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Zhao Chongguo
Born137 BCE
Shanggui, Longxi Commandery, Han dynasty
Died52 BCE
AllegianceHan dynasty

Zhao Chongguo (Chinese: 趙充國; pinyin: Zhào Chōngguó, 137 – 52 BCE) was a prominent Chinese military commander and official during the Western Han dynasty.

Early life and career

In 137 BCE, Zhao Chongguo was born in the Shanggui prefecture of the Longxi Commandery, located along the periphery of the Han Empire in what is now Tianshui in eastern Gansu province. He was born into a "well-respected family" (Chinese: 良家; pinyin: liángjiā) originating in the northwestern commanderies, suggesting material qualifications for officialdom and a lack of involvement with crime, magic, or merchant trades. At some point, he moved to Lingju in the Jinchang Commandery, in what is now Yongdeng County, Gansu.

Little is known about Zhao's early life or military experience prior to 104. Posthumous histories report that he was ambitious as a youth and sought to become a general. At a young age, he studied military science and the Four Barbarians. With the "Six Commanderies" having a regional tradition of cavalry service, Zhao likely began service as a cavalryman in a local defense unit.

Military service

In 104, an elite cavalry unit titled the Feathered Forest (羽林; yǔlín) was created in the capital of Chang'an, one of five units placed under the administration of the Minister of the Imperial Household and tasked with protecting the Emperor. The members of the unit, dubbed the "Gentlemen of the Feathered Forest" (羽林郎; yǔlínláng), were mainly recruited from the northwest, with a particular emphasis on the descendants of men who died in military service. The soldiers of the Feathered Forest, like those in other Imperial Household units, were often appointed to higher military and civil positions following a period of service. Zhao joined the unit at some point between its formation and 99. In 99, he joined a force of 30,000 cavalry in Li Guangli's campaign against the Xiongnu, receiving the rank of acting major. The Han army was forced to retreat and suffered heavy casualties. It eventually became trapped by the encroaching Xiongnu forces after several days of combat. Zhao led a group of around 100 men to breech the Xiongnu lines and allow for the rest of the Han army to retreat, suffering twenty sword cuts in the process. After General Li commended Zhao's service, Emperor Wu invited Zhao to a private meeting and consoled him on his injuries.

Soon after meeting with Emperor Wu, Zhao was promoted to the rank of Gentleman of the Household (中郎; zhōngláng). He was later promoted again, becoming Chief of Staff for the General of Chariots and Cavalry (車騎 將軍; jūjì jiāngjūn). Zhao likely served as chief of staff to Grand General Huo Guang, and progressed rapidly during Huo's succeeding dictatorship. In 80, Zhao led an army against the Di people, who had rebelled in the Wudu Commandery. During this campaign, he held the title of Army Protector Chief Commandant (護軍都尉; Hùjūn dūwèi), likely an advisory position to the Grand General. He was then sent to command the garrisons of Shanggu Commandery in modern-day Inner Mongolia, possibly only as a brief inspection.

Later in 80, Zhao was appointed as the Chief Commandant of Waters and Parks (水衡都尉; Shuǐhéng dūwèi), a position he would ultimately hold until 60 BCE. As Chief Commandant, he managed the Shanglin Park to the north of the capital. This position also allowed him to administrate the minting of cash coinage, as the central mint was located inside the park. By 74, Zhao was joined in this position by the General of the Van, Han Zeng.

In 74, Zhao collaborated with Huo to depose the newly-enthroned emperor Liu He in favor of Emperor Xuan, signing the deed of indictment against the emperor alongside the Imperial Counselor and Han Zeng. In reward for this service, Zhao was awarded the hereditary title of Marquis of Yingping. Around this time, he was promoted to General of the Rear (水衡都尉; Hòu jiāngjūn), alongside his concurrent civil post as Chief Commandant. From 72 to 71, Zhao was one of five Han generals who participated in a large cavalry campaign against the Xiongnu at the request of the Wusun. Following a massive raid into Shanxi in 70, a defected Xiongnu commander advised the Han army to place Zhao, who had reportedly become infamous to the Xiongnu, in command of the northern frontier commanderies. The Xiongnu forces retreated the following year. Huo Guang died two years later, and the Huo family was overthrown in favor of direct rule by Emperor Xuan. Zhao remained in the good graces of the administration.

