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Naval Operations of Coalition Forces in 1597
I changed this title back into "Korena Naval Operations in 1597".
Yes, China sent a large fleet to Korea to help out Admiral Yi. It is also true that China played a major factor in forcing the Japanese to retreat.
But most of the battles until late 1597 and 1598, it was mostly Korean forces that won naval battles against the Japanese. Chinese forces really helped out in the Battle of Noryang, and not at the moment they came to aid the Korean soldiers. Good friend100 19:27, 29 June 2006 (UTC)
reference tab
who put up the reference tab on the article?
a lot of the information I write comes from prior knowledge. Good friend100 16:21, 30 June 2006 (UTC)
I put it there. Whenever you have a reference being used, use this format: (take out the _) <_ref>source<_/ref>.
Many of this is not properly cited. Take a look at Jang Yeongsil article. It's thoroughly cited.
If we want this to be a featured article, we need to cite everything. (Wikimachine 20:00, 30 June 2006 (UTC))
Ok I'll get my Imjin War book. Good friend100 20:09, 1 July 2006 (UTC)
Korea's Navy
This is a question I've always kept unanswered- whatever happened to turtleships? After their significant role as destroying the Japanese navy, why didn't the Korean government continue a production of these ships? Oyo321 16:03, 4 July 2006 (UTC)
- The article clearly states that they didn't need the Turtle Ships anymore. Read first, then ask. Good friend100 20:55, 4 July 2006 (UTC)
Or perhaps they were too busy reconstructing the country. (Wikimachine 05:11, 5 July 2006 (UTC))
- Maybe, Korea had several weak kings and the military was ignored again. Consequently, the Japanese "invasion" happened in 1910 and Korea became annexed. It justs makes you think how Koreans are so ignorant sometimes; they had to suffer two invasions just to understand how dangerous their neighbor is. (I'm not bias, I'm Korean myself) Good friend100 18:12, 5 July 2006 (UTC)
reference
How on earth do you cite a reference or a source???
I have no idea. Could someone explain the steps to cite a reference? Thank you. Good friend100 03:34, 11 July 2006 (UTC)
Go to 'edit' to see the format
Sentence... sentence... sentence.
That's how you cite a webpage. Don't know about a book. Once you type this right after a sentence (with no space), it will automatically appear under 'References'.
If you cite the same source multiple times:
Sentence... sentence... sentence.Cite error: The <ref> tag has too many names (see the help page). (First time)
Sentence... sentence... sentence.Cite error: The <ref> tag has too many names (see the help page). (Second time)
Sentence... sentence... sentence.Cite error: The <ref> tag has too many names (see the help page). (Third time)
You can go on indefinately like this. Remember to add the slashes. When you do this again for another source make up another name.
I found all this out by looking at other articles. Taeguk Warrior 11:28, 11 July 2006 (UTC)
Here's a help source for the Imjin War...
Hi, this is a very interesting article, though it is lacking in depth and references as the headline tab says.
Read this: http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_military_history/v069/69.1swope.html
I think this is a more accurate and balanced account of the Imjin War than the stuff Stephen Turnbull writes.
Cheers
- Thank you for the reference however it seems you need to be a member of some sort. Anyhow, the Stephen Turnbull stuff is still reliable. Its just that he is a historian on Japanese history. The book was written as part of his researches on Japanese history not Korean, and some of the stuff in his book are POV. Good friend100 20:49, 13 July 2006 (UTC)
I'm sorry the article didn't work. I'm on university networks which is why. You're correct that Turnbull focuses on Japanese history. I feel that the other article that I linked gives a more reliable assessment overall, which is necessary here. It draws from sources of all the three major combatants. It also points at some loopholes in the other analyses. I suppose Turnbull can be reliable when you're just focusing on Japanese military history or for the lack of other sources in the case of the Imjin War (aspects relating to Japanese organization, governance), but as for the battles, and more international affairs, we need a comparative approach.
Here's the article: (This is only a brief abstract; the author is in the process of finishing the research paper)
Crouching Tigers, Secret Weapons: Military Technology Employed During the Sino-Japanese-Korean War, 1592-1598 Kenneth M. Swope
Abstract
The Japanese invasion of Korea (1592-98) has recently been called Asia's first "regional world war." It marked the first time in Asian history that massive armies equipped with modern weaponry faced one another on the field of battle. The Japanese armies commanded by the warlord Toyotomi Hideyoshi were arguably the most skilled in the world at the time, yet in the end the Japanese were defeated by a Sino-Korean alliance in tandem with Korean guerrillas. Looking at the primary documents of the war, it seems apparent that military technology was the single most important, but not the only, factor that shaped the direction and determined the outcome of the war. This article presents an overview of some of the major military technologies utilized by the belligerents and challenges conventional interpretations of the conflict, passed down through the centuries, that claim Japan's defeat was due to superior allied numbers and Hideyoshi's death.
The Japanese invasion of Korea (1592-98), masterminded by the upstart overlord of Japan, Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536-98),1 was one of the most significant events in the long history of East Asia. Planned as the first stage in Japan's conquest of China, and eventually India as well, the invasion has recently been called Asia's first regional "world war." It marked the first time in Asian history that massive armies equipped with modern weaponry clashed on the field of battle.2 Moreover, unlike the Korean War of the 1950s, often called "The Forgotten War" by Americans scarred by the experience of Vietnam, Hideyoshi's Korean War is still very much in the popular consciousness of both Korea and Japan, and to a much lesser degree, China as well. Shrines and memorials to heroes of this saga dot both the Korean and Japanese countrysides. Tourists are encouraged to visit the splendid museum inside Hideyoshi's former castle at Osaka, restored in the militaristic 1930s to serve as a memorial to Japan's glorious military past. Likewise, visitors can view spectacular paintings, statues, and reconstructed turtleboats (kŏbuksŏn) all over Korea. Admiral Yi Sunsin (1545-98), Korea's leading naval commander during the invasions, is regarded as perhaps the single greatest hero in Korean history. It is no accident that Yi's diary and memorials from the war are among the few primary sources of Korean history from the Yi dynasty translated into English.3 Additionally, some Japanese commanders, most notably KatōKiyomasa (1562-1611), were venerated to the point of deification in the years after the invasion. Even though Japan's designs were eventually thwarted by a Sino-Korean alliance, Hideyoshi's dream of conquering the Asian mainland was revived in the late nineteenth century by Meiji expansionists. In fact, the very route the Japanese invaders followed through China in the 1930s was modeled after Hideyoshi's initial plans. The events of the war also inspired anti-Japanese revolutionaries in Korea in the twentieth century, and the Japanese colonial regime went to great lengths to destroy reminders of the conflict that might provoke anti-Japanese resistance.
The war also has larger international implications. In terms of sheer numbers, the conflict involved armies that easily dwarfed those of their European contemporaries, as more than two hundred thousand regular troops fought for both the Chinese and Japanese sides, in addition to hundreds of thousands of Korean regulars, volunteer militiamen, and monk soldiers. The fluid political environment of maritime Asia in the late sixteenth century also meant that there was a significant European impact on the war as well, manifesting itself both in the form of European observers and chroniclers from afar, and more importantly, in the use of various European military technologies, most notably muskets and cannon, throughout the conflict. It is well known that the Japanese had used European-derived firearms in domestic conflicts since the middle of the sixteenth century, but only recently have other examples of military technological diffusion become apparent with regards to this war.4 Expanding upon and challenging Michael Roberts's and Geoffrey Parker's thesis of a European military revolution, Sun Laichen has persuasively argued that Ming China was in fact the world's first gunpowder empire and that the Ming were the primary exporters of military technology throughout Asia until at least the late sixteenth century.5 Japanese scholars have suggested that further technology transfers took place after the war, including a dissemination of firearms technology from Japan to China via captured Japanese prisoners, and the transmittal of Dutch knowledge of cannon making to the Koreans via shipwrecked sailors in the seventeenth century.6 Findings such as these suggest that the war really needs to be evaluated within the larger context of military innovation and international trade, and not just as an isolated phenomenon in Asian history. Thus, it would be useful to ask how this conflict fits into the larger parameters of the so-called military revolution and if this war could not be seen as a test study for the wider application of the theories of Geoffrey Parker and others along those lines, although that is beyond the scope of the present article.7
But despite its obvious importance for both East Asian and world history, the War of the Korean Peninsula remains little known and poorly understood in the West. Most textbooks give it scant attention or at best devote a few lines to it, blaming the war for the weakening of the Ming (1368-1644) state, the destruction of Korea, and the victory of the forces of Tokugawa Ieyasu (1542-1616) in the Battle of Sekigahara in Japan in 1600. This situation in itself is baffling, for the war is wonderfully documented in Korea, China, and Japan. Literally thousands of documents on the war remain extant, and a tremendous number of them have been published in various forms in China, Japan, and Korea. Most of these documents are written in classical Chinese, which is fortuitous for someone such as myself who does not read Korean. The sheer volume of material is certainly partly to blame for the lack of scholarly attention to this conflict in the West. This situation has been exacerbated by the general reluctance of Asianists in the West to devote much attention to military affairs, a reluctance perhaps born of the biases inherent in the writings of civil officials trained in Confucian learning.8
As a result of these and other problems, to date not a single full-length scholarly treatment of the conflict exists in English, although there seems to be a recent resurgence in interest in the war as evidenced by the number of articles published lately in Asia and elsewhere and interest expressed at scholarly conferences.9 Stephen Turnbull published the first popular account, which, although it provides a solid general narrative of the war, has a number of shortcomings. First of all, Turnbull relies entirely on Japanese- and English-language secondary materials, augmented by a few translations of primary sources. He uses virtually nothing written from the Chinese perspective, not even widely available English-language reference works or monographs. He also leaves out much important Japanese scholarship, most notably the works of Kitajima Manji, who has published extensively on the subject. As a result the work is one-sided and presents a rather flawed interpretation of the war. Turnbull repeats the conventional view that Hideyoshi's death in 1598 was the primary factor in Japan's defeat in Korea. He also seems to adopt a pro-Japanese slant throughout, such as glossing over Japanese atrocities by blaming them on "lesser soldiers not in the first rank of samurai heroes."10 Nevertheless, Turnbull does deserve credit for making a larger audience aware of this war and its historical importance. His work is also lavishly illustrated and therefore useful for those who would like to see images of some of the personalities, technologies, and sites of the war.
As indicated above, study of this conflict can shed invaluable light on a number of important issues in early modern Asian, or even world history, including the nature of foreign relations and diplomacy between states including the so-called Chinese world order and its attendant tributary system, the importance of ritual and "face" in interstate relations in Asia, the importance of imperial pretensions and motives, military logistics and planning, and the adoption and use of new military technologies in battle, to name just a few. It also helps to put the current tensions on the Korean peninsula in their proper historical perspective as North Korea's current desire for national security is certainly grounded in past experiences. Policy makers and negotiators would benefit by gaining a greater understanding of the historical tensions between China, Korea, and Japan as we move into a new century promising increased involvement on the international stage by all these states.
In this article I concentrate on one very important dimension of the war, military technology. Again, it is somewhat surprising that this aspect of the war has not received more attention outside East Asia. As will be seen below, traditional accounts generally attribute the complete and utter collapse of Korean regulars in the early stages of the war to their deficiencies in technology. Japanese accounts from the time of the war down to the present highlight this fact. It was only when the Koreans managed to invent their ingenious turtleboats (vessels reinforced with iron plates and ringed with spikes that made them resemble turtles) and the Ming Chinese intervened with overwhelming numbers that the tide was turned against the invaders.11 Japan's technological and tactical advantages were such that had Hideyoshi not died in 1598, then his dream of creating an empire in mainland Asia may have been realized,12 or so standard treatments, most of which were written from the Japanese perspective, would have us believe.13
While more recent scholarship, most notably the fine work of Kitajima Manji, has tended to adopt a more balanced appraisal of the conflict, for centuries the Japanese perpetuated a myth of victory in Korea, a myth so powerful that it fired the dreams of conquerors in the late nineteenth century until Hideyoshi's dreams were finally realized with the annexation of Korea in 1910. This myth stemmed in part from the various chronicles compiled on behalf of Hideyoshi's retainers serving in Korea, all of whom were eager to attain recognition for their efforts.14 Thus, official house historians were wont to exaggerate the prowess of their respective employers, and the numbers of enemy troops, for example, were often inflated so that the Japanese were always outnumbered in any conflict. Later historians, who wrote comprehensive accounts of the conflict for Japanese audiences by utilizing these earlier records as their sources, in turn transmitted such tales. The most prominent and influential of these works, if not the most accurate, were Kawaguchi Choju's Seikan iryaku, translated as A Heroic Account of the Conquest of Korea; and Rai Sanyo's Nihon gaishi, rendered as A History of Japan's Foreign Relations.15 Furthermore, this myth is alive and well today as evidenced by the content of various shrines and memorials to Hideyoshi and the war scattered throughout Japan and by the conversations I myself have had with ordinary Japanese.
What is perhaps more surprising is that modern Chinese histories of the conflict often have the same interpretation. Again, many of these flawed interpretations of the war stem from reliance upon biased or inaccurate source materials. For example, one of the most often cited summaries of the conflict, excerpted from the Ming shi, translated as The Official History of the Ming Dynasty, relates that "When the kampaku invaded the eastern country the war lasted seven years from start to finish and resulted in the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives, the destruction of millions of pounds of grain and yet the Middle Kingdom and Korea had still not devised a stratagem for victory. It was only with the death of Hideyoshi that hostilities were brought to a close."16 Yet throughout this same source, accounts that directly contradict this assessment can be found. Moreover, it must be kept in mind that Chinese historiographical practice virtually required the assignation of praise and blame, and as the history of the Ming was compiled during the succeeding Qing (1644-1911) period, it was necessary for the compilers to look for evidence of Ming military weakness. Since the compilers of this same history blamed the Wanli Emperor (r. 1573-1620) for initiating the period of Ming decline, it was only natural for them to extend their argument to all aspects of his administration. Later Chinese historians have followed this lead, with the notable exception of the late Li Guangtao, who made extensive use of primary sources from all three sides, most notably the Korean.17
When I first approached this topic as a graduate student, I was heavily influenced by the standard portrayals, but even a cursory reading of some of the primary sources suggested to me that such stock interpretations were grossly oversimplified and there was far more going on in the war that demanded further study. Additionally, far from conveying images of fearful Chinese and Koreans loath to meet the fabled Japanese war machine head on, I found that the reverse was often the case. In fact, it was the Japanese who often avoided large set piece battles with the Chinese, not because they feared their numbers, but because they had a healthy respect for Ming military technology. This assessment comes from Chinese, Japanese, and Korean sources. Therefore, based on my extensive readings of a number of key primary sources, it is my contention that despite all the rhetoric used by the participants throughout the conflict, in the end it was technological and logistical considerations that probably shaped the direction of the war more than anything else, and everyone knew it. Lest I open myself up to charges of technological determinism, I would add that I do not believe that technology was the only factor that impelled the Japanese retreat, but it was the single greatest variable. Early in the war, before the Chinese got involved and before the Koreans unveiled their turtleboats, the Japanese ran roughshod over the defenders. Technology leveled and then eventually tipped the battlefields in favor of the Sino-Korean allies, along with logistical considerations, of course. Finally, I would add that the present piece is but a tiny sliver of a much larger work in progress and I hope to present a much more thorough treatment of the war and all its myriad complexities in the finished work.
