Misplaced Pages

This is an old revision of this page, as edited by Keith-264 (talk | contribs) at 17:27, 8 September 2021 (Undid revision 1043145563 by Ahmed88z (talk) Reverting vandalism or test edit). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

Italian invasion of Egypt
Part of the Western Desert Campaign of the Second World War
Western Desert 1940
Date 9–16 September 1940 Location Egypt26°N 30°E / 26°N 30°E / 26; 30 Result Italian victory
Belligerents
United Kingdom Free France	Italy Libya
Commanders and leaders
Archibald Wavell William Gott John Campbell	Rodolfo Graziani Mario Berti Italo Gariboldi Pietro Maletti Annibale Bergonzoli
Strength
1 reinforced brigade 205 aircraft naval support	4 divisions 300 aircraft
Casualties and losses
40 killed 10 tanks 11 armoured cars 4 lorries	120 killed 410 wounded 6 aircraft

The Italian invasion of Egypt (Operazione E) was an offensive in the Second World War, against British, Commonwealth and Free French forces in the Kingdom of Egypt. The invasion by the Italian 10th Army (10ª Armata) ended border skirmishing on the frontier and began the Western Desert Campaign (1940–1943) proper. The Italian strategy was to advance from Libya along the Egyptian coast to seize the Suez Canal. After numerous delays, the scope of the offensive was reduced to an advance as far as Sidi Barrani and the engagement of any British forces in the area.

The 10ª Armata advanced about 65 mi (105 km) into Egypt against British screening forces of the 7th Support Group (7th Armoured Division) the main force remaining in the vicinity of Mersa Matruh, the principal British base in the Western Desert. On 16 September 1940, the 10ª Armata halted and took up defensive positions around the port of Sidi Barrani.The army was to wait in fortified camps, until engineers had built the Via della Vittoria (Victory Road) along the coast, an extension of the Libyan Litoranea Balbo (Via Balbia). The Italians began to accumulate supplies for an advance against the 7th Armoured Division and the 4th Indian Division at Mersa Matruh, about 80 mi (129 km) further on.

On 8 December, before the 10ª Armata was ready to resume its advance on Mersa Matruh, the British began Operation Compass, a five-day raid against the fortified Italian camps outside Sidi Barrani. The raid succeeded and the few units of the 10ª Armata in Egypt that were not destroyed were forced into a hurried retreat. The British pursued the remnants of the 10ª Armata along the coast to Sollum and across the border to Bardia, Tobruk, Derna, Mechili, Beda Fomm and El Agheila on the Gulf of Sirte. The British suffered casualties of 1,900 men killed and wounded during Compass and took 133,298 Italian and Libyan prisoners, 420 tanks, over 845 guns and many aircraft.

Background

Libya

Cyrenaica, the eastern province of Libya, had been an Italian colony since the Italo-Turkish War (1911–1912), although resistance continued until 1932. With Tunisia, a part of French North Africa to the west and Egypt to the east, the Italians had to defend both frontiers and established a North Africa Supreme Headquarters, under the command of the Governor-General of Italian Libya, Maresciallo dell'Aria (Marshal of the Air Force), Italo Balbo. Supreme Headquarters had the 5th Army (5ª Armata) (Generale Italo Gariboldi) in the west and the 10ª Armata (Tenente Generale Mario Berti) in the east, which in mid-1940 had nine metropolitan divisions with an establishment of about 13,000 men each, three Milizia Volontaria per la Sicurezza Nazionale (Blackshirt) divisions and two Italian Libyan colonial divisions with an establishment of 8,000 men each. Reservists had been recalled in 1939, along with the usual call-up of new conscripts.

Egypt

The British had based military forces in Egypt since 1882 but these were greatly reduced by the terms of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. The small British and Commonwealth force garrisoned the Suez Canal and the Red Sea route, which was vital to British communications with its Far Eastern and Indian Ocean territories. Ruled indirectly by the British, Egypt remained neutral during the war. In mid-1939, Lieutenant-General Archibald Wavell was appointed General Officer Commanding-in-Chief (GOC-in-C) of the new Middle East Command, over the Mediterranean and Middle East theatres. Until the Franco-Axis armistice, French divisions in Tunisia faced the Italians on the western Libyan border forcing the garrison to divide and face both ways.

In Libya, the Italian Royal Army (Regio Esercito Italiano) had about 215,000 men and in Egypt the British had about 36,000 troops, with another 27,500 men training in Palestine. British forces included the Mobile Division (Egypt) commanded by Major-General Percy Hobart, one of two British armoured training formations, which in mid-1939 was renamed the Armoured Division (Egypt) and on 16 February 1940, it became the 7th Armoured Division. The Egyptian–Libyan border was defended by the Egyptian Frontier Force and in June 1940, the headquarters of the 6th Infantry Division (Major-General Richard O'Connor) took over command in the Western Desert, with instructions to drive back the Italians from their frontier posts and dominate the hinterland, if war began. The 7th Armoured Division, less the 7th Armoured Brigade, assembled at Mersa Matruh and sent the 7th Support Group forward towards the frontier as a covering force.

The RAF also moved most of its bombers closer to the frontier and Malta was reinforced to threaten the Italian supply route to Libya. The HQ of the 6th Infantry Division, still lacking complete and fully trained units, was renamed the Western Desert Force on 17 June. In Tunisia, the French had eight divisions, capable only of limited operations and in Syria were three poorly armed and trained divisions, with about 40,000 troops and border guards, were on occupation duties against the civilian population. Italian land and air forces in Libya greatly outnumbered the British in Egypt but suffered from poor morale and were handicapped by some inferior equipment. In Italian East Africa were another 130,000 Italian and East African troops with 400 guns, 200 light tanks and 20,000 lorries; Italy declared war from 11 June 1940.

