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Here we go again
Due to the invasion of the Eastern European Nation of Ukraine by Russian Federation (a unilateral act of a UN Nation which received widespread world condemnation in 2022), we did go back to Russia and the Nation of Georgia in 2008. Russia legislature (the Duma) used the same "Russian-backed separatist provinces" as does this wikipedia to claim it did not violate Georgia's sovereign borders, called Georgia's regional governments rebel entities of theirs (large Russian country), and continues to claim that Georgia is not an independent Nation similar to their claims to new US ambassadors that Ukraine is not a separate Nation. Regretfully, we also detoured to Russia and Chechyna, and atrocities at the city of Grozny. 2603:7081:2000:3EF3:652E:C1DE:FBC2:3F24 (talk) 16:17, 5 April 2022 (UTC)JARacino2603:7081:2000:3EF3:652E:C1DE:FBC2:3F24 (talk) 16:17, 5 April 2022 (UTC)
Not understanding how someone can say there were "no issues" with including that controversial line from EU report when this talk page shows that is exactly what the issue was all along. Huge multi hundred page report say many contradictory things, privileging one line that Russia likes to hear over hundreds others is very undue. Please let not hide behind this RFC, which apparently was not even formulated correctly and also from what I see did not provide grounds for including this undue single liner from the report. The EU report itself implies focusing on this is undue, in their own words:
"This Report shows that any explanation of the origins of the conflict cannot focus solely on the artillery attack on Tskhinvali in the night of 7/8 August"
Despite this from report writers themselves, it seem we keep going in the direction of making that one line about artillery attack a centerpiece, which seem undue.--LeontinaVarlamonva (talk) 23:03, 6 August 2021 (UTC)
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- To address concerns about cherrypicking things from the report I'm using quotes from the Telegraph and not the report itself. All the concerns were from you and other users saw no problems with it, apart from using volume 1 instead of volume 2. Alaexis¿question? 07:22, 7 August 2021 (UTC)
- Now the article mentions both South Ossetian shelling and the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali when discussing how the conflict started. Mentioning only the former would fail WP:NPOV. Alaexis¿question? 07:26, 7 August 2021 (UTC)
- 1.) So if newspapers make a sensationalist claim, base on single line in a very long report, that gives us the right to privilege that secondhand information over the original report, which itself warns not to focus too much on that single line? When original source itself warns not to focus on that one line, it is ok for secondary source to make big deal about it and for us to make it a centerpiece? I see how you are trying circumvent this issue based on technicality (that you are not citing the original report itself, you just citing someone who cited it), but this is just technicality, does not change substance of my concern that this is undue.
- 2.) Others not commenting on merits of this specific line, partly because some did not seem to understand what you were asking, is not same as "saw no problems" with it. Also I'm bit offended how you say "all concern were from you", as if that make valid claim invalid because they were "just" from unimportant person like me.
- 3.) Adding this one line is not essential to explain how the conflict started, so don't imply that. Text already make clear Georgia launch offensive after shelling and then Russia responded. If that aspect was omitted entirely then that would be one sided but it isn't, it is explain sufficiently.--LeontinaVarlamonva (talk) 09:35, 7 August 2021 (UTC)
- Re 1, if the Telegraph is making a sensationalist claim, then RFE/RL saying that the Osstian forces broke the ceasefire is also a sensationalist claim. You can't say it just about the statements you don't like. It's not undue, it's prominent in the report itself and has been covered by reliable sources.
- Re 2. and 3. feel free to initiate an RfC with a better-worded question. Alaexis¿question? 10:08, 7 August 2021 (UTC)
- 1) The notion that you can substitute the actual EU report with a newspaper article (especially with the aim of deflecting responsibility for cherry picking) is entirely new and does not seem to been covered in RfC at all, where the only feedback talks about the EU report itself. You are introducing a very novel approach which was not covered in RfC and honestly seem like a trick to me, a technicality
- 2) RFE/RL is not a fair comparison because that article does not stand on its own and is supported by a non-media source from a research organization. Also it concerns something entirely different and is not same as cherry picking one line out of a hundred page primary source. As stated above EU report not explicitly mentioning break of ceasefire by SO is not same as refuting claims by others who think so, another reason why this comparison does not make sense. Not only all of this was not questioned during RfC when there was opportunity but in fact one of the responses you got was this: "...at any rate, the preponderance of historical evidence would make me trust a Georgian claim over a Russian one", and recent edits are definitely not in spirit of that.
