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A fact is a truth, something that is the case, or that which can be verified according to an established standard of evaluation. The precise definition of "fact" depends on the context, academic discipline and associated normative principles.

Basic definitions

A thorough review of the definition and usage of the word "fact" in Standard Written English reveals a range of concepts and differing shades of meaning. In addition to the meanings discussed later in this article, the word "fact" is used to indicate:

• a matter under discussion deemed to be true, or indicated as true, such as to emphasize a point or prove a disputed issue (e.g., "... the fact of the matter is ...");

• an allegation or stipulation of something that may or may not be a "true fact" (e.g., "Lightning never strikes twice and other false facts", "the author's facts are not trustworthy");

• existence, or something that is known or demonstrated to have existed, as distinguishable from conclusions or opinions that may be derived from such existence (e.g., "... not history, nor fact, but imagination ..."); and

• a process of evaluation, (through review of testimony, direct observation, or otherwise) as distinguishable from matters of inference or speculation; this indication is also reflected in the terms "fact-find" and "fact-finder" (e.g., "set up a fact-finding commission").

Fact in philosophy

In philosophy, the concept of fact relates to fundamental issues and questions of epistemology and ontology. A "fact" can be defined as something which is the case, ie. the state of affairs reported by a true proposition.

The proper analysis and interpretation of fact is central to various theoretic paradigms in philosophy. Questions of objectivity and truth are closely associated with questions of fact. Speaking for the objective approach, British philospher Roy Bhaskar asserts that "... facts are real and we are not free to invent them, but they belong to the realm of of epistemology and are discovered through theoretical paradigms and are historically specific social realities."

The Correspondence theory of truth holds that what makes a sentence true is that it corresponds to a fact. Similarly, Logical positivism asserts that all knowledge is based on logical inference which must be grounded in observable facts.

Compound facts

Any non-trivial true statement about reality is necessarily an abstraction composed of a complex of objects and properties or relationss.. For example, the fact described by the true statement "Paris is the capital city of France" implies that:

• There truly is such a place as Paris;
• There truly is such a place as France;
• There are such things as capital cities;
• France has a government;
• The government of France is legitimate, and has the power to define its capital city;
• The French government has chosen Paris to be the capital.
• There truly is such a thing as a "place" or a "government".

The truth of all of these assertions, if facts themselves, may coincide to create the fact that Paris is the capital of France.

Negative, modal and disjunctive facts

Difficulties arise, however, in attempting to identify the constituent parts of negative, modal, disjunctive, or moral facts.

The fact-value distinction

Moral philosophers since David Hume have debated the question whether values are objective, and thus factual. In A Treatise of Human Nature Hume pointed out that there is no obvious way for a series of statements about what ought to be the case to be derived from a series of statements of what is the case. Those who insist that there is a logical gulf between facts and values, such that it is fallacious to attempt to derive values from facts, include G. E. Moore, who called attempting to do so the Naturalistic fallacy.

The factual-counterfactual distinction

Factuality — what has occurred — can also be contrasted with counterfactuality — what might have occurred, but did not. A counterfactual conditional or subjunctive conditional is a conditional (or "if-then") statement indicating what would be the case if events had been other than they actually are. For example, "If Alexander had lived, his empire would have been greater than Rome". This is to be contrasted with an indicative conditional, which indicates what is (in fact) the case if its antecedent is (in fact) true — for example, "if you drink this, it will make you well".

Such sentences are important to Modal logic, especially since the development of Possible world semantics.

Fact in science

In science a fact is an objective and verifiable observation, in contrast with a theory, which is an explanation of or interpretation of facts. Scientific facts are believed to be independent from the observer in that no matter which scientist observes a phenomenon, all will reach the same necessary conclusion. Some scholars in the philosophy of science question whether scientific facts are truly objective or are always "theory-laden" to some degree. Thomas Kuhn and others as well pointed out that knowing what facts to measure, and how to measure them, requires the use of some other theory (e.g. age of fossils is based on radiocarbon dating which is justified by reasoning that radioactive decay follows a Poisson process rather than a Bernoulli process). This issue is tagged "the theory-ladenness of observation".

