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Attack on Pearl Harbor
Part of the Pacific Theater of World War II
HELLO Imperial Japanese Navy were approached from different directions. The U.S. Army radar operator spotted the Japanese attack force at 136 miles, but did not specifiy nautical or statute miles. .
Date December 7, 1941 Location Pearl Harbor, Hawaiʻi, USA Result Decisive Japanese victory; United States declares war on the Empire of Japan and enters World War II on the side of Allies; Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy declare war on the United States.
Belligerents
United States	Empire of Japan
Commanders and leaders
Husband Kimmel (USN), Walter Short (USA)	Chuichi Nagumo (IJN), Mitsuo Fuchida (IJNAS), Shigekazu Shimazaki (IJNAS)
Strength
8 battleships, 8 cruisers, 29 destroyers, 9 submarines, ~50 other ships, ~390 planes	6 aircraft carriers, 9 destroyers, 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 8 tankers, 23 fleet submarines, 5 midget submarines, 441 planes
Casualties and losses
2335 military and 68 civilians killed, 1143 military and 35 civilians wounded, 4 battleships sunk, 4 battleships damaged, 3 cruisers damaged, 3 destroyers sunk, 2 other ships sunk, 188 planes destroyed, 155 planes damaged	55 airmen, 9 submariners killed and 1 captured, 29 planes destroyed, 4 mini-submarines sunk

The Attack on Pearl Harbor or Bombing of the Harbor was a surprise attack on the United States naval base on Pearl Harbor, Oahu, Hawaii. It was launched on the morning of Sunday, December 7, 1941 (Hawaii time) by the Empire of Japan's 1st Air Fleet against the U.S. Pacific Fleet and other US armed forces stationed at the harbor and also on the other side of Oahu. The attack spurred the U.S. into entering World War II. American casualties were 2403 dead and 1178 wounded, one of the worst losses in U.S. history (but still comparatively light in comparison to what might have been, in the opinon of several observers) 5 older battleships, 3 destroyers, 3 cruisers, and 188 planes (mostly obsolescent P-40s or obsolete P-36s) were destroyed. By contrast, Japan's losses were 64 dead, 1 captured, 29 planes, and 5 midget submarines. When US President Franklin Roosevelt addressed the shocked American people, he called it "a date which will live in infamy." The date is still noted every year in the U.S.

The Battle of the Philippines (1941-42), the Japanese invasion of what was then a U.S. colony, began nine hours later.

Background

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Industrialization

After the Meiji Restoration, which replaced the previous government among other widesweeping effects, the Empire of Japan embarked on a rapid economic, political, and military expansion to achieve parity with the European and North American countries in terms of power. Part of this strategy included extending territorial and economic control to increase access to populations, bases, and natural resources which were thought needed because of a lack of abundant resource in the Japanese home islands. That rapid industrialization demanded more resources than were available. In order to match Western powers, Japan rapidly developed its military and economy under the slogan "National Wealth and Military Strength." Military personnel played an increasing role in policy and then in government, especially after the early years of the 20th century. Asassination, attempted coup, and internal pressure were some of the tactics used by extreme elements in the military and elsewhere in Japanese society. Eventually, Generals Hideki Tojo and Kuniaki Koiso became Prime Ministers. From about 1910 through the 1930s, Japan became extensively militarized, in particular building a large and modern navy, the third largest in the world at the time, and a large and modern army.

Expansion

Japan looked outward for resources to support its power. Japan's expansionist policy directly caused wars with other countries, initially with Korea, China and Russia, ranging from deliberate attack (eg, the Panay incident), war (against Russia and China around 1900, as part of WWI, and against China again beginning in the early 30s), to diplomatic reactions (leaving the League of Nations, threatening postures over various incidents, ...) and trade restrictions (mostly by others in reaction). The largest were the First Sino-Japanese War with China in 1894, in which Japan took control of Taiwan, and the Russo-Japanese War with Russia in 1904, by which Japan gained territory in and around China, including the Korean peninsula. After World War I, the League of Nations awarded Japan custody of most of Imperial Germany's possessions and colonies in East Asia and the Pacific. In 1931, Japan imposed the puppet state of Manchukuo on eastern Manchuria by force. And starting in 1937, Japan escalated its long-simmering conflict with mainland China by the staged incident at the Marco Polo Bridge, starting the Second Sino-Japanese War.

Condemnation

The attacks against China were condemned by the League of Nations, the U.S., the UK, Australia, and the Netherlands. All but the League had territorial interests in Southeast Asia or the Philippines. These nations had already become aware of Japanese military power and willingness to use it, for instance after the Russo-Japanese war when almost all of the Russian Fleet was destroyed. In response to diplomatic pressures there, Japan resigned from the League of Nations. Then in July 1939, the U.S. terminated the 1911 U.S.-Japan commercial treaty, an action which showed official disapproval and, more concretely, allowed the U.S. to impose trade restrictions as an additional pressure measure. Nevertheless, Japan continued the war in China and signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Nazi Germany, which formally ended World War I hostilities between the two countries and declared common interests. In 1940, Japan also signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Fascist Italy forming the Axis Powers.

These actions led the U.S. to embargo scrap metal and gasoline shipments to Japan, and to close the Panama Canal to Japanese shipping. In 1941, with the acquiesence (under pressure) of Vichy France, Japan moved into northern IndoChina. The U.S. responded by freezing Japan's assets in the U.S., and beginning a complete oil embargo. Oil was Japan's most crucial lack in resources; her own supplies were very limited -- 80+% of Japan's imports came from the U.S. and the Imperial Navy relied entirely on imported bunker oil stocks. To secure its oil supplies, and other resources, Japanese planners had long been looking to the South, especially the Dutch East Indies. The Navy was certain any attempt to seize this region would bring the U.S. into the war, but with the oil embargo, determination to seize the necessary resources increased. Planning (espionage, logistics, etc) continued.

War

With the Hull note of November 26, 1941, Japan's leaders decided not to cancel the Pearl Harbor attack, in planning for 10 months and in serious training for most of the year. In fact, the attack had already been finally approved at the second Imperial Conference to consider it, in September. The fleet had been assembling in the Kuriles, and indeed sailed the day the Hull note was sent. U.S. and UK demands to back down from its actions in China and surrounding areas were perhaps seen as meaning a loss of international prestige for Japan, "losing face," losing national pride, losing everything gained in the Second Sino-Japanese war, losing access to oil, and losing future possibilities, despite the heavy investments in the military. The economy and policy of Japan already had become war-focused and there was little effective opposition to militarization in the leadership. As planned, the force would execute a pre-emptive strike to be in a better position as war began. On September 4, 1941, at the second of two Imperial Conferences concerning an attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese Cabinet met in the presence of the Emperor to consider the attack plans prepared by Imperial General Headquarters, and officially declared the intent for war. It was decided:

Our Empire, for the purpose of self-defense and self-preservation, will complete preparations for war ... ... resolved to go to war with the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands if necessary. Our Empire will concurrently take all possible diplomatic measures vis-a-vis the United States and Great Britain, and thereby endeavor to obtain our objectives ... In the event that there is no prospect of our demands being met by the first ten days of October through the diplomatic negotiations mentioned above, we will immediately decide to commence hostilities against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands.

Japanese strategy and plans

In preparation for the expected war, planning began in early 1941 for a Pearl Harbor attack. For the next several months, planning, training, weapons development, espionage, and coordination with other plans to invade British and Dutch colonies to the South occupied much of the Japanese military's time and attention. The decision to attack, unless the U.S. agreed with the Japanese positions in China, Indochina, and elsewhere, was finalized in September 1941 at the second of the two Imperial Conferences considering. Preparations for attacks against Malaya, the Philippines, and assorted Pacific islands were ready by the planned date of early December. Pearl Harbor attack planning was a part of the Japanese expectation the US would be inevitably drawn into the war after a Japanese attack against Malaya and Singapore.

The intent of a pre-emptive strike on Pearl Harbor was to neutralize American naval power in the Pacific, if only temporarily. After approval at the first Imperial Conference such an attack was incorporated into a theater-wide, simultaneous coordinated attack against several different countries, to be carried out if the differences with the United States could not be resolved to Japan's satisfaction. Thus, the future of Imperial Japan was judged to depend on successfully dealing with the Pacific Fleet. The difficulties of such an attack were twofold. First, the Pacific Fleet was a formidable force, and would not be easy to defeat or to surprise. Second, for aerial attack, Pearl Harbor's shallow waters made using conventional air-dropped torpedoes ineffective. On the other hand, Hawaii's isolation meant a successful surprise attack could not be blocked or quickly countered by forces from the continental US.

