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Battles of Rzhev
Part of the Eastern Front of World War II
Date 8 January 1942 – 31 March 1943 Location Rzhev and Velikie Luki salients, Russian SFSR56°15′00″N 34°19′00″E / 56.25°N 34.316667°E / 56.25; 34.316667 Result Stalemate The Germans abandon the Rzhev salient
Belligerents
Soviet Union	Germany
Commanders and leaders
Georgy Zhukov Ivan Konev Vasily Sokolovsky Dmitry Lelyushenko	Fedor von Bock Günther von Kluge Ludwig Kübler Walter Model
Strength
Total: 2,100,000 Initial: 668,000 men 2,000 tanks Earmarked for Operation Jupiter: 415,000 men 1,265 tanks	Total: 1,659,000 13,000 guns and mortars 1,100 tanks 850 aircraft.
Casualties and losses
2,300,000 dead, wounded, missing and captured.	Unknown
class=notpageimage| Location within modern-day Russia

The Battles of Rzhev (Template:Lang-ru) were a series of Soviet operations in World War II between January 8, 1942 and March 31, 1943. Due to the high losses suffered by both sides, the campaign became known by veterans and historians as the "Rzhev Meat Grinder" ("Ржевская мясорубка").

The operations took place in the general area of Rzhev, Sychyovka (later known as Sychevka) in Sychyovsky District, and Vyazma against German forces.

Overview

The major operations that were executed in this area of the front were:

1. Rzhev–Vyazma Strategic Offensive Operation (Template:Lang-ru) (8 January – 20 April 1942) of the Kalinin Front, Western Front, Bryansk Front, and Northwestern Front
   • Sychyovsky–Vyazma offensive operation (Template:Lang-ru) (8 January – 20 April 1942) of the Kalinin Front
   • Mozhaysk–Vyazma offensive operation (Operation Jupiter) (Template:Lang-ru) (10 January – 28 February 1942) of the Western Front
   • Toropets–Kholm Offensive Operation (Template:Lang-ru) (9 January – 6 February 1942) of the Northwestern Front and reassigned to the Kalinin Front from 22 January 1942
   • Vyazma airborne operation (Template:Lang-ru) (18 January – 28 February 1942) of the Western Front (see also Operation Hannover)
   • Rzhev operation (3 March – 20 April 1942) (Template:Lang-ru)
2. Operation Seydlitz and the Soviet defensive battles around Bely and Kholm-Zhirkovsky (Template:Lang-ru) (2–23 July 1942) launched by 9th Army of Germany to eliminate the salient in the vicinity between Bely and Kholm–Zhirkovsky and annihilate the 39th Army and 11th Cavalry Corps of the Kalinin Front
3. First Rzhev–Sychyovka Offensive Operation (Template:Lang-ru) (30 July – 23 August 1942, other sources say ending on 30 September or 1 October 1942) by forces of the Kalinin Front and Western Front
4. Second Rzhev–Sychyovka Offensive Operation (Operation Mars) (Template:Lang-ru) (25 November – 20 December 1942) by the forces of the Kalinin Front and Western Front
   • Battle for Velikiye Luki (Template:Lang-ru) (24 November 1942 – 20 January 1943) by 3rd Shock Army of the Kalinin Front
5. Third Rzhev–Sychyovka Offensive Operation (Template:Lang-ru) (2–31 March 1943) by the forces of the Kalinin Front and Western Front, at the same time, the southern flank offensive operations on the Bryansk Front. These were operations that occurred during the planned German retreat from the salient known as Operation Büffel

Rzhev-Vyazma Strategic Offensive Operation

During the Soviet winter counter-offensive of 1941, and the Rzhev-Vyazma Strategic Offensive Operation (8 January 1942 – 20 April 1942), German forces were pushed back from Moscow. As a result, a salient was formed along the front line in the direction of the capital, which became known as the Rzhev-Vyazma Salient. It was strategically important for the German Army Group Centre due to the threat it posed to Moscow, and was therefore heavily fortified and strongly defended.