In primary accounts of the war, what is most striking at first is the diversity of technologies employed. All three combatants consistently sought to develop and implement new technologies and strategies throughout the conflict, and all devised countermeasures to combat the perceived advantages of their opponents. This should come as no surprise to most students of military history, but these developments, with the notable exception of Korea's famous turtleboats, have been largely ignored by historians outside Asia. Thus, this war provides an excellent forum in which to pursue comparative military issues. For example, much has been made of the so-called "Military Revolution" in Europe from 1500 to 1800, but hardly any attention has been devoted to Asian developments in this same period, despite the availability of primary source materials.18 It is taken for granted by many that military and technological innovation was a driving force of Western expansion and dominance and a manifestation of the West's dynamism.19 But, if one were to focus on even just this war, much of the same dynamism can be seen, albeit on a more limited scale. Therefore, the Korean War of 1592-98 is of seminal importance in understanding the nature and impetus for innovations in military technology in early modern East Asia and offers a unique setting in which to study both military theory and practice. We also see how fast military technologies can be developed and implemented during a war, a situation that is often discussed with respect to later conflicts, but also seems to apply here.
Before going further, it should be acknowledged that some of the technologies used in this war were in fact developed outside Asia, most notably the arquebus muskets used by the Japanese, while others were fascinating adaptations of designs and technologies developed in a variety of places and times. For example, according to tradition the Japanese first received firearms technology from Portuguese who landed off the island of Tanegashima in 1543. Thus, guns were sometimes called Tanegashima, in addition to the more general term teppō.20 These were small-bore weapons and were actually modeled on designs the Europeans quickly replaced, though they were retained by the Japanese with slight variations almost through the Tokugawa (1603-1868) period. While on the one hand this is certainly evidence of the superior firearms technology of the Europeans as of the sixteenth century, it is also a testament to the willingness of Asian states to adopt and adapt useful foreign technologies. States within Asia and rival groups within states, such as the Japanese daimyo (warlords), were very cognizant of the advantages superior military technology could offer them, and they were always on the lookout for something that could give them an edge. Thus, they eagerly adapted any new technology that might be in their means to implement. The ability to manufacture or acquire the technology is therefore key. In some instances it was impossible for states or leaders to use these technologies on a large scale for a variety of reasons, so obviously superior weapons were either not used at all or used only on a limited scale.
Before the coming of the Europeans in larger numbers in the sixteenth century, the Chinese were the major disseminators of military technology in Asia. The Ming Chinese had actually been using weapons similar to the Portuguese arquebus for some two hundred years.21 As indicated above, one scholar has even called early Ming China the first "gunpowder empire" in the early modern world and asserts that it was the Ming, not the Europeans, who started the military revolution, not only in Asian history, but also in world history.22 Therefore, when Europeans brought their arms to Asia, they did not introduce the technology, but rather they supplemented and expanded the options already available to war-makers. Victory or defeat often came to rest upon the ability to properly use the technologies at one's disposal. Because of this fact, troops which were otherwise overmatched or outclassed could prevail by virtue of the superiority of their weaponry, most often greater range or penetrating power on the part of their ranged weapons. As a result, conflicts often became testing grounds for new technologies.
When Hideyoshi first set his sights on conquering Ming China, and later, the rest of Asia, he had good reason to be confident. After all, with the use of Western military technology, namely the aforementioned arquebus musket, Hideyoshi had managed to conquer all of Japan and bring it under the rule of one man for the first time in over a century. He knew the Koreans, through whom he would have to go first, were woefully ill-equipped to deal with his disciplined, well-armed troops. Indeed, on paper the war looked like a serious mismatch from the start, though the early twentieth century scholar J. L. Boots, writing during the period of Japanese colonial rule over Korea, exaggerated a bit when he said, "The story of Korean arms is a tragedy. . . . It is a story of a people driven in desperation to a task for which they had no heart, forced to learn an art for which they had no aptitude. It is the story of a people who repeatedly had to lay down their honored pen and brush to defend their lands and homes against those who loved the sword."23
In fact, Hideyoshi did attempt to learn something of Korea's defenses and armed forces before the invasion via a number of spies and coastal raids. On the whole he was unimpressed. According to a Japanese source, Hideyoshi sent twenty-six ships to ply the waters off the south coast of Korea in 1587 in order to test the strengths and weaknesses of Korea's troops. The Korean troops on land and at sea were timid in these encounters and fled before the Japanese. The only commander who did come forth to fight was killed when his boat was sunk.24 Therefore, Hideyoshi felt he had nothing to fear whatsoever from the Koreans. Furthermore, he dismissed Ming China as "the country of the long sleeves" and figured that the scholar-bureaucrats who ran the empire would offer little resistance to his forces, saying the armies of the Ming "resemble helpless women in their spirit and fighting ability."25
What Hideyoshi did not know was that the Ming had also been developing cannon and other firearms based on Portuguese models since early in the reign of the Jiajing emperor (r. 1522-66). Upon seeing the efficacy of these weapons, the emperor ordered that a bureau be established immediately for their manufacture and that soldiers be trained in their use. After Jiajing's directive, the floodgates were opened for the importation of foreign military technology. In Wanli's reign (1573-1620), other foreign ships arrived bearing what the Chinese called "Red Barbarian Cannon" (hong yi pao), a mighty weapon some twenty feet in length and weighing over thirty-three hundred pounds, capable of reducing city walls and making the ground shake for ten li (approximately 3.5 miles).26 The manufacture of these weapons was but an extension of the duties of the Ming firearms division, which was first established by Emperor Yongle in 1407, allegedly with the help of Vietnamese experts captured during the Ming occupation.27 Equally fascinating is the fact that the Koreans also established their own firearms divisions and eagerly sought help from Ming China in this area.28 They also apparently made relatively frequent use of these weapons against both pirates and Jurchen raiders from the north, although it seems that they had fallen into disuse by the time of the Japanese invasions.
Finally, Hideyoshi did not foresee how important control of the seas would be during the campaign. Over the seven-year span of the war, the Japanese found themselves bested time and again by the allies at sea, their supply lines cut. They were never able to close the technological gap between themselves and the Chinese and Koreans in this area. Hideyoshi tried throwing more men at the problem, but the combination of Admiral Yi Sunsin's turtleboats and the naval artillery of the Chinese proved too much for the invaders to handle. In the end the superior experience, skill, and discipline of the Japanese were no match for the technological superiority of the Chinese and the Koreans. It should be added that numbers were not as much of a factor as some Japanese sources would have us believe. As far as I can determine, the Chinese did not have numerical superiority over the Japanese until the very last stages of the war, although the Koreans tipped numbers in favor of the allies. But the popular assertion that the Japanese were grossly outnumbered throughout the conflict is simply not true.
The invasion began on 23 May 1592 as a force of over 150,000 Japanese in several hundred ships landed at Pusan and other ports along Korea's southeastern coast.29 When Sō Yoshitoshi (1568-1615) and Konishi Yukinaga (1558-1600) arrived at the head of the invading forces, the Koreans were intimidated by their banners "which blotted out the sky" and their cannon which "roared like thunder."30 The garrison at Pusan was manned by 20,000 troops under the command of General Chŏng Pal, fierce in his black armor. Chong came forth to engage the enemy but he found his forces about to be cut off so he retreated to the city, pursued by the Japanese. The invaders took up positions on the mountain behind the city and fired down upon the Koreans within. Their ranks did not hold, and the Koreans scattered.31 As they tried to flee, the Japanese cut them to ribbons, killing 8,500 Koreans and capturing alive 200 more. Chŏng Pal himself died in the fighting but was buried with honor by the Japanese.32 In this engagement, as would be the case throughout the early stages of the war, Japanese muskets gave them a huge advantage over the defenders. Both Japanese and Korean accounts consistently refer to the Japanese use of firearms in land battles as being integral to early Japanese successes, the guns apparently having both greater range and penetrating power than Korean bows and arrows. Japenese invasion of 1592 Click for larger view Figure 1 Japenese invasion of 1592
We also see Japanese tactics and organization at work. Throughout the war when attacking Korean cities and mountain fortresses (sansŏng), the Japanese tried to gain the high ground and fire down upon the defenders with volleys of bullets and arrows.33 Japanese forces were organized into infantry and cavalry divisions with the infantry consisting of units of archers, spearmen, and gunners, while mounted troops tended to carry spears.34 It is significant to note that they did not generally rely upon the fabled Japanese long swords (katana) as their favored weapon in mass combat, although they did carry them. Japanese swords did prove vital in a least a couple of major battles during the war, being longer and sharper than the swords of the Chinese and Koreans. The general tactic adopted by the invaders was to fire musket volleys first, then advance, and fire more volleys before engaging in hand-to-hand combat. Spear units operated in tandem with archery and gun units to provide defense. As noted above, firearms and other light artillery came to be the most important weapons used by the Japanese. Some of them fired shot as heavy as thirty momme, or about three pounds.35 The matchlocks were called hinawaju or hinawajutusu in Japanese, in addition to the more generic terms mentioned above. Yi Sunsin remarked about how feared Japanese firearms were among the Koreans and how the Japanese often attacked with guns from caves, hideouts, and other fortified positions.
A typical Japanese musket was just over three feet in length and fired shot weighing about six momme. The caliber was about 15.8 mm. While the muskets had a range in excess of perhaps six hundred yards, they were actually more effective at longer distances because of the difficulties of loading, aiming, and firing at close range. The Koreans realized this fact early on and tried to exploit it, albeit with limited success. The Japanese also had smaller guns designed specifically for use from horseback; there was a fair variation in the length, weight, and caliber of their muskets, with some versions exceeding five feet in length and weighing approximately twenty pounds while having about the same caliber as the aforementioned models.36 Heavier hand-held arms weighed over sixty-five pounds and had much larger bores, firing heavier shot in a wider arc. Types of shot varied as well, ranging from small single pellets weighing just under half an ounce to balls with tiny hooks suspended from them to scattershot.37 Left: 'Black' mark cannon fired by fuse. Lead balls or bundles of large arrows were discharged. Right: 'Yellow' mark cannon shot lead balls and wing arrows. Click for larger view Figure 2 Left: "Black" mark cannon fired by fuse. Lead balls or bundles of large arrows were discharged. Right: "Yellow" mark cannon shot lead balls and wing arrows.
Larger guns were used specifically for sieges or sometimes mounted on platforms on ships, especially during the second invasion of 1597-98. But it appears that Japanese cannon never quite reached the massive sizes of their mainland counterparts, perhaps because of their different geopolitical environments, and quite likely in the Korean case, because it may have been too difficult for the Japanese to transport massive cannon through hostile and rugged terrain. Representative examples included in a recent military dictionary depict field pieces that weighed in at a mere ninety pounds or so.38 They tended to favor a short, heavy musket with a wide bore. Numerous illustrations of Japanese soldiers using these "hand cannons" in combat have survived.39 The Shimazu clan, in particular, were said to have used these weapons to great effect in the siege of Sachŏn in 1598.40 In fact, the Japanese came to rely more and more upon firearms as the war dragged on. Letters home frequently beseeched Hideyoshi and other commanders to send more firearms to counteract those of the Chinese. This included requests for heavier cannon.41
In discussing firearms used during the war it is interesting to note that while the Japanese specialized in hand-held weapons and light artillery, the Chinese and the Koreans countered with larger cannon and naval weapons.42 The most plausible explanation for this is the different types of strategic environments in which the three belligerents operated prior to the war. Korea had long been at peace and faced few external threats other than pirates. It makes sense that their few firearms were concentrated on boats or on the walls of important cities and fortresses. In their rather limited conflicts in other arenas, Korean bows, which were among the best in Asia and will be discussed below, were generally sufficient to carry the day. And as for cavalry, the Koreans preferred either spears or long battle flails, a weapon which has few parallels elsewhere. The Japanese, on the other hand, had been in a state of almost total war for over a century. The adoption of muskets and their deployment in the hands of relatively untrained peasants allowed a few daimyo to finally carry the day and defeat their rivals. Meanwhile the Chinese used different weapons in different areas depending upon the type of foe they faced. But they, too, increasingly relied upon firearms in the late Ming period, especially in conflicts with recalcitrant tribespeople along the frontiers who resisted the steady encroachment of the expanding Ming state. Larger cannon were, of course, best for attacking or defending the walled cities common in Ming China.