Strategic concepts

Several Japanese naval officers had been impressed by British Admiral Andrew Cunningham's Operation JUDGEMENT (the Battle of Taranto), in which 20 obsolete Fairey Swordfish biplanes, launched from aircraft carriers far from the main British base at Alexandria, disabled half the Italian fleet. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto dispatched a naval delegation to Italy, which concluded that a larger and better-supported version of Cunningham's strike could force the U.S. Pacific Fleet to retreat to bases in California, thus giving Japan the time and space thought necessary to erect a "barrier" defense to protect Japanese control of the resources (eg, oil) of Southeast Asia and the Dutch East Indies. Most importantly, the delegation returned to Japan with information about the shallow running torpedoes Cunningham's engineers had devised.

Some Japanese strategists may also have been influenced by U.S. Admiral Harry Yarnell's performance in the 1932 joint Army-Navy exercises, which assumed an invasion of Hawaiʻi. Yarnell, as commander of the attacking force, placed his carriers northwest of Oʻahu in rough weather and "launched" attack planes on the morning of Sunday, February 7, 1932. The exercise's umpires noted Yarnell's aircraft were able to inflict serious "damage" on the defenders, who for 24 hours after the attack were unable to locate his fleet. Yarnell's tactic was dismissed as impractical, since USN doctrine (in common with other navies') held any attacking force would be destroyed by the battleship force (the "battle line").

Primarily, Yamamoto’s idea for a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor was inspired by his hero, Fleet Admiral Marquis Tōgō Heihachirō, who in 1904 had, without declaring war, attacked the Second Russian Pacific Squadron at the Battle of Port Arthur in the Russo-Japanese War. The Russians lost two battleships and several cruisers, and never fully recovered. A year later, a young Ensign Yamamoto was injured in the Battle of Tsushima, where the Japanese destroyed almost the entire Russian fleet.

Intelligence and reconnaissance

On February 3, 1940, Yamamoto briefed Captain Kanji Ogawa of Naval Intelligence on the potential attack plan, asking him to start intelligence gathering on Pearl Harbor. Ogawa already had spies in Hawaii, including Japanese Consular officials with an intelligence remit, and he arranged for help from a German (and perhaps from family members as well) already living in Hawaii who was an Abwehr agent. None had been providing much militarily useful information. He planned to add 29-year-old Ensign Takeo Yoshikawa. By the spring of 1941, Yamamoto officially made a request for additional Hawaiian intelligence, and Yoshikawa boarded the liner Nitta-maru at Yokohama. He had grown his hair longer than military length, and assumed the cover name Tadashi Morimura.

Yoshikawa began gathering intelligence in earnest by taking auto trips around the main islands, and toured Oahu in a small plane, posing as a tourist. He visited Pearl Harbor frequently, sketching the harbor and location of ships from the crest of a hill. Once, he gained access to Hickam Field in a taxi, memorizing the number of visible planes, pilots, hangars, barracks and soldiers. He was also able to discover that Sunday was the day of the week on which the largest number of ships were likely to be in harbor, that PBY patrol planes went out every morning and evening, and that there was an antisubmarine net in the mouth of the harbor. Information was returned to Japan in coded form in Consular communications, and by direct delivery to intelligence officers aboard Japanese ships calling at Hawaii by consulate staff.

Early planning

In the event of outbreak of war with the United States, there would be little prospect of our operations succeeding unless, at the very outset, we can deal a crushing blow to the main force of the American Fleet in Hawaiian waters by using the full strength of the 1st and 2nd Air Squadrons against it, and thus to preclude the possibility of the American Fleet advancing to take the offensive in the Western Pacific for some time...We must use the entire carrier strength that we have. -- Minoru Genda, planning officer

In early 1941, Combined Fleet Commander-in-Chief Yamamoto began considering an attack on Pearl Harbor as a preemptive attack in the event of war. After some conflict with Naval General Headquarters and threatening to resign, he was finally authorized to create the Carrier Striking Task Force, and assigned Minoru Genda to develop the actual attack plan. Genda's plan stressed that surprise would be essential, given the expected balance of forces. Yamamoto obtained permission to begin formal planning and training exercises for the proposed attack. By April 1941, the Pearl Harbor plan became known as Operation Z, after the famous Z signal given by Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō at the Battle of Tsushima: On this one battle rests the fate of our nation. Let every man do his utmost.

Over the summer, pilots trained in earnest on the Japanese island of Kyūshū. Captain Genda chose Kagoshima City for a training area because its geography and infrastructure presented most of the same problems torpedo bombers would face at Pearl Harbor. In training, each crew would fly over the 5000-foot (1500m) mountain behind Kagoshima, dive down into the city, dodging buildings and smokestacks before dropping to an altitude of 25 feet (7m) at the piers. Bombardiers would release a torpedo at a breakwater some 300 yards (270m) away.

Yet even skimming the water would not solve the problem of torpedoes bottoming in the shallow waters of Pearl Harbor. Japan created and tested modifications allowing successful shallow water drops. The effort resulted in a heavily modified version of the Type 91 torpedo which inflicted most of the ship damage during the attack. Japanese weapons technicians also produced special armor-piercing bombs by fitting fins and release shackles to 14 and 16 inch (356 and 406 mm) naval shells. These were able to penetrate the armored decks of battleships and cruisers.

On a beach in Kagoshima Bay, Lieutenant Heijiro Abe, commander of ten high-level bombers, used lime to draw an outline of a battleship in the sand. He ordered his men to drop dummy bombs on it. Only he knew it was the outline of the battleship California.

Japanese navy orders, directives and organization

On December 1, 1941 Fleet Admiral and General Staff Osami Nagano gave a verbal directive to Yamamoto, declaring:

Japan has decided to open hostilities against the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands early in December...Should it appear certain that Japanese-American negotiations will reach an amicable settlement prior to the commencement of hostilities, it is understood that all elements of the Combined Fleet are to be assembled and returned to their bases in accordance with separate orders.

The Kido Butai's (Striking Force) objective was to

proceed to the Hawaiian Area with utmost secrecy and, at the outbreak of the war, will launch a resolute surprise attack on and deal a fatal blow to the enemy fleet in the Hawaiian Area. The initial air attack is scheduled at 0330 hours, X Day.

Upon completion, the force was to return to Japan, re-equip, and re-deploy for "Second Period Operations".

Finally, Order number 9, issued on 1 December 1941 by Osami Nagano commanded Yamamoto to

... smash the enemy fleets and air forces in the Orient and at the same time will intercept and annihilate enemy fleets should they come to attack us ... occupy immediately the key bases of the United States, Great Britain, and the Netherlands in East Asia ... capture and secure the key areas of the southern regions.

Carrier Strike Task Force (Kido Butai)

On November 26 1941, the carrier battle group commanded by Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo (six aircraft carriers, two battleships, three cruisers, nine destroyers, 23 fleet submarines, five midget submarines, 441 planes, and eight oilers) left Hitokappu Wan in the Kuril Islands bound for Hawaiʻi under strict radio silence. It was the most powerful carrier force with the greatest air power in the history of naval warfare .

The aircraft carriers were Akagi (flag), Kaga, Shōkaku, Zuikaku, and the newest, Sōryū and Hiryū. Two fast battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 9 destroyers, and 3 fleet submarines provided escort for the task force. The carriers had a total of 423 planes, including Mitsubishi A6M Type 0 fighters (Allied codename "Zeke", commonly called "Zero"), Nakajima B5N Type 97 torpedo bombers (Allied codename "Kate"), and Aichi D3A Type 99 dive bombers (Allied codename "Val"). In addition, the Advanced Expeditionary Force included 20 fleet submarines and five two-man Ko-hyoteki-class midget submarines which were to gather intelligence and sink U.S. vessels attempting to flee Pearl Harbor during or soon after the attack.

Order of battle

Below is the shortened Imperial Japanese Navy's order of battle and excluding the posthumous promotions:

• Imperial Japanese Navy - Admiral Osami Nagano (Tokyo)
  • Combined Fleet - Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto (Tokyo)
    • First Air Fleet - Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo (Akagi flag)
      • 1st Carrier Division - Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo
      • 2nd Carrier Division - Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi
      • 5th Carrier Division - Vice Admiral Chuichi Hara
      • 3rd Battleship Division - Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa (Hiei flag)
      • 8th Cruiser Division (Mikawa)
      • 1st Destroyer Squadron - Rear Admiral Sentaro Omori
        • 17th Destroyer Division
        • 18th Destroyer Division
      • 2nd Submarine Division - Captain Kijiro Imaizumi
      • 1st Supply Train
      • 2nd Supply Train
    • 6th Submarine Fleet
      • 1st Submarine Squadron - Rear Admiral Tsutomu Sato
      • 2nd Submarine Squadron - Rear Admiral Shigeaki Yamazaki
      • 3rd Submarine Squadron - Rear Admiral Shigeyoski Miwa
      • Special Attack Unit
      • Submarine Reconaissance Unit - Commander Yasuchika Kashihara

United States Preparedness

U.S. civil and military intelligence had, amongst them, good information suggesting additional Japanese aggression throughout the summer and fall before the attack. None of it then specifically indicated an attack against Pearl Harbor, nor has any been identified since. Public press reports during summer and fall, including Hawaiian newspapers, contained extensive reports on the growing tension in the Pacific. Late in November, all Pacific commands, including both the Navy and Army in Hawaii, were separately and explicitly warned war with Japan was expected in the very near future, probably with attacks in the Far East: the Philippines, Việt Nam, or Russia. The warnings were not specific to any area, noting only that war with Japan was to be expected in the immediate short term and that all commands should act accordingly. Had any of these warnings produced an active alert status in Hawaii, the attack would likely have been resisted more effectively, and perhaps might have caused less death and damage. On the other hand, recall of men on shore leave to the ships in harbor might have led to still more being casualties from bombs and torpedoes, or trapped in capsized ships by shut watertight doors (as the attack alert status have required). When the attack actually arrived, Pearl Harbor was effectively unprepared: anti-aircraft weapons not manned, most ammunition locked down, anti-submarine measures not implemented (e.g., no torpedo nets in thev Harbor), combat air patrol not flying, available scouting aircraft not in the air at first light, Air Corps aircraft parked wingtip to wingtip to reduce sabotage risks not to be ready to fly at first warning, and so on.