Terrain

The winds of the Mediterranean
Tramontane Gregale Levante Sirocco Ostro Libeccio Ponente Mistral

The Western Desert is about 386 km (240 mi) long, from Mersa Matruh in Egypt, west to Gazala on the Libyan coast, along Via Balbia, the only paved road. The Sand Sea, 150 mi (241 km) inland, marks the southern limit of the desert at its widest at Giarabub and Siwa; in British parlance, Western Desert came to include eastern Cyrenaica in Libya. From the coast, extending into the hinterland lies a raised, flat plain of stony desert about 500 ft (152 m) above sea level, that runs 124–186 mi (200–300 km) in depth until the Sand Sea. The region is inhabited by a small number of Bedouin nomads and local wildlife consists of scorpions, vipers and flies.

Bedouin tracks link wells (birs) and the easier traversed ground; desert navigation is by sun, star, compass and "desert sense", good perception of the environment gained by experience. (When the Italian invasion of Egypt began in September 1940, the Maletti Group (Raggruppamento Maletti, Major-General Pietro Maletti) lacking experience of desert conditions, got lost leaving Sidi Omar, disappeared and had to be found by aircraft.) In spring and summer, days are miserably hot and nights very cold. The Sirocco (Gibleh or Ghibli), a hot desert wind, blows clouds of fine sand, reducing visibility to a few yards and coating eyes, lungs, machinery, food and equipment. Motor vehicles and aircraft need special oil and air filters and the barren ground means that water and food as well as military stores, have to be transported from outside.

Italian Army

In 1936, General Alberto Pariani had been appointed Chief of Staff of the Italian Army and began a reorganisation of divisions to fight wars of rapid decision, according to thinking that speed, mobility and new technology could revolutionise military operations. In 1937, traditional three-regiment divisions (divisione ternaria) began to change to two-regiment binary divisions (divisione binaria), as part of a ten-year plan to reorganise the standing army into 24 binary, 24 triangular, twelve mountain, three motorised and three armoured divisions. The effect of the change was to increase the administrative overhead of the army, with no corresponding increase in effectiveness; new technology such as tanks, motor vehicles and wireless communications were slow to arrive and were inferior to those of potential enemies. The dilution of the officer class to find extra unit staffs was made worse by the politicisation of the army and the addition of Blackshirt Militia. The reforms also promoted the tactics of frontal assault to the exclusion of other theories of war, dropping the emphasis on fast mobile warfare backed by artillery. By September 1939, sixteen divisions of the 67 in the Italian Army (excluding the garrison of Ethiopia) had been converted to divisione binaria and had received their establishment of arms and equipment. The remaining divisions had obsolete equipment, no stock of replacements and lacked artillery, tanks, anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft guns and transport.

Morale was considered to be high and the army had recent experience of military operations. The Italian navy had prospered under the Fascist regime, which had paid for fast, well-built and well-armed ships and a large submarine fleet but the navy lacked experience and training. The air force had been ready for war in 1936 but had stagnated and was not considered by the British to be capable of maintaining a high rate of operations. The 5th Army (5ª Armata) in Tripolitania, the western half of Libya opposite Tunisia, had eight divisions; the 10ª Armata with six infantry divisions garrisoned the province Cyrenaica in the east. At the end of June, after the Fall of France, four divisions were transferred from the 5th Army to the 10ª Armata . When Italy declared war on 11 June, the 10ª Armata comprised the 1st Libyan Division Sibelle on the frontier from Giarabub to Sidi Omar and XXI Corps from Sidi Omar to the coast, Bardia and Tobruk. The XXII Corps was moved south-west of Tobruk, to act as a counter-attack force. Before war was declared, Balbo expressed his doubts to Mussolini

It is not the number of men which causes me anxiety but their weapons ... equipped with limited and very old pieces of artillery, almost lacking anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons ... it is useless to send more thousands of men if we cannot supply them with the indispensable requirements to move and fight.

and demanding more equipment including 1,000 trucks, 100 water tankers, more medium tanks and anti-tank guns, which the Italian economy could not produce or the army transfer from elsewhere. In Rome, Badoglio, the chief-of-staff, fobbed him off with promises, "When you have the seventy medium tanks you will dominate the situation", as Balbo prepared to invade Egypt on 15 July. After Balbo was killed in an accident, Benito Mussolini replaced him with Marshal Rodolfo Graziani, with orders to attack Egypt by 8 August. Graziani replied that the 10ª Armata was not properly equipped and that an attack could not possibly succeed; Mussolini ordered him to attack anyway.

Prelude

10ª Armata

The ten divisions of the 10ª Armata (Lieutenant-General Mario Berti) comprised the XX Motorised Corps (Tenente Generale Giuseppe di Stefanis), XXI Corps (Tenente Generale Lorenzo Dalmazzo), XXII Corps, XXIII Corps (Generale di corpo d'armata Annibali Bergonzoli) and the new Gruppo Divisioni Libiche (Libyan Corps). The army comprised metropolitan infantry divisions, Blackshirt (Camicie Nere ) infantry divisions and Libyan colonial divisions. The XXIII Corps with the metropolitan divisions "Cirene" and "Marmarica", the Blackshirt Division "23rd Marzo", the 1st and 2nd Libyan divisions (Lieutenant-General Sebastiano Gallina) and the Maletti Group was to conduct the invasion. Bergonzoli had about 1,000 lorries, first to move the "Cirene" and "Marmarica" divisions, followed by the "23rd Marzo". The Libyan divisions had 650 vehicles, enough to move equipment, weapons and supplies but the infantry would have to walk; the Maletti Group had 450 vehicles, enough to move its troops. The Maletti Group comprised three battalions of Libyan infantry, additional artillery, much of the Italian armoured vehicle element in Libya and almost all of the Fiat M11/39 medium tanks. XXI Corps, with the Sirte and "28th Ottobre" divisions formed a reserve and XXII Corps with the "Catanzaro" and "3rd Gennaio" divisions were left at Tobruk because of the transport shortage.