The Koreans had four primary types of cannon: heaven, earth, black, and yellow, their names derived from the first four characters of an ancient Chinese-language primer and typically inscribed upon the cannon themselves.43 They also used a variety of small cannon known as "victory mark cannon." These bronze weapons ranged from just under a foot to perhaps twice that in length and had bores of 23 to 29 mm.44 The Koreans also used mortars and primitive hand grenades, and quickly started manufacturing muskets after being given one as a present by a Japanese ambassador just prior to the war.45 They had four major sources of guns, namely, old guns they made themselves, the Ming Chinese, the Portuguese, and copied Japanese models. Therefore, most Korean models seem to be derivative though scattered references in Korea's dynastic histories suggest they may have invented some of their cannon or, at the very least, made extensive modifications to Chinese imports. Like the Chinese, the Koreans employed a number of hybrid weapons in their arsenal, most commonly arrows with small explosive charges or incendiary devices attached. They also sometimes used devices that fired a large number of arrows at once using the force of a single explosive charge. The ranges of these models varied, but, as an illustrative example, the Grand General Fire Arrow had a range of nine hundred paces.46 Modern Japanese texts contain diagrams of similar weapons, but I have seen no definitive evidence of their use in the fighting in Korea.47
The most important artillery pieces in the Ming arsenal were the Portuguese-derivedfolangji, sometimes translated as culverin, which were often mounted on ships, and native models such as the Grand General Cannon (da jiangjun pao), the Great Distance Cannon (wei yuan pao), and the Crouching Tiger Cannon (hu cun pao).48 The latter in particular were used to great effect at the Battle of Pyŏngyang in 1593. They were approximately two feet in length and thirty-three pounds in weight, firing in excess of one hundred (.43 ounce) pellets in one discharge.49 The Ming also had muskets, mortars, bombards (fa gong), fire arrows (another favorite of the Koreans), and a variety of smoke bombs and hand grenades. In addition to the examples mentioned above, both the Chinese and the Koreans also employed a fascinating array of hybrid weapons featuring elements of both more traditional catapults and gunpowder weapons. The most ingenious of these devices included the Korean hwacha, or firecart, used at the siege of Haengju in 1593. This was the equivalent of a modern rocket launcher as it consisted of a honeycomb-like framework mounted upon a wooden cart pushed by two to four men. One hundred to two hundred arrows or steel-tipped rockets could be fired simultaneously from the cart.50 The Ming also reportedly used battering rams loaded with gunpowder, though descriptions of these weapons are confusing. This list is by no means complete, and some of the more interesting weapons will be discussed later.
As the Japanese continued to advance during the last week of May and pushed rapidly towards the Korean capital at Seoul, the Koreans resolved to make a stand at narrow Chŏryŏng Pass, an eminently defensible position along the route to Seoul. Despite their shocking series of defeats up to this point, some Korean commanders, most notably Sin Ip (1546-92), who earned his reputation battling fierce Jurchen tribesmen in the north, still believed the Koreans could prevail.51 As a result, instead of meeting the enemy at the pass itself, Sin resolved to fight a decisive battle in the flatlands beyond the pass, before the hill fort of Ch'ungju, saying, "The enemy are foot soldiers and we are cavalry. If we go forth and meet them on the open plain and use our iron clad cavalry, how can we not be victorious?"52 Furthermore, Sin thought the Japanese were too short to be capable soldiers and because they relied upon muskets, which were useless at close range, the Korean forces should be able to close and defeat them with their array of polearms and flails.53
Korean cavalry were typically equipped with battle flails, glaives, and long spears, in addition to bows, which will be described below. The flail was a round hard wood stick, painted red and 4.5 feet long, with an additional heavier piece fourteen inches long, attached by three links of iron chain and covered with heavy iron nails or knobs.54 Mounted archers often carried it for use after they had spent all their arrows. Long spears came in all manner of shapes and sizes, including tridents and spears similar to European awls or pikes. They also used glaives, sometimes referred to as "reclining moon knives"; battle rakes modeled on those used by the Chinese; and cross-bladed spears, which were effective in unhorsing enemy cavalry. The Japanese used cross-bladed spears as well; the Japanese commander Kato Kiyomasa's personal weapon of this type has been preserved in Japan and immortalized in statues and artwork.55
The Battle of Ch'ungju turned out to be a complete and utter rout for the Koreans. Ignoring the advice of his subordinates, Sin Ip stubbornly insisted upon arraying his forces on the soft ground of the valley, with their backs to a river. The Japanese split up their forces and entered the valley from all sides, rushing in "like the wind and the rain."56 The combined force of their arquebuses and cannon shook the earth, and several outlying towers quickly fell to the attackers. According to a Japanese source, in the middle of the night the Japanese commander employed a "flaming ox attack" (burning reeds were attached to the tails of cattle which were sent forth) and the Korean lines broke, Sin and many of his men drowning in the Han River.57 Ch'ungju was taken on 7 June. Altogether, more than three thousand Koreans were killed and one hundred were captured.
At this point a few words should be said about missile weapons other than firearms since they proved nearly as important in the respective arsenals of the belligerents. According to J. L. Boots, the bow and arrow was the one weapon in which the Koreans excelled, both in use and production. In his usual florid way Boots states, "It was the one military practice in which Korean boys longed to become proficient, the one token of martial skill which ever held its own among a people who for thousands of years have preferred silks, pictures, poems, and music, the stately crane in the paddy fields and the knarled pine on the mountainside."58 Indeed, the diaries of the famed naval commander Yi Sunsin are replete with references to almost daily archery practice. The Korean bow was a composite reflex bow, usually about four feet in length and made of mulberry wood, bamboo, water buffalo horn, and cow sinew spliced together. The bows could be used in different ways and could fire different arrows. They were sometimes even used crossbow fashion to lay down a barrage of covering fire and could also be used from horseback.59 The Koreans sometimes employed poisoned, fire, or exploding arrows, much like the Chinese. Most significantly, Korean bows had tremendous range, being able to cover up to 500 yards, compared to about 350 yards for Japanese long bows.
The Chinese also used a variety of bows. They preferred the crossbow, which had been invented in China, and which had both great range and penetration power, its primary limitation being the amount of time it took to load, draw, and fire. The Chinese also used short bows for mounted combat and longer composite bows for their infantry. They especially liked to use fire arrows, particularly in siege and naval warfare. While some of these weapons were simply ordinary arrows wrapped with pitch or other inflammable materials, others contained explosive devices or gunpowder in small amounts. Japanese bows were massive, over seven feet in length, and constructed of bamboo and mulberry, wrapped with reed or lacquered. They fired arrows some three feet in length, tipped with a variety of different heads for specialized purposes, including for killing enemy officers and for signaling by means of attaching a wooden whistling box to the head.60
Rocked by the defeat at Ch'ungju, the Korean court abandoned the capital and fled to the north, finally stopping at the town of Ŭiju, located along the Yalu River, the border with China, as the Japanese captured city after city, eventually getting as far as Pyŏngyang. The Koreans requested aid from their nominal tributary overlords, the Ming, who were at the time preoccupied with the suppression of a troop mutiny in Ningxia in northwest China.61 Therefore, the Ming dispatched only Zu Chengxun, the Vice Commander of the northeastern city of Liaoyang, and a subordinate named Shi Ru at the head of three thousand troops. Their mission was to investigate the situation in Korea and perhaps send a military message to the Japanese. The Ming crossed the Yalu on 22 August and headed for Pyŏngyang. They encountered difficulties immediately as the Ming were not familiar with the terrain and their cavalry were hampered by heavy rains. The Japanese got word of the Ming approach and opened the gates of Pyŏngyang. The Ming, believing the city to be deserted, entered, only to be lured into an ambush on 23 August, the Japanese emerging from cover "like ghosts in the night," firing upon the Ming forces with their muskets, which the Ming apparently were not aware the Japanese possessed in large numbers, despite Korean warnings.62 The Ming horses could not maneuver on the muddy ground, and the calvary were almost completely annihilated. Shi Ru was killed, and Zu Chengxun barely escaped with his life.63 It was said that only a few dozen men survived the Japanese ambush.64 This would not be the only time during the Korean campaign that Chinese cavalry were undone by poor conditions. Nevertheless, even with their victory, the Japanese commanders were ill at ease. They knew the Chinese would be coming in greater numbers, and despite Hideyoshi's bombast, Japan's generals had a healthy respect for the military prowess of Ming China from the start. Throughout the next several years the Japanese would consistently avoid engaging the Chinese in set piece battles if at all possible and would try to rely on ambushes and terrain advantages to offset their technological shortcomings, which would become apparent in the Battle of Pyŏngyang in early 1593.
At any rate, the Ming was rocked by news of the debacle at Pyŏngyang. Immediate orders were issued for the bolstering of defenses and recruitment of troops in all coastal provinces in anticipation of a possible Japanese invasion. Song Yingchang (1536-1606), a veteran official known for his interest in military defense, training, and preparations, was appointed Military Commissioner (jinglue) of Korea, and Shen Weijing (ca. 1540-97), an obscure trader who had connections to the Chinese Minister of War, was made an ambassador to deal with the Japanese and buy the Ming some time as Song gathered men, mounts, and supplies for a large-scale expedition to Korea. A reconstruction of a turtle ship based on the written description of designs preserved in the Exhibition Hall at the Yi Sunsin Shrine in Asan, Korea. Click for larger view Figure 3 A reconstruction of a turtle ship based on the written description of designs preserved in the Exhibition Hall at the Yi Sunsin Shrine in Asan, Korea.
Things would have been even worse for the Koreans at this point had it not been for the heroism of Korea's most revered historical figure, Admiral Yi Sunsin. Yi was the Naval Commander of the Left of Chŏlla Province and soon joined the fight against the Japanese in the waters off the southern coast of Korea. He is famous for his invention of the turtleboats, but in actuality the idea had been around in Korea since at least 1415. Chinese sources from the same period contain pictures of craft that bear a striking resemblance to the turtleboat, in particular a ship known as the "falcon boat" (ying chuan), though I have found no evidence that suggests the Chinese used these boats in the war against Japan.65 The turtleboats were propelled by rows of oars on both sides, meaning they were not vulnerable to the vagaries of wind like the boats of the Japanese. A head was mounted on front, fires were apparently lit below decks, and the smoke funneled out the mouth for added effect. The plates and spikes thwarted the favored Japanese tactics of grappling and boarding but more significantly, the ships were equipped with cannon on all sides. This was in marked contrast to the Japanese, who had plenty of muskets on land but virtually no cannon on their ships.66 Thus, the Koreans were able to create havoc amongst the Japanese fleet by firing away with their cannon, out of range of Japanese bows and catapults. Moreover, the Japanese were scattered and disoriented by the smoke spewing from the mouth of the turtle at the front of the ships.67 In the Battle of Hansan Island in July 1592, only fourteen of seventy Japanese ships are said to have survived an encounter with Yi and his turtleboats. Korean sources have tended to give Yi and his ships almost all the credit for defeating the Japanese. Though this is an exaggeration in my opinion, the Korean navy did play a vital role in severing Japanese lines of transportation and communication and gave the Koreans a much-needed psychological boost.
It should be added that it was not just the turtleboats that outperformed Japanese naval vessels. In fact, the entire Korean fleet probably did not have more than half a dozen turtleboats in action at any one time. The square sails used by the Japanese were not nearly as effective as Chinese and Korean fore and aft sail designs. Therefore, Chinese and Korean ships were far more maneuverable than their Japanese counterparts, which were essentially appropriated merchant vessels. In fact, Hideyoshi had tried to obtain warships from the Portuguese through Jesuit intermediaries but was rebuffed. A first-class man-of-war (panoksŏn) of the Yi dynasty was "probably not less than seventy feet overall in length and probably went up to one hundred feet with a beam of about one third the length. . . . Along the sides were heavy bulwarks of thick planking loopholed for archery and fitted with ports for small cannon. On some vessels shields were hung along these bulwarks as was the custom in ancient times in the Mediterranean and with the Vikings."68 Korean sailors wore sea-blue uniforms with black felt hats and used a wide variety of weapons including swords, spears, tridents, battle axes, maces, scythes, grappling hooks and irons, and great bows with large arrows, fire arrows, and darts, some with a range of four hundred yards. They also used crossbows and even pistols for ranged warfare.69 Japan's second invasion of Korea, 1597-98 Click for larger view Figure 4 Japan's second invasion of Korea, 1597-98
The Chinese navy must also be taken into account when discussing the Korean campaign, although it should be noted that none of the participants in this conflict truly possessed a jurisdictionally separate navy, so readers should not think that these units were all that different from their land counterparts. On the one hand this might seem strange given the lengthy seacoasts of all three states, but this situation also reflects the political realities of the era when the most pressing military concerns (up to this point) were land based. Thus, the Japanese used co-opted pirates and merchants to facilitate their crossing to Korea and had few commanders with real experience in naval warfare. The Chinese and Koreans had a few officers and soldiers with extensive experience on the sea, but even these soldiers typically rotated inland when needed. Thus, they were typically just called "water soldiers," or shui bing in Chinese.
This notwithstanding, from the beginning of the war the Chinese recognized the importance of the navy, realizing they would need both warships and supply vessels. The warships of Fujian were deemed the best, followed by medium-sized vessels (cang chuan), flat-bottomed ships (sha chuan), and galleys (hu chuan). These boats were sturdily constructed of reinforced pine and ironwood and were equipped with cannon and smaller arms, making them very effective in combat. There was nothing that could match them on the seas, and the Japanese did not dare take them on.70 As soon as the Chinese decided that war with the Japanese was imminent, the Ministry of Works, one of the six branches of Ming government, was ordered to build twenty Fujianese war galleys, eighty to one hundred medium-sized ships, and fifty to sixty flat-bottomed vessels.71 These vessels were all typically equipped with a variety of firearms, ranging from bombards to falconets to mortars to culverins. Many of the Chinese vessels possessed oars in addition to sails. Bronze bombards sometimes weighed in excess of six hundred pounds and fired solid lead balls weighing about six pounds apiece. Ming mortars fired upwards of one hundred pellets in one discharge, each pellet weighing just under half an ounce.72
As preliminary discussions with the Japanese were taking place through the fall of 1592, the Ming were assembling an army for a much larger counterattack. Li Rusong (1549-98), who had been the commander responsible for the Ming victory in Ningxia and was from a prominent military family, was made Military Superintendent, a position which imbued him with sweeping authority for the Eastern Expedition that exceeded that of virtually any Korean official save the king. He led his forces directly from Ningxia to the Korean border where he linked up with other units recruited from all over the empire.73 According to some sources the Ming assembled as many as seventy thousand troops, but the actual number was probably somewhere in the vicinity of forty thousand, half of whom could be considered seasoned veterans. The Koreans were desperate for Ming assistance, but still reeling from their earlier defeats at the hands of the Japanese, they warned the Ming about the fighting prowess of their foes. Song Yingchang addressed the Korean envoy, saying, "Our army is like the wind and the rain. In the morning they will come together at the Yalu River and by evening we certainly will have smashed the enemy."74
The Ming finally crossed the Yalu in January 1593 and were again warned about the Japanese use of muskets in battle. Li Rusong scoffed at this, boasting, "The Japanese may rely on muskets, but we use great cannon which have a range of 5-6 li. What can the enemy do against them?"75 After a series of skirmishes the main body of the Ming army arrived outside the walls of Pyŏngyang on 6 February, bolstered by Korean forces. That night a Japanese assault on the camp of Li Rubo, Rusong's younger brother, was repulsed by the Ming with fire arrows.76 The allied commanders deployed their forces around the walls of the city even as some of the Japanese commanders beat a fighting retreat to its innermost defenses. Li had the Korean generals Yi Il and Kim Ŭngsŏ attack the east as he arrayed a variety of large and small cannon and artillery pieces around the other walls, directing his men to fire smoke bombs and flaming arrows into the city.77
At dawn on 8 February, the drums within the city sounded and the Japanese attacked, their boulders, bullets, and arrows falling down like rain on the besiegers. The ground shook and smoke filled the sky as the armies joined battle. Losses were heavy on both sides. Japanese armed with great spears and vats of boiling water repulsed the initial assault by Kim Ŭngsŏ and Yi Il on the east wall. Li then had his forces feign a major assault on the southeast corner of the city as he and his brother led their troops against the west walls. As the front ranks began to break, Li personally killed a fleeing soldier to restore order and announced that the first man to breach the walls would receive five thousand ounces of silver.78 Fires broke out all over the city and noxious vapors filled the air. Li Rusong galloped forth and directed the battle himself from the thick of the fighting. At one point his horse was even shot out from under him.79 He gathered a group of stouthearted men and hit the wall with "cloud ladders." Li Rusong then directed Commander Yang Yuan to proceed through the small west gate of the city while his brother, Li Rubo, followed through the great west gate, setting fires so that the smoke and flames blinded and disoriented the enemy. Subsequently Yang Yuan and Li Rubo found themselves in the midst of a bloody street fight with the defenders.