By 1941, U.S. signals intelligence, through the Army's Signal Intelligence Service and the Office of Naval Intelligence's OP-20-G, had intercepted and decrypted considerable Japanese diplomatic and naval cipher traffic, though none of those actually decrypted carried significant tactical military information about Japanese plans in 1940-41. Decryption and distribution of this intelligence, including such decrypts as were available, was capricious and sporadic, and can be blamed in part on lack of manpower. At best, the information was fragmentary, contradictory, or poorly distributed, and was almost entirely raw, without supporting analysis. It was also incompletely understood by decision makers. Nothing in it pointed directly to an attack at Pearl Harbor, and a lack of awareness of Imperial Navy capabilities led to a widespread underlying belief Pearl Harbor was safely out of harm's way. Only one message from the Hawaiian Japanese consulate (sent on 6 December 1941), in a low level consular cipher, included mention of an attack at Pearl; it was not decrypted until 8 December 1941.)

In 1924, General William L. Mitchell produced a 324 page report warning future wars (including with Japan) would include a new role for aircraft, against existing ships and facilities. He even discussed the possibility of an air attack on Pearl Harbor. He was essentially ignored. Navy Secretary Knox had also appreciated the possibility of an attack at Pearl in a written analysis shortly after taking office. American commanders had also been warned that tests demonstrated shallow-water aerial torpedo launches were possible, but no one in charge in Hawaii fully appreciated any o fthis. A war game surprise attack against Pearl Harbor in 1932 had been judged a success and to have caused considerable damage.

Nevertheless, because it believed Pearl Harbor had natural defenses against torpedo attack (e.g., the shallow water), the Navy did not deploy torpedo nets or baffles, which were judged an interference with ordinary operations. And as a result of limited numbers of long-range aircraft (including Army Air Corps bombers, The AAC being responsible for search by a prewar arrangement), reconnaissance patrols were not being made as often or as far out as required for adequate coverage against possible surprise attack; they imporved considerably, with fewer planes, after the attack. The Navy had 16 operational PBYs long range aircraft. Hawaii was low on the priority list for the B-17s finally becoming available for the Pacific, largely because General MacArthur in the Philippines was successfully demanding as many as could be made available to the Pacific. At the time of the attack, Army and Navy air defense were both on training status rather than operational alert. There was also confusion about the Army's readiness status as General Short had changed the alert level designations without clearly informing Washington. Most of the Army's mobile anti-aircraft guns were secured, with ammunition locked down in armories. To avoid upsetting property owners, and in keeping with Washington's admonition not to alarm civil populations (e.g., in the late November war warning messages from the Navy and War Departments), guns were not dispersed around Pearl Harbor (i.e., on private property). Additionally, aircraft were parked on airfields to lessen risk from sabotage, not in anticipation of air attack, in keeping with Short's (uncontradicted) interpretation of the war warnings.

Breaking off negotiations

Part of the Japanese plan for the attack included breaking off negotiations with the United States 30 minutes before the attack began. Diplomats from the Japanese Embassy in Washington, including the Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura, and special representative Saburo Kurusu, had been conducting extended talks with the State Department regarding the U.S. reactions to the Japanese move into Việt Nam in the summer (see above).

In the days before the attack, a long 14-part message was sent to the Embassy from the Foreign Office in Tokyo (encrypted with the Type 97 cryptographic machine, in a cipher named PURPLE by U.S. cryptanalysts), with instructions to deliver it to Secretary of State Cordell Hull at 1 p.m. Washington time. The last part arrived late Saturday night (Washington time) but, because of decryption and typing delays, and because Tokyo had neglected to stress the crucial necessity to deliver it on time, Embassy personnel failed to deliver the message at the specified time. The message, breaking off negotiations, was delivered to Secretary Hull several hours after the Pearl Harbor attack:

Obviously it is the intention of the American Government to conspire with Great Britain and other countries to obstruct Japan's efforts toward the establishment of peace through the creation of a new order in East Asia ... Thus, the earnest hope of the Japanese government to adjust Japanese-American relations and to preserve and promote the peace of the Pacific through cooperation with the American Government has finally been lost.

The United States had decrypted the 14th part of the final message well before the Japanese Embassy managed to, and long before the Embassy managed a fair typed copy. The final part, with its instruction for the time of delivery, prompted General George Marshall to send that morning's notorious warning message to Hawaii. There were delays because General Marshall couldn't be found (he was out for a morning horseback ride), trouble with the Army's long distance communication system, a decision not to use the Navy's parallel facilities despite an offer to permit it, and various troubles during its travels over commercial cable facilities (somehow its "urgent" marking was misplaced, adding additional hours to its travel time). It was actually delivered to Gen. Walter Short, by a young Japanese-American cycle messenger, several hours after the attack had ended.

Japanese records, admitted into evidence during Congressional hearings on the attack after the War, established that the Japanese government had not even written a declaration of war until after hearing of the successful attack. The two-line declaration of war was finally delivered to U.S. Ambassador Grew in Tokyo about 10 hours after the attack was over. He was allowed to transmit it to the United States where it was received late Monday afternoon (Washington time).

Attack

Japanese tactics for attack

The task force was ordered (Order Number 7) to engage the enemy fleet if encountered. The whole operation was obviously meant to be conducted in secret. In fact, a commercial freighter had scouted the proposed route earlier in the year. Yamamoto and senior Navy staff intended there be three waves of attack, but Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo decided to break off after the second. There were also supporting submarines and midget submarines assigned to engage U.S. ships should they succeed in leaving the harbor. The location of the attack force remained unknown to the U.S. until after the Japanese ships were already returning to the Eastern Pacific; they were not located after the attack, in part because such searches as were organized were conducted south of Oahu despite aircraft and radar reports of the attacking force that morning. (This was partially due to direction finding mistakenly placing searchers on a reciprocal bearing.) The total number of planes involved in the attack was 350. Ninety-one were engaged in protection of aircraft carriers and other ships during the attack.

The strike launched 200 nautical miles (370km) north of Oahu. On the home leg, the task force was instructed to counter-attack should American forces locate and engage them, and re-routed south to the friendly base in the Marshall Islands.

Here is general outline for the aerial attack:

The force will be 700 nautical miles due north of point Z (set at the western extremity of the Island of Lanai) at 0600 hours X-1 Day and advance on a course of 180 degrees from 0700 hours X-1 Day at an increased speed of 24 knots.

Air attacks will be carried out by launching the first attack units 230 nautical miles due north of Z point at 0130 hours X Day, and the second attack unit at 200 nautical miles due north of Z point at 0245 hours.

After the launching of the second attack units is completed, the task force will withdraw northward at a speed of about 24 knots. The first attack units are scheduled to return between 0530 and 0600 hours and the second attack units are scheduled to return between 0645 and 0715 hours.

Immediately after the return of the first and second attack units, preparations for the next attack will be completed. At this time, carrier attack planes capable of carrying torpedoes will be armed with such as long as the supply lasts.

If the destruction of enemy land-based air strength progresses favorably, repeated attacks will be made immediately and thus decisive results will be achieved.

In the event that a powerful enemy surface fleet appears, it will be attacked.

Pre-attack reconnaissance

On December 5, Yoshikawa went on his final “sightseeing” flight over Pearl Harbor in a small Piper Cub. He cabled Tokyo there were 8 battleships, 3 light cruisers, and 16 destroyers in the harbor. Also, two Aichi E12A Type 0 float scouts (Allied codename "Jake"), one each from Tone and Chikuma (Mikuma's Cruiser Division 8) secretly scouted the Lahaina Road anchorage and Pearl Harbor for the Pacific Fleet.