5° Squadra

The 10ª Armata was supported by the 5° Squadra of the Regia Aeronautica, with 336 aircraft. The command had four bomber wings, a fighter wing, three fighter groups, two reconnaissance groups and two squadrons of colonial reconnaissance aircraft, with 110 Savoia-Marchetti SM.79 bombers, fifty Breda Ba.65 ground attack aircraft, 170 Fiat CR.42 fighters and six IMAM Ro.37, Caproni Ca.309 and Caproni Ca.310bis long-range reconnaissance aircraft. On 9 September, another sixty-four bombers, seventy-five ground-attack aircraft and fifteen reconnaissance aircraft arrived from Italy. The 5° Squadra was organised to follow and support the army in the field as a self-contained unit but Berti could expect little support from the Regia Marina, because ten submarines had been lost since Italy declared war, the fleet was too important to risk and was short of fuel.

Italian plans

Three times, deadlines were set for an Italian invasion and cancelled; the first plan was intended to coincide with an expected German invasion of England on 15 July 1940. Balbo took all the trucks from the 5th Army and the Fiat M11/39 medium tanks being delivered from Italy, to reinforce the 10ª Armata for a crossing of the frontier wire and an occupation of Sollum as soon as war was declared. After a British counter-attack was repulsed and the Italian armies were replenished, the advance would continue. Although this plan was based on a realistic appreciation of what the Italian armies in Libya could achieve, it fell through when the invasion of England was cancelled. The second plan, for 22 August, was for a limited advance to Sollum and Shawni el Aujerin to the east, with three columns moving on three lines of advance. Once Sollum had been occupied, an advance on Sidi Barrani would be considered, an example of advance-in-mass, used on the northern front in the Ethiopian War. The Italian non-motorized infantry divisions were to use the only road but the summer heat in August, which would have affected them most, led to another postponement.

The third plan was for an invasion on 9 September with Sidi Barrani as the objective, which Graziani disclosed to his staff six days before Mussolini ordered the invasion. The non-motorised, metropolitan divisions would advance along the coast and attack through Halfaya Pass, occupy Sollum and continue to Sidi Barrani. A southern column of the Libyan divisions and the Maletti Group was to advance along the Dayr al Hamra–Bir ar Rabiyah–Bir Enba track, to outflank the British on the escarpment. The Maletti Group was to drive south and east through the desert but the Italian staff failed to provide proper maps and navigation equipment; when moving to its assembly and jumping-off points, the group got lost and XXIII Corps Headquarters had to send aircraft to help lead the group into position; the Libyan divisions arriving late at the rendezvous near Fort Capuzzo.

The embarrassment of the Maletti Group added to doubts about the lack of lorries, transport aircraft and British domination of the terrain, which led to another change of plan. The fourth plan was set for 13 September, with Sidi Barrani and the area to the south as the objective. The 10ª Armata, with only five divisions, due to the shortage of transport and the tanks of the Maletti Group, would advance in mass down the coast road, occupy Sollum and advance through Buq Buq to Sidi Barrani. The 10ª Armata was to consolidate at Sidi Barrani and bring up supplies, destroy a British counter-attack and resume the advance to Matruh. The non-motorized infantry divisions were to use the coast road because they would be ineffective anywhere else. A similar operation had been conducted on the northern front in Ethiopia but went against mobile warfare theory, for which there were ample forces to execute. Graziani believed the only way to defeat the British was by mass, having overestimated their strength.

Western Desert Force

Against an estimated 250,000 Italian troops based in Libya and about 250,000 more in Italian East Africa, Wavell had a ration strength of about 36,000 troops in Egypt; fourteen non-brigaded battalions of British infantry; the 2nd New Zealand Division (Major-General Bernard Freyberg) with one infantry brigade, an understrength cavalry regiment, a machine gun battalion and a field artillery regiment. The 4th Indian Infantry Division (Major-General Noel Beresford-Peirse) had two infantry brigades and some artillery, the 7th Armoured Division (Major-General Sir Michael Creagh) had two armoured brigades with two armoured regiments each instead of three. The 7th Support Group, with three motorised infantry battalions, artillery, engineers and machine-gunners, was to harass the Italians and to fight delaying actions between the border and Matruh if attacked but to retain the capacity to engage the main Italian force.

At Matruh an infantry force would await the Italian attack, while from the escarpment on the desert flank the bulk of the 7th Armoured Division, would be ready to counter-attack. The covering force was to exaggerate its size and the 7th Support Group was to use its mobility to cover the desert flank, while along the coast road, the 3rd Coldstream Guards, a company of the 1st Battalion King's Royal Rifle Corps (KRRC) and a company of Free French Motor Marines, with supporting artillery and machine-gunners, would fall back in stages, demolishing the road as they retired. At the end of May 1940, the Royal Air Force in the Middle East had 205 aircraft, including 96 obsolete Bristol Bombay medium bombers and modern Blenheim light bombers, 75 obsolete Gloster Gladiator fighters and 34 other types. In July, four Hawker Hurricane fighters arrived but only one could be spared for the Western Desert Force. By the end of July, the Mediterranean Fleet had won control of the Eastern Mediterranean and were able to bombard Italian coastal positions and transport supplies along the coast to Matruh and beyond.