Song Yingchang was present at the battle as well, leading reinforcements at the north, south, and west sides of the city. Konishi Yukinaga boldly led his men forth to break out of the encirclement, but a hail of arrows and cannon fire turned him back. The Japanese then turned to cut their way through the troops stationed to the southwest, whom they believed to be Koreans. To their dismay, however, the troops shed their disguises and revealed themselves to be Ming troops, a revelation which is said to have thrown the Japanese into a panic.80 Meanwhile, the Ming commander Wu Weizhong was battling the Japanese at the Peony Terrace outside the city, where he continued to lead his men despite taking a bullet in the chest.81 Japanese resistance remained stubborn, and even though they were badly defeated, Konishi Yukinaga was able to retreat to Pongwŏllu Pavilion outside the city.82 The Japanese made a fair stand there and cut down a number of their pursuers, which allowed Konishi Yukinaga to cross the frozen Taedong River in the middle of the night, as he retreated south towards Yŏngsan.83
The Japanese were sorely shaken after this defeat, and in a sense, after this battle, they never recovered the momentum they had enjoyed up to this point. Therefore, even though the war would drag on for over five more years, this battle was the turning point of the war, not unlike the Battle of Midway in the Second World War. It showed that the Japanese were not invincible and gave the Koreans their first chance to claim a definitive victory. Moreover, the Battle of Pyŏngyang changed the way the Japanese fought the rest of the war. Until the Ming got involved the Japanese largely relied on their superior training, morale, and firearms to carry the day. The Battle of Pyŏngyang convinced the Japanese they could not go head to head with the Ming when the latter could bring their big guns to bear. For the rest of the war the Japanese preferred to use ambushes and hit-and-run tactics against the Ming. They had apparently never encountered firepower of this magnitude in their own country. It is said that the great cannon of the Ming shook the earth for tens of li, and even the mountains around the city trembled during the battle. The smoke from the artillery blotted out the sky, and the whole city was ablaze from Ming fire arrows. The surrounding forest also caught fire.84
The Japanese commanders retreated in disarray and hastily convened a council of war to determine their next course of action. There were arguments and countercharges hurled about on all sides, but they eventually decided to retreat as far as Seoul, with the Chinese and Koreans in hot pursuit. The allies quickly recaptured the city of Kaesong and recovered the four northern provinces of Korea. The Korean king even returned to Pyŏngyang. The Koreans were duly impressed with Chinese firepower and military prowess as King Sŏnjo (r. 1567-1608) exclaimed, "Their army is said to number 30,000. This is not a lot but they know how to use them. That is military ability!"85 When the king asked his ministers about Chinese and Japanese firearms, they replied, "When the Japanese fire their muskets, you can still hear, even if they fire from all sides. But when the Chinese fire their cannon, the sky and the earth vibrate and the mountains and plains tremble and you can't even speak." The king replied, "With weapons such as these, how can we not fight and win?"86 The Koreans also stated, "Military affairs are simple. Big cannons defeat small cannons and many cannon defeat few cannon."87
Giddy with his success and possessing faulty intelligence which suggested that Japanese had already abandoned Seoul, Li Rusong sped forth at the head of no more than three thousand cavalry, leaving his train of firearms far behind. In late February Li and his men were ambushed by a large force of Japanese at the postal station of Pyŏkchegwan, some ninety li north of Seoul. The Japanese attacked with their muskets from the high ground and then closed in on the Ming cavalry, inflicting heavy casualties with their katana, which were longer and sharper than the swords carried by the northern Ming cavalry units that served as Li's vanguard. The battle raged from late morning until early afternoon. Li Rusong himself may well have been killed or captured had it not been for the heroism of his subordinate Li Yousheng, who used his own body as a human shield to save the general.88 The Ming commander was finally saved when his brothers Li Rubo and Li Rumei arrived and caught the Japanese in a pincer attack. In the end both sides suffered about equal losses and both retreated, the allies to Kaesong, the Japanese to Seoul. Soon thereafter the Japanese were forced to abandon Seoul, as a Chinese general led a detachment in burning the Japanese grain stores nearby.
Some sources erroneously refer to the Battle of Pyŏkchegwan as the largest or most important conflict of the entire Korean campaign.89 While the battle was important, as it temporarily slowed the allied advance and disheartened Li Rusong, in the end the Japanese were still forced to abandon Seoul and retreat all the way to the southeast coast of Korea. The main significance of the battle was probably that it rendered the Ming less aggressive for the remainder of the conflict. The battle also impressed upon both sides the importance of firearms and superior military technology. The Japanese were able to prevail because they possessed more guns and longer, better swords. As the Chinese were soon to find out, northern cavalry-based units were at a serious disadvantage in mountainous Korea. There was not enough grassland to pasture horses, and their mobility was severely curtailed in Korea's rugged terrain. The weapons northern soldiers typically carried, namely bows and short swords, were ineffective against Japanese muskets fired from cover and katana used in hand-to-hand combat. Some Ming commanders complained that the Japanese muskets fired too fast for the Ming to counter, while others said once the Japanese fired, it took them a long time to reload. Others said the muskets had range but lacked accuracy and were of little use at close quarters, so the Ming should just close on them.90 If the troops did this, however, they would have to contend with the longer swords of the Japanese. Therefore, as the war dragged on, the Chinese brought in more southern troops who were infantry based and trained in the tactics first devised by the great Ming commander Qi Jiguang (1528-88) in the 1560s to combat Japanese pirates who plagued the southeast coast of China.
The Japanese withdrew from Seoul on 9 May. They eventually hunkered down in a string of fortified camps along the southeast coast of Korea as peace talks dragged on for over four years. The commanders on all sides disagreed about exactly how to pursue peace negotiations and what the terms would be. Even worse, the envoys consistently misrepresented the demands of the other side to their respective governments.91 Most of the Ming forces returned to China, though a small number were left to keep an eye on the Japanese and help train the Koreans to defend themselves, using Chinese weapons, strategy, and tactics. There were occasional skirmishes between the two sides, and a Japanese massacre of civilians at Chinju in the summer of 1593 put a serious strain on the peace talks. Few at the Ming court trusted the Japanese, and the Koreans continued to press the Ming to help them expel the Japanese from the peninsula altogether. In the end, after a bizarre series of events that included the flight of the chief Ming envoy, the Ming granted Hideyoshi the title "King of Japan." This infuriated the Japanese ruler, who was of a mind to kill the Ming envoys on the spot but eventually just decided to invade Korea in force again.
Just over 140,000 men were mobilized for the second invasion of Korea, which began in early 1597. This time the Japanese were even more brutal, impressing Koreans into service and killing those of no value to them. As many as 50,000 to 60,000 Koreans may have been forcibly taken back to Japan. The Koreans again asked the Ming for help and dispatched Kwŏn Yul and Yi Wŏn'ik, Korea's foremost generals, to the south to rally forces against the enemy. This time the Japanese took pains to build up their navy and tried to supply more of their troops with firearms. They were aided by factional strife in Korea, which had resulted in Yi Sunsin being deprived of his post and replaced by an incompetent drunk, Wŏn Kyun. Thus, early in the second campaign, the Japanese were able to transport troops and supplies to the southern tip of Korea and attack from that direction in addition to the southwest. The Chinese forces still present moved to check the Japanese advance, but they were sorely outnumbered and could do little until reinforcements arrived. For their part, the Ming decided to send another large expeditionary force with the aim of striking the Japanese as quickly as possible.
In terms of military technology, the second campaign was much like the first, though overall the fighting was more bitter and there were more sieges. The Japanese enjoyed initial success in approaching Seoul from the south, but were finally checked in early autumn of 1597 at Chiksan, in the mountains south of the capital.92 Again, it was firearms that helped the allies carry the day. There are also reports of the Ming developing a type of reinforced, bulletproof armor which made them better able to withstand Japanese musket barrages.93 At the same time Chinese naval forces were arriving to threaten Japanese supply lines in the south, and an allied land offensive was pushing the Japanese back towards their fortified bases in the southeast.
Though an attempted siege of Ulsan in southeast Korea was foiled by a Japanese relief force at the end of 1597, the invaders never seriously went on the offensive again. They consistently found themselves holed up in strongly fortified castles, often along narrow mountain passes, which precluded the Chinese and Koreans from using their superior cannon. Even when the Japanese managed to save themselves from almost certain defeat, as was the case in Sachŏn when a freak explosion forced the allies to retreat as they breached the wall, they had to pull back for lack of supplies or reinforcements.
Morale amongst the Japanese steadily declined, and many of their commanders began pressing for a withdrawal to the home islands. Even Hideyoshi himself came to have doubts, allegedly saying, "How could I have sent 100,000 soldiers overseas to become ghosts?"94 When he questioned his generals about the situation in Korea, they said, "Korea is a big country. If we move east, then we have to defend the west; if we attack to our left, then we are assailed on the right. Even if we had another ten years, the matter still might not be resolved."95 Thereupon Hideyoshi complained of his advanced age and the fact that there appeared to be no way out of quagmire and asked them, "If we were to stop the troops and sue for peace, then what?" At this all the generals answered, "That would be best."96 Sources such as these indicate that Hideyoshi himself decided to withdraw from Korea before his death from illness on 18 September 1598. This is in marked contrast to the account transmitted in most secondary sources, which maintains that the decision to withdraw from Korea was made by Hideyoshi's inner circle of councilors and commissioners after his death. The most senior of these men also served as regents for Hideyoshi's infant son. It is generally held that these men sought to get out of the Korean quagmire so they could devote their full attention to contesting for power in Japan. While all of the information concerning their motives may well be true, it appears from these accounts that the disenchanted conqueror had already made his decision to throw down the sword. In fact, the withdrawal from Korea was well underway by the time of Hideyoshi's death, and less than half of his top commanders remained in Korea as of August 1598. Throughout the summer of 1598 the Japanese troops had become increasingly restless, and their commanders feared they were on the verge of mutiny. Matters were exacerbated when Yi Sunsin was restored to his post and given joint command of the naval forces with the Chinese commander Chen Lin (d. 1607), a noted firearms expert.97
The final three months of the war were nothing short of a disaster for the Japanese, whose retreat was far from orderly. The allies were eager to settle scores for damage inflicted upon them over the previous seven years. After heavy fighting most of the Japanese commanders managed to escape, though the allies inflicted a serious defeat on the Japanese in the Battle of Noryang Straits in mid-December of 1598. Although Yi Sunsin was killed in this engagement, the allies sunk over three hundred Japanese ships and killed as many as ten thousand Japanese. As the hapless Japanese swam to shore and tried to hide in caves in the tiny islets of the straits, allied forces bombarded them with cannon and mortar fire.98 This marked an ignominious end to Hideyoshi's dream of an Asiatic empire.
While there were many factors responsible for the final defeat of the Japanese in the Korean campaign, I would suggest that military technology was the single most important variable. The Japanese enjoyed great success early in the war when they held a monopoly on superior technology on land. Conversely, the Koreans and Chinese dominated the sea-lanes for most of the war and effectively prevented the Japanese from ever securing stable supply lines. Once they entered the war, the Chinese supplied the Koreans with superior weapons and helped train their troops. Tactically the Chinese and Koreans were often overmatched by their battle-hardened Japanese foes, yet the Japanese were reluctant to engage the allies in set-piece battles because they knew they could not win. Many Japanese accounts suggest that the allies prevailed simply by force of numbers. This was not the case. The Japanese mobilized close to half a million troops over the course of the war, perhaps five times as many as the Chinese. The Koreans were certainly more numerous, but their most notable victories were guerrilla attacks, and the major fighting was carried out by Chinese troops under Chinese commanders. In the end the Japanese commanders pressed their hegemon to pull out and return home where, ironically enough, they would largely isolate themselves from the outside world and its technologies for two and one-half centuries before once again emerging as a military threat to the Asian mainland at the end of the nineteenth century. Kenneth Swope earned his Ph.D. in History at the University of Michigan for his dissertation, "The Three Great Campaigns of the Wanli Emperor, 1592-1600: Court, Military, and Society in Late Sixteenth-Century China," and he conducted research for that work at the Academia Sinica in Taibei, Taiwan. He is currently Assistant Professor of History at Ball State University, where he is working on a book on the Ming Chinese response to the Japanese invasion of Korea. Endnotes
1. Hideyoshi was the second of the so-called Three Unifiers of sixteenth-century Japan, succeeding Oda Nobunaga (1534-82) and preceding Tokugawa Ieyasu (1542-1616). He rose to high position under Oda and succeeded him in 1582 after Nobunaga was surrounded and forced to commit ritual suicide by another vassal named Akechi Mitsuhide (1526-82). Mitsuhide lived barely two weeks after his coup as Hideyoshi soon mustered sufficient forces to crush his rival at the Battle of Yamazaki. After this engagement, Hideyoshi went about the business of defeating or co-opting his other military rivals and establishing a new government order in Japan, one which was federalist in its makeup, but legitimized by the authority of the imperial family, who bestowed high titles upon Hideyoshi, including the title of kampaku (imperial regent) in 1585, and taiko (retired imperial regent) in 1591. Because of his humble birth he could not attain the title of shogun, but by 1590 Hideyoshi had brought all of Japan under his rule and was poised to take the next step on his path to glory. The standard English-language biography of Hideyoshi is Mary Elizabeth Berry, Hideyoshi (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982). For a recent biography of Oda Nobunaga, see Jerouen Lamers, Japonius Tyrannus: The Japanese Warlord Oda Nobunaga Reconsidered (Leiden: Hotei Publishing, 2000); for Tokugawa Ieyasu, see Conrad Totman, Tokugawa Ieyasu: Shogun (San Francisco: Heian, 1983).
