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The "Cyprus Dispute" refers to the dispute between Turkey, Greece and Britain over Cyprus, an island in the eastern Mediterranean Sea. The dispute is mainly a result of Britain's efforts to secure strategic control over Cyprus. Such efforts have cultivated and produced Turkey's nationalism and same strategic interests. Likewise cultivation of Greece's nationalist and strategic interests has not been as sucessful and Greece practically abondoned serious claims at least since 1960. The natural inhabitants of Cyprus (Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots) have been used and victimized over the years in favour of such strategic interests. This dispute led to the de facto separation of the island into a mostly Greek speaking southern and a mostly Turkish-speaking northern part, the latter having been occupied by Turkish troops since 1974.

Historical Background Prior to 1960

As with so much relating to the Cyprus Dispute, the starting date of the conflict is open to argument and controversy. Most Greek Cypriots will point to an uninterrupted Greek presence on the island dating back four thousand years and note that the Turkish presence on the island is far more recent, dating back to the conquest of the island by the Ottoman Empire in 1571. However, as many Turkish Cypriots will point out, this nevertheless gives the Turkish Cypriots a four hundred year old right to regard the island as their home. In more contemporary terms, the Cyprus dispute has been less about who has the right to live on the island. Instead, it has been focused on which country has the greater right to control the island - Greece or Turkey. Starting in the early-nineteenth century, the Greek Cypriots sought to bring about an end to almost 250 years of Ottoman rule over the island and unite Cyprus with Greece, a process called enosis. This call for enosis grew louder after Britain took administrative control of the island in 1878, following the Congress of Berlin. Under the terms of the agreement reached between Britain and the Ottoman Empire, the island would remain an Ottoman territory. However, the Christian Greek-speaking inhabitants of the island saw the arrival of the British as a chance to lobby for the island's union with Greece. Britain refused to consider the idea.

When the First World War began in 1914, Britain annexed Cyprus. Soon afterwards, it offered it to Constantine I of Greece on condition that Greece join the war on the side of the British. Although the offer was supported by Eleftherios Venizelos, the Greek prime minister, it was rejected by the King, who wished to keep Greece out of the war. The offer therefore lapsed. After the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, the new Turkish government formally recognized Britain's ownership of Cyprus. In 1925 Britain declared Cyprus to be a Crown Colony. In the years that followed agitation for enosis continued. In 1931 this led to open rebellion. A riot resulted in the death of six civilians, injuries to others, and the burning of the British Government House in Lefkosia. In the months that followed about 2,000 people were convicted of crimes in connection with the violence. Britain reacted by imposing harsh restrictions. Military reinforcements were dispatched to the island, the constitution suspended, press censorship instituted, and political parties banned. Two bishops and eight other prominent citizens directly implicated in the riot were exiled. In effect, the governor became a dictator, empowered to rule by decree. Municipal elections were suspended, and until 1943 all municipal officials were appointed by the government. The governor was to be assisted by an Executive Council, and two years later an Advisory Council was established; both councils consisted only of appointees and were restricted to advising on domestic matters only. In addition, the flying of Greek or Turkish flags or the public display of portraits of Greek or Turkish heroes was forbidden.

Claims for enosis were put on hold during the Second World War, during which time many Greek Cypriots (and Turkish Cypriots) joined the British armed forces. In return, they expected that Britain would be prepared to discuss their political wishes at the end of the war. In 1946, the British government announced plans to invite Cypriots to form a Consultative Assembly to discuss a new constitution. As a demonstration of good will, the British also allowed the return of the 1931 exiles. Instead of reacting positively, as expected by the British, the Greek Cypriot hierarchy reacted angrily because there had been no mention of enosis. The Orthodox Church of Cyprus had expressed its disapproval, and twenty-two Greek Cypriots declined to appear, stating that enosis was their sole political aim. The efforts to bring about Enosis now increased, helped by active support from the Church of Cyprus, which was the main political voice of the Greek Cypriots at the time. However, it did not have the sole right to speak for the Greek Cypriots. The Church's main opposition came from the Cypriot Communist Party (officially the Progressive Party of the Working People; Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζόμενου Λαού; or AKEL), which viewed itself as the alternative political voice to the Orthodox Church of Cyprus, which opposed Enosis on the grounds that union with Greece would lead to the party being outlawed.