- 3)The way introduction appeared before this summer was a very stable version that seemed to be like this for many months as far as I can tell. So why should I initiate RfC when you are the one who want to change established status quo and introduce this new controversial information that has been controversial all along judging by past history of this page. --LeontinaVarlamonva (talk) 12:23, 7 August 2021 (UTC)
- None of the sources being discussed is Russian (or Georgian for that matter). The attack on Tskhinvali is the first thing that is said in the report about the course of the war (volume 1, p. 10 The Conflict in Georgia in August 2008). It has been cited by multiple reliable sources like France24, DW and Der Spiegel in addition to the Telegraph article. Alaexis¿question? 13:10, 7 August 2021 (UTC)
- of courrse it was cited because that one line made the biggest splash but we also consider original report and its context, including the disclaimer authors felt the need to make (probably as attempt at moderating overreaction). But none of this addressed my issue with your unusual approach, which is to cite somebody else's citation as a way of deflecting responsibility of cherry picking. This was outside scope of RfC and not discussed at all and again is a technicality that does not improve anything.--LeontinaVarlamonva (talk) 13:40, 7 August 2021 (UTC)
- This is a legitimate way to gauge notability, considering that it's a relatively long document. If something is said in the beginning of the report AND cited by multiple reliable sources chances are it's notable. Alaexis¿question? 16:28, 7 August 2021 (UTC)
- you need to cease adding this controversial content before discussion is concluded. whether one newspaper cherry pick that single line or several is not important, what is relevant is that its cherry picking of a single line from a long report and you admitted you want to deflect responsibility for cherry picking by not citing the report directly. And to say one more time, at no point did your RfC ask if including this one line like this was due or undue, so please we need to stop using recent RfC as cover for these changes. Other changes you made were ok, but this one line completely not covered in RfC, which by the way you were told was formulated very poor and confusing way.--LeontinaVarlamonva (talk) 17:30, 7 August 2021 (UTC)
- Okay, let's have another RfC. Re cherrypicking, I think you misunderstand how it works. I did not deflect any responsibility and did not admit to it. My point is that I'm not cherrypicking as other reliable sources also find this part of the report noteworthy. WP:NPOV says "Misplaced Pages aims to present competing views in proportion to their representation in reliable sources on the subject." In this case the view that the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali is the beginning of the large-scale hostilities is well represented in reliable sources and therefore should be included, alongside the claims of South Ossetian breaking the ceasefire before that. Alaexis¿question? 07:27, 10 August 2021 (UTC)
- you need to cease adding this controversial content before discussion is concluded. whether one newspaper cherry pick that single line or several is not important, what is relevant is that its cherry picking of a single line from a long report and you admitted you want to deflect responsibility for cherry picking by not citing the report directly. And to say one more time, at no point did your RfC ask if including this one line like this was due or undue, so please we need to stop using recent RfC as cover for these changes. Other changes you made were ok, but this one line completely not covered in RfC, which by the way you were told was formulated very poor and confusing way.--LeontinaVarlamonva (talk) 17:30, 7 August 2021 (UTC)
- This is a legitimate way to gauge notability, considering that it's a relatively long document. If something is said in the beginning of the report AND cited by multiple reliable sources chances are it's notable. Alaexis¿question? 16:28, 7 August 2021 (UTC)
- of courrse it was cited because that one line made the biggest splash but we also consider original report and its context, including the disclaimer authors felt the need to make (probably as attempt at moderating overreaction). But none of this addressed my issue with your unusual approach, which is to cite somebody else's citation as a way of deflecting responsibility of cherry picking. This was outside scope of RfC and not discussed at all and again is a technicality that does not improve anything.--LeontinaVarlamonva (talk) 13:40, 7 August 2021 (UTC)
- None of the sources being discussed is Russian (or Georgian for that matter). The attack on Tskhinvali is the first thing that is said in the report about the course of the war (volume 1, p. 10 The Conflict in Georgia in August 2008). It has been cited by multiple reliable sources like France24, DW and Der Spiegel in addition to the Telegraph article. Alaexis¿question? 13:10, 7 August 2021 (UTC)
I'm not sure why you not content with current version, which includes most of your additions. For example, look at this sentence "Other sources say that there was no armed attack by Russia before the Georgian invasion and that the Georgian claims of large-scale presence of Russian troops in South Ossetia could not be substantiated." The fact that it uses "Georgian invasion" is very strong wording and makes clear different viewpoint, I think you should leave at that because inserting anything more is simply tilting things too much in way that is undue. Considering report itself says that "any explanation of the origins of the conflict cannot focus solely on the artillery attack on Tskhinvali", showcasing that as definitive proof of when "open hostilities" began is questionable and undue. Current version based on your addition seem the most reasonable and sustainable. --LeontinaVarlamonva (talk) 09:14, 10 August 2021 (UTC)
