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Space Shuttle Challenger disaster

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An iconic image of the accident.

The Space Shuttle Challenger accident occurred on the morning of January 28 1986, at 11:39 EST, when Space Shuttle Challenger disintegrated 73 seconds into its flight (at the start of mission STS-51-L, the 25th mission of the STS program and Challenger's 10th flight) owing to the failure of an O-ring seal in the aft (lower) segments of the right solid rocket booster (SRB).

The seal failure caused a flame leak from the SRB that impinged upon the adjacent external propellant tank and aft SRB connecting strut. Within seconds the flame caused structural failure of the external tank, and the orbiter broke up abruptly due to aerodynamic forces. The crew compartment and many other vehicle fragments were eventually recovered from the ocean floor.

Christa McAuliffe had been expected to be the first teacher in space, and students worldwide had expected to watch a television broadcast of her delivering a science lesson from space.

U.S. manned space flights did not resume until over two years later, with the launch of the space shuttle Discovery on September 29 1988 with the "Return to Flight" mission STS-26. After the successful STS-26, flight would continue without major incident until the Columbia disaster.

Crew

The crew of STS-51-L.

Pre-launch conditions and delays

Launch delays

Challenger's launch was originally set for 2:43pm EST on January 22. Delays with STS-61-C caused the launch date to be pushed back to the 23rd and then to the 24th. Launch was re-scheduled for the 25th due to bad weather at the Transoceanic Abort Landing (TAL) site in Dakar, Senegal. NASA decided to use Casablanca as the TAL site, but because it was not equipped for night landings the launch had to be moved to the morning (Florida time). Predictions of unacceptable weather at KSC (Kennedy Space Center) caused the launch to be re-scheduled for 9:37am EST on the 27th. Launch was then delayed 24 hours when the pad technicians could not remove a 'closing fixture' from the orbiter's hatch. When the fixture was finally sawn off, cross winds at the Shuttle Landing Facility exceeded the limits for a Return to Launch Site (RTLS) abort, and thus the launch was delayed once again.

Pre-launch conditions

The morning of the 28th dawned unusually cold, with temperatures having dropped into the low twenties overnight. The low temperatures had prompted concern from engineers at Morton Thiokol, the contractor responsible for the construction and maintenance of the Shuttle's solid rocket boosters. At a teleconference which took place on the evening of the 27th, Thiokol engineers and managers discussed the weather conditions with NASA managers from Kennedy Space Center and Marshall Space Flight Center. Although several engineers--most notably Roger Boisjoly--expressed concern about the effect of the temperature on the resilience of the rubber O-rings that sealed the joints of the solid rocket boosters, Morton Thiokol managers in the end decided to recommend that the launch should go ahead.

Due to the low temperatures, a significant amount of ice built up on the fixed service structure that stood beside the Shuttle. Although the KSC ice team had worked through the night removing ice, engineers at Rockwell International, the Shuttle's prime contractor, still expressed concern. They warned that ice might be shaken loose during launch, and might either strike the Shuttle or be aspirated by its main engines. Managers at Rockwell told Shuttle program manager Arnold Aldrich that they could not completely assure that the Shuttle was safe to launch, but failed to communicate a firm recommendation against launching. As a result of these discussions, Aldrich decided to postpone the Shuttle launch by an hour in order to give the ice team the time to perform another inspection. After that last inspection, during which the ice appeared to be melting, Challenger was finally cleared to launch at 11:38am EST. hi

January 28 launch and failure

Liftoff

File:Sts-33 d67 01.jpg
Camera captures grey smoke emitting from the right-hand SRB

At 6.6 seconds before liftoff, the three space shuttle main engines (SSME) ignited. Until liftoff actually occurs, the SSMEs can be safely shut down and the launch aborted if necessary. At liftoff time (T=0), the three SSMEs were at 100% of rated performance and began throttling up to 104% of rated performance under computer control. At this moment, the two SRBs were ignited and hold-down bolts were released with explosives, freeing the vehicle from the pad. With the first vertical motion of the vehicle, the gaseous hydrogen vent arm retracted from the External Tank (ET) but failed to latch back. Review of film shot by pad cameras showed that the arm did not re-contact the vehicle. The post-launch inspection of the pad also revealed that kick springs on four of the hold-down bolts were missing. They were also ruled out as a contributing factor in the accident.

