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| Part of Mughal-Maratha Wars | |||||||
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| Belligerents | |||||||
 Maratha Empire |
 Mughal Empire | ||||||
| Commanders and leaders | |||||||
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Shivaji Netaji Palkar |
Kartalab Khan  Rai Bagan | ||||||
| Strength | |||||||
| 20,000 | 10,000 regular infantry | ||||||
The Battle of Umberkhind took place on 3 February 1661 between the Mughal and Maratha Empire. Shivaji's Maratha forces defeated the invading Mughal army, resulting in the Mughal army's surrender. The battle demonstrated Shivaji's Ganimi Kava and Guerrilla warfare tactics, marking a significant victory for the Marathas and strengthening their position against the Mughals.
Background
See also: Battle of ChakanAfter winning at Chakan, Mughal general Shaista Khan sought to expand into Maratha territory but lacked the manpower. He requested reinforcements from Aurangzeb. With fresh troops, he launched an offensive against Konkan forts. Meanwhile, Shivaji mobilized to resist. Shaista Khan, accompanied by Maratha Brahmin lady Rai Bagan, led the campaign to capture the forts under Uzbek commander Kartalab Khan.
Kartalab Khan, under the orders of Shaista Khan, embarked on an expedition into North Konkan sometime after January 1661. The objective of this campaign, as recorded in the Shivabharat, was to capture strategic locations including Nagothane, Chaul, Panvel, Kalyan, and Bhiwandi, collectively known as North Konkan. The exact strength of the force led by Kartalab Khan remains uncertain, although it likely numbered less than 10,000 troopers, possibly accompanied by a detachment of Imperial infantry.
The expeditionary force, comprising contingents from various clans and commanders such as Kachhwah, Chauhan, Amar Singh, Mitrasen, Sarjerao Gadhe, Rai Bagan, Jaswantrao Kokate, and Jadhavrao, began its descent from the Sahyadri range via the north-south route near Lohagad. The passage through this narrow foot-track, resembling the barrel of a gun, posed numerous obstacles at every stage of the march. Subsequently, the army entered a dense forest known as Umbarkhand.Historical analysis suggests that the pass mentioned in the Shivabharat corresponds to the Kuruwande Pass, situated approximately five kilometers south of the Bor Pass. Umbare village, located around six kilometers west of the Kuruwande Pass, marks the route's entry point into a precipitous gorge flanked by forest-clad hills. This terrain, described as a virtual death-trap, limited the army's mobility and exposed them to ambushes from adversaries concealed in the surrounding terrain.
The reasons behind Kartalab Khan's choice of this arduous route remain unclear. It is speculated that the Bor Pass, a more commonly used route, may have been heavily fortified by Shivaji's forces, prompting Khan to attempt an outflanking maneuver through the less guarded Kuruwande Pass. However, historical records do not provide definitive explanations for this strategic decision.
Ambush at Umberkhind Pass
After Kartalab Khan descended the Sahyadri range and entered the forest, Shivaji, aware of his enemy's intentions, strategically positioned his forces in the terrain to ambush the Mughal army. As the Mughals advanced unsuspectingly into the trap, they were suddenly attacked by Maratha forces with musket-balls and arrows. The surprise onslaught caused chaos and a stampede among the Mughal troops, despite attempts by some commanders to resist. Rai Bagan, a Maratha Brahmin lady accompanying Kartalab Khan, advised surrender due to the hopeless situation. Kartalab Khan then sent an emissary to parley with Shivaji, who granted safe passage for the Mughal army in exchange for surrendering their possessions. Consequently, the Mughal army abandoned their belongings and swiftly left the forest. The exact date of the battle is not recorded in contemporary sources, but it is estimated to have occurred around January 15, 1661. Shivaji's decision to allow safe passage to Kartalab Khan's force instead of capturing them entirely remains unclear.
Negotiation with Kartalab Khan
It is speculated that Shivaji, seeking to negotiate with the Mughals, refrained from annihilating the entire force to avoid further antagonizing them. Capturing the Mughals might not have significantly strengthened Shivaji's negotiating position, as they perceived him as a rebellious leader rather than an equal power. Additionally, the Mughals possessed vast manpower, and the loss of Kartalab Khan's force would not have significantly impacted their military capabilities. For Shivaji, capturing a large number of prisoners would have imposed logistical challenges without substantial benefits. Shivaji ambushed Kartalab Khan's advancing Mughal forces at Umberkhind pass, inflicting heavy casualties. Recognizing the dire situation, Mughal commander Rai Bagan advised surrender to Shivaji, allowing the Mughal army to retreat safely to Pune.
Tactics and Aftermath
Shivaji's decision to allow safe passage to Kartalab Khan's force after the Battle of Umberkhind was driven by political considerations rather than military gains. Understanding the moral and political consequences of his actions, Shivaji aimed to keep the conflict with the Mughals low-key while simultaneously pursuing diplomatic negotiations to end the war.War, as famously stated by Clausewitz, is an instrument of policy. Shivaji's primary objective was not to inflict maximum damage upon the enemy but to compel them to accept his desired political settlement. Given his limited resources, Shivaji focused on convincing the Mughals of their inability to impose their will on him at a reasonable cost while demonstrating his determination to defend his dominions.The tactical resemblance of the Battle of Umberkhind to the Battle of Lake Trasimene in 217 BCE is notable. Similar to Hannibal's strategy against the Romans, Shivaji either deliberately baited the trap or opportunistically exploited the enemy's carelessness. This strategic maneuver showcases Shivaji's adeptness in utilizing tactical advantages to further his political objectives.
See also
References
- Sardesai, GS (1946). "New History of the Marathas". Phœnix Publications. p. 137.
- Vaibhav, Purandare (22 August 2022). Shivaji: India' Great Warrior King. Juggernaut Books. p. 53. ISBN 9789391165505.
- "A Guerilla Victory At Umberkhind!". Chanakya Forum. Retrieved 2024-12-20.
- Sorokhaibam, Jeneet (2013-01-01). Chhatrapati Shivaji: The Maratha Warrior and His Campaign. Vij Books India Pvt Ltd. ISBN 978-93-82573-49-4.
- Bhave, Shreyas. The Legend of Bahirji-Naik: Siege of Panhala (Book II). Leadstart Publishing Pvt Ltd. ISBN 978-93-5559-089-3.
- C V Vaidya (2005). Shivaji_The_Founder_Of_Maratha_Swaraj. DR BR AMBEDKAR, Digital Library Of India. Poona. p. 157.
- ^ Gajanan Bhaskar Mehendale (2011). Shivaji His Life and Times. pp. 471–476.
- ^ Maratha Generals and Personalities: A gist of great personalities of Marathas. Pratik gupta. 2014-08-01. p. 127.
- ^ Kulkarni V. B. (1963). Shivaji The Portrait Of A Patriot. p. 78.
- ^ Setumadhavarao S Pagadi (1983). Shivaji. pp. 35–36.
- ^ S_R_Sharma (2005). Maratha_History. DR BR AMBEEDKAR, Digital Library Of India. karnatak_Publishing_House. p. 141.