Border skirmishes

On 17 June, using the headquarters of the British 6th Infantry Division, the headquarters of the WDF (Lieutenant-General O'Connor) was formed to control all troops facing the Italians in Cyrenaica, a force of about 10,000 men, with aircraft, tanks and guns. O'Connor was to organise aggressive patrolling along the frontier and set out to dominate no-man's land by creating "jock columns", mobile combined-arms formations based on units of 7th Armoured Division. These small, well-trained, regular forces made the first attacks on Italian convoys and fortified positions across the border. British patrols closed up to the frontier wire on 11 June, with orders to dominate the area, harass the garrisons of the frontier forts and lay ambushes along the Via Balbia and inland tracks.

Some Italian troops were unaware that war had been declared and seventy were captured on the track to Sidi Omar. Patrols ranged north to the coast road between Bardia and Tobruk, west to Bir el Gubi and south to Giarabub. Within a week, the 11th Hussars (Prince Albert's Own) had seized Fort Capuzzo and at an ambush east of Bardia, captured the 10ª Armata Engineer-in-Chief, Brigadier General Romolo La Strucci. Italian reinforcements arrived at the frontier, began to conduct reconnaissance patrols, improved the frontier defences and recaptured Fort Capuzzo. On 13 August, the British raids were stopped to conserve the serviceability of vehicles; the 7th Support Group took over to observe the wire for 60 mi (97 km) from Sollum to Fort Maddalena, ready to fight delaying actions if the Italians invaded Egypt.

Operazione E

9–10 September

XXIII Corps (General Annibale Bergonzoli) was to lead the 10ª Armata attack into Egypt to Sidi Barrani along the coast road with non-motorised and motorised formations. The corps had been given more lorries; the 62nd Infantry Division Marmarica and 63rd Infantry Division Cirene were part-motorised, the 1st Blackshirt Division 23rd Marzo was motorised, as were the Maletti Group and the 1st Raggruppamento Carri. The part-motorised infantry divisions would move by shuttling forward and the non-motorized infantry would have to march the 60 mi (97 km) to Sidi Barrani. Bergonzoli wanted the 1st Raggruppamento Carri as an advanced guard, two motorised infantry divisions in line and one motorised division in reserve. The two Libyan non-motorised infantry divisions would have to move on foot, with the Maletti Group bringing up the rear. The 1st Raggruppamento Carri was held back in reserve, except for the LXII Light Tank Battalion, which was attached to the 63rd Division "Marmarica" and the LXIII Light Tank Battalion assigned to the 62nd Division "Cirene". The 2nd Raggruppamento Carri stayed at Bardia except for the IX Light Tank Battalion attached to the 2nd Libyan Division "Pescatori". The II Medium Tank Battalion was with the Maletti Group, which had three fully motorised Libyan infantry battalions.

On 9 September, the activity of the Regia Aeronautica increased and bombers from 55 Squadron, 113 Squadron and 211 Squadron RAF retaliated with attacks on airfields, transport, supply dumps and a raid on Tobruk by 21 aircraft. Later in the day, 27 Italian fighters made a sweep over Buq Buq and the RAF flew more sorties against Italian airfields. British air reconnaissance revealed much ground movement at Bardia, Sidi Azeiz, Gabr Saleh and towards Sidi Omar from the west, which was interpreted as the beginning of the Italian invasion. The forward move of the 10ª Armata showed the limits of Italian mobility and navigation, when the Maletti Group got lost moving up to Sidi Omar, on the frontier wire. On 10 September, the armoured cars of the 11th Hussars spotted the Maletti Group and a thick mist shielded the British as they shadowed the slow Italian assembly. As the mist cleared, the hussars were attacked by Italian aircraft, tanks and artillery.

13–14 September

On 13 September, the 1st Blackshirt Division 23rd Marzo re-took Fort Capuzzo and a bombardment fell on Musaid, just over the Egyptian side of the border, which was then occupied. Artillery-fire and bombing began on Sollum airfield and barracks (which were empty), which raised a dust cloud. When the dust cleared the Italian army could be seen drawn up, ready to advance against the British covering force of the 3rd Coldstream Guards, some field artillery, an extra infantry battalion and a machine-gun company. The Italians advanced along the coast with two divisions leading, behind a screen of motorcyclists, tanks, motorised infantry and artillery. The Italian formation made an easy target for artillery and aircraft but the 1st Libyan Division "Sibelle" soon occupied Sollum barracks and began to move down the escarpment to the port.

On the inland plateau, an Italian advance towards Halfaya Pass was opposed by a covering force of a 3rd Coldstream company, a Northumberland Fusilier platoon and some artillery, which began to withdraw in the afternoon, as more Italian infantry and tanks arrived. During the evening, two columns of the 2nd Libyan Division Pescatori, the 63rd Infantry Division "Cirene" and the Maletti group from Musaid and the 62nd Infantry Division "Marmarica" from Sidi Omar, converged on the pass. Next day, the Italian units on the escarpment began to descend through the pass, towards the Italian force advancing along the road from Sollum. An 11th Hussar squadron, the 2nd Rifle Brigade and cruiser tanks of the 1st Royal Tank Regiment (1st RTR) harassed the Italian force on the escarpment. Just after noon, the British troops on the coast retreated to Buq Buq and met reinforcements from the 11th Hussars and a motorised company of Troupes de marine (French marines), which was enough to maintain contact with the Italians. The British withdrew to Alam Hamid on 15 September and Alam el Dab on 16 September, trying to inflict maximum losses without being pinned down and destroying the coast road as they went, damage which was made worse by the amount of Italian traffic.