Later review of launch film showed that at T+0.678, strong puffs of dark grey smoke emitted from the right-hand SRB near the aft strut that attaches the booster to the ET. The last smoke puff occurred at about T+2.733. The last view of smoke around the strut was at T+3.375. All times are given in seconds after launch and correspond to the telemetry time-codes from the closest instrumented event to each described event.

Initial ascent

Challenger lifts off.
File:Sts-33 e208 01.jpg
View of the ill-fated Space Shuttle Challenger launch from Cocoa Beach.

The following account of the accident is derived from real time telemetry data and photographic analysis, as well as from transcripts of air-to-ground and mission control voice communications. Flight controller call signs or crew name identify the speaker. "Intercom" means crew-to-crew communication.

Speakers:

T+5.000 seconds: DPS: Liftoff confirmed. Flight: Liftoff...

As the vehicle cleared the tower, the SSMEs were operating at 104% of rated performance, and control switched from the LCC (Launch Control Center) at KSC to the MCC (Mission Control Center) in Houston, Texas.

T+19.859 seconds: Booster: Throttle down to 94. Flight: Ninety four...

To prevent aerodynamic forces from tearing the shuttle apart, the SSMEs throttled down to limit the velocity of the shuttle in the dense lower atmosphere. The throttle down operation began at about T+28 seconds. At T+35.379, the SSMEs throttled back further to the pre-planned 65%.

T+40.000 seconds: Smith, intercom: There's Mach 1. Scobee: Going through 19,000.

T+48.900 seconds: Booster: Three at 65. Flight: Sixty-five, FiDO... FIDO: T-del confirms throttles. Flight: Thank-you.

At T+51.860, the SSMEs began throttling back up to 104% as the vehicle approached Max Q (the area of maximum aerodynamic pressure on the vehicle, approximately 720 pounds per square foot or 34 kilopascals).

T+57.000 seconds: Scobee, intercom: Throttling up.

Plume

File:Sts-33 e207 01.jpg
Camera captures plume on right SRB

At about T+58.788, a tracking film camera captured the beginnings of a plume near the aft attach strut on the right SRB. Unknown to those on Challenger or in Houston, ignited gas had begun to leak through a growing hole in one of the right-hand SRB's joints. Within a second, the plume became well defined and intense. Internal pressure in the right-side SRB began to drop because of the rapidly enlarging hole in the failed joint, and at T+60.238 seconds there was evidence of flame through the rupture impinging on the external tank.

At an altitude of 35,000 feet, Challenger passed through Mach 1.5 (1.5 times the speed of sound).

T+62.000 seconds: Smith, intercom: "Thirty-five thousand, going through one point five."

At T+64.660 seconds, the plume suddenly changed shape, indicating that a leak had begun in the liquid hydrogen tank, the aft portion of the external tank. Main engine nozzles pivoted under computer control to compensate for the unbalanced thrust produced by the booster burn-through. Pressure in the shuttle's external liquid hydrogen tank began to drop at T+66.764 seconds, indicating the effect of the leak.

At this stage the situation still seemed normal both to the astronauts and to flight controllers. The crew confirmed the Capcom's expected "go" call after throttle up.

T+68.000 seconds: CAPCOM: Challenger, go at throttle up. Scobee: Roger, go at throttle up.

Failure develops

At T+72.284 seconds, the right SRB apparently pulled away from the aft strut attaching it to the external tank. Later analysis of telemetry data showed a sudden lateral acceleration to the right at T+72.525 seconds, which may have been felt by the crew.

T+73.000 seconds: Smith, intercom: "Uh oh..."

This was the last intercom statement captured by the crew cabin recorder. Smith may have been responding to indications on main engine performance or falling pressures in the external fuel tank.

At T+73.124 seconds, the aft dome of the liquid hydrogen tank failed, producing a propulsive force pushing the tank into the liquid oxygen tank in the forward external tank. At the same time, the right SRB rotated about the forward attach strut and struck the intertank structure.

At about T+73.162 the vehicle breakup began. With the external tank disintegrating, Challenger veered from its correct attitude with respect to the local air flow and was immediately torn apart by aerodynamic forces. The two SRBs, which can withstand greater aerodynamic loads, separated from the ET and continued in uncontrolled powered flight for another 37 seconds. The SRB casings are one-half-inch thick steel and much stronger than the orbiter and ET; thus, both SRBs survived the breakup of the space shuttle stack, even though the right SRB was still suffering the effects of the joint burn-through that had set the destruction of Challenger in motion.