Initial Soviet forces committed by the Kalinin and Western Front included the 22nd, 29th, 30th, 31st, 39th of the former, and the 1st Shock, 5th, 10th, 16th, 20th, 33rd, 43rd, 49th, and 50th armies and three cavalry corps for the latter. The intent was for the 22nd Army, 29th Army and 39th Armies supported by the 11th Cavalry Corps to attack West of Rzhev, and penetrate deep into the western flank of Army Group Centre's 9th Army. This was achieved in January, and by the end of the month the cavalry corps found itself 110 km in the depth of the German flank. To eliminate this threat to the rear of the Army Group Centre's 9th Army, the Germans had started Operation Seydlitz by 2 July. However, due to the nature of the terrain the supply route of the troops of the Soviet 22nd Army, 29th Army and 39th Armies which attempted to enlarge the penetration became difficult, and they were encircled. The cutting of a major highway to Rzhev by the cavalry signalled the commencement of the Toropets–Kholm Offensive.

Sychyovsky-Vyazma Offensive

The offensive was conducted in late 1942.

This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (August 2017)

Mozhaysk-Vyazma Offensive (Operation Jupiter)

This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (August 2017)

Toropets-Kholm Offensive

This offensive was conducted across the northern part of the Western Front against the Wehrmacht's 4th Panzer Army and the 4th Army.

Vyazma Airborne Operation

A Soviet airborne operation, conducted by the 4th Airborne Corps in seven separate landing zones, five of them intended to cut major road and rail line of communication to the Wehrmacht's 9th Army.

Operation Seydlitz

In the aftermath of the Soviet winter counteroffensive of 1941–42, substantial Soviet forces remained in the rear of the German Ninth Army. These forces maintained a hold on the primitive forested swamp region between Rzhev and Bely. On July 2, 1942, Ninth Army under General Model launched Operation Seydlitz to clear the Soviet forces out. The Germans first blocked the natural breakout route through the Obsha valley and then split the Soviet forces into two isolated pockets. The battle lasted eleven days and ended with the elimination of the encircled Soviet forces.

First Rzhev–Sychyovka Offensive Operation

This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (August 2017)

Second Rzhev-Sychyovka Strategic Offensive (Operation Mars)

The next Rzhev-Sychyovka Offensive (25 November 1942 – 20 December 1942) codenamed Operation Mars. The operation consisted of several incremental offensive phases:

Sychyovka Offensive Operation 24 November 1942 – 14 December 1942

Belyi Offensive Operation 25 November 1942 – 16 December 1942

Luchesa Offensive Operation 25 November 1942 – 11 December 1942

Molodoi Tud Offensive Operation 25 November 1942 – 23 December 1942

Velikie-Luki Offensive Operation 24 November 1942 – 20 January 1943

This operation was nearly as heavy in losses for the Red Army as the first offensive, and also failed to reach desired objectives, but the Red Army tied down German forces which may have otherwise been used to try to relieve the Stalingrad garrison. An NKVD double agent known as Heine provided information about the offensive to the OKH as part of the plan to divert German forces from any relief of those trapped at Stalingrad.

German forces in the salient were eventually withdrawn by Hitler during Operation Büffel to provide greater force for the German offensive operation at Kursk.

Third Rzhev–Sychyovka Offensive Operation

This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (August 2017)

Results

Politico-military result

Fighting in the area remained mostly static for 14 months. Losses and setbacks elsewhere along the front finally compelled the Germans to abandon the salient in order to free up reserves for the front as a whole.

Defending the salient required 29 divisions. Its abandonment freed up 22 of those divisions and created a strategic reserve which allowed the Germans to stabilize the front and somewhat recover from massive losses at Stalingrad.

German general Heinz Guderian had doubts about the strategic aims of the later Operation Citadel, since the Germans had to abandon the strategically important Rzhev-Vyazma salient for gathering troops to attempt to take a much less valuable one at Kursk. The retreat of the Germans in Operation Büffel was tactically and militarily successful, but the abandonment of "the Rzhev-Vyazma pistol" was a strategic loss for Nazi Germany on the Eastern Front.

The Soviet Army paid a high price for their defeat at Rzhev, but the Germans were forced to withdraw from an important bridgehead which enabled the Germans to threaten Moscow. The Germans, however retreated to defensive positions that were as strong as the ones they held within the salients, contributing to the failure of Red Army offensives against Army Group Center in the summer of 1943.

Military losses

Losses for the entire series of operations around the Rzhev salient from 1941 to 1943 are difficult to calculate. These operations cover an entire series of battles and defensive operations over a wide area involving many formations on both sides.

