and in the journals of various high-IQ societies. It has also received extensive media coverage, including a description in Popular Science. That it has not appeared more widely in academic journals does not mean it is invalid. Academics tend to ignore outsiders with grandiose theories, dismissing them, often rightly, as cranks. Unfortunately, this blanket judgment puts more weight on incredulity that a nightclub bouncer could have proved the existence of God than on the need for a responsible assessment of his theory's validity. Tim Smith 18:52, 1 April 2006 (UTC)

Process physics

Can anyone confirm if it related to process physics?

The CTMU was created in the mid-1980s and published in 1989/1990; it therefore predates process physics, which grew from a 1996 paper by Reginald Cahill and Christopher Klinger. There are similarities: both theories view time as an iterative process rather than as an ordinary linear dimension; both seek to model reality without assuming pre-existing objects or laws; both employ concepts of self-organization; both distribute over reality a form of self-awareness.

A major difference, though, is that whereas the CTMU reduces reality to infocognition and ultimately to telesis, process physics is not a reductionistic theory at all. Cahill writes, regarding the basic iterator by which his bootstrap model evolves:

It is important to note that process physics is a non-reductionist modelling of reality; the basic iterator (2) is premised on the general assumption that reality is sufficiently complex that self-referencing occurs, and that this has limitations.

So the basic iterator—which New Scientist in a 2000 article called "largely the child of educated guesswork"—relies on what Cahill admits is a foundational assumption. At this level, process physics leaves reality unexplained, simply taking for granted that it possesses the complexity needed for self-reference. If it turns out that such complexity does not come for free, but rather imposes constraints on the structure of reality, then those constraints will govern process physics.

The CTMU says that self-referential complexity does impose a constraint: that reality take the form of an algebraic structure Langan calls a Self-Configuring Self-Processing Language (SCSPL). Unlike process physics, the CTMU contains, according to Langan, no assumptions:

Because the CTMU is based on logic, i.e. logical tautologies, plus a small set of metalogical tautologies, it has been described as a "supertautology". No assumptions are necessary, only laws of mathematics.

So if Cahill's and Langan's models are to be reconciled, process physics must be embedded in, and must conform to, the deeper reality of SCSPL. The CTMU is therefore the more fundamental of the two theories.

By the way, you can sign your posts. Tim Smith 16:12, 16 May 2006 (UTC)

conspansion.com

The author of conspansion.com writes: "The Conspansion paradigm has haunted me since 1991." His version of conspansion is therefore predated by the CTMU, which was created in the mid-1980s and published in 1989/1990. It is also substantially less notable than the CTMU; nearly all Internet references to conspansion are to Langan's version. Because by the author's own admission, his interpretation of the concept differs from Langan's, links to conspansion.com are in my opinion of little use to readers of this article seeking to understand the CTMU. For more information about conspansion in the CTMU, see "A New Kind of Reality Theory", particularly pages 27–30. Tim Smith 16:13, 17 June 2006 (UTC)

(1) "...substantially less notable" is as objective an observation as "tastes a lot better." This is a meaningless justification for the edit.

(2) Primacy is irrelevant. That two strangers developed/envisioned the paradigm independently is remarkable, and should be embraced by the originator(s) of this article.

(3) The link to conspansion.com was an unobstrusive (read: few bits) reference to more information. Without positing an ulterior motive, I cannot for the life of me speculate as to why anyone would want to remove such an unobtrusive reference to further, relevant information.

The subject of this article is the CTMU. conspansion.com does not explain conspansion in the CTMU; rather, it describes the author's own version of the concept, which differs from Langan's. It is therefore, as I said, of little use to readers of this article seeking to understand the CTMU. Since "conspansion" in this article refers specifically to Langan's version, it is clearer to say "a process Langan calls conspansion" than "a process called conspansion".

At Misplaced Pages, notability is not a mere matter of taste, but a developed set of criteria used as an aid to deciding what belongs in the encyclopedia. The CTMU, having appeared in Popular Science, on 20/20, and elsewhere in the mainstream media, is clearly notable. conspansion.com is not.

So for lack of relevance to the CTMU and lack of notability in its own right, conspansion.com was removed from the body of this article. By the way, you can sign your posts. Tim Smith 05:49, 1 July 2006 (UTC)

Criticism

By its nature, the Internet is an endless source of complaint and criticism. Some of the criticism is well-reasoned and cogent; considerably more of it is not. Four of the most reliable indicators that a given critique is worthless: it is vague, it is accompanied by contempt or denigration (e.g. "pseudoscience" and "crank"), it displays incomprehension regarding its target, and nobody is sufficiently confident of it to attach his or her real name to it and thus stake his or her personal and professional reputation on it.