First wave attack units

The first wave of attack consisted of 49 "Kate" level bombers, 51 "Val" dive bombers, 40 "Kate" torpedo bombers and 43 "Zeke" fighters (a total of 183), launched north of Oahu, commanded by Captain Mitsuo Fuchida. This wave included

• 1st Group (Captain Mitsuo Fuchida)
  • 1st-4th Attack Units - (Cpt. Fuchida, Lt. Cmdr. Hashiguchi, Lt. Abe and Lt. Cmdr. Kusmi) - 50 Nakajima B5Ns armed with 800 kg (1760 lb) armor piercing high altitude bombs.
  • 1st-4th Torpedo Attack Units - (Lt. Cmdr. Murata, Lt. Kitajima, Nagai and Matsumaru) - 40 Nakajima B5Ns armed with Type 91 torpedoes
• 2nd Group (Lt. Cmdr. Takahashi) - 55 Aichi D3As armed with 550 lb anti-ground bombs
  • 15th Attack Unit (27 "Val") - (Lt. Cmdr. Takahashi) - Hangars and aircraft on Ford Island
  • 16th Attack Unit (27 "Val") - (Lt. Sakamoto) - Hangars and aircraft on Wheeler Field
• 3rd Group (Lt. Cmdr. Itaya) - 45 Mitsubishi A6Ms for air control and strafing
  • 1st and 2nd Fighter Combat Units (18 "Zeke") - (Lt. Cmdr. Itaya and Lt. Shiga) - Ford Island and Hickam Field
  • 3rd and 4th Fighter Combat Units (15 "Zeke") - (Lt. Suganami and Okajima) - Wheeler Field and Barbers Point
  • 5th and 6th Figher Combat Units (12 "Zeke') - (Lt. Sato and Kaneko) - Kaneohe

The first attack wave divided into six formations with one directed to Wheeler Field. Each of the aerial waves started with the bombers and ended with the fighters to deter pursuit.

Second wave attack units

The second wave consisted of 54 level bombers, 78 dive bombers, and 35 fighters (a total of 167), launched from much the same location, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Shigekazu Shimazaki. This wave was composed of

• 1st Group (Lt. Cmdr. Shigekazu Shimazaki) - 54 Nakajima B5Ns armed with 550 lb anti-ground bombs and 120 lb general purpose bombs
  • 5th Attack Unit (27 "Kate") - (Lt. Ichihira) - Aircraft and hangars on Kaneohe, Ford Island and Barbers Point
  • 6th Attack Unit (27 "Kate") - (Lt. Cmdr. Shimazaki) - Hangars and aircraft on Hickam Field
• 2nd Group (Lt. Cmdr. Egusa)
  • 11th-14th Attack Units - (Lt. Egusa, Kobayashi, Chihaya, and Makino) - 78 Aichi D3As armed with 550 lb ordinary dive bombs
• 3rd Group (Lt. Cmdr. Shindo) - 36 Mitsubishi A6Ms for air control and strafing
  • 1st and 2nd Fighter Combat Units (18 "Zeke") - (Lt. Shindo and Nikaido) - Ford Island and Hickam Field
  • 3rd and 4th Figher Combat Units (18 "Zeke') - (Lt. Iida and Kumano) - Wheeler Field and Kaneohe

The second wave was divided into four formations with one formation tasked to Kāneʻohe Naval Air Station away from Pearl Harbor proper and the rest sent against the main naval base. The separate sections arrived at the attack point almost simultaneously, from several directions.

Post attack

For post attack survey, some fighters were scheduled to fly as low and fast as possible to study the damage inflicted to the targets.

Battle

Even before Nagumo began launching, at 03.42 Hawaiian Time, the minesweeper USS Condor spotted a midget submarine outside the harbor entrance and alerted USN destroyer Ward (DD-139). Ward carried out an unsuccessful search. The first shots fired, and the first casualties in the attack, occurred when Ward eventually attacked and sank a midget submarine, possibly the same one, at 06:37.

Five Ko-hyoteki-class midget submarines had been assigned to torpedo U.S. ships after the bombing started. None of these returned, and only four have since been found. Of the ten sailors aboard, nine died; the only survivor, Kazuo Sakamaki, was captured, becoming the first Japanese prisoner of war. Sakamaki's survival was thought traitorous by many Japanese, who referred to his dead companions as "The Nine Young Gods." United States Naval Institute analysis of photographs from the attack, conducted in 1999, indicates one of these mini-subs entered the harbor and successfully fired a torpedo into the West Virginia, what may have been the first shot by the attacking Japanese. Her final disposition is unknown.

The first wave of 1st Air Fleet of the Imperial Japanese Navy attack was coordinated by Captain Fuchida, the Imperial Japanese Navy Air Service. He led the first strike formation, followed by second wave led by Lieutenant-Commander Shigekazu Shimazaki.

On the morning of the attack, the Army's Opana Point station (an SCR-270 radar, located near the northern tip of Oahu, which had not entered official service, having been in training mode for months), detected the first wave of Japanese planes and called in a warning. Although the operators at Opana Point reported an aircraft echo larger than anything they had ever seen, an untrained new officer at the new and only partially activated Intercept Center, Lieutenant Kermit A. Tyler, presumed the scheduled arrival of six B-17 bombers was the cause because of the direction from which the aircraft were coming (only a few degrees separated their inbound courses); because he presumed the operators had never seen a formation as large as the U.S. bombers' on radar; and possibly because the operators had only seen the first element of incoming attackers.

Several U.S. aircraft were shot down as the first attack wave approached land; one at least radioed a somewhat incoherent warning. Other warnings were still being processed, or awaiting confirmation, when the shooting began. It is not clear any warnings would have had much effect even had they been interpreted correctly and much more promptly. For instance, the results the Japanese achieved in the Philippines were essentially the same as at Pearl Harbor, though MacArthur had nine hours of warning the Japanese had attacked at Pearl (and specific orders to commence operations) before they actually struck his command.

The air portion of the attack on Pearl Harbor began at 7:48 a.m. December 7 Hawaiian Time, or 3:18 a.m. December 8 Japanese Standard Time (as used by the Kido Butai), with the attack on Kaneohe. Japanese planes attacked in two waves; a total of 353 planes reached Oʻahu. Slow, vulnerable torpedo bombers led the first wave of 183 planes, exploiting the first moments of surprise to attack the most important ships present (the battleships), while dive bombers attacked U.S. air bases across Oʻahu, starting with Hickam Field, the largest, and Wheeler Field, the main AAC fighter base. The 170 planes in the second wave attacked Bellows Field and Ford Island, a Marine and Naval air station in the middle of Pearl Harbor. The only significant air opposition came from a handful of P-36 Hawks and P-40 Warhawks that flew 25 sorties, and may have been shot down by naval anti-aircraft fire.

Men aboard U.S. ships awoke to the sounds of bombs exploding and cries of "Away fire and rescue party" and "All hands on deck, we're being bombed" and other various calls to General Quarters. (The famous message, "Air raid Pearl Harbor. This is not drill." was broadcast by Commander Logan Ramsey from the headquarters of Admiral Patrick Bellinger, commander of Patrol Wing Two.) Despite the lack of preparation, which included locked ammunition lockers, aircraft parked wing to wing to prevent sabotage, and no heightened alert status, many American military personnel served with distinction during the battle. Rear Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, and Captain Franklin Van Valkenburgh, commander of Arizona, both rushed to the bridge to direct her defense, until both were killed by an explosion in the forward ammunition magazine from an armor piercing bomb that hit next to turret two. Both were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. Ensign Joe Taussig got his ship, Nevada, under way from a dead cold start during the attack. One of the destroyers, Aylwin, got underway with only four officers aboard, all Ensigns, none with more than a year's sea duty. That ship operated at sea for four days before her commanding officer caught up with her. Captain Mervyn Bennion, commanding West Virginia (Kimmel's flagship), led his men until he was cut down by fragments from a bomb hit in Tennessee, moored alongside. The earliest aircraft kill credit was assigned to submarine Tautog. Probably the most famous single defender is Doris "Dorie" Miller, an African-American cook aboard West Virginia, who went beyond his duty assignment and training when he took control of an unattended anti-aircraft gun, on which he had no training, and used it to fire on attacking planes, while bombs were hitting his ship. He was awarded the Navy Cross. In all, 14 sailors and officers were awarded the Medal of Honor. A special military award, the Pearl Harbor Commemorative Medal, was later authorized for all military veterans of the attack.

Ninety minutes after it began, the attack was over. 2403 Americans died (68 were civilians, most killed by American anti-aircraft shrapnel and shells landing in civilian areas, including Honolulu), a further 1178 wounded. Eighteen ships were sunk, including five battleships.

Nearly half of the American fatalities — 1,102 men — were caused by the explosion and sinking of Arizona. She was destroyed when the forward magazine exploded after it was hit by a bomb (a modified 40cm {16in} naval gun shell) dropped by Tadashi Kusumi. The wreck of Arizona has become a memorial to those lost that day, most of whom remain within the ship. She continues to leak small amounts of fuel oil, 65 years after the attack.

Nevada attempted to exit the harbor, but was deliberately beached to avoid blocking the harbor entrance. Already damaged by a torpedo and on fire forward, Nevada was targeted by many Japanese bombers as she got underway, sustaining more hits from 250 lb (113 kg) bombs as she beached.