For the whole series of Rzhev battles, the numbers are not clear yet. But, since the mobilized manpower of both sides were enormous and the fighting is violent, casualties should be very high. According to A. V. Isayev, the Soviet losses from January 1942 to March 1943 is 392,554 irrecoverable and 768,233 sanitary. The Soviet losses during the beginning period of 1942 (including "operation Jupiter") are 272,320 irrecoverable and 504,569 sanitary; with 25.7% of total manpower participated in these battles killed in the battlefield. According to V. V. Beshanov, the casualties of the July–September Rzhev offensive are 193,683 all cases, and during Operation Mars the Soviet suffered 250,000 casualties with 800 tanks damaged or destroyed. Isayev provided a lower number: 70,340 irrecoverable and 145,300 sanitary.

Russian historian Svetlana Gerasimova, states that the official Soviet casualties of 1,324,823 men for the four offensive operations against the Rzhev-Viaz’ma salient only accounts to approximately eight out of the 15 months (between the start and endpoint of the operations) of fighting. Soviet operational losses from May-July and October-November 1942, and January-February 1943 are missing and not included in the official figure. Gerasimova states that with the inclusion of casualties from these seven months, and the official casualty figures of the four offensive operations, the total losses approach 2,300,000 men.

Retired German general Horst Grossmann did not provide the total casualties of the German side in his book Rzhev, the basement of the Eastern Front. But according to his description, from 31 July to 9 August, one German battalion at the front line, after being exhausted in the violent battles, only had one commandant and 22 soldiers, and by 31 August there were battalions which had only one commandant and 12 soldiers (equal to one squad). According to Grossmann, during Operation Mars, the German suffered 40,000 casualties.

According to the German reports which are still stored at the Storage Center of National Documents of Germany, from March 1942 to March 1943, the casualties of the 2nd, 4th, 9th, 2nd Panzer, 3rd Panzer and 4th Panzer Army (The 4th Panzer Army only have data from March to April 1942) amount to 162,713 KIA, 35,650 MIA, 469,747 WIA. The number of soldiers that died during treatment in the hospital are still unknown. According to Mikhail Yuryevich Myagkov, the casualties of German forces from January 1942 to March 1943 are about 330,000 irrecoverable and more than 450,000 sanitary. However, according to Svetlana Gerasimova, German casualties in the battle for the Rzhev – Viaz’ma are uncertain, and the commonly cited 350,000 - 400,000 lack substantiation and references to documentary sources.

Civilian losses

Before the war, Rzhev had more than 56,000 people, but when it was liberated on 3 March 1943, there were only 150 people remaining, plus 200 in the surrounding rural area. The inhabitants were transported to Germany and Eastern Europe. Out of 5,443 houses, only 297 remained. Material losses were estimated at 500 million rubles (1941 value).

Vyazma was also virtually destroyed during the war. In this city, two transit camps of Nazi Germany, named Dulag No. 184 and Dulag No. 230 were established. Prisoners in these camps were Soviet soldiers and Soviet civilians from the area of Smolensk, Nelidovo, Rzhev, Zubtsov, Gzhatsk, and Sychyovka. According to German data collected by the Soviet counter-espionage agency SMERSH, 5,500 people died of their wounds. During the winter of 1941-42, in these camps, about 300 people each day were killed by diseases, cold, starvation, torture and other causes. After the war, two mass graves were discovered in the area, each a size of 4 × 100 m and in total containing an estimated 70,000 bodies, all of them unidentified. Germans also discovered and executed 8 local political leaders, 60 commissars and political instructors, and 117 Jews at the Dulag No. 230 camp.

Strengths and weaknesses in the Soviet and German tactics

USSR

Strength

The Soviets managed to exploit the earlier victory at the Battle of Moscow and create some advantages in the critical sector of the front. Their attacks threatened the flanks of Army Group Center and forced the Germans to divert the forces to these areas, therefore reducing the pressure on Moscow. During this time, the USSR's Army commanders began to concentrate their main forces at the critical zones to strengthen their position in these areas, or to muster enough power for their assaults. In addition, the Soviets also started using tanks as a main assault force instead of a mere supporting tool for infantry. The Front commanders also got some important experience in commanding and coordinating a combined force. From May 1942, Soviet Fronts started to deploy their own air armies for supporting the land troops, reporting under the direct command of the Front commanders. Thus these commanders began to have some sort of full authority to use the air forces, except the long-ranged strategic bomber units which were still under direct command of the Soviet Stavka.

After the "manpower crisis" of late 1941, in 1942 the Soviets had gathered enough strategic reserves, and they also began to pay more attention to developing them. In 1942 the Soviets managed to build 18 new reserve armies and resupply 9 others. At Rzhev, the army received 3 reserve armies and had 3 others resupplied. Of course, in this period, many Soviet units still had inadequate strength and equipment, but with the more plentiful reserve force, they managed to somewhat maintain stable fighting capability and prevent the severe fluctuation in manpower. This enabled the Red Army to conduct active defenses and prepare for large-scaled offensives.

