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Alawite opposition to the Assad regime refers to Alawites who opposed the Assad regime, which ruled Ba'athist Syria from 1970 until its 2024 dissolution.

Background

After a series of coups, the 1963 Syrian coup d'état helped the Ba'ath Party seize power. Alawite military officers Hafez al-Assad and Salah Jadid took part in the coup. In 1970, Hafez al-Assad launched the Corrective Movement and overthrew fellow Salah Jadid. Alawites were largely poor and rural, and were a marginalized group in Syria until Hafez al-Assad gained power. Robert D. Kaplan claimed that an Alawite ruling Syria was an "unprecedented development shocking to the Sunni-majority population which had monopolized power for so many centuries."

Under Hafez al-Assad, Alawites constituted the majority of Syrian military and political elites. Although the social status of Alawites improved, the living conditions of Alawites remained relatively poor, and the Sunni-Alawite tensions persisted. In 1971, Assad declared himself president of Syria, a position that was constitutionally reserved for Sunnis. In 1973, a new constitution was adopted, removing Islam as the state religion and only mandating that the president be a Muslim, without mentioning a specific sect. In 1974, in order to ease tensions, Musa as-Sadr issued a fatwa recognising Alawites as Muslims.

Opposition

After the Islamist uprising in Syria, the Assad regime carefully ensured the dominance of Alawites in all factors of the Syrian government. Despite increased Sunni-Alawite tensions, Syria remained stable until the Syrian civil war.

During the Syrian civil war, the Assad regime deployed mostly Alawite soldiers, and also conscripted Alawites. The mass conscriptions disproportionately targeted Alawite regions. The conscriptions resulted in many young Alawite men dying, and caused suffering to the Alawite region along the Syrian coast. There were increased tensions between the Alawite community and the Assad government. Many Alawites also stated that the Alawite community should not be associated with the Assad government.

During the Syrian civil war, many Alawites felt compelled to back Assad, fearing that an opposition victory would lead to mass killings of Alawites, especially after the rise of Sunni Islamism among the opposition. Over 100,000 young Alawite men were killed in combat by 2020.

Alawites had also opposed Iranian intervention in Syria, viewing it as a threat to the Alawite faith due to Iran running Shia conversion campaigns in the Alawite regions with tacit approval of the Assad government.

The Assad regime faced increasing opposition from the Alawite community as the Syrian civil war progressed. By 2023, Alawites had began to publicly criticise the Assad regime.

There were claims of the Assad regime attempting to integrate Alawites into Sunni Islam or dismissing the Alawite faith as simply Twelver Shi'ism. Both Hafez al-Assad and Bashar al-Assad were accused of undermining the Alawite faith throughout their rule. Syrian school textbooks in the Assad regime did not mention the Alawite faith as a religion. Ali Sulayman al-Ahmad, the chief judge of Baathist Syria, stated "we are Alawi Muslims. Our book is the Quran. Our prophet is Muhammad. The Kaaba is our qibla, and our religion is Islam."

References

1. Kaplan, Robert (February 1993). "Syria: Identity Crisis". The Atlantic.
2. ^ Frederic C. Hof; Alex Simon (2013). "Sectarian Violence in Syria's Civil War: Causes, Consequences, and Recommendations for Mitigation" (PDF). Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.
3. Kaplan, Robert (February 1993). "Syria: Identity Crisis". The Atlantic.
4. Seale, Patrick. Asad, the Struggle for the Middle East. University of California Press, 1989, p.173.
5. The New Encyclopedia of Islam by Cyril Glasse, Altamira, 2001, p.36–7
6. Lazkani, Alimar (4 August 2020). "No Homeland, No Future: Alawite Youth As the Backbone of the Assad Regime". Arab Reform Initiative. Archived from the original on 3 February 2023.
7. "ديلي تلغراف: الطائفة العلوية تدفع ثمنا باهظا لدعم الأسد". Arab 21. 7 April 2015. Archived from the original on 3 October 2020.
8. Assad loyalists shaken by his fall, some relieved by lack of violence, Reuters (December 8, 2024).
9. Yaroslav Trofimov (9 July 2015). "After Backing Regime, Syrian Minorities Face Peril". Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 15 July 2015.
10. Sherlock, Ruth (7 April 2015). "In Syria's war, Alawites pay heavy price for loyalty to Bashar al-Assad". The Daily Telegraph. Retrieved 15 July 2015.
11. "ديلي تلغراف: الطائفة العلوية تدفع ثمنا باهظا لدعم الأسد". Arab 21. 7 April 2015. Archived from the original on 3 October 2020.
12. "150,000 Alawites killed in 6-year Syria war". 20 April 2017.
13. Lazkani, Alimar (4 August 2020). "No Homeland, No Future: Alawite Youth As the Backbone of the Assad Regime". Arab Reform Initiative. Archived from the original on 3 February 2023.
14. Tsurkov, Elizabeth (22 July 2019). "Between Regime and Rebels: A Survey of Syria's Alawi Sect". The New York Review. Archived from the original on 31 March 2023.
15. Mohammed Alaa Ghanem, Alawites in Syria breaking silence?: Criticizing the dictatorship from within, Middle East Institute (August 11, 2023).
16. ^ Syrian comment. Asad's Alawi dilemma, 8 October 2004
17. "Islamic Education in Syria: Undoing Secularism". Open University. Retrieved 25 December 2012.
18. Cite error: The named reference Yunis 1992, p. 63 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).