In 1950, Michael Mouskos, Bishop Makarios of Kition (Larnaca), was elevated to Archbishop Makarios III of Cyprus. In his inaugural speech, he vowed not to rest until union with "mother Greece" had been achieved. In Athens, enosis was a common topic of conversation, and a Cypriot native, Colonel George Grivas, was becoming known for his strong views on the subject. In anticipation of an armed struggle to achieve enosis, Grivas visited Cyprus in July 1951. He discussed his ideas with Makarios but was disappointed by the archbishop's reservations about the effectiveness of a guerrilla uprising. From the beginning, and throughout their relationship, Grivas resented having to share leadership with the archbishop. Makarios, concerned about Grivas's extremism from their very first meeting, preferred to continue diplomatic efforts, particularly efforts to get the UN involved. The feelings of uneasiness that arose between them never dissipated. In the end, the two became enemies. In the meantime, in August 1954, Greece's UN representative formally requested that self-determination for the people of Cyprus be included on the agenda of the General Assembly's next session. Turkey rejected the idea of the union of Cyprus and Greece. The Turkish Cypriot community had consistently opposed the Greek Cypriot enosis movement, but had generally abstained from direct action because under British rule the Turkish minority status and identity were protected. The expressed attitude of the Cypriot Turks was that, when Britain withdrew, control of Cyprus should simply revert to Turkey – although Turkey gave up all rights and claims to Cyprus in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. Meanwhile, Turkish Cypriot identification with Turkey had grown stronger, and after 1954 the Turkish government had become increasingly involved as the Cyprus problem became an international issue. In the late summer and fall of 1954, the Cyprus problem intensified. On Cyprus, the colonial government threatened advocates of enosis with up to five years' imprisonment. In December, the UN General Assembly announced the decision "not to consider the problem further for the time being, because it does not appear appropriate to adopt a resolution on the question of Cyprus." Reaction to the setback at the UN was immediate and violent, resulting in the worst rioting in Cyprus since 1931.

The EOKA Campaign, 1955-59

In January 1955, Grivas founded the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston – EOKA). On April 1, 1955, EOKA opened a campaign of violence against British rule in a well-coordinated series of attacks on police, military, and other government installations in Lefkosia, Famagusta, Larnaka, and Lemesos. This resulted in the deaths of over 100 British servicemen and personnel and Greek Cypriots suspected of collaboration and an equal amount of Greek Cypriots whe were members of EOKA or were suspected of giving it support. As a result of this many Greek Cypriots began to leave the police. They were replaced by Turkish Cypriots. This served to reinforce the impression that Britain was engaging in a divide-and-rule policy. At the same time, it led to tensions between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

A bombing incident at the Turkish consulate in Thessaloniki, Greece, in June led to rioting in İstanbul and İzmir. The pogroms in İstanbul caused the majority of Greeks, Armenians and Jews to emigrate. It was later learned that the bombing had been carried out by a Turk, and that the riots had been prearranged by the government of Turkey to bring pressure on the Greeks and to show the world that Turks were keenly interested in Cyprus. Greece reacted by withdrawing its representatives from the NATO headquarters in Turkey, and relations between the two NATO partners became quite strained.

In 1957 the Turkish Resistance Organization (Türk Mukavemet Teskilati – TMT), was formed by Rauf Denktash to fight EOKA. In response to the growing demand for enosis, a number of Turkish Cypriots became convinced that the only way to protect the interests and identity of the Turkish Cypriot population in the event of enosis would be to divide the island – 'taksim' ("division" in Turkish) into a Greek sector and a Turkish sector.

On 7 June 1958 the Turkish press office in Nicosia was blown up by the TMT on the orders of the Turkish foreign ministry. Afterwards the TMT murdered eight unarmed Greek Cypriot civilians that were deliberately stranded by the British SBA authorities near the Turkish Cypriot populated village of Geunyeli in a totally unprovoked attack. These were the first reported inter-communal killings. In the same summer, in the mixed suburb of Omorphita in Nicosia, the TMT evicted 700 Greeks from their homes. The riots in Nicosia caused by the bomb in the Turkish press office resulted in the deaths of 56 Greek and 53 Turkish Cypriots.