File:STS51L(S)002.jpg
Jay Greene at his console after the breakup of Challenger

Post-breakup flight controller dialog

At T+79.000 a TV tracking camera showed a cloud of smoke and vapor where Challenger had been, with pieces of debris falling toward the ocean.

T+89.000 seconds: Flight: "FIDO, trajectories" FIDO: "Go ahead." Flight: "Trajectory, FIDO" FIDO: "Flight, FIDO, filters (radar) got discreting sources. We're go." GC: "Flight, GC, we've had negative contact, loss of downlink (of radio voice or data from Challenger)." Flight: "OK, all operators, watch your data carefully." FIDO: "Flight, FIDO, till we get stuff back he's on his cue card for abort modes" Flight: "Procedures, any help?" Unknown: "Negative, flight, no data."

At T+110.250 the Range Safety Officer (RSO) sent radio signals that activated the range destruct packages on board both solid rocket boosters. This was a normal contingency procedure, undertaken because the RSO judged the free-flying SRBs a possible threat to land or sea. The same destruct signal would have destroyed the External Tank had it not already disintegrated.

T+1 min. 56 seconds PAO: "Flight controllers here are looking very carefully at the situation. Obviously a major malfunction."

T+2 min. 1 second GC: "Flight, GC, negative downlink." Flight: "Copy."

T+2 min. 8 seconds PAO: "We have no downlink."

At T+2 min 20 seconds a TV tracking camera showed falling bits of debris and white contrails against the blue sky. Larger objects plummeted toward the ocean, streaming thin vapor trails.

T+2 min. 25 seconds FIDO: "Flight, FIDO." Flight: "Go ahead." FIDO: "RSO (range safety officer) reports vehicle exploded." Flight: (after a long pause): "Copy. FIDO, can we get any reports from recovery forces?" FIDO: "Stand by."

T+2 min. 45 seconds Flight: "GC, all operators, contingency procedures in effect."

No "explosion"

Challenger begins to disintegrate.

The shuttle and external tank did not actually "explode"; there was no detonation. Instead they rapidly disintegrated under tremendous aerodynamic forces, since the shuttle was near "Max Q", or maximum aerodynamic pressure. When the external tank disintegrated, the fuel and oxidizer stored within it was released, producing the appearance of a massive fireball. However, according to the NASA team that analyzed imagery after the accident, there was only "localized combustion" of propellant. Instead, the visible cloud was primarily composed of vapor and gases resulting from the release of the shuttle's liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen propellant. Had there been a true explosion, the entire Shuttle would have been instantly destroyed, killing the crew at that moment. The more robustly constructed crew cabin and SRBs survived the breakup of the launch vehicle; the detached cabin continued along a ballistic trajectory, and was observed exiting the cloud of gases at T+75.237 seconds.

Cause and time of death

At vehicle breakup, the robustly constructed crew cabin detached in one piece and slowly tumbled. NASA estimated separation forces at about 12 to 20 times the force of gravity (g) very briefly; within two seconds forces were below 4 g, and within ten seconds the cabin was in free fall. These forces were likely insufficient to cause major injury.

At least some of the astronauts were likely alive and briefly conscious after the breakup, because three of the four personal egress air packs (PEAPs) on the flight deck were found to have been activated. Investigators found their remaining unused air supply roughly consistent with the expected consumption during the 2 minute 45 second post-breakup trajectory. The PEAP switch design made accidental activation due to the vehicle breakup or water impact very unlikely.

Whether the astronauts remained conscious long after the breakup is unknown, and largely depends on whether the detached crew cabin maintained pressure integrity. If it did not, time of useful consciousness at that altitude is just a few seconds. The PEAPs supplied only unpressurized air, and hence would not have helped much.

The crew cabin impacted the ocean surface at roughly 207 miles per hour (333 km/hour), causing deceleration of over 200 g, far beyond the structural limits of the crew compartment or crew survivability levels.

