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The ideology of the Sheikh Said rebellion refers to the the Kurdish nationalism motivated by Islamism which was the ideology and motive of the Sheikh Said rebellion.

Ideology

Sheikh Said was a local leader of the Naqshbandi sect. He was an ardent Kurdish nationalist and had ties to the Azadi organisation. Sheikh Said was one of the most outspoken nationalists during the first Azadi congress in 1924. The Azadi organisation planned the revolt, and its leaders elected Sheikh Said as the general leader due to his charisma and religious credentials. Sheikh Said was among the first to link Kurdish nationalism with Islam.

Sheikh Said was not only provoked by the secularism of the new republic, but also the Turkish character. While the Turkish government knew of the separatist intentions of Sheikh Said, they claimed to domestic and international media that the Sheikh Said revolt was a Turkish religious uprising aimed at reinstating the Ottoman dynasty. The Turkish state later contradicted itself during the trial of Sheikh Said, which condemned him to death as a Kurdish separatist. Historians worldwide later agreed that the Ottomanist motives were a Turkish government fabrication. İsmet İnönü, in his own report, described the revolt as a separatist and "fully-fledged nationalist movement". During his trial, Sheikh Said stated "we had a national goal and were ready to sacrifice our wealth and our lives to achieve that goal. We are not traitors. We fought to liberate Kurdistan and the Kurdish nation."

The Ottoman Empire had given Kurds autonomy in exchange for allegiance to the Sublime Porte, therefore the majority of Kurds were indeed upset when the Ottoman Empire was replaced with Turkey. However, the Shafi'i clerics largely rejected the authenticity of the Ottoman sultans as legitimate caliphs. In a 1924 speech in defence of the abolition of the Caliphate, Seyyid Bey stated that "from a religious point of view, the Shafi'i ulama of India, Egypt, Najd, Yemen, and that of Kurdistan, do not recognize our kings as caliphs. Do you believe the ulama in Kurdistan take the debate over the Caliphate seriously? The ulama of those regions have never recognized our kings as caliphs."

Sheikh Said himself had spoken negatively of the Ottoman Empire, stating that "under the pretext of religion and the Caliphate, the Turks and the Ottomans have for over 400 years been pushing us gradually towards slavery, darkness, ignorance and destruction." Sheikh Said intended to revolt against Turkish rule in general, claiming that "we have not made the spirits of our ancestors happy. We have not fulfilled the wishes of Ahmadi Khani. That is why we live in misery and make our enemies glad." He also claimed that Turks were merely "migrants". The Sheikh Said revolt was very unpopular with Turks. The revolt did not spread to the Turks of Eastern Anatolia. The majority of Sheikh Said's soldiers were illiterate monolingual Kurds. The core of Sheikh Said's commanders were Hamidiye officers, such as Halid Beg Cibran, who was an in-law of Sheikh Said.

Sheikh Said planned on implementing Sharia and restoring the title of Caliph, however the caliph would be in his new Kurdish state, which would be an Islamic state based on the Shafi'i school. Sheikh Said claimed that his "caliphate" would safeguard "Kurdish honor and religion", and would not extend beyond Kurdistan. He also described the form of Islam practiced in Turkish society as "deceptive". Some of Sheikh Said's closest friends had even been non-Muslims who supported him due to the shared nationalism.

Sheikh Said had invited Said Nursi to the revolt, although Said Nursi had rejected and criticised it. Despite his tensions with Sheikh Said, on many occasions, Said Nursi had been mistaken for Sheikh Said and was targeted. Said Nursi specifically opposed Kurdish independence and preferred an Ottoman revival. Said Nursi claimed that Turks were the "standard-bearers" of the Islamic world for centuries and that "the sword may not be drawn against the sons of such a nation", while Sheikh Said claimed that Turks abandoned Islam and their promises to Kurds, and that it was necessary to fight them.

Sheikh Said and his fighters were known for their strong belief in their ideology and their high morale, and they captured over one third of Turkish Kurdistan, including many major cities and eventually sieging Diyarbakir, with over half of the Turkish army being deployed to suppress the revolt. The Turkish army reportedly lost more soldiers during the Sheikh Said rebellion than they did during the Turkish War of Independence. Turkey initially wanted to keep all of Greater Kurdistan within its borders. However, the Sheikh Said revolt was a major turning point, as Turkey stopped its claim over the Mosul vilayet shortly after. The Mosul vilayet was mostly Kurdish and given to Iraq by the British. The Turkish government were convinced that much difficulties came with ruling over large Kurdish regions. Turkey accused the British of supporting the Sheikh Said revolt.

Sheikh Said attempted to gain the support of Kurdish Alevis, and some individual Alevis, notably Hasan Hayri, joined him. However, Kurdish Alevis refused to join the revolt, claiming that they were better off in a secular Turkey than a Sunni Kurdistan. Some Alevi tribes, such as Xurmek and Lewlan, even assisted Turkish forces during the revolt.

Turkish Islamists, such as the Refah Party, founded in 1983, and the Justice and Development Party, founded in 2001, eventually rose to prominence and cited the Ottoman Empire and attempted an "Islamic formula" to counter Kurdish demands, while simultaneously trying not to offend Turkish nationalism, although they were unable to present a working solution.

References

1. The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880–1925, Robert Olson, pp. 92-101
2. The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880–1925, Robert Olson, pp. 114, 153
3. Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan, Martin van Bruinessen, 1992, pp. 265-66
4. The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization and Identity, David Romano, 2006, pp. 34
5. The Kurds and the Politics of Turkey: Agency, Territory and Religion, Deniz Çifçi, 2019, pp. 60-61
6. Violent Radical Movements in the Arab World: The Ideology and Politics of Non-State Actors, 2019, pp. 184
7. The New Turkey and Its Discontents, Simon Waldman, Emre Caliskan, 2017, pp. 166
8. Violent Radical Movements in the Arab World: The Ideology and Politics of Non-State Actors, 2019, pp. 184
9. Islam and Competing Nationalisms in the Middle East, 1876-1926, Kamal Soleimani, 2016, pp. 248
10. Islam and Competing Nationalisms in the Middle East, 1876-1926, Kamal Soleimani, 2016, pp. 245-247
11. The New Turkey and Its Discontents, Simon Waldman, Emre Caliskan, 2017, pp. 166
12. Islam and Competing Nationalisms in the Middle East, 1876-1926, Kamal Soleimani, 2016, pp. 248
13. From Caliphate to Secular State: Power Struggle in the Early Turkish Republic, Hakan Özoglu, 2011, pp. 120
14. The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880–1925, Robert Olson, pp. 47, 94
15. Dersim as an Internal Colony: The Turkish Civilizing Mission (1927–1952), Murat Devres, 2024, pp. 72
16. The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s: Its Impact on Turkey and the Middle East, Robert Olson, 1996, pp. 67
17. Political Function of Religion in Nationalistic Confrontations in Greater Kurdistan, Sabah Mofidi, 2022, pp. 31