2. See Jahyun Kim Haboush, "Dead Bodies in the Postwar Discourse of Identity in Seventeenth Century Korea: Subversion and Literary Production in the Private Sector," Journal of Asian Studies 62, no. 2 (May 2003): 416.
3. See Ha Tae-hung, trans., Nanjung Ilgi: War Diary of Admiral Yi Sunsin (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1981); and Lee Chong-young, ed., Imjin Changch'o (Admiral Yi Sunsin's Memorials to Court), trans. Ha Tae-hung (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 1981). Recently, another extremely important document, the account of Korea's prime minister during the war, Yu Sŏngnyong, known in Korean as the Chingbirok, has also been translated into English as The Book of Corrections: Reflections on the National Crisis During the Japanese Invasion of Korea, 1592-1598, trans. Choi Byonghyon (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002). For a more complete discussion of the historiography of the conflict, see Kenneth M. Swope, "The Three Great Campaigns of the Wanli Emperor, 1592-1600: Court, Military, and Society in Late Sixteenth-Century China" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 2001).
4. The standard English-language treatment of Japan's initial adoption of firearms is still probably Noel Perrin, Giving Up the Gun: Japan's Reversion to the Sword, 1543-1879 (Boston: David R. Godine, 1979). For a comparative look at Japan's adoption of European firearms technologies, see Geoffrey Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 140-45.
5. Sun Laichen, "Ming-Southeast Asian Overland Interactions, ca. 1368-1644" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 2000). Sun is currently expanding his field of inquiry to include Korea, and his preliminary research suggests the same conclusions.
6. On the transfer of firearms technology from Japan to China, see Kuba Takashi, "Juroku seikimatsu Nihon shiki teppō no Min-Chō he no dempa: Banreki Chōsen no eki kara Banshu Yo Oryo no ran he," Toyo Gakuho 84, no. 1 (June 2002): 33-54. On the Dutch connection with Korea, see Shin Dongkyu, "Oranda jin hyōryu min to Chōsen no seiyo shiki heiki no kaihatsu," Shi'en 61, no. 1 (November 2000): 54-71. I would add that some of the assertions made in this second piece seem questionable, given that some of the weapons attributed to the Dutch were in fact copied by the Chinese from the Europeans a century earlier and probably transmitted that way.
7. Of course, Parker is not without his critics. For an overview of the discussion concerning technology and the military revolution, see Bert S. Hall, Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 201-35. Also see Clifford J. Rogers, The Military Revolution Debate (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995).
8. The virtues of civilian control over the military had been extolled in China since the time of Confucius (551-479 BC). Traditional Chinese histories were written by civil officials, who tended to denigrate the influence and achievements of their military counterparts. Periods of military ascendancy were cast as aberrations of the natural order of things. This bias has tended to influence, consciously or not, subsequent scholarship on the Chinese past.
9. There are also a number of works in progress on various aspects of the war, in addition to my own.
10. Stephen Turnbull, Samurai Invasion: Japan's Korean War, 1592-1598 (London: Cassell and Co., 2002). The quotation appears on page 86.
11. See Chŏson Wangjo sillok (Sŏnjo sillok) as compiled in Li Guangtao, ed., Chaoxian "Renchen Wohuo" shiliao, 5 vols. (Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo, 1970), 15 and 18. This is a collection of Korean historical materials, most of which are derived from the official dynastic histories of the Yi dynasty.
12. For example, see Kitajima Manji, Hideyoshi no Chōsen shinryaku (Tokyo: Yamakawa kōbunkan, 2002), 92-98. In fact Hideyoshi's presumed motives for the invasion itself are still very much a matter of debate and range from a desire to monopolize foreign trade to a desire to weaken would-be rivals in Japan to the quest for eternal glory, to name a few. For more on this, see Swope, "Three Great Campaigns," 187-90; and Samuel Dukhae Kim, "The Korean Monk-Soldiers in the Imjin Wars: An Analysis of Buddhist Resistance to the Hideyoshi Invasion, 1592-1598" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1978), 8-11.
13. For a summary of Japanese interpretations of the war going all the way back to the Tokugawa (1603-1868) period, see Kitajima Manji, Toyotomi seiken no taigai ninshiki to Chōsen shinryaku (Tokyo: Azekura shōbo, 1990), 24-82. Also see Ishihara Michihiro, Bunroku keichžōno eki (Tokyo: Hanawa shōbo, 1963).
14. A number of these family chronicles are still extant in Japan and some have been published. For a representative example, see Yamamoto Masayoshi, comp., Shimazu kokushi: History of the Feudal Domain of the Shimazu clan, 10 vols. (Tokyo: Seikyō kappan insatsujo, 1905).
15. Kawaguchi Choju,Seikan Iryaku (1831), in Wu Fengpei et al., comps., Renchen Wohuo zhi yi shiliao huiji, vol. 2 (Beijing: Quanguo tushuguan suowei fuzhi zhongxin chubanshe, 1990), 471-74. Rai Sanyo, Nihon gaishi, 2 vols. (1827; reprint, Taibei: Guangwen shuju, 1982).
16. See Zhang Tingyu et al., eds., Ming shi (1739), 12 vols. (Taibei: Dingwen shuju, 1994), 8358.
17. For an example of the lingering influence of traditional historiography in contemporary treatments of the war and the Wanli Emperor, see He Baoshan, Han Qihua, and He Dichen, Ming Shenzong yu Ming Dingling (Beijing: Beijing yanshan chubanshe, 1998), especially 98-121. A more balanced appraisal can be found in Fan Shuzhi's biography of Wanli. See Fan Shuzhi, Wanli zhuan (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993), 227-55.
18. See Parker, Military Revolution.
19. A number of scholars have taken up these issues recently in the field of Chinese history, and an impressive body of work is starting to come out. For an overview of these trends, see Hans van de Ven, ed., Warfare in Chinese History (Leiden: Brill, 2000), in particular the introduction by van de Ven, 1-32, and the conclusion by Jeremy Black, 428-442.
20. See Yoshioka Shinichi, "Bunroku Keichō no eki ni okeru kaki ni tsuite no kenkyu," Chōsen gakuhō 108 (July 1983): 71. In his excellent study of Korean weaponry, J. L. Boots asserts that the Japanese shogun Ashikaga Yoshimitsu (1358-1408) received a matchlock from the Portuguese as early as 1368. See J. L. Boots, "Korean Weapons and Armor," Transactions of the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 33, no. 2 (December 1934): 25. Moreover, although the Portuguese are generally given credit for introducing firearms into Japan, Japanese sources written by famous gunsmiths from the early seventeenth century state they learned the art of gunnery from China, not Portugal. See Joseph Needham et al., Science and Civilisation in China, vol. 5, part 7, Chemistry and Chemical Technology: Military Technology; The Gunpowder Epic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 390-91. Some argue the Japanese largely discarded earlier technologies when Portuguese weapons were introduced.
21. Needham, Science and Civilisation in China, vol. 5, part 7, 71.
22. See Sun, "Ming-Southeast Asian Overland Interactions," 31, 75.
23. Boots, "Korean Weapons and Armor," 1.
24. Kawaguchi, Seikan Iryaku, 478-79. It should be added that the Koreans did embark upon a haphazard and generally ineffective program of military reforms after these engagements in anticipation of a possible Japanese invasion. See Swope, "Three Great Campaigns," 194-97. Also see Yu Sŏngnyong, Chingbirok (ca. 1630; published 1695), 257-470, in Wu Fengpei et al., Renchen Wohuo zhi yi shiliao huiji, 281-87.
25. This appraisal comes from a letter Hideyoshi wrote to two of his generals in Korea and is translated in Yoshi S. Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent, 2 vols. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1937-40), 1: 323. Kuno's work contains many important translations, but it should be used with caution because it is heavily influenced by the nationalistic Japanese fervor of the 1930s. This work and other sources on the Korean campaign are discussed at length in Swope, "Three Great Campaigns," chapters 4-6; and in Kenneth M. Swope, "Rhetoric, Disguise, and Dependence: China, Japan, and the Future of the Tributary System, 1592-1596," International History Review 24, no. 4 (December 2002): 757-82.
26. Zhang et al., eds. Ming shi, 2264-65.
27. Ibid., 2264.
28. Chosŏn Wangjo sillok as cited in Sun Laichen, "Ming China and Korea, c. 1368-1600: With Special Reference to Gunpowder Technology," unpublished conference paper, 9-10.
29. Li, ed., Chaoxian "Renchen Wohuo" shiliao, 1.
30. See Kawaguchi, Seikan Iryaku, 507.
31. Sin Kyŏng, Zai zao fan bang zhi (ca. 1693), 2 vols. (Taibei: Guiting chubanshe, 1980), 71.
32. See Turnbull, Samurai Invasion, 51; Kawaguchi, Seikan Iryaku, 509; and Kuwata Tadachika and Yamaoka Shohachi, eds., Chōsen no eki, vol. 5 of Nihon no senshi (Tokyo: Tokuma shoten, 1965), 255.
33. Korean fortresses are discussed at length in Wilbur Bacon, "Fortresses of Kyŏnggido," Transactions of the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 37 (1961): 1-63. Japanese-built fortresses in Korea, known as wajŏ, are treated in Turnbull, Samurai Invasion, and in ōta Hideharu, "Gumbu ni yoru Bunroku-Keichō no eki no jokaku kenkyu," Gunji shigaku 38 (September 2002): 35-48.
34. Kuwata and Yamaoka, eds., Chōsen no eki, 68.
35. Ibid.; and Yoshioka, "Bunroku Keichō no eki ni okeru kaki ni tsuite no kenkyu," 71.
36. See the chart in Yoshioka, "Bunroku Keichō no eki ni okeru kaki ni tsuite no kenkyu," 78.
37. See Sasama Yoshihiko, Jidai kosho Nihon kassen zuten (Tokyo: Yuzankaku shuppansha, 1997), 249.
38. Ibid., 245.
39. An example can be found in Turnbull, Samurai Invasion, 211.
40. Yoshioka, "Bunroku Keichō no eki ni okeru kaki ni tsuite no kenkyu," 74.
41. Ibid., 75.
42. Ibid., 71.
43. Turnbull, Samurai Invasion, 89-90; and Yoshioka, "Bunroku Keichō no eki ni okeru kaki ni tsuite no kenkyu," 71-72. All of these models were fairly small and portable. Heaven-mark cannon were fired by fuse and discharged both lead balls and arrows. Earth cannon were slightly smaller than Heaven-mark models, and though they also used fuses, they only fired bundles of arrows. Black-mark cannon were also fired by fuse and discharged both lead balls and bundles of arrows, being slightly larger than Heaven-mark cannon. Finally, Yellow-mark cannon were the largest of all and fired lead balls and giant arrows.
44. Yoshioka, "Bunroku Keichō no eki ni okeru kaki ni tsuite no kenkyu," 80.
45. Boots, "Korean Weapons and Armor," 21-24.
46. Technical details on all these firearms can be found in Yoshioka, "Bunroku Keichō no eki ni okeru kaki ni tsuite no kenkyu."
47. Sasama, Jidai kosho Nihon kassen zuten, 247-48.
48. Yoshioka, "Bunroku Keichō no eki ni okeru kaki ni tsuite no kenkyu," 72.
49. See L. Carrington Goodrich and Chaoying Fang, eds., Dictionary of Ming Biography, 2 vols. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 173-74.
50. See Turnbull, Samurai Invasion, 149.
51. See, for example, Sin, Zai zao fan bang zhi, 79.
52. Ibid., 93.
53. Yu, Chingbirok, 285-87.
54. Boots, "Korean Weapons and Armor," 15.
55. See the illustrations in Boots, "Korean Weapons and Armor," and Turnbull, Samurai Invasion.
56. Kawaguchi, Seikan Iryaku, 520.
57. Li, ed., Chaoxian "Renchen Wohuo" shiliao, 2.
58. Boots, "Korean Weapons and Armor," 4.
59. Ibid., 4-8.
60. Ibid., 9-10. Much more information on Japanese archery can be found in G. Cameron Hurst, Armed Martial Arts of Japan: Swordsmanship and Archery (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1998), 103-43.
61. The Ningxia mutiny is discussed at length in Swope, "Three Great Campaigns," chapter 3; and in Kenneth M. Swope, "All Men Are Not Brothers: Ethnic Identity and Dynastic Loyalty in the Ningxia Troop Mutiny of 1592," Late Imperial China 24, no. 1 (June 2003): 79-130.
62. Zhuge Yuansheng, Liang chao ping rang lu (1606) (Taibei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1969), 239-40.
63. See Mao Ruizheng, Wanli san da zheng kao (1621), vol. 58 in Shen Yunlong, comp., Ming-Qing shiliao huibian, 83 vols. (Taibei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1971), 33. Also see Gu Yingtai, Ming shi jishi benmo (1658), reprinted in Lidai jishi benmo, 2 vols. (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1997), 2375.
64. Kawaguchi, Seikan Iryaku, 557.
65. See Mao Yuanyi, Wubei zhi (1601), 22 vols. (Taibei: Huashi chubanshe, 1987), 4762-4821. A picture of the falcon boat can be found on 4797. Also see Turnbull, Samurai Invasion, 94.
66. Horace H. Underwood, "Korean Boats and Ships," Transactions of the Korea Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society 23, no. 1 (1934): 59.
67. Kawaguchi, Seikan Iryaku, 554.
68. Underwood, "Korean Boats and Ships," 55.
69. Ibid., 58-59. I should add that as far as armor is concerned, Korean armor tended to be leather or even just padding with metal plates sewn in it. Japanese armor varied widely according to station and rank but was generally better, while Ming armor could be anything from simple paper/padding to chain mail, though it was most commonly some variation of studded leather.
70. Mao, Wubei zhi, 4775.
71. See Li Guangtao, Chaoxian Renchen Wohuo yanjiu (Taibei: Zhongyang yanjiuyuan lishi yuyan yanjiusuo, 1972), 34-35. Fujian is the southeastern coastal province that faces Taiwan. The larger Fujianese boats typically carried over one hundred men and were equipped with catapults, cannon, and great bows, though they sometimes had trouble dealing with small, fast ships. See Mao, Wubei zhi, 4778.