Fact in law

The general concept and analysis of fact in Law and Jurisprudence is supported by several well-established standards. Matters of fact have various formal definitions under common law jurisdictions.

These include:

• an element required in legal pleadings to demonstrate a cause of action;

• the determinations of the finder of fact after evaluating admissible evidence produced in a trial or hearing;

• a potential ground of reversible error forwarded on appeal in an appellate court; and

• any of various matters subject to investigation by official authority to establish that a crime has been perpetrated.

Fact in psychology

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Matters of fact have application in psychology. In this context, "fact" is the personal awareness that proceeds from the routine operation of healthy cognitive function. Unhealthy or maladaptive cognitive function is considered the basis of delusion, characterized by the retention or awareness of "facts" that do not coincide with objective "states of affairs." In this context the term "fact" is more technically described as "false belief."

Retention and internal representation of fact is the role of Declarative memory, which includes both Semantic memory and Episodic memory.

Rhetorical use of the word "fact"

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Because more respect is generally accorded to facts than opinions, people may describe their opinions, based on personal experience, as "fact" even though they have not been evaluated or verified beyond the limits of individual perception. Such "facts" would be better described as beliefs, or strongly held convictions.

See also

• De facto
• Reality
• State of affairs
• Truth

Notes and references

1. Chamber's Dictionary, ninth edition
2. "Fact" (6c). OED_2d_Ed_1989
3. (See also "Matter" (2,6). Compact_OED)
4. "Fact" (5). OED_2d_Ed_1989
5. According to the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, "Fact has a long history of usage in the sense 'allegation'" AHD_4th_Ed
6. "Fact" (4a) OED_2d_Ed_1989
7. "Fact" (6a). OED_2d_Ed_1989
8. "Fact" (8). OED_2d_Ed_1989
9. "A fact is, traditionally, the worldly correlate of a true proposition, a state of affairs whose obtaining makes that proposition true". -- Fact in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy
10. "A fact, it might be said, is a state of affairs that is the case or obtains" -- Stanford Encyclopdeia of Philosophy. States of Affairs
11. (Bhaskar 1989 infra) Roscoe, Jane (2002). Faking It: Mock-Documentary and the Subversion of Factuality. Manchester University Press. ISBN 0719056411.(Quoting Bhaskar (1989) et. al.)
12. Roy Bhaskar (1989)Reclaiming Reality: A Critical Introduction to Contemporary Philosophy
13. Engel, Pascal (2002). Truth. McGill-Queen's Press- MQUP. ISBN 0773524622.
14. (Engel 2002)
15. "Facts possess internal structure, being complexes of objects and properties or relations" Oxford Companion to Philosophy
16. "Fact", in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Ted Honderich, editor. (Oxford, 1995) ISBN 0-19-866132-0
17. Cassell, Eric J. The Nature of Suffering and the Goals of Medicine Oxford University Press. Retrieved 16 May 2007.
18. Estrich, Willis Albert (1952). American Jurisprudence: A Comprehensive Text Statement of American Case Law. Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Company.
19. Elkouri, Frank (2003). How Arbitration Works. BNA Books. ISBN 157018335X.p. 305
20. Bishin, William R. (1972). Law Language and Ethics: An Introduction to Law and Legal Method. Foundation Press. Original from the University of Michigan Digitized Mar 24, 2006.p. 277
21. The Yale Law Journal: Volume 7. Yale Law Journal Co. 1898.
22. Per Lord Shaw of Dunfermline, Clarke v. Edinburgh and District Tramways Co., 1919 S.C.(H.L.) 35, at p 36.
23. Merrill, John Houston (1895). The American and English Encyclopedia of Law. E. Thompson. Original from Harvard University Digitized Apr 26, 2007.
24. Bennett, Wayne W. (2003). Criminal Investigation. Thomson Wadsworth. ISBN 0534615244.

• Philosophical concepts