California was hit by two bombs and two torpedoes. The crew might have kept her afloat, but were ordered to abandon ship just as they were raising power for the pumps. Burning oil from Arizona and West Virginia drifted down on her, and probably made the situation look worse than it was. The disarmed target ship Utah was holed twice by torpedoes. West Virginia was hit by seven torpedoes, the seventh tearing away the ship's rudder. Oklahoma was hit by four torpedoes, the last two above her side armor belt which caused her to capsize. Maryland was hit by two of the converted 40cm shells, but neither caused serious damage.

Although the Japanese concentrated on battleships (the largest vessels present), they did not ignore other targets. The light cruiser Helena was torpedoed, and the concussion from the blast capsized the neighboring minelayer Oglala. Two destroyers in dry dock were destroyed when bombs penetrated their fuel bunkers. The leaking fuel caught fire; flooding the dry dock in an effort to fight fire made the burning oil and so the fire damage, rise which burned out the ships. The light cruiser Raleigh was hit by a torpedo and holed. The light cruiser Honolulu was damaged but remained in service. The destroyer Cassin capsized, and destroyer Downes was heavily damaged. The repair vessel Vestal, moored alongside Arizona, was heavily damaged and beached. The seaplane tender Curtiss was also damaged.

Almost all of the 188 American aircraft in Hawaii were destroyed or damaged, and 155 of those were hit on the ground. Almost none were actually ready to take off to defend the base, having been parked wingtip to wingtip. Attacks on barracks killed additional pilots and other personnel. Friendly fire brought down several U.S. planes (including at least one inbound from Enterprise) which was heading for Pearl at the time of the attack.

Fifty-five Japanese airmen and nine submariners were killed in the action. Of Japan's 441 available planes (350 took part in the attack), 29 were lost during the battle (nine in the first attack wave, 20 in the second), with another 74 damaged by antiaircraft fire from the ground. Over 20 of the aircraft that safely landed on their carriers could not be salvaged.

The Third Wave

Some senior officers and flight leaders urged Nagumo to make a third strike to destroy as much of Pearl Harbor (eg, oil storage depots, machine shops, dry docks, etc) as possible. The US Navy had considered the vulnerability of the fuel oil storage before the war and secretly started construction of the bomb resistant Red Hill installation before the attack. Destruction of the oil still in vulnerable tanks would have greatly increased the U.S. Navy's difficulties, as the nearest immediately usable fleet facilities were several thousand miles away, on America's West Coast. Some military historians have suggested destruction of those oil tanks and repair facilities would have crippled the Pacific Fleet more seriously than loss of battleships. Nagumo decided to forgo a third attack in favor of withdrawing for several reasons.

• Anti-aircraft performance during the second strike was much improved over the first, and two-thirds of Japan's losses were during the second wave. A third strike would have suffered still worse losses.
• The first two strikes had essentially used all the previously prepared aircraft available, so a third strike would have taken time to make ready, perhaps allowing the Americans time to find and attack Nagumo's force. The location of the American carriers was and remained unknown to Nagumo.
• The Japanese had not practiced an attack against shore facilities and organizing such an attack would have taken still more time, though several of the strike leaders urged a third strike anyway.
• The bunker fuel situation did not permit remaining on station north much longer. The Japanese force was at the limit of its logistics support. To remain in those waters for much longer would have risked running unacceptably low on fuel.
• The timing of a third strike meant aircraft would probably have to recover after dark. Night operations from aircraft carriers were in their infancy in 1941, and neither Japan nor anyone else had developed reliable techniques and doctrine.
• The second strike had essentially completed the entire mission: neutralization of the Pacific Fleet.
• There was danger remaining in one location too long. The attack force was very fortunate to have escaped detection during its voyage from the Inland Sea to Hawaii. The longer they remained near Hawaii, the more danger they were in from American carriers.
• The carriers were needed to support the main Japanese attack toward the "Southern Resources Area" (i.e., the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Malaya, and Burma) which was intended to capture control of oil and other resources. Japanese leaders (especially the Army) had been reluctant to allow the attack at all as it used air cover which might be needed for the southern thrust; and Nagumo was under orders not to risk his command any more than necessary. War games during planning for the attack had predicted from two to four carriers might be lost in the attack; that none had been even attacked was a major bonus.

Yamamoto was not happy with Nagumo after the attack for not launching a third attack, for not destroying the US aircraft carriers, and Pearl Harbor's oil storage and Navy Yard.

Additional U.S. losses on 23 December 1941

I-26 sank the Cynthia Olson, a U.S. Army chartered schooner, off the coast of San Francisco with a loss of 35 lives.

Subsequent Japanese attacks on Hawaii

Later during the war another small-scale attack was also made on Pearl Harbor.

In March, 1942, in Operation K-1, a preparation for the Midway invasion, two Japanese H8K flying-boats, based at Wotje in the Marshall Islands, were tasked with reconnaissance to see how repairs were progressing, and to bomb the important "Ten-ten" repair dock. The distance involved required refueling en route, and was done from submarines at French Frigate Shoals, 500 miles (800 km) north-west of Pearl Harbor. Poor visibility hampered the mission, and the bombs were dropped some miles from their target.

Five Japanese submarines supported the operation: I-9 as a radio beacon; I-19, I-15 and I-26 to refuel the flying boats and I-23 to provide weather reports. However, I-23 was lost without trace.

American ships were posted to the Shoals thereafter, which precluded another attempt using the same approach. As a result, flying boats were unable to conduct reconnaissance prior to Midway, allowing Fletcher to sortie undetected.

Immediate aftermath

Ninety minutes before the attack on Pearl Harbor began (December 8, 1941 Japan time, on the other side of the International Date Line), Japan invaded British Malaya. This was followed by an early morning attack on the New Territories of Hong Kong and within hours or days by attacks on the Philippines, Wake Island, and Thailand and by the sinking of HMS Prince of Wales and Repulse.

American Response

On December 8, 1941, Roosevelt addressed a joint session of Congress, calling 7 December 1941 "a date which will live in infamy". Amid outrage at the attack and the late delivery of the note breaking off relations, actions considered treacherous, Congress declared war on Japan with Jeannette Rankin (Republican of Montana) casting the only dissenting vote. Roosevelt signed the declaration the same day. Continuing to intensify its military mobilization, the U.S. government finished converting to a war economy, a process begun by provision of weapons to the Soviet Union and Great Britain.

The Pearl Harbor attack immediately galvanized a divided nation into action. Public opinion had been moving towards support for entering the war during 1941, but considerable opposition remained until the Pearl Harbor attack. Overnight, Americans united against Japan, and that response probably made possible the unconditional surrender position later taken by the Allied Powers. Some historians believe the attack on Pearl Harbor doomed Japan to defeat simply because it awakened the "sleeping beast", regardless of whether the fuel depots or machine shops had been destroyed or even if the carriers had been caught in port and sunk. U.S. industrial and military capacity, once mobilized, was able to pour overwhelming resources into both the Pacific and Atlantic theaters. Others believe Japanese trade protection was so incompetent, U.S. submarines could have strangled Japan into defeat alone.

Perceptions of treachery in the attack before a declaration of war sparked fears of sabotage or espionage by Japanese sympathizers residing in the U.S., including citizens of Japanese descent and was a factor in the subsequent Japanese internment in the western United States. Other factors included misrepresentations of intelligence information (none) suggesting sabotage, notably by General John DeWitt, commanding Coast Defense on the Pacific Coast, who had personal feelings against Japanese Americans . In February 1942, Roosevelt signed United States Executive Order 9066, requiring all Japanese Americans to submit themselves for and internment.

Japan's Allies' Response

Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy declared war on the United States on December 11, four days after the Japanese attack. Hitler and Mussolini were under no obligation to declare war under the mutual defense terms of the Tripartite Pact. However, relations between the European Axis Powers and the American leadership had deteriorated since 1937. Earlier in 1941, the Nazis learned of the U.S. military's contingency planning to get troops in Continental Europe by 1943; this was Rainbow Five, made public by sources unsympathetic to Roosevelt's New Deal, and published by the Chicago Tribune. Hitler seems to have decided war with the United States was unavoidable, and the Pearl Harbor attack, the publication of the Rainbow Five plan, and Roosevelt's post-Pearl Harbor address, which focused on European affairs as well as the situation with Japan, probably contributed. Hitler also underestimated American military production capacity beyond Lend Lease, the nation's ability to fight on two fronts, and the time his own Operation BARBAROSSA would require. Similarly, the Nazis may have hoped the declaration of war, a showing of solidarity with Japan, would result in closer collaboration with the Japanese in Eurasia, particularly against the Soviet Union.

Regardless of Hitler's reasons, the decision was an enormous strategic blunder and it further enraged the American public. It allowed the United States to immediately enter the European war in support of the United Kingdom and the Allies without much public opposition.