16 September

The uncommitted part of the 1st Raggruppamento Carri, followed the 1st Libyan Division "Sibelle" and the 2nd Libyan Division "Pescatori" towards Bir Thidan el Khadim. At Alam el Dab near Sidi Barrani, about fifty Italian tanks, motorised infantry and artillery tried an outflanking move, which forced the Coldstream Guards to retreat. The armoured group was engaged by British field artillery and made no further move but by dark the 1st Blackshirt Division 23 Marzo had occupied Sidi Barrani. Above the escarpment, the British covering forces fell back parallel to those on the coast road and the threat from the desert flank did not materialise. British aircraft flew many reconnaissance and bombing sorties and 5° Squadra made sweeps with up to 100 fighters and bombers on British forward airfields and defensive positions. The British anticipated that the Italian advance would stop at Sidi Barrani and Sofafi and began to observe the positions with the 11th Hussars, as the 7th Support Group withdrew to rest and the 7th Armoured Division prepared to confront an advance on Matruh. Italian radio broadcasts about the invasion suggested that the advance would continue from Sidi Barrani but it soon appeared that the Italians were digging-in on an arc to the south and south-west at Maktila, Tummar (east), Tummar (west), Nibeiwa and on top of the escarpment at Sofafi as divisions further back occupied Buq Buq, Sidi Omar and Halfaya Pass.

Aftermath

Analysis

The 10ª Armata advanced about 12 mi (19 km) a day to enable the non-motorised units to keep up and at Sidi Barrani, built fortified camps. No bold mechanised strokes or flanking movements had been made by the armoured units, XXIII Corps had guarded the infantry instead and the 10ª Armata suffered fewer than 550 casualties during the advance. The Raggruppamento Maletti, 1st Raggruppamento Carri and the 1st Blackshirt Division "23rd Marzo" had failed to operate according to Italian armoured warfare theory. Lack of preparation, training and organisation had led to blunders in assembling and directing the Raggruppamento Maletti and over-caution with the other tank battalions of 1st Raggruppamento Carri. The rushed motorisation of the 1st Blackshirt Division "23rd Marzo", which had not been trained as a motorised division, disorganised the relationship between drivers and infantry.

The advance reached Sidi Barrani with modest losses but failed to do much damage to the British. On 21 September, there were sixty-eight Fiat M.11/39 tanks left of the seventy-two sent to Libya. The 1st Medium Tank Battalion had nine serviceable and twenty-three unserviceable tanks and the 2nd Medium Tank Battalion had twenty-eight operational and eight non-operational tanks. Italian medium tank strength was expected to increase when deliveries of the new Fiat M13/40, which had a powerful Cannone da 47/32 M35 47 mm gun, began. The II Medium Tank Battalion with thirty-seven M13/40 tanks arrived in Libya in early October, followed by the V Medium Tank Battalion with forty-six M13/40 tanks on 12 December. In mid-November the Italians had 417 medium and light tanks in Libya and Egypt. Wavell wrote,

The greatest possible credit is due to Brigadier William Gott, MC, commanding the Support Group, and to Lieutenant-Colonel John Campbell, MC, commanding the Artillery, for the cool and efficient way in which this withdrawal was carried out, also to the troops for their endurance and tactical skill.

— Wavell

Repair works began on the coast road, renamed Via della Vittoria from Bardia and construction of a water pipe begun, which were not expected to be ready before mid-December, after which the advance would be resumed as far as Matruh.

Mussolini wrote on 26 October

Forty days after the capture of Sidi Barrani I ask myself the question, to whom has this long halt been any use—to us or to the enemy? I do not hesitate to answer, it has been of much use, indeed, more to the enemy…. It is time to ask whether you feel you wish to continue to command.

and two days later, on 28 October, the Italians invaded Greece, beginning the Greco-Italian War. Graziani was allowed to continue planning at a leisurely pace and an Italian advance to Matruh was scheduled for mid-December.

Casualties

In 1971, Kenneth Macksey wrote that the 10ª Armata suffered 530 casualties, 120 killed and 410 wounded against a British loss of "but forty men...and little equipment". In 1993, Harold Raugh wrote of about 2,000 Italian casualties against less than fifty British. In 1995, the writers of Germany and the Second World War noted that equipment losses for both sides had not been accurately tabulated. In 1997, Giorgio Bocca wrote that the Western Desert Force suffered casualties of forty men killed, ten tanks, eleven armoured cars and four lorries destroyed. In his 1999 MA thesis, Howard Christie wrote that from 9 to 16 September, the 10ª Armata suffered casualties of 120 men killed and 410 wounded. Several tanks and lorries broke down and six aircraft were lost, two to accidents.

Subsequent operations

On 17 September, the Mediterranean Fleet began to harass Italian communications and Benghazi harbour was mined. A destroyer and two merchant ships were sunk by torpedo and a destroyer hit a mine at Benghazi and sank. RAF Blenheims destroyed three aircraft on the ground at Benina. The road on the escarpment near Sollum was bombarded by a navy gunboat and targets near Sidi Barrani by two destroyers, from which fires and explosions were seen. Captured Italians spoke of damage, casualties and a loss of morale. An attempt to bombard Bardia by a cruiser and destroyers was thwarted by Italian torpedo bombers, which hit the stern of the cruiser and put it out of action. Bombardments continued during the lull, which led to camps and depots being moved inland. Small British columns on land were set up to work with armoured car patrols, moving close to the Italian camps, gleaning information and dominating the vicinity.

Operation Compass

On 8 December the British launched Operation Compass, a five-day raid against the fortified Italian camps set up in a defensive line outside Sidi Barrani. Berti was on sick leave and Gariboldi had temporarily taken his place. The raid succeeded and the few units of the 10ª Armata in Egypt that were not destroyed were forced to withdraw. By 11 December, the British began a counter-offensive and the rest of the 10ª Armata was swiftly defeated. The British pursued the remnants of the 10ª Armata to Sollum, Bardia, Tobruk, Derna, Mechili, Beda Fomm and El Agheila on the Gulf of Sirte. The British lost 1,900 men killed and wounded, about ten per cent of their infantry, in capturing 133,298 Italian and Libyan prisoners, 420 tanks and over 845 guns and aircraft. The British were unable to continue beyond El Agheila, due to broken-down and worn out vehicles and the diversion of the best-equipped units to the Greek Campaign.