- I think that the NPOV description of the lead-up to the war should mention all the events: 2004 clashes in SO, re-militarisation of the Kodori Gorge by Georgia in 2006 (a violation of the Moscow ceasefire agreement!), shelling of Georgian villages by SO heavy artillery in the beginning of August 2008 and the attack on Tskhinvali. It doesn't mean that all of these are of equal importance and should be mentioned in the lede, but now the shelling by SO forces in the beginning of August has undue weight. Adding a statement that large-scale hostilities started with the attack on Tskhinvali would make it more balanced. Actually some of the sources use a much stronger language like "Georgia 'triggered' war with Russia, EU investigation finds." Alaexis¿question? 10:34, 10 August 2021 (UTC)
Lede changes
Kober I'm for making the lede more concise but these changes have major issues. By moving the information from the EU report to a separate section you left only one position in the lede (that Russian forces moved into SO before the Georgian attack) which violates NPOV. Alaexis¿question? 19:48, 12 November 2021 (UTC) By the way, the changes were discussed at length a few months ago, so now a case must be made for any changes to the current consensus version. Alaexis¿question? 20:11, 12 November 2021 (UTC)
- We can work out a better version, but what you call NPOV violation is backed up by much evidence and accordingly referenced in the article. Now that Crimea had been conquered and the acute phase of Georgia-Russia information war has long dwindled, most Russians I've met would not deny that the Russian troops had been there before the Georgian response. They are even proud of their regime's "preemptive" skills. That said, I am not against rewording the statement provided the so-called Georgian version remains in a prominent place due to its heavy documentary backup and international support. --Kober 07:41, 13 November 2021 (UTC)
- Well, when we had this discussion a few months ago here it wasn't demonstrated that this version has a much greater support. The current sources supporting this version are pretty weak (Bagapsh's interview is a primary source which needs other sources to put it in context, United States Army Special Operations Command is likely biased to needs to be used carefully, Moscow Times simply doesn't say it, Estonian National Defence College and German Marshall Fund-funded Romanian think-tank are not prominent and likely to be biased too). I'm not arguing that they should not be used, rather that there is no overwhelming evidence in favour of one version. I'll add back the information from the EU report to the lede and would be happy to discuss other sources here. Alaexis¿question? 08:07, 13 November 2021 (UTC)
The Wall Street Journal, The Guardian, the CNN, the Financial Times, the Parliament of Canada, the Library of Congress and the US Army are pretty much mainstream sources. The argument that the United States Army Special Operations Command, Estonian National Defence College and German Marshall Fund-funded Romanian think-tank are biased because they don't support the Russian POV and EU report is reliable due to its pro-Russian bias is pretty weak. The Moscow Times says that Russian-installed president of South Ossetia has confirmed the deployment of the Russian troops before the Georgian counterattack on Tskhinvali.
The pro-Russian view is not mainstream. Misplaced Pages requires that the lede must reflect mainstream views and not place too much importance on the fringe views. The EU report has long been found to be unreliable source and had deliberately omitted certain facts to make Georgia look like the aggressor as evidenced by the sources added by Kober. Alaexis has not presented one shred of evidence that anti-Russian sources are not reliable, just his personal opinion. Therefore it's the EU report that should be deleted from the lede as unreliable.
The language used by Alaexis is not neutral. "Georgian invasion" in the lede is pretty biased wording because it disregards the fact that South Ossetia was recognised as Georgian territory by Russia in early August 2008. Generally, invasion refers to one country's army taking over a piece of land in another country. About half of the territory claimed by South Ossetia was already controlled by Georgia before August 8. "Georgian attack" mentioned by Alaexis in this discussion is not a neutral statement. The war was started by South Ossetia by launching an attack on the Georgian-controlled areas and therefore Georgia's move was a retaliation, not invasion. The current version is not "consensus version" because only two Russian editors were edti-warring the POV changes months ago and one other editor was resisting them with numerous solid arguments. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 77.10.116.84 (talk) 16:50, 1 December 2021 (UTC)
- I agree that invasion generally refers to an armed incursion by one sovereign state into another one's territory. South Ossetia lacked sovereignty and was not recognized by any UN member as independent on August 8, 2008. Russia recognized South Ossetia only on August 26, 2008. Attempted retroactive recognition by some Misplaced Pages's editors is nothing else but historical revisionism. Practically no English-language mainstream source treats South Ossetia as an independent state even now. Majority of Russians and Russian sources may state that South Ossetia is an independent country, but even so, this is not Russian Misplaced Pages. 100.2.23.10 (talk) 03:31, 25 December 2021 (UTC)
- I agree that invasion generally refers to an armed incursion by one sovereign state into another one's territory. South Ossetia lacked sovereignty and was not recognized by any UN member as independent on August 8, 2008. Russia recognized South Ossetia only on August 26, 2008. Retroactive application of recognition is nothing else but historical revisionism. Practically no English-language mainstream source treats South Ossetia as an independent state. Perhaps majority of Russian sources state that South Ossetia is an independent country, but even so, this is not Russian Misplaced Pages.100.1.51.214 (talk) 00:29, 26 December 2021 (UTC)