Logistical and Strategic Analysis

The attack on Pearl Harbor failed to destroy the three aircraft carriers assigned to the Pacific Fleet (Enterprise, Lexington, and Saratoga). The attack did result in the permanent loss of Arizona and Oklahoma, and it removed several other battleships from the order of battle (including Nevada, West Virginia, and California). However, all of these were older designs, requiring refit before working as part of the carrier task forces which became central to the Pacific War. Probably more important in the short run was the destruction of over 155 aircraft, damage to the principal forward naval base in the Pacific, and to American pride. In terms of shock, Pearl Harbor may be compared to Gunther Prien's attack on the HMS Royal Oak inside Scapa Flow, or the 11 September 2001 attack on the World Trade Center.

Genda's plan, and Nagumo's execution, left every the infrastrucre of the Pearl Harbor base and the Navy Yard, except the battleships, almost untouched. Cruisers, essential to for carrier task forces later in the War, suffered little damage, and only three destroyers were lost: Shaw, Cassin, and Downes. (Even so machinery from both of the latter, and even the Arizona, were successfully salvaged.) The tank farms, containing 530 million liters of fuel oil, were unscathed. The Navy Yard, critical to ship maintenance, famously to Yorktown prior to Midway, was undamaged. The engineering and repair shops were intact. The torpedo store was, as well. The power station, central to base function, continued to operate. The Submarine Base, critical to the initial phase of the War and to commerce raiding throughou, was unaffected. And the cryptanalysis unit, HYPO, located in the basement of the old Administration Building, actually benefitted, gaining staff from unemployed ship's bands.

The Army Air Force loss of P-40s and (obsolete) P-36s must be balanced against the fact that neither was a front line design even at the time. Japan might have achieved a good deal more with not much additional effort or loss.

Nagumo's hesitation, and failure to find and destroy the American carriers, may have been a product of his lack of faith in the plan, and the fact he was a gun line officer, not an air power officer. In addition, Yamamoto's targeting priorities, placing obsolete battleships first in importance, reflect what would soon be clear to all was a faulty Mahanian doctrine, and an inabilty to extrapolate from history, given the damage German submarines did to British trade in World War I. In the end, Japan achieved surprisingly little for all her daring and apparent success.

The politics of a Europe First strategy, loss of air cover over Pearl Harbor, and subsequent losses through the Japanese invasion of the Philippines, meant the U.S. Navy and Army Air Force were unable to play a significant role in the Pacific War for several months. Japan was temporarily free of worries about the rival Pacific naval power, which was at least part of what had been intended by the Pearl Harbor attack. She conquered Southeast Asia, the Southwest Pacific, and extended her reach far into the Indian Ocean, albeit without occupying territory.

However, in the end, the attack was a strategic disaster. It spurred the United States into a determination to fight to complete victory. It resulted in the destruction of the Japanese armed forces, the Occupation of the home islands, and even the loss of territory (the Kuriles) which has not been returned even six decades later.

Investigations and Blame

President Roosevelt appointed an investigating commission, headed by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Owen Roberts to report facts and findings with respect to the attack on Pearl Harbor. It was the first of many (nine total) official investigations. Both the Fleet commander, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, and the Army commander, Lieutenant General Walter Short (the Army had been responsible for air defense of Hawaii, including Pearl Harbor, and for general defense of the islands against hostile attack), were relieved of their commands shortly thereafter. They were accused of "dereliction of duty" by the Roberts Commission for not making reasonable defensive preparations. None of the investigations conducted during the War, nor the Congressinal investigation after the War provided enough reason to reverse those actions. The decisions of the Navy Department and the War Department to relieve both was controversial at the time and has remained so ever since. However, neither was court-martialed as would normally have been the result of dereliction of duty. On May 25, 1999, the US Senate voted to recommend both officers be exonerated on all charges of dereliction of duty, citing "denial to Hawaii commanders of vital intelligence available in Washington".

Rumors

During the first days following the attack, various rumors began to circulate.

One of the most dramatic and corrosive was the claim that Japanese workers had cut arrows into the cane fields, thus pointing the way to Pearl Harbor for the Imperial pilots. This rumor's influence was due perhaps to its implication the enemy (Japan) was inept and would be easily defeated. However, there was no truth to the rumor. It was considered ludicrous by military officers (especially pilots), who knew any force which could fly hundreds of miles to find O'ahu would have no difficulty finding the largest harbor in the Central Pacific. The rumor also ignored the larger evidence of Japanese navigational skills.

Another rumor was Roosevelt (or Marshall, or some other senior official or some combination) had known the attack was coming, but had allowed it to proceed for any of several reasons depending on the purveyor of the rumor. This began as early as the morning of the 8th, perhaps first by then Senator Guy Gillette.

Japanese views of the attack

Although the Imperial Japanese government had made some effort to prepare the general Japanese civilian population for war via anti-U.S. propaganda, it appears most Japanese were surprised, apprehensive, and dismayed by the news they were now at war with the U.S., a country many Japanese admired. Nevertheless, the Japanese people at home and her territories thereafter generally accepted their government's account of the attack and supported the war effort until their nation's surrender in 1945.

Japan's national leadership at the time appeared to have believed war between the U.S. and Japan had long been inevitable. In any case, Japanese-American relationships had already significantly deteriorated since Japan's invasion of China beginning in the early 30s, of which the United States strongly disapproved. In 1942, Saburo Kurusu, former Japanese ambassador to the United States, gave an address in which he talked about the "historical inevitability of the war of Greater East Asia." He said war had been a response to Washington's longstanding aggression toward Japan. For example, provocations against Japan included the San Francisco School incident, (the United States' racist policies on Japanese immigrants), Naval Limitations Treaty, other Unequal treaties, the Nine Power Pact, constant economic pressure against Japan, culminating in the "belligerent" scrap metal and oil boycott in 1941 by the United States and Allied countries to contain and/or reverse the actions of the Empire of Japan especially in IndoChina during her expansion of influence and interests throughout Asia. In light of Japan's dependence on imported oil, the trade embargos were especially significant for Japan. These pressures directly influenced Japan to go into alliance with Germany and Italy through the Tripartite Pact. According to Saburu, because of these reasons, the Allies had already provoked war with Japan long before the attack at Pearl Harbor, and the United States was already preparing for war with Japan. Suburu also states the United States was also looking for world domination, beyond just Asia, with "sinister designs" . Some of this view seems to have been shared by Adolf Hitler, when he called it one of the reasons Germany declared war on the United States. He also had mentioned European imperialism toward Japan many years before. Therefore, according to Kurusu, Japan had no choice but to defend herself and so should rapidly continue to militarize, bring Germany and Italy closer as allies and militarily combat the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands.

Japanese leadership also saw itself as justified in its conduct in view of the Japanese leadership role in Asia in which they believed. They also took pains to explain their actions in public by claiming to have done everything possible to alleviate tension between the two nations. The decision to attack, at least for public presentation, was reluctant and forced on Japan. Of the Pearl Harbor attack itself, Kurusu said it came in direct response to a virtual ultimatum from the U.S. government, the November Hull note, and so the surprise attack was not treacherous. Since Japanese-American relationship already had hit their lowest point, there were no alternative choices; in any case, had an acceptable settlement of differences been reached, the Carrier Striking Task Force could have been called back.

View today

Many Japanese today still feel they were "pushed", or compelled, to fight because of threats to their national security and national interests by the U.S. and certain European powers, and because of embargoes and lack of cooperation, particularly the United States, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The most important embargo was on oil on which its Navy and much of the economy was dependent. For example, the Japan Times, an English-language newspaper owned by one of the major news organizations in Japan (Asahi Shimbun), ran numerous columns in the early 2000s echoing Kurusu's comments in reference to the Pearl Harbor attack.

In putting the Pearl Harbor attack into context, Japanese writers repeatedly contrast the thousands of U.S. servicemen killed there with the hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians killed in U.S. air attacks later in the War, even without mentioning the 1945 atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the United States.

However, in spite of the perceived inevitability of the war by many Japanese, many also believe the Pearl Harbor attack, although a tactical victory, was actually part of a seriously flawed strategy for engaging in war with the U.S. As one columnist eulogizes the attack:

The Pearl Harbor attack was a brilliant tactic, but part of a strategy based on the belief that a spirit as firm as iron and as beautiful as cherry blossoms could overcome the materially wealthy United States. That strategy was flawed, and Japan's total defeat would follow.

In 1991, the Japanese Foreign Ministry released a statement saying Japan had intended to make a formal declaration of war to the United States at 1 p.m. Washington time, 25 minutes before the attack at Pearl Harbor was scheduled to begin. This officially acknowledged something which had been publicly known for years, that diplomatic communications had been coordinated well in advance with the attack, but had failed delivery at the intended time.

It appears the Japanese government was referring to the "14-part message", which did not actually break off negotiations, let alone declare war, but which did officially raise the possibility of a break in relations. However, because of various delays, the Japanese ambassador was unable to make the declaration until well after the attack had begun.