On July 28, 1986, Rear Admiral Richard H. Truly, NASA's Associate Administrator for Space Flight and a former astronaut, released a report from Joseph P. Kerwin, biomedical specialist from the Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas, relating to the deaths of the astronauts in the accident. Dr. Kerwin, a veteran of the Skylab 2 mission, had been commissioned to undertake the study soon after the accident. According to the Kerwin Report:

The findings are inconclusive. The impact of the crew compartment with the ocean surface was so violent that evidence of damage occurring in the seconds which followed the explosion was masked. Our final conclusions are:

  • the cause of death of the Challenger astronauts cannot be positively determined;
  • the forces to which the crew were exposed during Orbiter breakup were probably not sufficient to cause death or serious injury; and
  • the crew possibly, but not certainly, lost consciousness in the seconds following Orbiter breakup due to in-flight loss of crew module pressure.

Crew escape was not possible

Further information: ]

.

During powered flight of the space shuttle, crew escape was not possible. While modified SR-71 Blackbird ejection seats and full pressure suits were used on the first four shuttle orbital missions, considered test flights, they were removed for the operational missions that followed. During subsequent missions the astronauts wore only cloth flight suits.

Retaining ejection seats was possible for the commander and pilot, but they were considered impractical for the rest of the crew, especially the three below deck. Unlike a fighter pilot under a thin canopy, the crew below deck were in the center of the forward fuselage, surrounded by vehicle structure on all sides. Additionally, ejection seats might have problems at Max Q (period of maximum aerodynamic pressure), or because of the SRB exhaust plume. The ejection seats used during test flights were primarily intended for an escape during landing, since the shuttle is unpowered when landing and has only one chance to make the runway. The crew cabin could have been designed as a self-contained escape vessel, but this would have been prohibitively expensive, and would have added excessive weight to the vehicle.

Further information: ]

.

While launch escape systems were often considered during shuttle development, NASA eventually decided the shuttle was sufficiently reliable to not need one. Also, launch escape systems entail significant weight and space penalties, and the associated pyrotechnics incur safety issues. After the Challenger loss, a bail-out system was designed to give the crew the option to leave the shuttle under certain conditions; however, these conditions did not include the Challenger scenario.

Aftermath

In the aftermath of the accident, NASA was criticized for its lack of openness with the press. The New York Times noted on the day after the accident that "neither Jay Greene, flight director for the ascent, nor any other person in the control room, was made available to the press by the space agency". In the absence of reliable sources, the press turned to speculation; both the New York Times and United Press International ran stories suggesting that a fault with the space shuttle external tank had caused the accident, despite the fact that NASA's internal investigation had quickly focused in on the solid rocket boosters. "The space agency," wrote space reporter William Harwood, "stuck to its policy of strict secrecy about the details of the investigation, an uncharacteristic stance for an agency that long prided itself on openness."

Investigation

File:ChallengerCrewRemains.jpg
The Challenger crewmember remains being transferred from 7 hearse vehicles to a MAC C-141 transport plane at the SLF for transport to Dover Air Force Base, Delaware.

The Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, also known as the Rogers Commission (after its chairman), was formed to investigate the disaster. The commission members were Chairman William P. Rogers, Vice Chairman Neil Armstrong, David Acheson, Eugene Covert, Richard Feynman, Robert Hotz, Donald Kutyna, Sally Ride, Robert Rummel, Joseph Sutter, Arthur Walker, Albert Wheelon, and Chuck Yeager. The commission worked for several months and published a report of its findings. It found that the Challenger accident was caused by a failure in the O-rings sealing a joint on the right solid rocket booster, which allowed pressurized hot gasses and eventually flame to "blow by" the O-ring and make contact with the adjacent external tank, causing structural failure. The failure of the O-rings was attributed to a faulty design, whose performance could be too easily compromised by factors including the low temperature on the day of launch.

More broadly, the report also considered the contributing causes of the accident. Most salient was the failure of both NASA and its contractor Morton Thiokol to respond adequately to the danger posed by the deficient joint design; rather than redesigning the joint, they came to define the problem as an acceptable flight risk. The report also strongly criticised the decision making process that led to the launch of Challenger, saying that it was seriously flawed.

...failures in communication... resulted in a decision to launch 51-L based on incomplete and sometimes misleading information, a conflict between engineering data and management judgments, and a NASA management structure that permitted internal flight safety problems to bypass key Shuttle managers."