Weakness

As the second top person of the Stavka, G. K. Zhukov was one of the first Soviet military officers to admit and to make a strict self-criticism about the Soviet's and also his own faults in this period:

Today, after reflecting the events of 1942, I see that I had many shortcomings in evaluating the situation at Vyazma. We overestimated ourselves and underestimated the enemies. The "walnut" there was much stronger that what we predicted.

— G. K. Zhukov.

The Soviet Army suffered terribly from severe deficits in weapons and equipment due to the tremendous losses during the German onslaught in 1941. Meanwhile, during the first half of 1942, the reserved source of equipment was still not adequate. For example, during January and February 1942, the Western Front only received 55% of needed 82mm mortar rounds, 36% of needed 120mm rounds and 44% of needed artillery munitions. On average, each artillery battery only had 2 rounds per day. The weapons deficit was so severe that the Front commanders had to make occasional appeals for equipment. The serious lack of ammunition hampered Soviet efforts in neutralizing German strongpoints, leading to heavy casualties in the assaults.

The lack of munitions did not only occur in the case of cannons and mortars, but also for small arms. During "the ammunitions famine" at Rzhev salient, on average, the Red Army only had 3 bullets for each rifle, 30 bullets for each submachine gun, 300 bullets for each light machine gun and 600 bullets for each heavy one. The "famine" of munitions in firearms and artillery pieces forced the Soviet army commanders, in many cases, to use tanks in the role of artillery; such inappropriate usage together with the outdated military thinking (which did not pay enough attention to the assault role of tank forces) sharply reduced the effectiveness of the tank units, preventing them from conducting deep penetration into the German defensive line. For the tank forces, although the Soviet possessed a large number of tanks, the numbers of low quality, damaged and outdated ones were also large. In the Bryansk, Western and Kalinin Front, the proportion of low quality tanks was 69% and the rates of damaged tanks about 41-55%. All the above facts meant that the Red Army in the Rzhev area did not have adequate preparation in terms of equipment, weapons and logistics.

The worst mistakes of the Red Army in 1942 at the Rzhev salients lies in the coordination and cooperation between its Fronts and the control of Stavka towards them. During the offensives in January and February 1942, instead of establishing a centralized command and control with tight cooperation between the Fronts, the Soviet Stavka and I. V. Stalin let each Front carry out their own assault without notable cooperation between the Fronts. Such separated and uncooperative assaults failed to achieve their goals and lead to the total failure of the whole offensives. To make matters worse, on 19 January 1942 Stalin suddenly retook the 1st Shock Army from the Western Front with a "very nonsense" reason. That unreasonable act severely weakened the right wing of the Western Front and lead to the failure of the offensive at the area Olenino - Rzhev - Osuga.

Further errors in the Soviet's tactics and commands were the ambitious and unrealistic goals of the offensives. Early 1942, the Red Army had just recovered from the disastrous losses during the late half of 1941, therefore it was still very weak. Even the victory at the previous battle of Moskva was already a miracle for the Soviet Union. In every offensive, the aims and scale have to be correlative with the army's strength, but at the battles of Rzhev, the Soviet commanders demanded too much from their subordinates.

Last but not least, another "palindromic disease" of the Red Army in 1942 is the hesitation in retreating from threatened sectors. As a results, many Soviet units were trapped in a notable number of "pockets" when the Germans counter-attacked. In these cases, only the troops of 11th Cavalry Corps and 6th Tank Corps managed to escape successfully. The escape of 33rd and 41st Army was conducted on time, but they failed to keep it secret and chose the wrong direction to move, leading to considerable casualties. And in the case of 11th Cavalry and 39th Army, the Stavka made a serious mistake when they planned to keep them in the Kholm-Zhirkovsky bridgehead for future attacks; however not only they failed to conduct any attacks but also they were surrounded and nearly destroyed during the Seydlitz operation.

Germany

Strength

After the Soviet winter counter-offensive of 1941–42, the Germans were able to securely hold and defend the salient against a series of large Soviet offensives. The operations led to disproportionately high Soviet losses and tied down large numbers of Soviet troops. The defense of the Salient provided the Germans with a base from which they could launch a new offensive against Moscow at a future time. The defensive positions created by the Germans after the retreat from Moscow were well constructed and placed. The Germans eventually withdrew from the positions only due to losses elsewhere in the war and were able to withdraw from the salient with minimal losses.