- I've replaced invasion with operation. Alaexis¿question? 06:21, 26 December 2021 (UTC)
- I see no issue with Kober's edits. Numerous arguments and academic sources have been presented that the EU report is not an undisputed reliable source. The version preferred by Russian editor violates WP:CHERRYPICKING, WP:UNDUE and WP:RSUW policies. The Moscow Times presents the statement of South Ossetia's president as proof that Russian troops indeed crossed the border already on August 7. It is quite amusing that Russian editor does not hesitate to believe the Ossetian POV that Georgia invaded South Ossetia, but chooses not to believe the statement of the Ossetian president imputing Russia. Canome (talk) 08:48, 26 December 2021 (UTC)
NPOV in the lede
Canome, can you explain why you removed referenced content from the lede? The source for the passage that you removed is The Daily Telegraph. Alaexis¿question? 11:44, 26 December 2021 (UTC)
There are plenty of sources which say that there are differing opinions on the responsibility for starting the hostilities.
1. Warning about War: Conflict, Persuasion and Foreign Policy by Christoph O. Meyer, Chiara De Franco, Florian Otto, published in 2019. See p. 215
“ | There is substantial evidence, albeit contested by some, that the war was triggered by a surprise attack by Georgian armed forces on Tskhinvali | ” |
2. Towards Global Justice: Sovereignty in an Interdependent World by Simona Ţuţuianu, published in 2012, p. 77
“ | In the case of the war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008, there are numerous interpretations regarding the responsibility of initiating the hostilities | ” |
3. The Making of Modern Georgia, 1918-2012 by Stephen F. Jones, published in 2014, p. 54
“ | ...Russia and Georgia clashed in a five-day war after Georgian troops, following an intensive exchange of fire and an anticipated invasion by Russian forces, attempted to assert control over the breakaway region of South Ossetia | ” |
The current version ignores this complexity and presents only one view: that Russia invaded SO and Georgia responded to it. It's a clear violation of WP:NPOV. Alaexis¿question? 12:24, 26 December 2021 (UTC)
- Caution is needed when using controversial sources. If the source contains multiple contradictory statements, choosing only one statement that fits one's narrative is not suitable for neutral Misplaced Pages editor. If the source is unreliable, but the author is notable, then attribution is required. If the source is very famous, but other academic sources have questioned the claims or shown them to be untrue, then controversy caused by such publication must also be mentioned. The current version fails to mention in the lede that Tagliavini was subjected to heavy criticism due not finding the evidence of the Russian invasion on August 7. The Daily Telegraph or any newspaper report on the publication of the report in 2009 is not enough evidence that the source is currently widely accepted by academic consensus as reliable. Only the Russian propagandists treat the EU-sponsored report as gospel.
- It is obvious that you are trying to push pro-Russian POV under the guise of the NPOV. NPOV does not mean conforming with the Russian POV. You are just helping the Russian government to obfuscate the facts regarding the start of the war and selectively use sources not critical of the Russian government. Nothing in your behavior suggests that you are willing to reach consensus with non-Russian editors. The current version edited by your team grossly violates the NPOV as it presents the fact of the Russian incursion on August 7 as having been mainly claimed by the Georgian government. None of the cited sources are published by the Georgian government. It does not present the fact of the Russian claim to have responded to the Georgian attack on August 8 as having been refuted by reputable researchers. Russian media reports support the statement that the Russian troops were already fighting in South Ossetia on August 7. The Russian soldiers themselves admit it. Who are you and what gives you the right to disregard such strong evidence? 100.2.23.10 (talk) 23:06, 30 December 2021 (UTC)
- Please refrain from making personal attacks and casting aspersions. WP:CIVILITY is a policy. I've provided quotes from books published in 2019, 2014 and 2012 to show that there are different opinions about the degree of responsibility of each side. Alaexis¿question? 14:05, 31 December 2021 (UTC)
Speaking of Misplaced Pages policies, read WP:FRINGE and WP:GEVAL. Just because there are differing views from the mainstream view, this does not mean that they should be treated equally. You found some biased/unreliable source making extraordinary claim that "There is substantial evidence, albeit contested by some, that the war was triggered by a surprise attack by Georgian armed forces on Tskhinvali." What kind of substantial evidence? There simply can not be such evidence because there is an evidence that the Ossetians initiated the attacks on the Georgian villages and Georgia was not preparing to attack Tskhinvali in August 2008. The U.S. intel leaked by WikiLeaks is cited in the article. It states: "All evidence available to the country team supports Saakashvili’s statement that this fight was not Georgia’s original intention." It also states: "As late as 22:30 Georgian Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials were still hopeful that the unilateral cease-fire announced by President Saakashvili will hold. Only when the South Ossetians opened up with artillery on Georgian villages, did the offensive to take Tskhinvali begin." If Saakashvili was planning an invasion of South Ossetia in August 2008, surely the Americans would have known it and mentioned it in their cables.