Orders of Battle 10 June 1940

5ª Armata (5th Army)

Air Marshal Italo Balbo, Supreme Commander Italian Forces in North Africa. Details taken from Christie (1999) unless specified.

Western Frontier (Tunisia, Generale Italo Gariboldi)

• X Corps
  • 25th Infantry Division "Bologna"
  • 60th Infantry Division "Sabratha"
• XX Corps
  • 17th Infantry Division "Pavia"
  • 61st Infantry Division "Sirte"
  • 27th Infantry Division "Brescia"
• XXIII Corps
  • 1st Blackshirt Division Division "23rd Marzo"
  • 2nd Blackshirt Division "28th Ottobre"
  • 2nd Libyan Division "Pescatore" (reserve to 5ª Armata)

10ª Armata

Eastern Frontier, (Libya, General Mario Berti )

• XXI Corps
  • 62nd Infantry Division "Marmarica"
  • 63rd Infantry Division "Cirene"
• XXII Corps
  • 64th Infantry Division "Catanzaro"
  • 4th Blackshirt Division "3rd Gennaio"
  • 1st Libyan Division "Sibelle" (10ª Armata reserve)

5° Squadra, Regia Aeronautica

On 10 June 1940 there were 363 Italian aircraft in North Africa 306 operational and 57 trainers; 179 aircraft were unserviceable.

• Bomber
  • 10th Stormo: 30 Savoia-Marchetti SM.79
  • 14th Stormo: 12 SM.79, 1 Fiat BR.20
  • 15th Stormo: 35 SM.79, 8 Savoia-Marchetti SM.81, 3 BR.20
  • 33rd Stormo: 31 SM.79
• Fighter
  • 2nd Stormo: 36 Fiat CR.32, 25 Fiat CR.42
  • 10th Gruppo: 27 Fiat CR.42
  • 50th Stormo: 11 Breda Ba.65 (ground attack), 3 IMAM Ro.41 (reconnaissance), 23 Caproni Ca.310 (light bomber/reconnaissance)
• Reconnaissance
  • 64th Gruppo: 8 IMAM Ro.37bis, 5 RO.1bis
  • 73rd Gruppo: 6 RO.37bis, 1 RO.1bis
  • 143rd Squadron: CANT Z.501/6 (maritime reconnaissance)
• Colonial
  • I Gruppo Aviazione Presidio Coloniale: 18 Caproni Ca.309, CA.310, RO.37 (light bomber/reconnaissance)
  • II Gruppo Aviazione Presidio Coloniale: 21 CA.309, CA.310 and RO.37 (light bomber/reconnaissance)

Western Desert Force (WDF)

• Commander-in-Chief Middle East, General Sir Archibald Wavell
  • Commander Western Desert Force: Lieutenant-General R. N. O'Connor
• 7th Armoured Division (Major-General Michael Creagh)
  • 4th Armoured Brigade, Mersa Matruh
    • 1st Royal Tank Regiment
    • 6th Royal Tank Regiment
  • 7th Armoured Brigade, Sidi Suleiman
    • 7th Hussars
    • 8th Hussars
  • 7th Support Group (Motorised Infantry Brigade) Sidi Barrani
    • 1st K.R.R.C. Battalion
    • 2nd Motor Battalion (The Rifle Brigade)
    • 3rd Battalion Coldstream Guards
    • 1st Royal Northumberland Fusiliers
    • 3rd Royal Horse Artillery
    • F Battery, 4th Royal Horse Artillery
    • 11th Hussars (attached to 7th Support Group from 7th Armoured Brigade)

Sidi Barrani

Operations on the Libyan–Egyptian Border

• Cairo Infantry Brigade – Garrison for Mersa Matruh

Other Commonwealth Forces in Egypt

• 4th Indian Division (less one infantry brigade) Nile Delta
  • 5th Indian Infantry Brigade
  • 11th Indian Infantry Brigade
  • Divisional Troops
• 6th Australian Division (forming, Nile delta)
• 2nd New Zealand Division (forming, Nile delta)

Orders of battle 13 September 1940

10ª Armata

Marshal Rodolfo Graziani, Supreme Commander Italian Forces in North Africa.

• XXI Corps (10ª Armata Reserve, Tobruk)
  • 61st Infantry Division "Sirte"
  • 2nd Blackshirt Division "28th Ottobre"
  • LX Light Tank Battalion (L3)
• XXII Corps
  • 64th Infantry Division "Catanzaro"
  • 4th Blackshirt Division "3rd Gennaio"
• XXIII Corps: Commander General Annibale Bergonzoli
  • 1st Blackshirt Division "23rd Marzo" (motorised for the invasion of Egypt)
  • 62nd Infantry Division "Marmarica" (part motorised for the invasion)
  • LXIII light tank battalion (L3) (reinforcing the 62nd Division "Marmarica")
  • 63rd Infantry Division "Cirene" (part motorised for the invasion)
  • LXII light tank battalion (L3) (reinforcing the 63rd Division "Cirene")
  • 1st Libyan Division "Sibelle" (non-motorised)
  • 2nd Libyan Division "Pescatore" (non-motorised)
  • IX light tank battalion (L3) (reinforcing the 2nd Libyan Division "Pescatore")

Comando Carri Armati della Libia

• 1st Raggruppamento Carri (reserve to XXIII Corps, under command 10ª Armata)
  • I Medium Tank Battalion (M11)
  • XXI Light Tank Battalion (L3)
• 2nd Raggruppamento Carri
  • XX Light Tank Battalion (L3)
  • LXI Light Tank Battalion (L3)
• Raggruppamento Maletti (part of XXIII Corps)
  • II medium tank battalion (M11)
  • 3 Motorized Libyan infantry battalions