Virtually all of the criticism thus far directed at the CTMU and its author has displayed at least three of these indicators, and most of it has displayed all four. In general, the existence of such criticism is uninteresting to all but the critics themselves, and therefore does not belong in an encyclopedia (even when accompanied by important-sounding terms like "rigor" and "the scientific method", which tend to be invoked at least as frequently by those who do not understand them as by those who do).

Recent changes to this article, particularly those by someone calling himself "Byrgenwulf", have been a case in point. Although Mr. Byrgenwulf (?) claims that he is trying to restore a NPOV, the tone and content of his edits tells another story entirely. It would be appreciated if Mr. Byrgenwulf, instead of using this encyclopedia to grind whatever philosophical axe he is evidently bent on grinding, would confine his attention to topics regarding which he is himself capable of maintaining neutrality.

OK, here's how I see things. I have studied the CTMU; I've read all of the papers and other matter pertaining to it that I could find on the Internet, and it seems that its originator, this Langan chap, follows the commendable policy of making his work freely available. So, in other words, it isn't as though there are volumes and volumes published about it which I am missing. What is more, I happen to work in the field of philosophy of physics, professionally, and I do know a thing or two about this subject.

Now, I agree that an encyclopaedia should maintain a neutral point of view. I also think that ideas like the CTMU have a right to be represented. However, despite the preachy, biased nature of the article on it, it is not an orthodox scientific theory. In fact, it is not scientific, it is metaphysical, by definition (and by Langan's admission). I feel that a reader of the encyclopaedia who looks up this article has the right to know this, and we who know a thing or two about the field have the duty to keep the reader informed.

I certainly understand the CTMU, such as it is something that can be understood. It is not mathematically or logically correct. For one thing, G\"odel's incompleteness theorem completely rips it to shreds...Langan's use of set theory is not, shall we say, rigorous. Moreover, it does not make use of the scientific method. It doesn't. It's that simple. No-one can claim that it does: where are the experiments to back it up? I don't have the time or the inclination to write a fifty page debunking of this idea at the moment, and besides, I do not believe that to be appropriate: the CTMU should be allowed to state its case in the article, with the criticism section kept to the minimum reasonable for the encyclopaedia to do its duty.

As for the "pseudonym" thing, this is normal for the Internet. It is a username I came up with to try to overcome the even more anonymous nature of an IP address. Does it say "Asmodeus" on your birth certificate, then? What a ridiculous and puerile assertion, that using a username on the Internet (like everyone else) renders what one says meaningless. And hypocritical to boot!

Now, why is it that the CTMU and its proponents are so terrified of criticism? Where are the peer-reviewed commentaries? I know that it was published in intelligent design journals, but if you read the entry for intelligent design, specifically under the heading for "peer-review", all the same comments that apply to that field also apply to CTMU. Why is it that these criticisms cannot be mentioned here?

In order to try to deal with this constructively, and prevent stupid "revert wars", why not talk over a reasoned set of modifications to the article here, including a small criticism section, and then we can post a final copy? --Byrgenwulf 08:33, 12 July 2006 (UTC)

His explanation notwithstanding, Byrgenwulf's criticisms of the CTMU still fail to qualify as nontrivial according to the reasonable criteria enumerated above by Asmodeus. The criticisms remain uninformative and overtly prejudicial, would add nothing of value to the article, and would probably convey the false impression that the criticisms are authoritative, despite what we already know to be their vagueness, derisiveness, anonymity and technical irrelevance, not to mention their total lack of credible citations.

Byrgenwulf privately (and still anonymously) claims to be a "professional philosopher of physics". However, I don't think we're in a position to take this on Byrgenwulf's say-so alone, particularly when it remains unclear whether Byrgenwulf understands the theory on any level beyond that required to generate vague and sanctimonious allusions to undecidability, rigor, and the scientific method. I myself have a PhD, know a bit about the philosophy of science, and do not agree with Byrgenwulf's sour assessment of the theory's integrity. Furthermore, this article has already been gone over with regard to NPOV and carefully reworded to conform to neutrality. All claims associated with the theory have been qualified as Langan's alone. Langan is, after all, free to make claims, and insofar as these claims are part of his theory and the theory has been deemed notable, they belong in the article.

As noted in the article, Langan is a "somebody" who has been the recipient of extensive media coverage. While he and his supporters are not allowed to use Misplaced Pages as an advertising medium, Langan and his theory are sufficiently notable that they belong there, complete with all associated claims. Langan's work is extensive, and as those who have read it are aware, he does make considerable effort to justify these claims. Such claims cannot be refuted without vastly more effort, and expertise, than have thus far been brought to bear against them.