The mainstream view is that the Ossetians provoked the war and Russia had already started an invasion of Georgia or was ready for launching an invasion before the Georgian counterattack on August 8. This is supported by the pro-government Russian sources linked by an IP editor.
1. The report published in 2020 by History (American TV network).
“ | After accusations of aggression from both sides throughout the spring and summer, South Ossetian troops violated the ceasefire by shelling Georgian villages on August 1. Sporadic fighting and shelling ensued over the coming days, until Saakashvili declared a ceasefire on August 7. Just before midnight, seeing that the separatists would not, in fact, cease firing, Georgia’s military launched an attack on Tskhinvali in South Ossetia. Russian troops had already entered South Ossetia—illegally—and responded quickly to the Georgian attack. | ” |
2. The report published in 2020 by The Jerusalem Post.
“ | The 2008 Russo-Georgian War took place on August 7-12, over the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, where there were pro-Russian separatists. Amid deteriorating relations between Tbilisi’s pro-Western government and Moscow, Russia stopped its sanctions on the separatists. When South Ossetian separatists shelled Georgian villages, the Georgian Army entered the area to stop them. Russia invaded Georgia by land, sea and air, claiming that they were enforcing the peace in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. | ” |
3. The report published in 2020 by InformNapalm.
“ | On the eve of the invasion of Georgia, Russia conducted large-scale military exercises Caucasus-2008. Increasing the intensity of provocations, Moscow was waiting for a good excuse for open aggression. Their excuse was the Georgian army’s attempt to put an end to the Ossetian shelling and the creeping occupation of the border territories. | ” |
4. The report by UCLA's Foreign Affairs Magazine.
“ | On August 7th, 2008, the leaders of the Russian Federation shocked the world and made the controversial decision to mobilize and invade Georgia, a small, sovereign nation located in the Caucasus Mountains just south of Russia. The Georgian military had been engaged with separatists from the regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia for just under a week, yet by the time a large batch of Russian military personnel entered their territory through the mountainous Roki tunnel at 11:00 PM, it was too late. | ” |
5. The report by Agence France-Presse.
“ | On August 8, 2008, the Russian army swept into Georgia - bombing targets and occupying large swathes of territory - after Tbilisi launched a large-scale military operation against South Ossetian separatist forces who had been shelling Georgian villages in the region. | ” |
6. The report by the Atlantic Council.
“ | On August 7, 2008, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili swiftly responded to the deployment of Russian troops into South Ossetia, which violated Georgian territorial sovereignty. Russia, accusing Georgia of aggression and provoking war, began shelling Georgian villages, with Putin declaring “war has started.” | ” |
The version before your revert reflected the majority mainstream view on the subject and did not give undue weight to a fringe statement by the report not endorsed by scholarly consensus. Therefore that version is the NPOV version. Canome (talk) 17:00, 31 December 2021 (UTC)
- The Russian preparations for invasion have been reported in Russian media, and on top of that, somebody told mum he was already in South Ossetia. See «Когда мы поехали выручать разведчиков, командир всем раздал крестики». A typical example of a Russian soldier talking to mummy prior to 8 August, on "exercises" while he can see Tskhinvali. That can only be south of Roki, in South Ossetia. Not a JPKF peacekeeper, but a regular conscript. Secondly, various Russian journalists reported of massive Russian movement on the (Russian) Transkam on 6-7 August to Roki, not a place to just camp out, while Russian "volunteers" poored in.1, 2 No direct proof, but it corroborates what both Georgian officials communicated and others (in the west) observed.
- Furthermore, agree with the chronology above, the provocation offensive of the Ossetians on the eve of the 7th, after the Georgians called a unilateral ceasfire. A ceasefire that was, let's be reminded, advised by Russian commander of the JPKF, Marat Kulakhmetov, when Georgian minister Iakobashvili visited Tskhinvali on the 7th 1 to defuse the situation with the Ossetian leadership. The latter ducked away for that meeting, setting demands to postpone for a day.2 With just sheer logic, if they wanted to meet the next day, to maybe work out a ceasefire, the Georgians already call that ceasefire, why start an strong offensive on civil targets? That is because they wanted to provoke a reaction. Nothing POV <whatevah> about it. No need to guess, just reproduce the entirely reported timeline and everybody sensible can make up their mind. My two cents.