72. Goodrich and Fang, eds., Dictionary of Ming Biography, 173-74.
73. Li Rusong's biography can be found ibid., 830-35. The biographies of the entire Li family can be found in Zhang et al., eds., Ming shi, 6183-98. Also see Kenneth M. Swope, "A Few Good Men: The Li Family and China's Northern Frontier in the Late Ming," forthcoming in Ming Studies 49 (2004).
74. Zhuge, Liang chao ping rang lu, 245.
75. Kawaguchi, Seikan Iryaku, 575-76.
76. Mao, Wanli san da zheng kao, 34.
77. Zhuge, Liang chao ping rang lu, 248.
78. See Wang Chongwu, "Li Rusong zheng dong kao," Lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan 16 (1947): 343-74, 345.
79. Gu, Ming shi jishi benmo, 2375.
80. Kawaguchi, Seikan Iryaku, 579.
81. Mao, Wanli san da zheng kao, 35.
82. Other sources say he retreated to Yonkwang Pavilion. See Li, "Li Rusong zheng dong kao," 346.
83. Some sources maintain that Li Rusong sent Konishi a letter saying he would allow the Japanese a chance to retreat because of excessive bloodshed on both sides. According to this version of the story, Korean forces stationed along the Taedong mistook a cannon blast in the city for the signal to attack so they cut down the Japanese as they retreated. See Li Guangtao, Renchen Wohuo yanjiu, 77, and Wang, "Li Rusong zheng dong kao," 346.
84. Kawaguchi, Seikan Iryaku, 579.
85. Cited in Zheng, Ming dai Zhong-Ri guanxi, 597. On Korean observations of the utility of firearms, see Li, ed., Chaoxian "Renchen Wohuo" shiliao, 256-57.
86. See Zheng, Ming dai Zhong-Ri guanxi, 597.
87. See Li, ed., Chaoxian "Renchen Wohuo" shiliao, preface, 15.
88. Mao, Wanli san da zheng kao, 36.
89. See, for example, Turnbull, Samurai Invasion, 143-48.
90. The debate is summarized in Wang, "Li Rusong zheng dong kao," 363.
91. For a complete discussion of the failed peace talks, see Swope, "Rhetoric, Disguise, and Dependence."
92. Mao, Wanli san da zheng kao, 53.
93. See Li Guangtao, "Ming ren yuan Han yu Jishan da jie," Lishi yuyan yanjiusuo jikan 43 (1971): 1-14.
94. This quote is taken from chapter 16 in Nihon gaishi and is cited in Li Guangtao, Ming-Qing dang'an lunwen ji (Taibei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1986), 828. Examples of Hideyoshi's regret and disappointment over failing can also be found in Li, ed., Chaoxian "Renchen Wohuo" shiliao, preface, 16-19.
95. See Li, Dang'an lunwen, 831.
96. Ibid. Also see Park Yune-hee, Admiral Yi Sun-shin and His Turtleboat Armada (Seoul: Hanshin Publishing Co., 1978), 227-28, on the Japanese generals' desire to withdraw and their recommendation to Hideyoshi.
97. For more information on Chen Lin, see Goodrich and Fang, eds., Dictionary of Ming Biography, 167-74, and Zhang et al., eds., Ming shi, pp. 6404-8.
98. Zhang et al., eds., Ming shi, p. 6405.
- Thank you, thank you for the information. I think it will be a great help to the Imjin War article. Good friend100 12:24, 15 July 2006 (UTC)
I found this
I think it's supposed to be the Battle of Chilchonryang. It should be deleted. Taeguk Warrior 08:51, 15 July 2006 (UTC)
- Hmm, I wonder where this came from. I agree it should be deleted along with all other "Battle of Busan (1597)" since they all are the Battle of Chilchonryang. Good friend100 12:25, 15 July 2006 (UTC)
Fair use of pictures
Taeguk Warrior: No one is arguing that the pictures aren't good--they're great pictures! Unfortunately they don't qualify for inclusion under Misplaced Pages:Fair_use. Komdori 19:56, 18 July 2006 (UTC)
- The picture you have deleted are fair use. I have found them at the Korean national museum. There is a large problem growing at, not only the Imjin War article, but in the entire History of Korea articles.
- Several users are deliberately deleting information and slapping "no reference" signs all over the article. This is making the Korean articles look bad and it is weakening them. I see this as another way to vandalize the Korean articles, as what happened to the Dokdo talk page. This is ridiculous and it is annoying to see everybody use "NPOV NPOV NPOV" as an excuse to delete information that is true and informative.
- NPOV is not going to save you. And it is not going to hide your history. Japan has done many war crimes in the past and you can't just get away with it by pasting euphemistic words on the articles. True information is true information and it must be kept that way. Good friend100 21:42, 18 July 2006 (UTC)
- Good friend100, please read about the good faith policy at . I want to help improve the encyclopedia. These pictures are good pictures, and add to the articles. No one claimed they were POV based. I don't think I've ever used a "no reference" tag. Read the policies about those pictures carefully, and you'll see it has no political motivation at all, but instead is trying to stick with Misplaced Pages:Fair_use.
- Although totally unrelated to this discussion, I have not made many (any?) changes about Japanese war crimes. I am not certain if this was a comment directed at me, but if so, perhaps it would be better discussed on my talk page. I also am unaware exactly why you are assuming people's backgrounds?
- I definitely am not trying to "get away" with any war crimes :S What I am trying to do is improve the quality of both Korean and other articles on Misplaced Pages. Komdori 22:25, 18 July 2006 (UTC)
Give a specific reason why this tag is not valid for the pictures that have been deleted. Taeguk Warrior 15:35, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- The person thats treating me because of my background is Latose IT. Good friend100 21:14, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- I never pointed out specific people about the Korean or Japanese articles. It feels, after checking all those Korean and Japanese articles that have stuff deleted or changed, gives the impression that the articles are becoming worse. Tell me then, after all those edits on the name, content, or pictures, does the article look any better? Or have better information? I don't think so. This argument about the name just made the Imjin War weak and it is in a worse condition, now that nobody can edit it (be they good or bad) because of the template. Good friend100 21:14, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- Those images I have removed from the article are not used for critical commentary on the work in question, the artistic genre or technique of the work of art or the school to which the artist belongs. They also lack detailed fair use rationale. --Kusunose 01:22, 20 July 2006 (UTC)
- Pictures greatly enhance the article and it helps the reader understand a lot more visually. Some of the battle pictures you have removed are from the national museum in Korea. If the pictures are not useful for "critical commentary on the work in question" what kind of pictures would be eligible? Good friend100 01:26, 20 July 2006 (UTC)
- And the painting from the Battle of Haengju is at the Haengju Memorial (see here). The fact that these paintings can be found on dozens of non-personal Korean websites, especially news websites, most certainly shows that Korean law allows for this. Taeguk Warrior 03:31, 20 July 2006 (UTC)
- See Misplaced Pages:Fair use#Counterexamples. A work of art, not so famous as to be iconic, whose theme happens to be the Spanish Civil War, to illustrate an article on the war is not considered fair use. This is applicable to those images I removed. --Kusunose 01:47, 20 July 2006 (UTC)
- Good friend100--no one is saying that having those pictures wouldn't be nice additions. There are literally millions of copyrighted images and other works that would enhance the encyclopedia. The fact that many violate their copyright and are not prosecuted doesn't change the fact that they are unfortunately unusuable by this project.
- Wouldn't you like one of the articles you work on to become a highly rated one? That's doubtful if there are images and content with dubious copyright status. Even though it might make the page look less nice, believe it or not these people are helping improve the quality. LactoseTI 04:33, 20 July 2006 (UTC)
Then whats with the deletion of the irregular forces image? Sombody deleted it and I can't even find it now. Good friend100 04:24, 26 July 2006 (UTC)
Seven-Year War
This page should be under Seven-Year War (it's as far as the last discussion got) but it won't permit it to go there... I guess someone is playing games with the page moves? I am still "newish" to this kind of thing in Misplaced Pages... any help restoring it to the correct name would be appreciated. It's only here because I wasn't sure if it wasn't able to move _at all_ and now that I realize it can, I guess it's a weird flub.
In the English speaking world, it's clearly called Seven-Year War--it shows up in history books that way, and there have been several games, etc. released in the US and UK with this name about this war. Asking for help... Komdori 00:51, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- As for the search engine, "imjin war" korea turns up about 773 on google, "seven year war" korea turns up about 23,000. Both have a lot of wikipedia caches in them, but still... what's more, the Imjin War can refer to the first of the two invasions instead of both, as well, so it's not really right, either...
- I know you'd like to see things in your native tongue, but unfortunately, it just isn't done in English Komdori 01:18, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- The reason why we moved the page is because it was confusing with the European Seven Years War. Also your reasoning is incorrect. Just because this is English Misplaced Pages doesn't mean that foreign words cannot be used. "Sushi" is Japanese and their is an article on it. I don't think any English speaking users would understand if it was "Japanese Rice in Seaweed" as an "English" name. Good friend100 02:06, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- Komdori has a point - this is the English Misplaced Pages, and we really ought to call it by the name used most commonly in English-language texts. Since this is a Japanese-Korean conflict, calling it by the Korean name, you must admit, is somewhat biased. And as for it being confusing, that's what disambiguations are for. There are a ton of things on Misplaced Pages that have similar names and are thus confusing. LordAmeth 02:27, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- For the record, none of my sources (Turnbull, Sansom, Frederic) contain the word "Imjin" anywhere in their contents. They refer to the conflict most often as "Hideyoshi's attempts to invade Korea" or "Hideyoshi's campaigns in Korea" or any number of other permutations, describing the conflict without naming it. I really don't care where the article lives, provided there are sufficient redirects and disambigs (the link here needs to stay on the Seven Year War disambig page). But I stand by my assertion that (1) Imjin is most definitely the Korean name of the conflict, which would never be used by an English-language scholar of Japanese history such as myself, and (2) simply because something is confusing is not a good enough reason to leave the article at a more obscure name. LordAmeth 02:37, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- Komdori has a point - this is the English Misplaced Pages, and we really ought to call it by the name used most commonly in English-language texts. Since this is a Japanese-Korean conflict, calling it by the Korean name, you must admit, is somewhat biased. And as for it being confusing, that's what disambiguations are for. There are a ton of things on Misplaced Pages that have similar names and are thus confusing. LordAmeth 02:27, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
If you believe that the article must be moved, then set up a poll. The name of Imjin War is a specific name for this article. Good friend100 02:39, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- I think it's a good idea to set up a poll before a move. As it was Seven-Year War, originally, the appropriate thing to do is to move it back, and then have a discussion on whether or not to move it to some foreign language title. Komdori 02:48, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
If people are so concerned about the fact that it is difficult to keep the names straight, Seven-Year War (Asia) makes it pretty clear. I agree with LordAmeth--I have never seen it under Imjin War; usually Hideyoshi's Invasions or some such phrase. I guess if there are a lot of Koreans who object to it slanting it toward sounding like a "Japanese only" event, we should use the neutral term. I'll have to look through some books to see what they call it--I do recall hearing "Seven-Year War," but Hideyoshi's Invasion is much more common--never "Imjin." LactoseTI 02:57, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- "Seven Year War Asia makes it pretty clear"? This title is terribly vague now that nobody is familiar with this name. The Imjin War occurred only in Korea. "Seven Year War" is used by the west, because the name "Imjin" is unfamiliar to them. Good friend100 03:40, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- And "Injin" is used only by Korea--not outside--because it is familiar to them but not the rest of the English speaking world. I have gone through a set of history books that at least mention it, and all of them use "Hideyoshi's Invasions," "Hideyoshi's Expenditions," or some such thing. I saw one that said an "Asian Seven Years War" but that's about it. I guess we'll get a poll open and just hope that it's not sabotaged by parties who don't keep an open mind. LactoseTI 04:07, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
Whatever ends up happening with the title of this article, can we at least please try to keep the formatting nice? As of right now, there is a ton of blank space on the left before the start of the article, probably as a result of the auto-formatting carried by all those ugly templates at the top. LordAmeth 17:33, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- Thats what I have been trying to fix, or ask someone to fix.Good friend100 21:10, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
Move the article
There has been no consensus with the rest of the other editors. Please move the article back to Imjin War.
Open a poll or something instead of this name. Now, its even more vague to other people. Seven Year War (Asia)? What does that mean??
Disambiguation is used when articles of the same name cannot be moved to another title. This article clearly has a name for it. The Imjin War article. Its just an excuse to downgrade this article with that "This is an English Misplaced Pages". Then I suppose every single article that is not an English word must be deleted.