WDF

Commander-in-Chief, Middle East: General Sir Archibald Wavell Commander Western Desert Force: Lieutenant-General R. N. O'Connor

• Corps Troops
  • 7th Battalion, Royal Tank Regiment (Matildas)
  • 1st Royal Horse Artillery
  • 104th Royal Horse Artillery
  • 51st Field Regiment R.A.
  • 7th Medium Regiments R.A.
  • 64th Medium Regiments R.A.
• 7th Armoured Division
  • 4th Armoured Brigade
  • 7th Armoured Brigade
  • Support Group (Infantry Brigade)
  • Divisional Troops
• 4th Indian Division
  • 5th Indian Infantry Brigade
  • 11th Indian Infantry Brigade
  • Divisional Troops
  • 16th Infantry Brigade (attached to 4th Indian Division until

11 December 1940)

• 6th Australian Division (from mid-December)
  • 16th Australian Infantry Brigade
  • 17th Australian Infantry Brigade
  • 16th Infantry Brigade (attached from 4th Indian Division 11 December)
  • Divisional troops
  • 7th RTR (attached from 7th Armoured Division)
• Selby Force (a Brigade Group for the defence of Mersa Matruh)

See also

• List of Italian military equipment in World War II
• List of British military equipment of World War II
• List of World War II battles
• North African campaign timeline

Notes

1. Sources give conflicting data, Santoro listed 110 bombers, 135 fighters, 45 ground-attack aircraft six long-range reconnaissance aircraft and four torpedo-bombers.
2. The Italians considered forming a mechanised force to invade Egypt, followed by garrison troops to maintain the lines of communication. Two divisions and a brigade of Libyan troops could be fully motorised and join the tanks and motorised artillery, which would have created an all-arms force. Graziani rejected the suggestion since the rest of the army would lose its supply transport. The Comando carri della Libia (Armoured Command Libya), three or four artillery regiments and a motorised infantry division could have been formed according to the new mechanised warfare theory but Graziani favoured strength in numbers.
3. The Western Desert Force consisted of about 31,000 soldiers, 120 guns, 275 tanks and sixty armoured cars. The Italian 10ª Armata in Egypt consisted of 80,000 troops, 250 guns and 125 tanks. The 4th Indian Division was exchanged with the 6th Australian Division for the pursuit after the first part of Operation Compass.

Footnotes

1. ^ Playfair 1959, pp. 38–39, 92.
2. Jackson 2006, pp. 117–119.
3. ^ Playfair 1959, pp. 19, 93.
4. Playfair 1959, pp. 32, 93, 97–98, 375.
5. Playfair 1959, pp. 32, 93, 97, 100, 375.
6. Luck 1989, p. 92.
7. ^ Playfair 1959, pp. 115–116.
8. Lewin 1998, p. 149.
9. Maiolo 2010, p. 197.
10. Macksey 1971, p. 24.
11. Jowett 2000, pp. 4–5.
12. Schreiber 2015, pp. 66–67.
13. ^ Macksey 1971, p. 38.
14. Macksey 1971, p. 28.
15. Playfair 1959, p. 207.
16. Schreiber 2015, p. 65.
17. ^ Schreiber 2015a, pp. 271–272.
18. Mollo 1981, p. 92; Schreiber 2015a, p. 272.
19. ^ Schreiber 2015a, p. 272.
20. Christie 1999, pp. 51–52.
21. ^ Christie 1999, p. 52.
22. Christie 1999, pp. 52–53.
23. Christie 1999, pp. 53–54.
24. Playfair 1959, pp. 92–93.
25. Playfair 1959, p. 205.
26. Macksey 1971, p. 40; Playfair 1959, pp. 209–210.
27. Macksey 1971, pp. 28–29.
28. Mead 2007, p. 331.
29. Macksey 1971, p. 26.
30. ^ Pitt 1980, p. 32.
31. Playfair 1959, pp. 119, 205.
32. ^ Christie 1999, p. 54.
33. ^ Christie 1999, pp. 54–55.
34. ^ Playfair 1959, pp. 209–210.
35. Playfair 1959, pp. 210, 211.
36. ^ Christie 1999, p. 55.
37. ^ Playfair 1959, p. 211.
38. Macksey 1971, pp. 47, 68; Playfair 1959, p. 211.
39. Christie 1999, p. 56.
40. Wavell 1946, p. 3,001.
41. ^ Macksey 1971, p. 47.
42. Macksey 1971, p. 41.
43. Raugh 1993, p. 85.
44. Schreiber 2015a, p. 276.
45. Bocca 1997, p. 16.
46. Playfair 1959, pp. 211–212.
47. Playfair 1959, pp. 211, 257–294, 351–366.
48. Christie 1999, pp. 65, 68–79, 82, 104.
49. Greene, Massignani & Blennemann 1990, p. 17.
50. Playfair 1959, p. 265, 271.
51. Christie 1999, p. 86.