Weakness

German operations in 1941 directed at Moscow lasted too late into the year. Rather than stabilize the front and create defensive positions, the Germans pushed their forces forward and left them poorly prepared for the Soviet winter counteroffensive. The losses in men and equipment to Army Group Centre were considerable. The Army group lacked the strength to go back on the offensive in 1942.

After the front stabilized, the German Army tied down enormous amounts of manpower in holding salients from which they did not intend to exploit. This reduced the amount of manpower the Germans could devote to operations elsewhere on the front. The Germans also used some of their best formations, such as 9th Army, in a strictly static defensive role. The Rzhev salient had value and tied down disproportionate numbers of Soviet troops, but it is unclear if the salient was worth the loss of around 20 high quality divisions for offensive or defensive operations elsewhere in 1942.

The abandonment of the salient was necessary in 1943 to create reserves for the front as a whole. But the reserves and the strength created were mostly used up in the costly offensive directed at Kursk in 1943 (Operation Citadel).

Controversies about the battles of Rzhev

This part of the Second World War was poorly covered by Soviet military historiography, and what coverage exists occurred only after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, when historians gained access to relevant documents. Exact dates of particular battles, their names, outcomes, significance, and even losses have not been fully clarified and there are still many controversies about these topics.

Casualties of the Soviet forces

In 2009, a television movie was aired in Russia entitled Rzhev: Marshal Zhukov's Unknown Battle, which made no attempt to cover up the huge losses suffered by Soviet forces. As a consequence, there were public calls in Russia for the arrest of some of those involved in its production. In the movie, the casualties of Soviet forces are given as 433,000 KIA. The journalist Alina Makeyeva, in an article of Komsomolskaya Pravda newspaper which was published on 19 February 2009, wrote: "The number presented by the historian is too low. There must be more than one million Soviet soldiers and officers killed! Rzhev and its neighboring towns were completely destroyed."; however, Alina could not present any proof. Journalist Elena Tokaryeva in her article which was published in the newspaper The Violin (Russia) on 26 February 2009 also claimed that more than 1,000,000 Soviet soldiers were killed at Rzhev. The number of casualties again was raised with the claim of journalist Igor Elkov in his articled published in the Russian Weekly on 26 February 2009. Igor said: "The accurate number of casualties of both sides is still dubious. Recently, there are some opinions about from 1.3 to 1.5 million Soviet soldiers was killed. It may reach the number of 2 million".

All this data was heavily criticized by Reserve Colonel, Doctor of History A. V. Isayev. By providing the data in the stored documents of Russian Ministry of Defence, Isayev stated that 's estimates were judgment of people without adequate knowledge of history, and are the results of demagogic motivation under the slogan "every information must be shown to the people". Using very detailed documents with clear origins, A. V. Isayev proved the casualties of the Soviet forces as below:

• Casualties of Western Front on Rzhev direction, from January to April 1942: 24,339 KIA, 5,223 MIA, 105,021 WIA. (data of Ministry of Defence, code name TsAMO RF, shelf 208, drawer 2579, folder 6, volume 208, pp. 71–99).
• Casualties of Kalinin Front on Rzhev direction, from January to April 1942: 123,380 irrecoverable, 341,227 sanitary. (data of Ministry of Defence, code name TsAMO RF, shelf 208, drawer 2579, folder 16, volume ll, pp. 71–99).
• Total casualties of Western and Kalinin front during Jan-Apr 1942: 152,943 irrecoverable, 446,248 sanitary (above sources).
• Total casualties of 29th and 30th Army (Kalinin Front), 20th and 31st Army (Western Front) in August 1942: 57,968 irrecoverable and 165,999 sanitary. (data of Ministry of Defence, code name TsAMO RF, shelf 208, drawer 2579, folder 16, volume ll, pp. 150–158)
• Total casualties of 20th, 29th, 30th, 31st (Western Front) and 39th Army (Kalinin Front) on September 1942: 21,221 KIA and 54,378 WIA.(data of Ministry of Defence, code name TsAMO RF, shelf 208, drawer 2579, folder 16, volume ll, pp. 163–166).
• Total casualties of Kalinin Front during Operation Mars: 33,346 KIA, 3,620 MIA, 63,757 WIA. (above source).
• Total casualties of 20th, 30th, 31st Army and 2nd Guard Cavalry Corps from 21 to 30 November 1942 (first phase of Operation Mars): 7,893 KIA, 1,288 MIA, 28,989 WIA. (data of Ministry of Defence, code name TsAMO RF, shelf 208, drawer 2579, folder 16, volume ll, pp. 190–200).