Of course, Byrgenwulf is free to doubt the CTMU for his own personal reasons, on his own personal authority, in his own space, and on his own time. However, these personal doubts do not qualify for inclusion in an encyclopedia article. Having already tipped his hand, and shown us that neutrality is the farthest thing from his mind, he should not be allowed to misrepresent his opinion as factual, credible, or even worthy of mention. At such a time as Byrgenwulf becomes a personage in his own right, his own fans can then submit an article about him. Until then, his opinions are not sufficiently notable, or believable, for inclusion in Misplaced Pages. DrL 17:05, 12 July 2006 (UTC)

DrL, in what way does you claiming to have a PhD have anything to do with philosophy of science? I don't know what field you qualified in, but obviously not philosophy of science if you "know a bit about" it! Please let's let this whole anonymity thing drop: we're all using screen names here, not just me, and it is getting childish. In fact this entire thing is getting very childish indeed.

Now, most articles on philosophical matters have criticism sections in them. Why should this one be immune? I still dispute the NPOV of this article, while I do acknowledge that it is written with appropriate provisos such as "Langan argues" or the "CTMU says". However, this does not mean that criticisms of the theory, not of Langan or the article should not be included. And I have never disputed the right of the CTMU to be represented here, and given a fair shot at representing itself. That is precisely why I have not peppered the entire article with commentary where absurd claims and terminological howlers are made...I am not Hellbent on vandalising it, contrary to what you seem to be alleging.

But, here are some examples. The claim is made that the article references "advanced mathematics" such as category theory, model theory, etc. It does no such thing. Look at the bibliography for yourself. It just doesn't. An Encyclopaedia of Mathematics and Goedel's paper do not amount to this. I think the purpose of putting this statement in there is to awe and wow the layman into believing that it must be right.

Here's a quick proof that ought to settle the matter as to whether or not the entire theory is as watertight as some seem to think. Let S be the set of statements provable by the axiomatic system that governs the CTMU. Then, by Goedel, there is a statement which is true of reality which is not in the set S. Therefore, the CTMU is not a theory of everything. Simple. Not very advanced, but then it took all of ten seconds. And it would take a lot more than that to refute.

Moreover, it is simple to prove that Langan's idea of building the theory on tautologies is spurious. And coming from someone who uses quantum information (it from bit) in the supposed proof, this oversight is damning...it is not possible to draw out more information from a tautological statement than is already encoded in the premises. This is a mathematical fact. So, in essence, the only way a tautologous theory such as this could be "true" is if it says nothing. Otherwise it is adding information which is not proven.

Now, I don't want to right a paper on the inadequacies of the CTMU here. It could be done, and it wouldn't be difficult either. However, I hope that these two small, very superficial arguments show that a a criticism section is warranted. I can even admit I was perhaps too derogatory and scathing at first, but I am not going to back down on this. So, what say you?

In the hope of saving time for all concerned, I'll take a moment to address Byrgenwulf's "proof" that the CTMU is not "watertight":

"Let S be the set of statements provable by the axiomatic system that governs the CTMU. Then, by Goedel, there is a statement which is true of reality which is not in the set S. Therefore, the CTMU is not a theory of everything."

However, owing precisely to Goedel's theorems, a "theory of everything" can only be a comprehensive theory structured to accommodate all true statements regarding its universe, even the undecidable ones. In particular, it is not some sort of magical engine capable of deductively generating all true statements from a finite axiom set; rather, it is such that undecidable truths are not excluded, and can be consistently accommodated as they emerge. This is an explicit criterion of the CTMU, and its theoretical structure has been defined accordingly.

This leads us to Byrgenwulf's related misunderstanding of tautology and its place in the CTMU. In fact, a tautology can accommodate all kinds of information within its sentential variables. Such information need not be specifically implied by the tautology, but need merely be accommodated (regardless of how it is generated). For example:

Equation 1: X or not-X (This expression, called the Law of Excluded Middle, is a tautology because it is always true regardless of the truth value assigned to the arbitrary sentential variable X)

Let X = (Byrgenwulf is not a philosopher of science)

Then substituting and reducing,

Equation 2: (Byrgenwulf is not a philosopher of science) OR (Byrgenwulf is a philosopher of science)

Note that we did not deduce the informative statement "Byrgenwulf is not a philosopher of science", represented by the metavariable X, from the tautology "X or not-X". Instead, we inferred it from the quality of his discourse and inserted it therein. The key point: the tautology is still comprehensive, even if the information in its sentential variables is axiomatically undecidable. If the tautology were deductively limited to the statement we inserted, then obviously, it would not be comprehensive, since it is equally possible that Byrgenwulf is a philosopher of science, and that he is not (as equation 2 explicitly says).