One of the commission's most well-known members was theoretical physicist Richard Feynman. During a televised hearing, he famously demonstrated how the O-rings became less resilient and subject to seal failures at ice-cold temperatures by immersing a sample of the material in a glass of ice water. He was so critical of flaws in NASA's "safety culture" that he threatened to remove his name from the report unless it included his personal observations on the reliability of the shuttle, which appeared as Appendix F. In the appendix, he argued that the estimates of reliability offered by NASA management were wildly unrealistic, differing as much as a thousandfold from the estimates of working engineers. "For a successful technology," he concluded, "reality must take precedence over public relations, for nature cannot be fooled."

The U.S. House Committee on Science and Technology also conducted hearings, and on October 29, 1986 released its own report on the Challenger accident. The committee reviewed the findings of the Rogers Commission as part of its investigation, and agreed with the Rogers Commission as to the technical causes of the accident. However, it differed from the committee in its assessment of the accident's contributing causes.

...the Committee feels that the underlying problem which led to the Challenger accident was not poor communication or underlying procedures as implied by the Rogers Commission conclusion. Rather, the fundamental problem was poor technical decision-making over a period of several years by top NASA and contractor personnel, who failed to act decisively to solve the increasingly serious anomalies in the Solid Rocket Booster joints.

Tributes

The Space Shuttle Challenger Memorial, where some remains were buried.

On the night of the disaster, President Ronald Reagan had been scheduled to give his annual State of the Union address. He initially announced that the address would go on as scheduled, but under mounting pressure he postponed the State of the Union address for a week and gave a national address on the Challenger disaster from the Oval Office of the White House. The speech was written by Peggy Noonan. At its end, he made the following statement, quoting from the poem "High Flight" by John Gillespie Magee, Jr.: "We will never forget them, nor the last time we saw them, this morning, as they prepared for their journey and waved goodbye and 'slipped the surly bonds of earth' to 'touch the face of God.'" Three days later, he and his wife Nancy traveled to the Johnson Space Center for a memorial service to honor the astronauts.

Funeral ceremonies

The remains of the crew that were identifiable were returned to their families on April 29, 1986. Two of the crewmembers, Dick Scobee and Michael Smith, were buried by their families at Arlington National Cemetery at individual grave sites. Other crew remains were buried at the Space Shuttle Challenger Memorial in Arlington on May 20, 1986.

Recovery of debris

On board Challenger was an American flag that was sponsored by Boy Scout Troop 514 of Monument, Colorado. It was recovered intact, still sealed in its cargo bag. Debris from Challenger washed up on Florida beaches for years after the incident. On December 17, 1996, ten years after the incident, two large pieces of the shuttle washed up at Cocoa Beach. The USS Simpson was among the naval ships that assisted in the recovery with the United States Coast Guard.

References in popular culture

In 1990, a television movie called Challenger was made about the events leading up to the launching of the shuttle. It was announced in May 2006 that another movie about the accident would be made, also called Challenger. The movie was to be directed by Philip Kaufman and would focus on the role of Richard Feynman in the ensuing investigation.

The Challenger accident has also been referenced in numerous other television shows and movies. An episode of the NBC television series Punky Brewster entitled "Accidents Happen," (first aired March 9, 1986) dealt with the title character's reaction to the disaster as she watched it on TV at school; the Farscape episode "Kansas" involved the main character traveling back in time in order to stop his astronaut father from becoming a crewmember on the Challenger mission. The movie Star Trek IV: The Voyage Home was dedicated to the memory of the Challenger crew, "whose courageous spirit shall live to the 23rd century and beyond."

French electronic music artist Jean-Michel Jarre had composed a track on his album Rendez-Vous which he intended to be performed by Challenger astronaut Ronald McNair, a saxophonist and personal friend of Jarre. After McNair's death, Jarre dedicated the album to his memory, and performed a free concert in Houston in memory of the Challenger astronauts. John Denver also wrote a tribute to the crew of Challenger on his album One World, released June, 1986. The song was called Flying For Me, and ended with a 73 second instrumental to commemorate the flight's duration.

In the 1989 PC Game Wing Commander, one of the Confederation's ships is named the TCS McAullife, apparently a tribute to the Challenger crewmember.