--Labrang (talk) 02:52, 1 January 2022 (UTC)
- No one is disputing that the SO forces were shelling Georgian villages in the first week of August 2008 (and the Georgians returned the fire). This is already mentioned in the lede so I don't understand how it's relevant to our discussion here.
- Regarding the claim that the version you removed is fringe, you can't just say that it's so. You need to prove that it meets the relevant criteria. In particular, you'll need to show that the books I cited (written by respectable Western scholars and published in the West and not in Moscow) do not reflect the mainstream view to the extent that this position should not be included in the lede at all.
- Regarding the reports in Russian media that you referenced, it's not some kind of trump card which lets you make an end run around WP:NPOV. The most you can say is that there were reports of the presence of some Russian soldiers in SO. Then it's the job of secondary sources to take these reports along with all other information into account and provide the synthesis. Alaexis¿question? 11:17, 1 January 2022 (UTC)
- This does not prove what you claim is the mainstream view. Some of these sources after all are questionable or unreliable. For example, Euronews states: "Fighting broke out between Georgian troops and separatist forces in early August 2008 but it was the launching of a concerted air and ground campaign by Georgia on South Ossetia's main city, Tskhinvali, that sparked the conflict on the evening of August 7-8." Also it mentions the EU-commissioned report, that it "found Georgia started the conflict with Russia but that Moscow was behind a long history of provocation and reacted disproportionately." Apparently this report is all propaganda but this report is not questioned in the article. Similar thing with CNN. Apparently this is "fringe" and "pro-Russian" POV. Mellk (talk) 04:28, 2 January 2022 (UTC)
- At least The Jerusalem Post and Agence France-Presse mentioned in this discussion are very reputable news outlets and there is no need to discard them as unreliable. History Channel is as reputable as Discovery Channel. These sources support the statement in the lede that the Georgian Army acted in response to the Ossetian shelling and was obliged to stop their illegal attacks.
- The article already cites European sources. EUobserver has reported: "The 2008 war began when Russia-controlled fighters in the breakaway South Ossetia region in Georgia escalated skirmishes against Georgian troops." Nobody is disputing that the EU-sponsored report said that Georgia initiated the conflict. But this does not mean that the EU report reflects the current mainstream view on the subject or that Misplaced Pages is obliged to cite only that source. Russo-Georgian_War#The_EU_report has cited the source published by Palgrave Macmillan which disputes the veracity of the claims made by the EU report. The European Council on Foreign Relations has stated: "On 7th August, Russian deployment to South Ossetia began. (...) The very limited Russian information operation were effective in influencing Western (particularly German) public opinion, which soon tilted towards the Russian version of the events. Lines of Russian disinformation even penetrated the EU's own final report, which overplayed the significance of US support and military assistance to Georgia. Russia learned its lessons, however, its information operations were dramatically increased for the 2014 campaign in Ukraine, albeit with much less effectiveness than in 2008." Agence France-Presse, EUobserver, Palgrave Macmillan, European Council on Foreign Relations - that's four European sources versus a single pro-Russian European source. Why should 1 pro-Russian source be picked over 4 NPOV source? So there is no need to cite the compromised EU report prominently in the lede when it already has its own section below in the article, especially without mentioning the controversy it has caused. Mention by The Daily Telegraph does not explicitly make the EU report a reliable source.
- If Russian propaganda managed to influence the European Union officials, then it is not surprising to surmise that Russian propaganda has also managed to influence a limited number of sources published in the West. Searching for pro-Russian sources instead of accepting mainstream sources already cited in the article is not a valid approach towards building a factual encyclopedia. Russian media reports on the presence of the Russian troops in South Ossetia on August 7 can be counted as significant evidence because they are published testimonies. There have been instances where the court rulings have found the suspects as innocent due to lack of evidence. But later the suspects have admitted their guilt. You will agree that it would be very wrong or biased to cite only the court's initial ruling without referencing the suspect's later testimony.