References

• Bocca, Giorgio (1997) . Storia d'Italia nella guerra fascista 1940–1943 [History of Italy in the Fascist War]. Oscar Storia No. 128 (Mondadori, Roma ed.). Bari: Laterza. ISBN 978-88-04-42699-8.
• Christie, H. R. (1999). Fallen Eagles: The Italian 10th Army in the Opening Campaign in the Western Desert, June 1940 – December 1940 (MA). Fort Leavenworth, KS: U. S. Army Command and General Staff College. OCLC 465212715. A116763. Retrieved 8 March 2015.
• Greene, J.; Massignani, A.; Blennemann, U. (1990). Mare Nostrum: The War in the Mediterranean, being a Study on Aspects of the Italian Army, Navy and Air Forces, with Comments on the German and Allied War Contribution in the Mediterranean & North Africa Fighting in World War II (2nd online ed.). Watsonville, CA: Jack Greene. OCLC 26647786.
• Jackson, A. (2006). The British Empire and the second World War. London and New York: Hambledon Continuum. ISBN 978-1-85285-417-1.
• Jowett, Philip S. (2000). The Italian Army 1940–45: Europe 1940–1943. Vol. I. Oxford/New York: Osprey. ISBN 978-1-85532-864-8.
• Lewin, Ronald (1998) . Rommel As Military Commander. New York: B&N Books. ISBN 978-0-7607-0861-3 – via Archive Foundation.
• Luck, Hans von (1989). Panzer Commander: The Memoirs of Colonel Hans von Luck. New York: Dell (Random House). ISBN 978-0-440-20802-0.
• Macksey, Major Kenneth (1971). Beda Fomm: The Classic Victory. Ballantine's Illustrated History of the Violent Century. New York: Ballantine Books. ISBN 978-0-345-02434-3. Battle Book Number 22.
• Maiolo, Joe (2010). Cry Havoc: The Arms Race and the Second World War 1931–1941. London: John Murray. ISBN 978-0-7195-6519-9 – via Archive Foundation.
• Mead, Richard (2007). Churchill's Lions: A Biographical Guide to the Key British Generals of World War II. Stroud: Spellmount. ISBN 978-1-86227-431-0.
• Mollo, Andrew (1981). The Armed Forces of World War II. New York: HMSO. ISBN 978-0-517-54478-5.
• Pitt, B. (1980). The Crucible of War: Wavell's Command. Vol. I (2001 ed.). London: Cassell. ISBN 978-0-304-35950-9 – via Archive Foundation.
• Playfair, I. S. O.; et al. (1959) . Butler, J. R. M. (ed.). The Mediterranean and Middle East: The Early Successes Against Italy (to May 1941). History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series. Vol. I. 3rd impression. HMSO. OCLC 888934805.
• Raugh, H. E. (1993). Wavell in the Middle East, 1939–1941: A Study in Generalship (1st ed.). London: Brassey's. ISBN 978-0-08-040983-2.
• Schreiber, G.; et al. (2015) . Falla, P. S. (ed.). The Mediterranean, South-East Europe and North Africa, 1939–1941: From Italy's Declaration of non-Belligerence to the Entry of the United States into the War. Germany and the Second World War. Vol. III. Translated by McMurry, D. S.; Osers, E.; Willmot, L. (2nd pbk. trans. Oxford University Press, Oxford ed.). Freiburg im Breisgau: Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt. ISBN 978-0-19-873832-9.
  • Schreiber, G. "Part I: Political and Military Developments in the Mediterranean Area, 1939–1940. Chapter 1: "Mussolini's Non-belligerence": 4. The Italian Fighting Forces (a) Equipment and Organisation". In Schreiber, Stegemann & Vogel (2015).
• Schreiber, G.; et al. (2015a) . Falla, P. S. (ed.). The Mediterranean, South-East Europe and North Africa, 1939–1941: From Italy's Declaration of non-Belligerence to the Entry of the United States into the War. Germany and the Second World War. Vol. III. Translated by McMurry, D. S.; Osers, E.; Willmot, L. (2nd pbk. trans. Oxford University Press, Oxford ed.). Freiburg im Breisgau: Militärgeschichtliches Forschungsamt. ISBN 978-0-19-873832-9.
  • Schreiber, G. "Part I: Political and Military Developments in the Mediterranean Area, 1939–1940. Chapter 3: The Strategic Dilemma of the summer and autumn of 1940: An Alternative or Interim Strategy (c) The Offensive against Sidi Barrani". In Schreiber, Stegemann & Vogel (2015a).
• Wavell, Archibald (1940). Despatch on Operations in the Middle East from August, 1939 to November, 1940. London: War Office.

Further reading

• Bauer, E. (2000) . Young, Peter (ed.). The History of World War II (Orbis: London, rev. ed.). New York: Galahad Books. ISBN 978-1-85605-552-9.
• Black, Jeremy (2003). World War Two: A Military History. Warfare and History. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-30535-8.
• Churchill, Winston (1986) . Their Finest Hour. The Second World War. Vol. II. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. ISBN 978-0-395-41056-1.
• Dando, N. (2014). The Impact of Terrain on British Operations and Doctrine in North Africa 1940–1943 (PhD). Plymouth University. OCLC 885436735. Retrieved 25 March 2015.
• Titterton, Commander G. A.; Essenhigh, First Sea Lord Admiral Sir Nigel; Brown, David (2002) . The Royal Navy and the Mediterranean: September 1939 – October 1940. Naval Staff Histories. Vol. I. Frank Cass. ISBN 978-0-7146-5179-8.
• Walker, Ian W. (2003). Iron Hulls, Iron Hearts: Mussolini's Elite Armoured Divisions in North Africa. Marlborough: Crowood. ISBN 978-1-86126-646-0.

External links

• "Archibald Wavell's Despatch on Operations in the Middle East From August, 1939 to November, 1940". Supplement to the London Gazette, Number 37609. June 13, 1946. Retrieved October 31, 2009.
• The Italian Army in Egypt during World War II
• "Bush Battles". Time Magazine. 12 August 1940. Archived from the original on May 4, 2008. Retrieved July 15, 2009.

• Egypt
• Italy

• Conflicts in 1940
• 1940 in Egypt
• North African campaign
• Egypt in World War II
• Battles and operations of World War II involving the United Kingdom
• Battles of World War II involving Italy
• Battles of World War II involving France
• Battles and operations of World War II involving India
• World War II invasions
• Invasions by Italy
• Invasions of Egypt
• Egypt–Italy military relations
• Military history of Italy during World War II