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The Battle of Panipat, took place on January 14, 1761 at Panipat (Haryana State, India) about 80 miles north of Delhi. It was one of the bloodiest battles ever recorded. It is estimated that over 100,000 people were killed in just twelve hours.

Prelude to Panipat

Around 1756, Raghoba Dada, the minister and general of the Maratha confederacy, persued Najib Ud Doulah and Afgans of Ahmedshah Abdali to Attack Pakhtoonistan, in the foothills of Afganistan.

Mistake No.1 : Najib(Indian Rohilla muslim) was arrested and released subsequently by Marathas. Najib invites Abdali back in 1761. Promising him Indian empire.

Abdali gives call of Jihad to fellow tribes of Afganistan & invades India.

Mistake 2 : This time, Sadashivrao Bhau, the younger brother of Nanasaheb Peshwe, takes up the challenge & due to internal politics Raghoba dada (experienced & seasoned general) do not join him.

Wives of both Nanasaheb & Raghoba plays their part in inflating egos of their generals in this politics resulting in ommission of Raghoba dada. (Gopikabai & Anandibai)

Sadashivrao Bhau (younger brother of priminister gets the army of about 70-90,000 however he did not get what he wants. He is accompanied by Vishwasrao, son of priminister.

Mistake 3 :He wanted sizable & more seasoned cavalry which is on 12 months payroll. He did not get infantry regiment of masketeers. He was made to carry passengers & tourist civilians men, women & children numbering 30,000 on war. (Perhaps to ensure his failure) This limits in speed, mobility & manouverability considerable.

However he gets 150 fine pieces of french rifled long range artillery. Larger battle hardened infantry with famed maratha pikemen.

As abdali comes in India, muslims, mostly rohillas, Navab of Ayodhya (Shuja ud dowlah) joins him thus making him more powerful.

Mistake 4 : Where as north indian hindu kingdoms either refuses to join war on terror or ditches him (Sadashivrao bhau) on the way, notable among them was Jat king Surajmal when he was not permitted to loot Delhi.

In october 1761 armies of maratha confederacy and afgans with his indian muslims comes to face to face.

Marathas dugs in trenches around panipat town block Abdalis way to Afganistan & Abdali theirs to Deccan.

However it was 2 months siege for marathas where as abdali manages to get his logistic supplies on time from indian muslims. Whereas Maraths get dwindling supplies like germans in harsh winter in stalingrad.

On January 14, 1761 Sadashiv Bhau decided to break the siege by attacking first. His plan was to pulverise the enemy formations with cannon fire and not to employ his cavalry until the Muslims were throughly softened up. He planned to simultaniously move the formation towards Delhi, with a protective ring of infantry, cavalry and artillery around the 30,000 Maratha civilians.

He emerged from the trenches into the open early in the morning of the 14th January 1761. The Maraths pushed 150 fine artillery pieces beyond the trenches and arranged them along a circular 12km line, ready to open fire on the Afgan positions before dawn.

The artillery was to be defended by infantry, pikemen, musketeers, and bowmen, the cavalry being instructed to wait behind the artillery, ready to be thrown in when control of battlefield had been established.

Behind this defensive circular mass was another ring of 30,000 young Maratha soldiers who were not battle tested, and inside this shield were roughly 30,000 Maratha civilians. Many were middle class men, women and children on their piligrimage to the North Indian Hindu holy places and shrines—for them it was once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to see Aryavarta (Aryan Land). The civilians were supremely confident in the Maratha army, regarding it as one of the best in the world, and definitely one of the most powerful in Asia. Behind the encircled civilians was jet another protective infantry line, of young inexperienced soldiers.

In response, Abdali positioned 60 smoothbore cannon and returned fire. However, because of the short range of the smoothbore weapons, the Maratha lines remained untouched. Abdali then launched a cavalry attack.

The first defensive salvo of the Marathas went over the Afgan's heads and inflicted very little damage, but the Afgan attack was broken down by Maratha bowmen and pikemen, along with some musketeers stationed close to the artillery positions. The second and subsequent salvos from the well-disciplined, French-trained Maratha artillery were fired at point blank range, and the resulting carnage sent the Afgans reeling back to their original lines. The European plan had worked just as envisioned.

The Marathas also tried to gain mileage by pushing ahead artillery pieces. The Afgans responded with repeated cavalry attacks, all of which failed. About 17,000 Afgan cavalry and infantrymen lost their lives in this stage of the battle. Gaping holes were opened in the Afgan ranks, and in some places the Afgans and Indian Muslims began to run away.