A major goal of the CTMU, as I understand it, is to build tautology into the structure of reality to insure that all true statements can be consistently accommodated by it, or equivalently, so that the universe can consistently accommodate all of its own states, relationships and processes, never giving rise, by any means at its disposal, to anything that is not consistent with what has gone before and elsewhere. Prior to the CTMU, this had never been done, at least to my knowledge. It is done here by means of various "meta-axioms" as described in the introductory paper, which one can only suggest that interested parties take the time to read and understand.

As far as what the PCID paper explicitly references, in the body rather than merely the bibliography, I opened the .pdf and successfully ran a search on the terms "model theory" (page 1), "undecidability" (page 24), and "categories" (page 25). I find all three usages transparent and coherent, at least for those with a prior understanding of what these terms actually mean. They also occur elsewhere in Langan's writings, where their usages are no less meaningful and appropriate. That is, not only do these terms appear in the PCID paper and Langan's other writings; the concepts thereby labeled are there as well, usually figuring as points of departure for more advanced reasoning. So much for accuracy.

On a final note, the purpose of Misplaced Pages is to inform the public on what's out there so that they can undertake further research and come to their own informed conclusions. It is not about debating content. Misplaced Pages's verifiability policy dictates that any information introduced to a submission, critical or otherwise, must be verifiable, that is, must have been verifiably published in a reputable source. Anonymous critics and their misconceived "proofs" do not constitute verifiable sources, and therefore do not belong in this article. DrL 22:05, 12 July 2006 (UTC)

DrL, as your supposed criticism was obviously intended to be humorous but biting at the same time, I shall address it here: I know this isn't a debating forum, but you took me up on it, instead of accepting the point that criticisms do exist. Your "defence" is completely specious: it is not possible for a complete theory to be consistent. To put it differently, if all theorems derived from the axioms are true, and there are even some true propositions which are not theorems, then there will be inconsistencies in the theory. This is what Goedel's theorem means...perhaps you'd like to read up on it? I know that Langan refers to the actual paper in his bibliography! The CTMU must choose between completeness and consistency, it cannot have both (because as a theory of everything, one would hope it could account for at least arithmetic truths, and this is what Goedel's theorem deals with).

Moreover, you reiterated my point that tautologies are only as good as the information we put into them, you didn't refute it. And I know the paper talks about model theory etc. (believe it or not, I really did take the time to sit and work through it), but the word reference in this context normally refers to bibliographies, and there are no references to literature in these fields...so perhaps you would like to change the wording?

I would appreciate it if you refrain from ad hominems...I have not started attacking you personally, but I am warning you that if this ad hominem pseudo-argumentation continues, I shall not hold back. I don't quite know what Misplaced Pages's policy is on this sort of thing, but I shall be reading up on it. I really am trying to address this in a mature, reasonable manner: why won't you?

I think we may have a little confusion here. Byrgenwulf states that "The CTMU must choose between completeness and consistency," maintaining that Langan has failed to properly make this choice. But in fact, Langan has explicitly chosen consistency, and therefore rejects completeness in favor of another property, "comprehensiveness".

On page 4 of the PCID paper, Langan writes of "the development of a comprehensive explanation of reality." On page 13, he parenthetically defines "comprehensiveness" as the "non-exclusion of truth" (which happens to be the way it is used in DrL's last edit on this page). Again on page 13, Langan observes that sentential logic is comprehensive in this sense. On page 14, he asserts that comprehensiveness is the goal of reality theory. On the very next page (15), he distinguishes comprehensiveness from completeness, stating that comprehensiveness is "...less thorough but also less undecidable than completeness". Scrolling down that page, one learns how comprehensiveness is built into the CTMU: "The M=R principle, a tautological theoretical property that dissolves the distinction between theory and universe and thus identifies the real universe as a self-reifying theory, makes the syntax of this theory comprehensive by ensuring that nothing which can be cognitively or perceptually recognized as a part of reality is excluded for want of syntax." (He goes on to explain the principle in far greater detail.) And so on and so forth.

In other words, the notion that the CTMU is ruled out by undecidability is simply wrong. So is the notion that tautology lacks the power to informationally constrain a theory; tautologies can be expressively violated, e.g., "A and not-A", and the CTMU simply explains (among other things) why the universe never does this in the course of expressing itself.

I am not going to enter a debate on the value of the CTMU here, because this is an encyclopaedia (suffice it to say I still don't agree). But I'm beginning to wonder if it isn't an amusing divertissement in its own right! (By the way, I discussed my most recent edit at the top of this talk page)--Byrgenwulf 10:25, 13 July 2006 (UTC)