Good friend100 03:15, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- I agree there has been no consensus; it should go back to what it was originally, or better yet be changed entirely. It was moved inappropriately without consensus in the first place. LactoseTI 04:16, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
For English uses of Imjin War, see, for example: http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/8995442425/sr=8-1/qid=1153281436/ref=pd_bbs_1/102-6067816-5147312?ie=UTF8 http://www.umich.edu/~urecord/9899/Feb22_99/imjin.htm http://researchboard.jp/kenkyukai/Hinrich%20abstract.pdf http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/0605Franks.html http://www.geocities.com/makkawity.geo/magnit.html Dollarfifty 04:22, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- No one is saying that it is NEVER used, just not really in history books, academic literature, or anything originating from outside the region. LactoseTI 04:25, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- Just to keep this in perspective, the policy in general is that "article naming should give priority to what the majority of English speakers would most easily recognize," not what the majority of Korean speakers would recognize, even if they might have the most interest in the content. It's a decent sized military conflict between Japan and China, and most people HAVE learned of it--they just don't remember. They have no chance at all if it's under a foreign name. LactoseTI 04:28, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
if you're gonna claim more common usage, please provide evidence. i get the following:
- Korea "Imjin War" -Sweden -Indian -Misplaced Pages 1,350 hits
- Korea "Seven Year War" -Sweden -Indian -Misplaced Pages 456 hits
for google scholar, i get something like 12 vs. 22 for "seven year war", but most results for "seven year war" are lowercase, common noun phrase, not capitalized proper name. in fact, i only see 3 or 4 uses of "Seven Year War" as the proper noun name for this war. Appleby 04:41, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- And for Hideyoshi Invasion -Sweden -Indian -Misplaced Pages you get about 26,400. You aren't going to find a good way to google compare these--the more common term isn't a term, but a phrase--so you'd have to add up all variations into one. Just the point is an English speaker is unlikely to grow up learning "Imjin War" unless they are Korean. LactoseTI 04:52, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- As for google, how about these searches (I think this is about the best we'll get):
- Hideyoshi Imjin ] (27)
- Hideyoshi invasion ] (520)
and for google:
- Hideyoshi Imjin -Misplaced Pages ] (1240)
- Hideyoshi invasion -Misplaced Pages] (35,200)
It's not really conceivable that a discussion of the events could NOT mention Hideyoshi. LactoseTI 05:00, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- We are looking for the proper noun name of this event, not a description that belongs in the article. you are searching individual unconnected words, which is of no help in finding the proper name. "Hideyoshi Invasion" gets 50 hits in google Appleby 05:03, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- The point is that it is just not described that way... if you have a thousand books that use the phrase "Hideyoshi's invasions of Korea" and the like, that's what everyone knows. Just because two people say "Imjin War" as a set phrase doesn't make it a better article title. The main point is that it seems that there the google search above shows that 97% of the pages discussing the event don't NOT mentioning the word Imjin LactoseTI 05:10, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
The probable reason why "Hideyoshi's invasions of Korea" or "Seven Year War" is used is because it makes more sense to English readers and the term Imjin is probablt unknown to them. Obviously nearly all the English books on the war would use those terms. Good friend100 21:09, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- So am I to understand you now are on the side who says it should be moved back away from using Imjin? Misplaced Pages policy says we should use the one which is most familiar to those who use English texts. Komdori 22:22, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- What do you mean? I support using the "Imjin War" as the name. >Komdori
- Google searches can help determine what word is used more, but Google is crude for accurate information. Google searches do not determine everything. Good friend100 00:36, 20 July 2006 (UTC)
- Please read the naming policy page. I think they were referring to the fact that based on your above statements, perhaps without realizing it, you are ironically endorsing keeping the page where it was (at least moving it off of any term that involves "Imjin"). LactoseTI 04:35, 20 July 2006 (UTC)
- Korean users are obviously making this into some sort of a bizarre "Korean pride" sort of thing. Moving the article to a different (more common) name does not "downgrade" the article. And even if you could argue it would, it doesn't really matter to Misplaced Pages Guidelines (do read them, btw). Please try and widen your horizons and not just look at this from a strictly Korean nationalistic perspective. Mackan 16:50, 25 July 2006 (UTC)
- Please read the naming policy page. I think they were referring to the fact that based on your above statements, perhaps without realizing it, you are ironically endorsing keeping the page where it was (at least moving it off of any term that involves "Imjin"). LactoseTI 04:35, 20 July 2006 (UTC)
The title "Seven Year War" can be confused with the European "Seven Years War". Also, the word "Seven Year War" is a perspective from the Americas or Europe. "Seven Year War" is just a name pasted on by English historians since the word "Imjin" could be unfamiliar to English speaking countries.
And its not all about nationalistic perspectives. The war took entirely in Korea and the invasion was started with the attack on Busan. "Imjin War" is definitely the more appropiate name.
Good friend100 01:55, 26 July 2006 (UTC)
- You are obviously unfamiliar with Misplaced Pages's naming conventions. Yes, the word Imjin is unfamiliar to English speakers, which is why, on the English language Misplaced Pages, the more common name 7 year war should be used. Mackan 03:45, 26 July 2006 (UTC)
- The word "Imjin" is unfamiliar because they don't know about it. English historians just use the word "Seven Year War" because it best suits English speaking countries.
- I have to repeat this all the time. "English language Misplaced Pages". Ok, then I suppose every foreign word must be written into English words again. One example is sushi. I don't think just because this is "english wikipedia" they would write "rice wrapped in seaweed".
- Just because this is English wikipedia doesn't mean that all words must be English. There are thousands of words that are in the English vocabulary that come from latin, French, German, etc.
- "Seven Year War" is just a term used in English speaking countries. Good friend100 03:55, 26 July 2006 (UTC)
- I agree. Also, most instances of the use of this expression (usually, "Seven Years' War") refer to European history, I seem to remember. Too ambiguous. I believe historians use it in a particular context. Shogo Kawada 04:18, 26 July 2006 (UTC)
- Good friend, you just don't get it--sushi is at sushi because most (ignorant, if you like) people know it under that name. Many people are exposed to this event in school, but never under this name. Ironically, the reason "Imjin War" started was to be politically correct and not call it an "Invasion." The fact remains that since most people do not know this name (as you admit) it doesn't belong here--we don't use wikipedia naming to "teach" people. Komdori 16:04, 26 July 2006 (UTC)
space
Does anybody know how to get rid of the large gap between the title and the first paragraph? Thanks. Good friend100 03:37, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- Sorry, but as far as I know this can only be removed by hiding the table of contents.--Ryoske 04:10, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
Its because the article looks really bad. Good friend100 21:07, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- That's strange. The gap wasn't there before. Taeguk Warrior 01:16, 22 July 2006 (UTC)
Page protected from moves
This is becoming extremely disruptive (not to mention making a number of people liable to be blocked for 3RR violations—yes, it does apply to moves). I've protected the page from any further moves for the time being; I haven't the faintest idea what the best title is, but please discuss it and come to a consensus before moving the page all over the place. Kirill Lokshin 03:42, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- I dug through the page history and two people have been blocked for 3RR violations. Please play nice. Stifle (talk) 10:18, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
Request for Comment: Seven-Year War/Hideyoshi Invasions/Imjin War
This is a dispute about what to call this article. It was originally entitled Seven-Year War, changed recently without reaching consensus to Imjin War, and has suffered a move war recently. A consensus is being sought on what might be the best name (other options welcome!) 04:38, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- Statements by editors previously involved in dispute
- I have never seen it under Imjin War; usually Hideyoshi's Invasions or some such phrase... It's a decent sized military conflict between Japan and China, and most people HAVE learned of it--they just don't remember. They have no chance at all if it's under a foreign name. LactoseTI 04:28, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- The Imjin War occurred only in Korea. "Seven Year War" is used by the west, because the name "Imjin" is unfamiliar to them.Good friend100 03:40, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- e really ought to call it by the name used most commonly in English-language texts. Since this is a Japanese-Korean conflict, calling it by the Korean name, you must admit, is somewhat biased. And as for it being confusing, that's what disambiguations are for...For the record, none of my sources (Turnbull, Sansom, Frederic) contain the word "Imjin" anywhere in their contents. LordAmeth 02:27, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- I recommend the "Seven Year War" or some close derivative, as the English name. This is, after all, the English Misplaced Pages. Stifle (talk) 10:02, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- It seems from the actual evidence given (not personal opinions) that "Imjin War" is the most common English name for this topic. Dollarfifty 13:32, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- Actually, the evidence seems to be pointed directly opposite to that. Hideyoshi's _something_ is more common in English; I think "Seven Year War" is about as neutral as you can get--it's what shows up in at least a couple of high school textbooks, for sure. The fascination with Hideyoshi is due to the fact that he is behind the whole thing, much like Caesar or Alexander. It's also more popular in English (from American and British sources) because (unfortunately) high schoolers and college students spend almost no time on Korea at all, instead focussing on China and Japan. Since Korea is smack dab between them, all the "important" events get covered this way, but nonetheless Korean-language based names just don't make it out into the world. If I'm not mistaken, the policy isn't just to find the term that's most likely encountered online, anyway, but by an average person. If a person ever DOES see this, it will be in a (probably dusty) book, not online, and it won't use the Korean name. Komdori 19:04, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- Hideyoshi's _something_ is not the name of the war, it's a narrative description. The Google results show that "Imjin War" is the most common capitalized proper name of the event, in English. Misplaced Pages policy is to use the most common English name, not a made-up descriptive phrase to be "politically correct". Sushi is not "neutral" because it is called "Chobap" in Korean, and it is described as "seaweed roll" in English. But the article is not named "Chobap" or "Seaweed Roll." It is named "Sushi" because that's the most common in English. So, this article should be named "Imjin War" for the same reason, because it's the most common English name, especially in scholarly usage. Dollarfifty 19:19, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- The fact remains that the vast majority of articles and sources that talk about this conflict do not even mention the word Imjin. If 95%+ of all sources don't mention the name, how can it be the best one? What's more Imjin refers to the first invasion--not the pair. Komdori 19:25, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- Comments
- proper google and google scholar searches actually show "imjin war" is the more common English name for this war (see above). no need to rely on anecdotal evidence or personal testimony of wikipedians. please provide evidence that "Seven Year War" is actually the more common name. even if both were roughly the same in usage (which is not the case, afaict), the disambiguation consideration should weigh in favor of a distinctive name. unlike the korean "imjin waeran", the english use of "Imjin War" encompasses both invasions of the seven years, so accuracy is not a problem either. Appleby 04:47, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- I would suppose that's because it's not really considered a war in most descriptions of history. I would suggest looking in the major history books on East Asian history. Lord Ameth mentioned a few. This is a somewhat insignificant event, much more important to Koreans and Japanese than the rest of the world (since it really only affected them, and at a time when their interaction with the rest of the world was rather minimal). It's not surprising that you are having trouble finding a name in google--it's usually described with a phrase, not a name. It's technically not even a "war"--for that reason it's described as "Hideyoshi's invasions" or a variety thereof. I would suggest the best idea is to move it there, but if this is impossibly "POV" based to you, then a more neutral term, such as "Seven-Year War"? 04:49, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- Proper google searches don't really back up what you said. I might also add that just by you saying that the English use of "Imjin War" (the rough translation of Imjin Waeran, which does NOT mean both wars), it doesn't make it so. LactoseTI 04:54, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- in what sense do the searches not back up what i said? searches for the proper noun "Hideyoshi Invasion" turns up negligible results. look at the google scholar results for "Imjin War". they give the years encompassing both invasions. in the mean time, we're still waiting for your objective evidence of a more common english proper noun, other than your personal testimony. Appleby 05:07, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- The point is that it is just not described that way... if you have a thousand books that use the phrase "Hideyoshi's invasions of Korea" and the like, that's what everyone knows. Just because two people say "Imjin War" as a set phrase doesn't make it a better article title. LactoseTI 05:10, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- In a nutshell: it seems that there the google search above shows that 97% of the pages discussing the event don't NOT mentioning the word Imjin LactoseTI 05:26, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
that seems a pretty silly way of using google. search for imjin -hideyoshi gets 85,700 hits, which would mean hideyoshi's not mentioned in most of the pages that describe this event. again, we're looking for the proper name, & "Imjin War" is the most common, in general and in scholarly use. Appleby 05:31, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- Try "imjin war" -hideyoshi, and you get only 648 results--about domestic Korean issues. Searching for "Imjin" and "-hideyoshi" will return unrelated results about the river. It's not the most common; aside from google, try finding a book that mentions it. Try the books mentioned by LordAmeth. That use as a "proper noun" that you keep spouting is actually referring to the first incursion, not even the pair of them. It's a translation from Korean, so not surprising that it shows up in many English language materials written by Koreans--but in English language history texts it doesn't show up. You've been given three major examples of print sources where it doesn't that a majority of people encounter.
- Are you seriously suggesting that any discussion of those events can possibly exist not mentioning Hideyoshi when he is the sole cause of the conflict? Do the math--over 95% of them don't even mention the WORD Imjin, even by your dubious google searches. LactoseTI 05:58, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- Keep in mind we're talking about two campaigns here. The first started in the "imjin" year of the 60 year Chinese cycle. It's why we talk about the FIRST battle being called the "Imjin war" (from the Korean perspective). The second invasion followed years later, and to say that it's lumped into the first (when not even Koreans do that) doesn't make sense. Many of the results you might find with Google are not referring to the wars as a pair... Komdori 19:14, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- Please stop repeating misinformation. Look at the results at Google Scholar. Scholars use the term "Imjin War" to mean the 1592 – 1598 events. You are confusing the Korean word imjin waeran with the English "Imjin War". Two different things. Dollarfifty 19:57, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- I'm sorry to be blunt, but I'm not the one who is confused. While it may be true that some (small group of) people use the term in that way, it's clearly not the majority; Chinese and Koreans alike use that term to discuss the first invasion, but not the second. Some discuss its role in leading to the next, but it's not a general term. Komdori 20:11, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
Just because the Imjin War only refers to the first invasion, that doesn't mean it should be removed. Articles use the war "Imjin" to mention the entire war, and most people in Korea call it by this name.
"Imjin War" does not have to nessecarily have to refer to the first invasion. There is flexibility to this name.
The war never took place in Japan, only in Korea.
The name Imjin War stuck, and a vague, unclear, "Seven Year War (Asia)" makes it even worse since nobody outside of Misplaced Pages will probably understand it. Good friend100 20:55, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
The article should be moved back to "Imjin War", not "Imjin Wars", because that's the most common English name for the two invasions combined. Komdori, just look at Oei Invasion. Is that a "neutral" name? Is that an "English" name? Do you want to change that name to "Yi Jong-mu's Invasion"?
- I do apologize for commenting again; I imagine the purpose of organizing this into a formal RfC was to cut down on the back-and-forth arguing. I would like to thank LactoseTI for organizing this. Hopefully we can get it resolved soon. I do have one more comment though. For those who are arguing that it took place in Korea, and should therefore be known by the Korean name here, in the English Misplaced Pages, I feel the need to point out that it is a Japanese-Korean conflict, not a domestic Korean one. Sino-Japanese War is listed under the English name, not the Chinese, Japanese, or Korean name. Vietnam War is listed under that English name, not in Vietnamese or French. The Russo-Japanese War, also conducted almost entirely in and around Korea, is also listed under an English language name, not in Russian, Japanese, or Korean. Again, I apologize to those who are more familiar with accounts taken from the point of view of scholars of Korean history, but out of those sources written from a Japanese (or even general Asian) history point of view, 99% of them do not mention the term Imjin War or Imjin Waeran at all. Only a very few I'd imagine even mention the term Imjin at all. Take a look at your average source on the Mongol invasions of Japan. Most sources will call it that; only very few, of a more esoteric and scholarly nature, will even mention terms like "bunroku no eki". LordAmeth 22:14, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
I don't doubt that that's your personal impression from the books you personally read (I'm sure everyone can provide their personal experience and opinions), but actual Google searches and Google Scholar searches show something else objectively. "Imjin War" is the most common name used by English-speaking scholars to describe the invasions. "Imjin War" is not a Korean word, it's English. Just like Oei Invasion and Sushi are appropriate English article titles, as others have pointed out. As obscure as it is, it is still the most common name in English. There has been no evidence otherwise, other than personal testimonies. Dollarfifty 22:33, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- I agree. But I don't think "Imjin Wars" is much more different than "Imjin War". I suggest using either one. Good friend100 23:32, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- Since everyone seems to weighing in a second time (or more), I'll post a second comment. As Good friend100 notes, Imjin is so familiar to English speakers, and that's part of the point. Another part is that, although you'd like to believe it, Imjin only refers to the first half, and generally is used by Koreans. I have no doubt that we will need to leave a redirect there, but the article should not stay.