Imperial Japanese military leaders appear to have had mixed feelings about the attack. Admiral Yamamoto was unhappy about the botched timing of the breaking off of negotiations. He is rumored to have said, "I fear all we have done is awakened a sleeping giant and filled him with terrible resolve". Even though this quote is unsubstantiated, the phrase seems to describe his feelings about the situation. He is on record as having said, in the previous year, that "I can run wild for six months ... after that, I have no expectation of success."

The first Prime Minister of Japan during World War II Hideki Tojo later wrote

When reflecting upon it today, that the Pearl Harbor attack should have succeeded in achieving surprise seems a blessing from Heaven.

Fleet Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto had said, regarding the imminent war with the United States,

Should hostilities once break out between Japan and the United States, it is not enough that we take Guam and the Philippines, nor even Hawaii and San Francisco. We would have to march into Washington and sign the treaty in the White House. I wonder if our politicians (who speak so lightly of a Japanese-American war) have confidence as to the outcome and are prepared to make the necessary sacrifices?"

Long term effects

A common view is the Japanese fell victim to victory disease because of the perceived ease of their first victories. It has also been stated by the Japanese military commanders and politicians who visited and lived in the United States their leadership (mostly military personnel) took the war relatively lightly with the United States compared to them. For instance, Isoroku Yamamoto's quote and Battle of Iwo Jima commander Tadamichi Kuribayashi expressed the views and concerns of the greater industrial power of the United States in comparison to Japan.

Despite the perception of this battle as a devastating blow to America, only three ships were permanently lost to the U.S. Navy. These were the battleships Arizona, Oklahoma, and the old battleship Utah (then used as a target ship); nevertheless, much usable material was salvaged from them, including the two aft main turrets from Arizona. Heavy casualties resulted from Arizona's magazine exploding and the Oklahoma capsizing. Four ships sunk during the attack were later raised and returned to duty, including the battleships California, West Virginia and Nevada. California and West Virginia had an effective torpedo-defense system which held up remarkably well, despite the weight of fire they had to endure, enabling most of their crews to be saved. Many of the surviving battleships were heavily refitted, including the replacement of their outdated secondary battery of anti-surface 5" (127mm) guns with more useful turreted dual-purpose (antiaircraft and antiship) guns, allowing them to better cope with the new tactical reality. Destroyers Cassin and Downes were total losses as ships, but their machinery was salvaged and fitted into new hulls, retaining their original names, while Shaw was raised and returned to service.

Of the 22 Japanese ships that took part in the attack, only one survived the war. As of 2006, the only U.S. ships in Pearl Harbor during the attack still remaining afloat are the Coast Guard Cutter Taney and the yard tug USS Hoga. Both remained active over 50 years after the attack and have been designated museum ships.

In the long term, the attack on Pearl Harbor was a strategic blunder for Japan. Indeed, Admiral Yamamoto, who conceived it, predicted even success could not win a war with the United States, because American productive capacity was too large. One of the main Japanese objectives was to destroy the three American aircraft carriers stationed in the Pacific, but they were not present: Enterprise was returning from Wake Island, Lexington was near Midway Island, and Saratoga was in San Diego following a refit at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard. Putting most of the U.S. battleships out of commission was regarded—in both Navies and by most observers worldwide—as a tremendous success for Japan.

Though the attack was notable for large-scale destruction, the attack was not significant in terms of long-term loss of life and equipment. Had Japan destroyed the American carriers, the U.S. might have sustained significant damage to its Pacific Fleet for a year or so. As it was, the elimination of the battleships left the U.S. Navy with no choice but to put its faith in aircraft carriers and submarines—the very weapons with which the U.S. Navy halted and eventually reversed the Japanese advance. A particular flaw of Japanese strategic thinking was a belief the ultimate Pacific battle would be between battleships of both sides, in keeping with the doctrine of Captain Alfred Mahan. As a result, Yamamoto hoarded his battleships for a decisive battle that never happened.

Ultimately, targets that never made the attackers' list, the Submarine Base and the old Headquarters Building, were more important than any of them. It was submarines that brought Japan's economy to a standstill and crippled its transportation of oil, immobilizing heavy ships. And in the basement of the old Administration Building was the cryptanalytic unit, HYPO, which contributed significantly to the Midway ambush and the Submarne Force's success.

Historical significance

This battle has had history-altering consequences. It only had a small strategic military effect because the Japanese Navy failed to sink U.S. aircraft carriers or destroy the Submarine Base, but even if this had been achieved, it would not have helped Japan in the long term. The attack firmly drew the United States and its massive industrial and service economy into World War II, and the U.S. sent huge numbers of soldiers, weapons, and supplies to help the Allies fight Germany, Italy, and Japan, contributing to the utter defeat of the Axis powers by 1945. This attack opened the Pacific War, which ended with two nuclear strikes.

The United Kingdom's Prime Minister Winston Churchill, on hearing the attack on Pearl Harbor had finally drawn the United States into the war, wrote, "Being saturated and satiated with emotion and sensation, I went to bed and slept the sleep of the saved and thankful." The Allied victory in this war and the subsequent U.S. emergence as a dominant world power have shaped international politics ever since.

In terms of military history, the attack on Pearl Harbor marked the emergence of the aircraft carrier as capital ship, replacing the battleship as the striking arm of the fleet. However, not until later battles, notably Coral Sea and Midway, did this breakthrough became apparent to the world's naval powers.

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Monumental status

Pearl Harbor is generally regarded as an extraordinary event in American history, marking the first time since the War of 1812 America was attacked on its home soil by another country, although this popular assertion is erroneous, as Hawaii was not a part of the United States at the time (Hawaii became the 50th state in 1959). Pearl Harbor was simply a military installation in the Pacific. The event has assumed mythical status, and its prominence was vividly demonstrated sixty years later when the September 11, 2001 attacks took place: the World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks were almost instantly compared to Pearl Harbor, although this popular assertion is also erroneous, as Pearl Harbor was a military installation attacked by another nation in a time of war, as the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were attacked by terrorists in peace time. The lessons of intelligence analysis and sharing had not been learned.

Cultural impact

The attack on Pearl Harbor, anti-Japanese propaganda, Japanese alliance with the Nazis and the ensuing war in the Pacific along with racism and xenophobia, fueled anti-Japanese sentiment greatly. Japanese, Japanese-Americans and Asians having a similar physical appearance were regarded with deep seated suspicion, distrust and hostility. The attack was viewed as having been conducted in an extremely underhanded way and also as a very "treacherous" or "sneaky attack" fueled by extensive anti-Japanese propaganda to later sell war bonds among other things. Fear of a Japanese ethnic fifth column led to an order for massive detention of ethnic Japanese, mostly on the West Coast of the U.S. <--citation? ue to General John DeWitt's racist views--> signed by the President on February 19, 1942. The Japanese American internment, in both the United States and Canada has reverberated ever since.

Postwar, Japan's overthrow of colonial powers gave credence and encouragement to resistance movements in India, Burma, Indonesia, and Vietnam.

The attacks on Pearl Harbor were depicted in the joint American-Japanese film Tora! Tora! Tora! (1970), the American film Pearl Harbor (2001) and in several Japanese productions.

Recipients of the Medal of Honor

* Awarded posthumously.

• Mervyn S. Bennion *
• John William Finn
• Francis C. Flaherty *
• Samuel G. Fuqua
• Edwin J. Hill *
• Herbert C. Jones *
• Isaac C. Kidd *
• Jackson C. Pharris
• Thomas J. Reeves *
• Donald K. Ross
• Robert R. Scott *
• Peter Tomich *
• Franklin van Valkenburgh *
• James R. Ward *
• Cassin Young

See also

• Attacks on North America during World War II
• Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor
• List of United States Navy losses in World War II
• Pearl Harbor
• Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debate
• Pearl Harbor Survivors Association
• USS Arizona Memorial