See also

References

  1. Rogers Commission report (1986). "Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Volume 1, chapter 2".
  2. Rogers Commission report (1986). "Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Volume 1, chapter 5".
  3. Rogers Commission report (1986). "Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Volume 1, chapter 5".
  4. Rogers Commission report (1986). "NASA Photo and TV Support Team Report, Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Volume 3, Appendix N".
  5. Photo and TV Analysis Team Report (1986). Space Shuttle Challenger Accident Investigation. STS-51L Data and Analysis Task Force. {{cite AV media}}: External link in |title= (help)
  6. Rogers Commission report (1986). "NASA Photo and TV Support Team Report, Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Volume 3, Appendix N".
  7. A major source for information about the Challenger accident is the STS 51-L Incident Integrated Events Timeline developed by the NASA Photo and TV Support Team as part of the Rogers Report (Appendix N). Numerous other timelines have been written based on this information. A detailed transcript of air-to-ground and mission control voice communications was put together by Rob Navias and William Harwood for CBS news, and integrates a timeline of events: http://www.cbsnews.com/network/news/space/51Lchap13timeline.html.
  8. Photo and TV Analysis Team Report (1986). Space Shuttle Challenger Accident Investigation. STS-51L Data and Analysis Task Force. {{cite AV media}}: External link in |title= (help)
  9. Rogers Commission report (1986). "Rogers Commission report, Volume I, chapter 9, Range Safety Activities, January 28, 1986". Retrieved July 4. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
  10. Photo and TV Analysis Team Report (1986). Space Shuttle Challenger Accident Investigation. STS-51L Data and Analysis Task Force. {{cite AV media}}: External link in |title= (help)
  11. Photo and TV Analysis Team Report (1986). Space Shuttle Challenger Accident Investigation. STS-51L Data and Analysis Task Force. {{cite AV media}}: External link in |title= (help)
  12. Joseph P. Kerwin (1986). "Challenger crew cause and time of death". Retrieved July 4. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
  13. Joseph P. Kerwin (1986). "Challenger crew cause and time of death". Retrieved July 4. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
  14. Reinhold, Robert (January 29, 1986). "At Mission Control, Silence and Grief Fill a Day Long Dreaded". New York Times. pp. A8. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  15. William Harwood (1986). Voyage into History; Chapter Six, the Reaction. See, for example, New Orleans Times-Picayune, January 29, 1986, p. 1.
  16. William Harwood (1986). Voyage into History; Chapter Six, the Reaction.
  17. Rogers Commission report (1986). "Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Volume 1, chapter 4"., p. 72.
  18. Rogers Commission report (1986). "Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Volume 1, chapter 6"., p. 148.
  19. Rogers Commission report (1986). "Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Volume 1, chapter 5"., p. 104.
  20. Rogers Commission report (1986). "Report of the Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, Volume 1, chapter 5"., p. 82.
  21. Richard P. Feynman. What Do You Care What Other People Think?
  22. Richard P. Feynman. (1986) Appendix F- Personal Observations on the reliability of the Shuttle.
  23. U.S House Committee on Science and Technology (October 29, 1986.). "Investigation of the Challenger Accident; Report of the Committee on Science and Technology, House of Representatives" (PDF). US Government Printing Office. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  24. U.S House Committee on Science and Technology (October 29, 1986.). "Investigation of the Challenger Accident; Report of the Committee on Science and Technology, House of Representatives" (PDF). US Government Printing Office. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help), pp. 4-5.
  25. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Address to the nation on the Challenger disaster. Retrieved on July 4, 2006.
  26. The Shuttle Challenger Memorial, Arlington National Cemetary. Retrieved on 2006-09-18.
  27. CNN.com (1996), Shuttle Challenger debris washes up on shore. Retrieved on July 4, 2006.
  28. "Media 8 To Produce "Challenger" Directed by Philip Kaufman". May 24, 2006. Retrieved 2006-09-21. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  29. Star Trek IV: The Voyage Home-Production Notes, page 5 (The Film Frontier).
  30. Rendes-Vous Houston

Further reading

  • Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch. The Golem at Large: What you should know about technology. Includes chapter on the Challenger disaster.
  • Richard Feynman. What Do You Care What Other People Think? ISBN 0-586-21855-6. Describes the inner workings of the Rogers Commission, the confusion and misjudgement that plagued NASA and the moment when the cause of the Challenger disaster was revealed.
  • Joseph Trento. (1988) Prescription for Disaster, ISBN 0-245-54615-4.
  • Edward Tufte. (1997) Visual Explanations, ISBN 0-9613921-2-6, Chapter 2.
  • Diane Vaughan. (1996) The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA ISBN 0-226-85176-1

External links

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