Campaign against the Qiang

Preventing contact and alliances between the Qiang people and the Xiongnu had been a geopolitical goal of the Han since the reign of Emperor Wu, and was a major motivator for the conquest of the Hexi corridor. During the mid-60s, a chieftain of the Qiang Xianlian tribe requested permission to pasture their herds in the Huangshui valley, where they had previously been expelled. Zhao was angered after this proposal was relayed positively to the Han court by the emissary Yiqu Anguo, accusing the Qiang of merely seeking contact with the Xiongnu and recommending a preemptive attack. The Han government's official response to the proposal is unknown, but the local garrison was unable to prevent the Qiang resettlement in the region.

In 63, the chief of the Xianlian joined a large group of Qiang chieftains in suspending local feuds and forming an alliance. Zhao counseled Emperor Xuan on the matter, describing a unified Qiang as a particular threat to the Han, and predicting that the Xiongnu would imminently seek to ally with them. In 62, the Han became aware that the Qiang lord Langhe had sent envoys to the Xiongnu, seeking to join in an alliance to attack Dunhuang and Shanshan. Sensing an imminent attack, Zhao advocated for the officer Xin Wuxian, the Grand Administrator of Jiuquan, to be sent into Qiang territory as part of a punitive expedition. Instead, the offices of the Chancellor and Imperial Secretary sent Yiqu Anguo into Qiang territory, ostensibly for diplomatic purposes. His brutal campaign caused widespread resentment, and more Qiang tribes rose up in revolt. Yiqu Anguo was forced to retreat back into Han territory.

Leading the campaign

Emperor Xuan sent Imperial Secretary Bing Ji to consult Zhao on the leadership of an ensuing relief expedition. Although now in his seventies, Zhao volunteered to lead the expedition himself to the emperor's approval. Zhao joined a group of around 10,000 cavalry troops mobilized at the Jincheng Commandery. The army departed west along the Yellow River, seeking to make a crossing to the northern bank east of the confluence with the Huangshui River. During the night, Zhao sent three regiments to cross and construct field fortifications along the northern bank in order to protect the rest of the army. However, this vanguard was attacked by a small group of Qiang horsemen shortly after. Suspecting a possible ambush, he withdrew his forces and sent a party to scout a highly defensible location along the river known as the Siwang Narrows. When no Qiang forces were found at the narrows, the army traveled along the Huangshui through Luodu (now Ledu) and rested for several days at the fort of Longzhi, southeast of modern Xining.

Shortly before Zhao's arrival at Longzhi, a Qiang emissary named Diaoku from the Kai tribe was detained at the fort. Zhao declared him innocent and sent him as a messenger to the Qiang, promising amnesty and large monetary rewards for Qiang who decapitated those in the rebellion. They would also be rewarded with ownership of the wives, children, and property of the decapitated. As Zhao advanced upriver, his son Zhao Ang led a hastily-assembled relief column comprised of two regiments of standing forces from Chang'an. Bogged down by Qiang forces at Lianju and cut off from its supply lines, it was eventually reinforced by a group of around 5,000 cavalry. The Grand Administrator of Jincheng, commanding around 10,000 cavalry, was also sent to reinforce Zhao Ang. However, many of these troops had likely joined Zhao Chongguo's forces.

Xin Wuxian wrote to Zhao Chongguo and advocated a strike on the Han and Kai tribes near Qinghai Lake, suggesting that the enslavement of their families and the seizure of their livestock would greatly weaken the Qiang, and allow for their destruction by the main army in the winter. Zhao stated that the plan would leave the northern frontier undefended against a potential Xiongnu attack, and that the amount of supplies needed for such an expedition would unhelpfully encumber the horses. Although the Han and Kai tribes were seen as most responsible for the rebellion, he believed that subduing and gaining the allegiance of the nearby Xianlian would secure the frontier against the other Qiang tribes.

After deliberations, the Three Lords and Nine Ministers advised the emperor against Zhao's proposal. Yiqu Anguo was dispatched to deliver the emperor's response to Zhao, reprimanding him for not seeking to prevent Han and Kai raids into Gansu. The emperor additionally gave Xin Wuxian the title of "General Who Smashes the Qiang" (Chinese: 破羌將軍; pinyin: Pò-qiāng jiāngjūn). Zhao rebuked this and responded with a further outline of his plan in July or August 62, stating that he wished to attack only the Xianlian, and only attack the Han and Kai if they continued their hostilities afterwards. He noted that a preemptive attack against the Han and Kai would guarantee their alliance with the Xianlian, while they could be otherwise convinced to turn against them. After a very brief period of deliberation, the emperor conceded and approved Zhao's plan.