The Marathas cavalry charge

At this stage, it looked as though Bhausaheb would clinch victory for the Marathas once again. However, some of the Maratha lieutenants, jealous of the exploits of their artillery chiefs, now decided to exploit the gaps in the enemy lines—despite strict instructions not to charge or engage Afgan cavalry. They Maratha horsemen raced through their own artillery lines and charged towards the demoralised Afgans, intending to cut the faltering army in two.

The over-enthausiasm of the charge saw many of the Maratha horses blown long before they had traveled the two kilometres to the the Afgan lines. Some collapsed. Making matters worse was the suffocating odour of the rotting corpses of men and animals from the fighting of the previous months.

In response, the Afgan officers stiffened their troops resistance with blows and by shooting would-be deserters. Abdali called up his reserves and cavalry of musketeers, who fired an extensive salvo at the Maratha cavalry, who were unable to withstand the rifled muskets of the Afgans.

With their own men in the firing line, the Maratha artillery could not respond, and about 7000 Maratha cavalry and infantry perished before the hand to hand fighting began at around 2:00PM. By 4:00PM the tired Maratha infantry began to succumb to the onslaught of attacks from fresh Afgan reserves protected by their armoured leather jackets.

Attack from within

The Maratha Muslim logistics infantrymen (Rohillas), who had not been trusted to fight in the front line because their loyalty was suspect—or, rather, who were suspected of being loyal to the Koran or fellow Muslims and not to their country— now responded to the calls of the Afgan army for jihad. They revolted, and started looting and pillaging the Maratha civilians inside the encirclement. This caused brought confusion and great consternation to loyal Maratha soldiers, who thought that the enemy has attacked from behind.

29 year old Sadashivrao Bhau, seeing his forward lines dwindling and civilians behind, felt he had no choice but to come down from his elephant and take a direct part in the battle, on horseback at the head of his frontline troops. He left instructions with his loyal bodyguards that, if the battle were lost, they must kill his wife Parvati bai, as he could not abide the thought of her being dishonoured by Afgans.

Some Maratha soldiers, seeing that their general had disappeared, panicked and began to flee. Vishwasrao, the son of Prime Minister Nanasaheb, had already fallen to Afgan sniper fire, shot in the head. Sadashivrao Bhau and his bodyguard fought to the end, the Maratha leader having three horses shot from under him.

The pursuit

The Afgans pursued the fleeing Maratha army and the civilians. Some Maratha artillery units fought till sundown. Some Maratha units on the vast battlefield had remained more-or-less intact and, choosing not to launch a night attack, made good their escape.

Many of the fleeing Maratha women jumped into the Panipat well rather than risk rape and dishonour. Many others did their best to hide in the streets of Panipat when the North Indian Hindus of the town refused to give them refuge.

The Afgan cavalry and pikemen ran wild through the streets of Panipat, killing any Maratha soldiers or civilians who offered and resistance. About 6000 women and children sought shelter with Shuja (allies of Abdali) whose Hindu officers persuaded him to protect them.

Abdali's soldiers arrested about 10,000 women and another 10,000 young children and men brought them to their camps. The women were raped, many committed suicide because of constant rapes perpetrated on them. All of the prisoners were exchanged or sold as sex slaves to Afganistan or North India, transported on carts, camels and elephants in bamboo cages.

Parvati bai escaped the armageddon with her body guards and in a few months time reaches the Maratha capital of Pune in the Maratha Empire in Deccan.

Afgan officers who had lost their kin in battle were permitted to carry out masscres the next day, also in Panipat and the surrounding area. They arranged victory mounds of severed heads outside their camps. About 10,000 Maratha civilians and soldiers alike were slain this way on 15th January 1761.

To save their kingdoms, the very Delhi Mughals the Marathas had tried to save by laying down their 50,000 lives welcomed the Afgans and Abdali. Abdali's army had lost about 30,000 men.

Thus the biggest and bloodiest battle on terror was lost to Islamic zealots in 1761. However the news soon come to Abdali that Marathas in the south had organised another 100,000 men to avenge the loss and rescue the prisoners. He left Delhi two months after the battle, heading for Afganistan with his loot of 500 elephants, 1500 camels, 50,000 horses and about 22,000 enslaved Maratha women and children.

A conservative estimate places Maratha losses at 35,000 on the Panipat battlefield itself, and another 10,000 or more in surrounding areas. The two armies did not meet again for another two years, when the Marat partially avenged their defeat by routing the Afgans and Rohillas near Farukkabad.