- There is absolutely nothing non-neutral about dating the start of the Russian invasion on August 7 because this statement is supported by evidence and solid academic sources, such as Palgrave Macmillan. The only non-neutral thing I see here are some editors attempting to disturb a consensus, WP:BLUDGEON the discussion and force the vast majority of neutral editors into accepting their pro-Russian version. 98.6.61.195 (talk) 14:22, 19 January 2022 (UTC)
Plenty of sources say that the Georgian attack preceded the Russian invasion (see the list in the beginning of this section). Therefore per WP:NPOV this position should be mentioned in the lede. Now it's not, so considering that the discussion is stuck now, we'll need an RfC. Alaexis¿question? 08:59, 14 February 2022 (UTC)
- The NPOV as of now does not cast a doubt on "a section" but on the whole article, which is not correct. It was better as Labrang (talk · contribs) put it: it has to address its specific section, not the whole article if the article as a whole is not considered POV. I find this whole NPOV thing to be very, very, forced (and as the anonymous user above implied, a bit too much "politically interested") almost totally lacking of standing. This article has not a problem with POV. Lone Internaut (talk) 09:52, 14 February 2022 (UTC)
- I must add that it seems to me that, among the opinions expressed above, there is some kind of consensus towards this NPOV thing lacking of standing and being based on fresh air, hence why I removed the tag. This article also went under scrutiny being a Good article. Lone Internaut (talk) 10:00, 14 February 2022 (UTC)
- Thanks. I have been quite surprised by the POV complaint on top since new year effectively disputing the entire article, but since I have no appetite to get engaged in potential edit wars or long (semantic) discussions I let it be. It is very easy to make the actual disputed line worded just so it reflects a need for both-sideism and find common ground. But maybe that is not in the interest of some. I don't know. --Labrang (talk) 10:22, 14 February 2022 (UTC)
- Look, I think it's a bit stupid to argue about NPOV tags. I put it in the beginning as the dispute is about the lede. If you really want to remove it feel free to do it, I won't restore it again. I'll open an RfC and hopefully we'll get some external feedback. Alaexis¿question? 13:09, 14 February 2022 (UTC)
- It's not stupid cause a NPOV tag like that looks like a dispute to the whole article, not only the lead as the lead does not have proper section(s) like the rest of the article body. I think it's fine with how Lebrang reworked the lead. Do as you wish, but this could be ended right here, right now. Lone Internaut (talk) 02:02, 16 February 2022 (UTC)
- Look, I think it's a bit stupid to argue about NPOV tags. I put it in the beginning as the dispute is about the lede. If you really want to remove it feel free to do it, I won't restore it again. I'll open an RfC and hopefully we'll get some external feedback. Alaexis¿question? 13:09, 14 February 2022 (UTC)
- Thanks. I have been quite surprised by the POV complaint on top since new year effectively disputing the entire article, but since I have no appetite to get engaged in potential edit wars or long (semantic) discussions I let it be. It is very easy to make the actual disputed line worded just so it reflects a need for both-sideism and find common ground. But maybe that is not in the interest of some. I don't know. --Labrang (talk) 10:22, 14 February 2022 (UTC)
- I must add that it seems to me that, among the opinions expressed above, there is some kind of consensus towards this NPOV thing lacking of standing and being based on fresh air, hence why I removed the tag. This article also went under scrutiny being a Good article. Lone Internaut (talk) 10:00, 14 February 2022 (UTC)
The first source provided in this discussion is erroneous since it makes an extraordinary claim that "There is substantial evidence, albeit contested by some, that the war was triggered by a surprise attack by Georgian armed forces on Tskhinvali." Where this evidence can be seen? The evidence that Russian troops invaded Tskhinvali first is available to the public and is pretty damning. More than 13 years have passed since the 2008 conflict and no Georgian soldier has admitted so far that the Georgian Army was preparing to start a war in South Ossetia in August 2008 so how can such evidence imputing Georgia really exist? The only available source containing the testimonies of the Georgian soldiers is this article.
“ | Georgian military sources now state that an attack had earlier been expected from Abkhazia, but never from South Ossetia. "We were indeed preparing for something in May when Georgia was denied NATO membership ," said the 4th Brigade senior lieutenant, but there "were no preparations made" for a military operation in South Ossetia this August. "Many were on vacation and we were preparing to go Iraq in the fall." | ” |
The following source provides the evidence that Georgia was not planning to start a war in August 2008:
“ | At that time most of the decision makers, the President, the Minister of Defense, the President of the Parliament and others from the inner circle of decision, were out of the country. This alongside the fact that 2000 of the best Georgian troops were in Iraq at the time, was the most solid evidence that there was no Georgian plan of attack. | ” |
American sources agree that the presence of the Georgian government and the best troops out of the country is evidence that Georgia did not intend to start the war in August 2008.