Zhao advanced further into Qiang territory. The Xianlian troops scattered at their approach, leaving behind their livestock, carts, and wagons. The Chinese army proceeded into the territories of the Han sub-tribe, likely to the northeast of Qinghai Lake, but refrained from looting. This endeared the Han to the army. Around September 62, Han chieftain Miwang sent an envoy to Zhao, asking for his people to be allowed to return to their original territory. Although most of his officers were opposed to pardoning Miwang for allying with the Xianlian, Zhao overruled them and granted clemency to him and the Han tribe.

Agricultural garrisons

Zhao fell ill around two months later, but was urged to stay on the offense. The emperor ordered Xin Wuxian to transfer his garrison troops to Zhao's army and ordered Zhao to attack in January 61. If Zhao's illness worsened, he ordered Xin and the General of Strong Crossbows, Xu Yanshou, to launch the attack in his stead. This frustrated Zhao, who did not seek to take immediate offensive operations, and so had no use for additional men under his command; by the end of the year, he commanded an army of around 60,000 troops, requiring large amounts of grain and salt for rations. Zhao Ang sent an aide to his father, begging him to follow the emperor's orders despite his illness. Zhao defended himself to his son, stating that he intended to continue his plans, stating that "our brilliant ruler may judge if my words are loyal".

Zhao outlined a strategy for a longer-term occupation of the Qiang territories. He sought permission to disband most of his forces, leaving only 10,281 troops (comprising the troops from the commanderies of Huaiyang and Runan as well as former convicts from the capital region) behind. These would refrain from offensive operations to construct administrative outposts, irrigation ditches, and reservoirs in order to build up the agricultural capacity along the Huangshui. He predicted that this could extend administration as far as Qinghai Lake. A group of 1,000 cavalrymen would be reserved to live off the land during the spring and summer in order to protect the army's farms.

The emperor was befuddled by Zhao's proposal, asking in reply: "What sort of general would plan this? When will the enemy be exterminated? When will our troops gain a decision? If you can figure out why this plan is to our advantage, memorialize again!" Zhao responded with another memorial, listing twelve advantages of his plan. He described the plan as denying the Qiang their most fertile territories and instead relegating them to the arid highlands, causing infighting and starvation among the Qiang armies. Additionally, the plan would allow for the construction of infrastructure to keep troops constantly supplied, as opposed to carrying their own supplies through the mountains, where they may be ambushed or cut off from resupply. Zhao dismissed imperial concerns that the reduction in numbers would put the troops at risk of a large-scale Qiang assault by emphasizing that waiting out the enemy would further reduce their combat capacity due to their lack of supplies.

Notes

  1. Comprising Longxi, Tianshui, Anding, Beidi, Shang, and Xihe commanderies.
  2. The Siwang Narrows are without a clear identification, but are downstream from Ledu.
  3. Chinese: 罕; pinyin: Hǎn, not to be confused with the similarly named dynasty or ethnic group.
  4. wushen day of the sixth month of the wuwu year
  5. The location of the Han tribe's territories is unknown, and they may have been to the north or south of the Huangshi.
  6. Twelfth month of the wuwu year

References

  1. ^ Knechtges & Chang 2014, p. 2206.
  2. ^ Dreyer 2008, pp. 670.
  3. ^ Dreyer 2008, pp. 671–672.
  4. Dreyer 2008, pp. 673–674.
  5. ^ Dreyer 2008, pp. 673–675.
  6. Loewe 2019, pp. 195–196.
  7. Loewe 2019, p. 197.
  8. Loewe 2019, p. 188.
  9. Dreyer 2008, pp. 675–678.
  10. Dreyer 2008, pp. 675–679, 685, 693.
  11. ^ Dreyer 2008, pp. 679–680.
  12. Dreyer 2008, pp. 682, 688.
  13. Dreyer 2008, pp. 680–681, 688.
  14. Dreyer 2008, p. 685.
  15. Dreyer 2008, pp. 681–684.
  16. Dreyer 2008, p. 690.
  17. Dreyer 2008, pp. 685–691.
  18. ^ Dreyer 2008, p. 691.
  19. Dreyer 2008, pp. 691–695.
  20. Dreyer 2008, pp. 694–696.
  21. Dreyer 2008, p. 696.
  22. Dreyer 2008, pp. 696–699.
  23. Dreyer 2008, pp. 699–702.

Bibliography