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Mius–Donets offensive
Part of The Eastern Front of World War II
The Soviet plan for the Donbas offensive (in German)
Date 17 July 1943 – 2 August 1943 (2 weeks and 2 days) Location Donets Basin, Soviet Union Result German victory
Belligerents
Germany	Soviet Union
Commanders and leaders
Erich von Manstein	Fyodor Tolbukhin Rodion Malinovsky
Units involved
Army Group South 6th Army 1st Panzer Army	Southern Front 2nd Guards Army 5th Shock Army 28th Army 51st Army Southwestern Front 1st Guards Army 3rd Guards Army 8th Guards Army
Strength
unknown	474,220 1,864 tanks/assault guns (17 July)
Casualties and losses
3,298 killed 15,817 wounded 2,254 missing Total: 21,369 (6th Army)	25,613 killed, captured or missing 74,147 wounded or sick 732 tanks/assault guns destroyed 522 anti-tank guns destroyed 197 guns destroyed 438 mortars destroyed (Southern Front) Total: 99,760

The First Donbas strategic offensive was a military campaign fought in the Donets Basin from 17 July to 2 August 1943, between the German and Soviet armed forces on the Eastern Front of World War II. The Germans contained the Soviet offensive in its northern portion after initial gains and pushed the southern portion back to its starting point.

Battle

In July 1943, while the Battle of Kursk was raging to the north, two German armies of Army Group South in the Donets Basin confronted two Soviet army groups on a 660-kilometer front. Stavka launched two offensives on 17 July in the Donets basin, involving 474,220 men and 1,864 tanks and assault guns. The Izyum–Barvenkovo offensive against the 1st Panzer Army consisted of 202,430 Soviet troops as well as 1,109 tanks and assault guns. Air support was provided by the 17th Air Army. The Soviets established bridgeheads several kilometers deep but were stopped by a German counteroffensive led by two Panzer Divisions. After ten days the Soviets called off the operation, having lost 38,690 men.

The Mius offensive deployed 271,790 men with 737 tanks and assault guns in four field armies as well as the 8th Air Army against the 11 heavily under-strength divisions of the German 6th Army. The Soviets achieved a penetration 15 kilometers deep and 20 kilometers wide, alarming the German High Command. After initial interference from Adolf Hitler in delaying the movement of German reinforcements, a counteroffensive deploying 258 operational tanks in five Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions, including the SS divisions Das Reich and Totenkopf, was launched on 30 July. The German counterattack was backed by the Luftwaffe's IV Air Corps, providing close air support and air interdiction against the Red Army. The attack achieved immediate success, encircling five Soviet divisions on the second day. A wild, general rout of the Soviet armies to the Mius followed. On 2 August, the Germans reached the Mius at Dmytrivka, regaining their positions after inflicting at least 61,070 casualties on the Soviets, of which 15,303 were listed as killed or missing. Actual Soviet losses were far higher, as 6th Army took 17,762 prisoners, more than the Soviet total for killed and missing.

Operationally, the Germans stopped the attacks of two Soviet army groups in their tracks and inflicted at least 99,760 casualties on the Red Army, while losing more than 21,369 men themselves. Strategically, the Red Army failed in its objectives but achieved an indirect success by forcing the transfer of German armored forces from the Kursk salient, smoothing the ground for Operation Rumyantsev, the Soviet attack on Kharkov, which was launched on 3 August. The Germans were forced once again to redeploy their most battle-worthy mechanized divisions to contain this more immediate threat, which the Soviets exploited by launching a successful offensive in the Donets region on 13 August, deploying 1,053,000 men.

Casualties and losses

The positional battle on Mius resulted in heavy losses for the troops of the Soviet Southern Front. Subsequently, the chief of staff of the front, S.S. Biryuzov, wrote in his memoirs: “For the troops of the Southern Front, the July operation was a kind of dress rehearsal. It’s just a pity that this rehearsal cost us too much.” The 2nd Guards Army, with a total strength of 72,606 men at the beginning of the operation, taking into account the attached 2nd and 4th Guards Mechanized Corps, over the two decades of July and the first ten days of August, lost 39,812 men killed, wounded and missing, of which irretrievable losses ( killed, missing, and for other reasons) amounted to 8,405 people. In fact, in the July battles, half of the army personnel were knocked out. In a report compiled at the headquarters of the 2nd Guards Army following the battles, losses in the battles on the Mius River were compared with losses during the onset of winter 1942–1943. - then the army lost an average of 1,200–1,300 men per day, and in the July battles the average daily losses were about 2,400 men. The total losses of the Soviet 5th Shock Army over the two decades of July and the first ten days of August amounted to 34,507 men, of which 8,485 men were killed and captured (according to Soviet military terminology, irrevocably). The total losses of the 28th Army amounted to 19,878 people, including 5,829 permanent casualties. According to German data, the total number of Soviet prisoners captured by the German 6th Army from July 17 to August 3 was 17,762, including 995 defectors. Thus, the total losses of the three Soviet armies participating in the Mius operation over the two decades of July and the first ten days of August 1943 amounted to 94,197 soldiers, including 22,786 killed, captured and missing. The German 6th Army's own losses from July 17 to August 3, 1943 amounted to 3,298 killed, 15,817 wounded and 2,254 missing.

Citations

1. ^ Frieser et al. 2007, p. 339.
2. ^ Frieser et al. 2007, p. 342.
3. Frieser et al. 2007, p. 338.
4. Frieser et al. 2007, pp. 341–342.
5. Бирюзов С.С. Когда гремели пушки. – М.: Воениздат, 1961. – С. 166.

Bibliography

• Frieser, Karl-Heinz; Schmider, Klaus; Schönherr, Klaus; Schreiber, Gerhard; Ungváry, Kristián; Wegner, Bernd (2007). Die Ostfront 1943/44 – Der Krieg im Osten und an den Nebenfronten [The Eastern Front 1943–1944: The War in the East and on the Neighbouring Fronts] (in German). Vol. VIII. München: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt. ISBN 978-3-421-06235-2. {{cite book}}: |work= ignored (help)

• Battles and operations of the Soviet–German War
• Military operations of World War II involving Germany
• Strategic operations of the Red Army in World War II
• Donbas
• 1943 in Ukraine
• July 1943 events
• August 1943 events