“ | The absence of Georgia’s best troops has also been cited as being one of the clearest signs that Tbilisi did not have a premeditated intention to get into a war, and certainly not one with the Russian military. It stands to reason that if that had been Georgia’s aim, it would have much preferred to have their combat-tested, well-trained battalions in Georgia instead of watching their country get trampled from TV screens in Mesopotamia. | ” |
The Russian propaganda is real and aims to blame Georgia for the war and obfuscate the crimes committed by Russia. The following source gives a detailed explanation how the Russian propaganda works.
“ | The August 7th start date is also debated as part of a determined Russian effort to maintain a strategic narrative of being the victim of Georgian aggression. | ” |
“ | Russia flew approximately fifty Russian reporters to Tskhinvali just days before the August 7th invasion.250 The presence of these reporters and the lack of Western war correspondents enabled Putin to control the narrative that was disseminated through Western news media outlets, and subsequently shape the opinions of the Western public and policy makers. The Russian narrative of Georgian aggression against South Ossetians, who were conveniently now Russian citizens due to the liberal issuance of Russian passports in the years prior to 2008, and Russian steps to stop “genocide” in progress is still the Russian version of the start of the war. This narrative, carefully managed by Russian reporters, and personally delivered to U.S. President George W. Bush by Vladimir Putin, the freshly appointed Russian Prime Minister, at the opening ceremony to the Beijing Olympic Games, largely succeeded in minimizing any outcry from the West.251 The Russian narrative dismisses claims that the Russians deliberately invaded Georgia | ” |
One can easily see how some Misplaced Pages editors dismiss the fact that Russia invaded Georgia on August 7 without any provocation just like the Russian propaganda does. Neutral observers will of course connect the dots. The argument that "Plenty of sources say that the Georgian attack preceded the Russian invasion" is not a compelling one to push the Russian POV. Plenty of sources can be found that state that Euromaidan was a coup d'état by Ukrainian fascists and local Russian-speaking patriots of Donbass foiled a genocide attempt by illegitimate Kiev junta with their bare hands. But WP policies such as WP:Gevаl are in place to prevent pushing of such revisionist propaganda sources. If some editors continue to argue for the pro-Russian POV under the guise of the NPOV just like they have been doing for years, they will benefit from a quick trip to WP:ANI or WP:AE and topic ban from Russian topic area.
Labrang's version added a mention of the ceasefire on late August 7 which was violated by the Ossetians. Such excessive details are not suitable for the lede, since the lede had already determined that Georgians responded to the Ossetian attacks which began on August 1. The lede currently also describes the start of the Russian invasion on August 7 as being insisted by Georgia. But the cited sources do not date the start of the invasion on August 7 because Georgia said so. They specifically refer to the testimonies of the Russian troops as evidence. The infamous EU report is not a reliable source as the discussion here has already determined it was written under the influence of the Russian propaganda, so it is not suitable for the inclusion in the lede. The previous version was more neutral and succinct and to the point. 68.237.83.40 (talk) 15:53, 19 February 2022 (UTC)
- Like said, my last contribution to the lede was basically intended to get things moving forward, away from the "disputed content" tag. It may certainly have been a bit too detailed for the lede, but alas, a call for everyone to improve it then. While this page will see an increased interest w developments in Ukraine, it is both bad and a disgrace the tag on top of the page is still effectively discrediting the entire page, whereas it is about *one* sentence. It is not in the interest of the community to let it be, except for some who I have seen selectively nitpicking over the past months. Labrang (talk) 14:20, 20 February 2022 (UTC)
Prelude Section - Image Legend
In the Prelude section, April-July 2008, there is an image for "Situation in Georgia before the war." The legend for the image could be improved: a. the green area of the map does not have a legend description, b. the grey legend item does not appear in the map, c. the word "zone" in the legend does not fit within the border of the image, d. the conflict areas circled by thin blue lines, are poorly contrasted with the river blue lines and the sea edge blue lines. SquashEngineer (talk) 13:21, 25 February 2022 (UTC)
- the legend is fine, except a) the green is missing. That might be added to the description as being controlled by breakaways. b) What you call "grey" is not grey. It is simply the blue line. The area in the map within the blue line (RWZ zone) covers the area of three background colours as it overlaps these. That entire area is (was) the RWZ zone. c) I can check into that if that can be improved. d) I think this is an externally sourced image, but I see it is in SVG vector file. Maybe I can change the blue line, but I suspect it is still a flat image. (Can't judge from phone) Labrang (talk) 18:39, 25 February 2022 (UTC)
- @ Goran tek-en, as you explicitly demand in the wikimedia file no one is allowed to edit your upload, please be reminded about this request / feedback, and please respond appropriately.... Thanks! (first time I see this kind of construction, but alas, I guess open source is not that open source anymore..) --Labrang (talk) 13:03, 27 February 2022 (UTC)
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