- I hope people will keep an open mind about this. It seems that there are a very few who are being very inflexible. Why not consider that it should be changed to something besides Imjin--since Google, Google scholar, and all the print sources indicate that the term Imjin appears rarely when describing this topic in English texts, and native speakers of English would be very unlikely to encounter this event under that name (as Komdori, LordAmeth, GoodFriend 100, and I agree). I was going to mention Washington's_crossing_of_the_Delaware, but I like the example Mongol invasions of Japan even better... even though there are proper noun names for those invasions, and Google and Google scholar will show them if you search, this phrase is how the vast majority of textbooks describe the event. That situation is virtually identical to the situation here. LactoseTI 04:25, 20 July 2006 (UTC)
I have checked Google Book Search and Google Scholar. Results are:
- "Imjin War": 9 from Google Book Search, 15 from Google Scholar; searched with "Imjin War"
- "Hideyoshi Invasions": 58 from Google Books, 20 from Google Scholar; searched with "the Hideyoshi invasions" -"Hideyoshi's invasions" Korea
- "Seven-Year War": 27 from Google Books Search, 54 from Google Scholar; searched with "Seven-Year War" Korea
"Imjin War" is not the most common English name for this topic, it seems. Also note searching "Imjin" on Britannica, Encarta and Columbia Encyclopedia comes up nothing relevant to the topic.
I agree LactoseTI that Mongol invasions of Japan is a good example. Let's use a descriptive name such as "Japanese invasions of Korea". --Kusunose 06:11, 20 July 2006 (UTC)
please do the searches correctly. we're looking for the proper noun, not a descriptive phrase. all the following searches are done with Korea and Japan and without Sweden or French, (the other, more famous Seven Year Wars):
- "Imjin War" OR "Imjin Wars" google books 18
- same at google scholar 12
- "Hideyoshi Invasion" - "Hideyoshi's Invasions" google books 3 of 20 are verifiable as capitalized proper nouns rather than a narrative description
- same at google scholar none of 16
- "Seven-Year War" at google books 1 of 10
- same at google scholar 1 of 9
so "Hideyoshi Invasion" or "Seven Year War" are almost never used as the name of this topic, but the "Hideyoshi invasion" and "seven-year war" are good descriptions of the Imjin War to use in the body text. Appleby 06:31, 20 July 2006 (UTC)
"Imjin War" is not a Korean language name, any more than Battle of Bun'ei, Battle of Kouan, Oei Invasion, etc., are Japanese language names. These are the English proper nouns, and therefore most neutral. Appleby 06:43, 20 July 2006 (UTC)
- Sorry to weigh in again, but I was just wondering if anyone whos is arguing for Imjin was bothering to read the comments the rest of us are putting. It seems fairly uncontroversial that these events are usually not described with Imjin, but your main point seems to be that they are usually described with a a phrase, and that there happens to be a proper noun that is rarely used. There are multiple examples where using a proper noun is wrong, and this is such a case because, as others and I have mentioned:
- * Few of the descriptions out (percentage wise) there use the term you want
- * Even though you are finding instances of "Imjin war" it is often referring to only the first half
- The examples you give, Appleby, are names that show up in US and UK texts (Oei Invasion), that's the difference. Now it seems you are ceding the point that these events are referred to not using Imjin, but by something else (albeit perhaps not by a proper noun).
- To turn this into a productive comment--how about just using "Hideyoshi's campaigns" or "Hideyoshi's invasions"? They were his pet project and I strongly believe that it is unlikely to find any source out there describing the event that doesn't use it (perhaps not right next to each other, perhaps using a slight variation (incursion, invasion, whatever)). Isn't that the entire essense of the naming convention? To name it in a way that most people would recognize? I'm trying to have good faith here in people's ideas, but it seems that the people that are dead set on Imjin are just saying they think it's what the event should be named (not the article) and even though few know it under their name, they want to "educate by renaming to an relatively unused term." Why? LactoseTI 13:08, 20 July 2006 (UTC)
The thought that "Imjin" is not a common term is not true. And why use "Seven Year War", even if its more NPOV, when there is another term to keep it from being confused with the European wars of the same name? Good friend100 21:51, 21 July 2006 (UTC)
Just an example but last year, a book was published by Samuel Hawley: The Imjin War: Japan's 16th-Century Invasion of Korea and Attempt to Conquer China, published jointly by the Seoul Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society and The Institute of East Asian Studies at the University of California, Berkeley. I think most of the (academic) research on the invasion of Korea is not called "Seven Year War". I just looked up Amazon and none of the 3 pages of research results mention anything about the Korea-Japanese-Chinese conflict, only stuff about European powers and America. Most researchers (who, I daresay, tend to validate authoritative uses of historical expressions), to my knowledge, use "Imjin War(s)". Shogo Kawada 04:48, 26 July 2006 (UTC)
- Notice, it was published by the Seoul Branch--it's because it's targetting Koreans, who have learned that term, not English speakers. Check out children's (high school/middle school) textbooks, and you will not find the term Imjin (ever, I think; rarely at best). Komdori 16:06, 26 July 2006 (UTC)
- Being a former academic, and currently in publishing, and having read the book (which really was just an example), I can tell you for a fact that it's not meant for a Korean-speaking audience. Also, I have to admit I do think an academic book has more authority than children's textbooks. I am not against the use of "Seven Year War", which basically leaves me quite indifferent, BUT, if you look up Amazon.com, there is not a single instance of the expression as a reference to Hideyoshi's Invasion, as it is sometimes called. And I thought wikipedia was based on consensus.
Shogo Kawada 18:02, 26 July 2006 (UTC)
- "Imjin War mentions only the first invasion". Umm yes it is but that is not a good enough reason for not using "Imjin War". Specifically, it means the first invasion, but nearly everybody calls it "Imjin War" describing the war itself as a whole. Also, just because "Imjin" is a foreign word doesn't mean it cannot be used. There are several wars that are named in foreign words. Good friend100 19:08, 26 July 2006 (UTC)
I propose Invasion of Korea or variations such as Hideyoshi's invasion of Korea. Looking through Google Books, we have:
- 435 instances of "Hideyoshi" "invasion of Korea"
- 48 instances of "Hideyoshi" "invasion of China"
- 119 instances of "Imjin War"
- 6 instances of "Hideyoshi" "Seven Year War"
--Endroit 19:23, 26 July 2006 (UTC)
errors
"the Japanese army dominated land with the Korean Navy dominating sea"
I am pretty sure someone added this sentence to the article. Please make sure your additions make grammatical sense. I have found many of these kinds of sentences throughout the article. To edit the article is to make it better, not just slop some bad words onto it. Seriously. Its not funny anymore. The article has been weakened already. Good friend100 21:06, 19 July 2006 (UTC)
- Please familiarize yourself with Misplaced Pages:Civility. While I agree that sentence is not the best, it is more or less grammatical. Why discourage others from adding content? Don't sit around and complain, but do something about it--if you think you can do better, improve the wording so the article can be even stronger! LactoseTI 04:28, 20 July 2006 (UTC)
That's because idiots like Komdori keep on making bullshit edits. Here is a classic example among many. This has got to be one of the dumbest edits I have ever seen. Hideyoshi's goal was to conquer China in the first place. That's why he asked Korea to move his troops through the country. People are destroying all of Good friend100's edits. Taeguk Warrior 19:12, 20 July 2006 (UTC)
- I improved the article to my best. I added the entire "Second Invasion" because all it consisted was of like 4 paragraphs. I only complain because the edits don't seem to help the article. The article doesn't seem to be getting any better. >Lactose TI
- Stop using nasty words like "bullshit". Even if it is "bullshit" don't use those words. It doesn't help at all. Of course Komdori's edits in the link is Japanese POV but everything can be explained. >Taeguk Warrior Good friend100 02:13, 21 July 2006 (UTC)
Message to Komdori
Stay away from this article.
http://en.wikipedia.org/search/?title=Imjin_Wars&diff=65034110&oldid=65014954
Everyone take a look at how he changed "Japanese Chaos" into "Chaos". Simply amazing. Taeguk Warrior 15:54, 21 July 2006 (UTC)
- What part of "Imjin Waeran" means
Japanese1592 to you? Put the change back with Japanese still there; what about the other changes? At least attempt to be accurate--why insert words that don't exist? Komdori 16:22, 21 July 2006 (UTC)
Komdori, please stop. You are only losing credibility. Damool 16:27, 21 July 2006 (UTC)
- Take a look at this dumbass. Taeguk Warrior 16:31, 21 July 2006 (UTC)
- Do you actually speak Korean? Did you know there are many, many Imjin years? It doesn't mean that specific year. Please, learn Korean, or stop telling us what the language means. If you're going to spill your own (wrong) ideas all over, we'll have to request the entire page be protected from editing until we can firmly settle that what you're saying is wrong.
- Incidently, if Korea "controlled" the sea, how did Japan get so many troops there? "Dominate" is much better since it is right, where your wording is wrong. What is your native language? Apparently neither Korean nor English? Komdori 16:33, 21 July 2006 (UTC)
Ok, let's try it again.
- 왜놈(倭놈, Waenom) — Means "short bastard" or "shortie". This term refers to the ancient name of Japan given by China, Waeguk (倭國) (see Wō above). Koreans also use this term to make fun of the common stereotype there of Japanese people being short.
Taeguk Warrior 16:36, 21 July 2006 (UTC)
- Could you try to pay attention to what's going on? I know what "Wa" means. It was removed when trying to fix the gigantic flub of translating Imjin to the year, which is a pure and simple translation error... I added back when I realized I had deleted it.
- And how does that relate to reverting all the other changes? Could you learn to fix just the small thing that you disagree with rather than destroying the whole thing? Komdori 16:41, 21 July 2006 (UTC)
EVERYONE LOOK AT THIS
You are cleary trying to make this look like a misunderstanding which it isn't.
"What part of "Imjin Waeran" means "Japanese" to you?"
You didn't know what the character meant. Now you're changing your story. Taeguk Warrior 16:45, 21 July 2006 (UTC)
- With a name like "Komdori," what would make you think I wouldn't know the character? I made a typo, and didn't know how to do the strikeout. I looked it up (how to do the strikeout, and put the original text back) because you (ignorantly) didn't read the REST of the argument I've been making through this whole post, which is talking about the year. It was also the point of the original change.
- Keep in mind... Everyone's bound to make a typo or two when trying to fix the flurry of bad changes here... I try to have good faith, but gee you guys make it tough... Komdori 16:49, 21 July 2006 (UTC)
Let's try again. Please see Sexagenary_cycle. Pay particular attention to "Imjin." I'll refrain from using foul language, but I will suggest it might improve your understanding. My issue with your translation is that you are making it sound like it's a general term referring to a year, when it's not. I have no problem with including Japanese there. The idea is that these mistranslations lead to mistakes later on. Didn't you notice that I put the term "Japanese" back? See the partial revert; by "it doesn't exist" I meant the second year number, which I left. Komdori 17:04, 21 July 2006 (UTC)
- I agree that Komdori's edits are "euphemisms". Japan invaded Korea with little apparent reason other than to conquer and that message cannot be covered forever. But, the Korean side, shouldn't attack the Japan side. That is not nessacery. Of course, anti-Japanese sentiment comes from the looting, raping, pillaging, etc from the Japanese invasions.
- There are other ways to argue for a better article that explains what happened during the war.
- For example you can add references, make edits to the article, and write in new sections. Screaming on a talk page helps protect the article from becoming a Japanese POV article but that is only a temporary solution.
- And stop making bad edits on the article. Only edit it if you have a reference or you know it will help the article. Good friend100 21:02, 21 July 2006 (UTC)
- I'm not on any side. The thing is I wasn't even trying to make it a euphamism--as for that edit that I think you're talking about, I was trying to say that Japan was interested in Korea as more than a land bridge--they wanted to conquer that land, too. I was adding something which might even be considered Korean POV by some, I suppose, but instead you've succeeded in making sure that no one thinks this way--the only valuable things in Asia must be Japan and China, according to you people. Don't immediately assume someone's trying to stomp you out.
- Don't you think it might be nicer for people who know more about Korean history (often Koreans) to figure out how to word things in the least POV way as possible? Then no one else can come along and complain, and eventually change it dramatically. Komdori 21:16, 21 July 2006 (UTC)
I expanded the Imjin War article a lot. The Second Invasion section and nearly all the subsections under it was written by me. Unfortunately, there are users who believe the wording is POV and try to "soften" the words up so it doesn't make Japan look as bad.
The point is, no one can hide the fact that Japan invaded Korea with little apparent reason other than to conquer and to hide it means that you cannot face the truth. A dark chapter in a country's history of course makes a bad impression but it doesn't make that country a bad nation. Facing the truth shows you are at least forgiven by some. Good friend100 21:49, 21 July 2006 (UTC)
Another classic edit
http://en.wikipedia.org/search/?title=Toyotomi_Hideyoshi&diff=65058348&oldid=65053780
"Invasion of Korea was arguably successful...." Notice how the term Imjin War was removed to prevent people from linking to this page.
Taeguk Warrior 19:39, 22 July 2006 (UTC)
- It was successful until Chinese troops came and Admiral Yi defeated the Japanese navy. Good friend100 22:35, 22 July 2006 (UTC)
new battle
Just to let you guys know, I wrote a new article on the Battle of Chongju. Expanding on it might be a good idea. Thanks for your help. Good friend100 22:40, 23 July 2006 (UTC)
please revert
Why did you delete the irregular forces picture? The site allowed me to use it. Now whats the problem?? Good friend100 20:19, 24 July 2006 (UTC)
OMG!!! The image is copyrighted and I have permission to use it. This is ridiculous. What is the problem now??? Is this the "Delete all Korean images Movement" that somebody started? It makes me mad that this image was deleted. Good friend100 02:02, 26 July 2006 (UTC)
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