A. V. Isayev also used the research of Colonel-General G. F. Krivosheyev, his senior workmate at Russian Military History Institute and pointed out the common results between Isayev and Krivosheyev. On the Website "Soldier" of Russian Military History Institute, Isayev also said that the electronic draft of Krivosheyev was stolen and illegally used by the hackers, hence these drafts were completely deleted from the Institute Website. Nowadays, only the book whose copyright is held by Krivosheyev himself is recognized as legal document.

Finally, A. V. Isayev claimed that the Soviet casualties at Rzhev from January 1942 to March 1943 were 392,554 KIA and 768,233 WIA. The document film of Aleksey Vladimirovich Pivovarov was also heavily criticized by Isayev; he stated that in this film, many important events of the Rzhev battles is not mentioned such as the breakout of 1st Guard Cavalry Corps, the breakout of more than 17,000 remaining troops of 33rd Army during Operation Seydlitz, and the breakout of the 41st Army. According to A. V. Isayev, if the film of Aleksey Vladimirovich Pivovarov and the thesis of Svetlana Aleksandrovna Gerasimova were true, many living people should have been recorded as KIA. Until now, there has not been any Russian articles or works which objects the arguments of A. V. Isayev.

Role of G. K. Zhukov in Operation Mars

The role of Zhukov in this infamous offensive is also a debated topic. American military historian, Colonel David M. Glantz claimed that G. K. Zhukov had to take the main responsibility in the tactical failure of this operation, and this is "the greatest defeat of Marshal Zhukov". In more detail, David Glantz asserted that Zhukov's command in this offensive was not careful, too ambitious, too clumsy and all these lead to a disaster. However, Antony Beevor disagreed with Glantz's comment. According to Beevor, at that time Zhukov had to concentrate on Operation Uranus at Stalingrad battlefield hence he had little time to care for what was happening at Rzhev.

The Russian authors Vladimir Chernov and Galina Yaroslavovna also disagreed with Glantz. They asserted that from 26 August 1942 Zhukov did not command the Western Front, and that from 29 August he had his hand busy with the serious matters at Stalingrad. It has been asserted that Stalin was actually the commander in charge of all the fronts at the Rzhev salient. Zhukov only took part in the commanding at Rzhev during its later periods as a "firefighter" who was solving the serious problems of the battlefield at that moment. Therefore, Beevor asserted the comments of Glantz about Zhukov's responsibility were not correct.

The Title "City of Military Glory" of Rzhev

Rzhev was conferred the status of "City of Military Glory" by the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin on October 8, 2007, for "courage, endurance and mass heroism, exhibited by defenders of the city in the struggle for the freedom and independence of the Motherland". This act also caused heated debate and controversy. Many people believed that Rzhev shouldn't be a "City of Military Glory" since it was under Nazi German occupation before being liberated. However, according to the law, being occupied does not prevent a city from receiving this honorary title. As long as its citizens, military personnel and government officers paid a large contribution for the Great Patriotic War and expressed great heroism, bravery and patriotism in these contributions, that is enough. Furthermore, the fierce and heroic resistance of Soviet citizens at Rzhev did not only occur during the 1942–1943 period, but also during the defence of Moscow in 1941. According to all these facts, Rzhev, Vyazma and many other cities have enough conditions to have the title "City of Military Glory," whether they were occupied or not.

References

Citations

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Bibliography

• Gerasimova, Svetlana (2016). The Red Army's forgotten 15-month campaign against Army Group Center, 1942–1943. London: Helion and Company. ISBN 978-1-91109-614-6. {{cite book}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help)
• Boris Gorbachevsky, Through the Maelstrom: A Red Army Soldier's War on the Eastern Front, 1942-1945, by University Press of Kansas, 2008, ISBN 978-0-7006-1605-3, Hardcover, 443 pages, photos.

External links

• Rzhev Battle 1941-1943 Template:Ru icon
• Horst Grossmann Geschichte der rheinisch-westfaelischen 6 Infanterie-Division 1939–1945 Template:De icon
• German war photos Template:Ru icon
• Battles of Rzhev Template:Ru icon

• Conflicts in 1942
• Conflicts in 1943
• World War II aerial operations and battles of the Eastern Front
• Battles and operations of the Soviet–German War
• Battles of World War II involving Germany
• Battles involving the Soviet Union