Notes

1. Out of over 40000 Army, Navy, and Marine personnel on the island: eight battleships with crews about 1500 each, a dozen cruisers with about 1000 each, over 60 other ships, 20-30000 in two Army infantry divisions, a PBY patrol wing and two fighter groups with about 3000, and assorted others. See Nimitz, Memoirs; Prange et al., December 7th 1941; Blair, Silent Victory; Willmott, Barrier and the Javelin
2. Willmott, op. cit.
3. Caidin, Ragged, Rugged Warriors.
4. Roland H. Worth, Jr., No Choice But War: the United States Embargo Against Japan and the Eruption of War in the Pacific (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland, 1995). ISBN 0-7864-0141-9
5. Yuichi Arima, The Way to Pearl Harbor: U.S. vs Japan, ICE Case Studies Number 118, December, 2003 (accessed April 10, 2006).
6. ^ US Army. Japanese monograph #97. Pearl Harbor Operations: General Outline of Orders and Plans, 5 November to 2 December 1941. Washington, DC: US dept of the Army.
7. Peattie & Evans, op.cit.
8. John Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire 1936-1945, Random House, 1970, p. 150
9. Toland, ibid, p.152-53
10. Toland, ibid, p. 167
11. John Toland, ibid, p. 154
12. John Toland, ibid, p. 160
13. John Toland, ibid, p. 163
14. Technically called "Condition Zed". Prange et al. op. cit.
15. John Costello, Days of Infamy (Pocket hardback, 1994)
16. Holmes, Double-Edged Secrets.
17. Prange et al., op.cit., p.86, says 39: 3 each Akagi & Kaga, 6 Soryu, 9 ea Shokaku, Zuikaku, & Hiryu.
18. Prange et al., op.cit., p.41, says 9. Blair, Silent Victory, says 7.
19. John Toland, ibid., p.189.
20. Prange et al., op. cit., p.82, and Fitzsimons, Bernard, ed. Twentieth Century Weapons and Warfare (London: Phoebus, 1978), Volume 8, p.819.
21. Prange et al., December 7th 1941.
22. ibid., p.72.
23. John Rodgaard et al., "Pearl Harbor—Attack from Below," Naval History, December 1999 (accessed June 10 2005).
24. Prange et al., op.cit., p.98.
25. ibid., p.97.
26. ibid., p.174.
27. USAF Historical Study No.85 credits 6 pilots with 10 planes destroyed: 1stLt Lewis M. Sanders (P-36) and 2nd Lts Philip M Rasmussen (P-36), Gordon H. Sterling Jr. (P-36, killed in action), Harry W. Brown (P-36), Kenneth M. Taylor (P-40, 2), and George S. Welch (P-40, 4). Three of the P-36 kills were not verified by the Japanese
28. Stetson Conn et al, "Chapter 7 - The Attack on Pearl Harbor" Guarding the United States and Its Outposts, Center of Military History United States Army, Washington, D.C., 2000
29. Their ship having been laid up, her band was assigned to assist the cryptanalysts at HYPO and its commander (the famous Commander Joseph P. Rochefort, "promoted" to Fleet Intelligence Officer in the film "Midway") thought they did well there. (Musicians seemed to make good crypto men. Holmes, op.cit.)
30. USAAF pilots of the 46th and 47th Pursuit Squadrons, 15th Pursuit Group, claim to have destroyed 10
31. Kelley L. Ross, "The Pearl Harbor Strike Force" (accessed June 10, 2005).
32. Willmott, op. cit.; Blair, op. cit.; Beach, Submarine!; Holmes, Double-Edged Secrets and Undersea Victory.
33. Caidin, op. cit. and Fork-Tailed Devil (Ballantine, 1968).
34. Willmott, op. cit.; Peattie and Evans, op. cit..
35. Robert Guillain, I saw Tokyo burning: An eyewitness narrative from Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima (J. Murray, 1981). ISBN 0-7195-3862-9
36. Saburo Kurusu, Historical inevitability of the war of Greater East Asia, Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service, Tokyo, November 26, 1942 (accessed June 10, 2005).
37. Haruko Taya & Theodore F. Cook, Japan at War: An Oral History (New Press; Reprint edition, 1993). ISBN 1-56584-039-9
38. Charles Burress, "Biased history helps feed U.S. fascination with Pearl Harbor," Japan Times, July 19, 2001 (accessed June 10, 2005);
39. Hiroaki Sato, "The View From New York: Debunking America's 'Good War' myth," Japan Times, June 25, 2001 (accessed June 10, 2005);
40. Burritt Sabin, "The War's Leagacy: Dawn of a tragic era," Japan Times, February 8, 2004 (accessed June 10, 2005).
41. Isoroku Yamamoto to Shigeharu Matsumoto (Japanese cabinet minister) and Fumimaro Kondoye (Japanese prime minister), quoted in Eagle Against the Sun: The American War With Japan by Ronald Spector (Vintage, 1985).
42. In fact, their rate of fire was too slow to deal with aircraft, as experience with kamikaze would demonstrate. Not until the introduction of a fully automatic 3" {76mm} postwar was a suitable solution found.
43. Churchill, Winston. The Second World War, Vol. 3. p. 539.
44. Medal of Honor Citations, U.S. Army Center of Military History.

1. Kiroku Hanai "U.S. War Conduct: No sense of proportionality," Japan Times, September 28, 2004 (accessed June 10, 2005);
2. Gregory Clark, "Shedding imposed war guilt," Japan Times, April 15, 2005 (accessed June 10, 2005).
3. McCollum memo A 1940 meno from a Naval headquarters staff officer to his superiors outlining how Japan could be led to war, ending the building tension. (declassified in 1994).

Further reading

• Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept (McGraw-Hill, 1981), Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History (McGraw-Hill, 1986), and December 7, 1941: The Day the Japanese Attacked Pearl Harbor (McGraw-Hill, 1988). This monumental trilogy, written with collaborators Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, is considered the authoritative work on the subject.
• Larry Kimmett and Margaret Regis, The Attack on Pearl Harbor: An Illustrated History (NavPublishing, 2004). Using maps, photos, unique illustrations, and an animated CD, this book provides a detailed overview of the surprise attack that brought the United States into World War II.
• Walter Lord, Day of Infamy (Henry Holt, 1957) is a very readable, and entirely anecdotal, re-telling of the day's events.
• W. J. Holmes, Double-Edged Secrets: U.S. Naval Intelligence Operations in the Pacific During World War II (Naval Institute, 1979) contains some important material, such as Holmes' argument that, had the U.S. Navy been warned of the attack and put to sea, it would have likely resulted in an even greater disaster.
• Michael V. Gannon, Pearl Harbor Betrayed (Henry Holt, 2001) is a recent examination of the issues surrounding the surprise of the attack.
• Frederick D. Parker, Pearl Harbor Revisited: United States Navy Communications Intelligence 1924–1941 (Center for Cryptologic History, 1994) contains a detailed description of what the Navy knew from intercepted and decrypted Japan's communications prior to Pearl.
• Henry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee, Pearl Harbor: Final Judgement, (HarperCollins, 2001), an account of the secret "Clausen Inquiry" undertaken late in the war by order of Congress to Secretary of War Stimson.
• Robert A. Theobald, Final Secret of Pearl Harbor (Devin-Adair Pub, 1954) ISBN 0-8159-5503-0 ISBN 0-317-65928-6 Foreword by Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr.
• Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! (Henry Holt Co, 1958) ISBN 0-89275-011-1 ISBN 0-8159-7216-4
• Hamilton Fish, Tragic Deception: FDR and America's Involvement in World War II (Devin-Adair Pub, 1983) ISBN 0-8159-6917-1
• John Toland, Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath (Berkley Reissue edition, 1986 ISBN 0-425-09040-X) is an excellent account by a Pulitzer Prize winning author, though thought by some not to back up his claims as thoroughly as expected by academic conventions.
• Robert Stinnett, Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor (Free Press, 1999) A study of the Freedom of Information Act documents that led Congress to direct clearance of Kimmel and Short. ISBN 0-7432-0129-9
• Edward L. Beach, Scapegoats: A Defense of Kimmel and Short at Pearl HarborISBN 1-55750-059-2
• Andrew Krepinevich, Template:PDFlink (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments) contains a passage regarding the Yarnell attack, as well as reference citations.
• Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, (Stanford University Press: 1962). Regarded by many as the most important work in the attempt to understand the intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor. Her introduction and analysis of the concept of "noise" persists in understanding intelligence failures.
• John Hughes-Wilson, Military Intelligence Blunders and Cover-Ups. Robinson, 1999 (revised 2004). Contains a brief but insightful chapter on the particular intelligence failures, and broader overview of what causes them.
• Horn, Steve (2005). The Second Attack on Pearl Harbor: Operation K And Other Japanese Attempts to Bomb America in World War II. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-388-8. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)

• Seki, Eiji (2007). Sinking of the SS Automedon And the Role of the Japanese Navy: A New Interpretation. University of Hawaii Press. ISBN 1905246285. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)

• Daniel Madsen, Resurrection-Salvaging the Battle Fleet at Pearl Harbor. U.S. Naval Institute Press. 2003. Highly readable and thoroughly researched account of the aftermath of the attack and the salvage efforts from December 8, 1941 through early 1944.

External links

1. Part 1

Accounts

• Guarding The United States And Its Outposts Official U.S. Army history of Pearl Harbor
• War comes to Hawaii Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Monday, Sept. 13, 1999

Media

• Video of first Newsreel from December 23 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor
• Roosevelt's Day Of Infamy Speech Audio of speech given by President Roosevelt shortly after Pearl Harbor Attack
• U.S. Naval Historical Center "Pearl Harbor Raid: Overview and Special Image Selection"
• Library of Congress: The day after

Historic Documents

• Second World War - USA Declaration of War on Japan.
• Collection of extensive Japanese preparation military documents
• Naval Institute Special Collections: Pearl Harbor — Articles, books, and pictures.
• Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings Detailed reports from various investigations.
• Pearl Harbor Attack at HyperWar

Miscellaneous

• "Pearl Harbor Attacked" Message Board — A website featuring personal recollections.
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