Several attempts to present a compromise settlement had failed. Thefeore, beginning in December 1958, representatives of Greece and Turkey opened discussions of the Cyprus issue. Participants for the first time discussed the concept of an independent Cyprus, i.e., neither enosis nor taksim. Subsequent talks yielded a compromise agreement supporting independence, laying the foundations of the Republic of Cyprus. The scene then shifted to London, where the Greek and Turkish representatives were joined by representatives of the Greek Cypriots, the Turkish Cypriots, and the British. The Zurich-London agreements that became the basis for the Cyprus constitution of 1960 were the Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Guarantee, and the Treaty of Alliance. The general tone of the agreements was one of compromise. Greek Cypriots, especially members of organizations such as EOKA, expressed disappointment because enosis had not been attained. Turkish Cypriots, however, welcomed the agreements and set aside their demand for taksim. According to the Treaty of Establishment, Britain retained sovereignty over 256 square kilometers, which became the Dhekelia Sovereign Base Area, to the northwest of Larnaka, and the Akrotiri Sovereign Base Area to the southwest of Lemesos.

Cyprus achieved independence on August 16, 1960.

Constitutional Breakdown, Violence and Intercommunal Talks, 1960-74

According to constitutional arrangements, Cyprus was to become an independent, non-aligned republic with a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice-president. General executive authority was vested in acouncil of ministers with a ratio of seven Greeks to three Turks. (The Greek Cypriots represented 78% of the population and the Turkish Cypriots 18%. The remaining 4% was made up by the three minority communities: the Latins, Maronites and Armenians.) A House of Representatives of fifty members, also with a seven-to-three ratio, were to be separately elected by communal balloting on a universal suffrage basis. In addition, separate Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Communal Chambers were provided to exercise control in matters of religion, culture, and education. According to Article 78(2) any law imposing duties or taxes shall require a simple majority of the representatives elected by the Greek and Turkish communities respectively taking part in the vote. Legislation on other subjects was to take place by simple majority but again the President and the Vice-President had the same right of veto--absolute on foreign affairs, defence and internal security, delaying on other matters--as in the Council of Ministers. The judicial system would be headed by a Supreme Constitutional Court, composed of one Greek Cypriot and one Turkish Cypriot and presided over by a contracted judge from a neutral country.

Within a short period of time the first disputes started to arise between the two communities. Issues of contention included taxation and the creation of separate municipalities. Repeated attempts to solve the disputes failed. Eventually, on November 30, 1963, Makarios put forward a thirteen-point proposal designed, in his view, to eliminate impediments to the functioning of the government. The thirteen points involved constitutional revisions, including the abandonment of the veto power by both the president and the vice president. Turkey rejected it on December 16, declaring the proposal an attempt to undermine the constitution. A few days later, on 21 December 1963 fighting erupted between the communities in Nicosia after a shoot-out left one policeman wounded and one Turkish Cypriot dead. In the days that followed it spread across the rest of the island. Within a week the Turkish garrison captured a strategic position across the Lefkosia to Kyrenia main highway which it held onto until the Turkish invasion of 1974. Turkish commandos were parachuted in and were shot down by the Cypriot security forces and Greek Cypriot civilians.

At the same time, the power-sharing government collapsed. How this happened is one of the most contentious issues in modern Cypruot history. The Greek Cypriots argue that the Turkish Cypriots withdrew in order to form their own administration. The Turkish Cypriots argue that they were forced out. In any event, in the days that followed the fighting a frantic effort was made to calm tensions. Fighting in Nicosia ended on 27 December 1963 when British forces intervened at the request of President Makarios. The Green line was established between the Greek and Turkish quarters of Nicosia and became a permanent feature of the city. The demarcation of the capital was followed by the eviction of the entire Armenian community which happened to fall in the Turkish sector. By February 1964 5,500 Turkish Cypriots and 1,600 Greek Cypriots had been displaced because of the fighting. Later 19,500 more Turkish Cypriots left their homes most of which were in mixed villages and moved into Turkish Cypriot only enclaves for better security.

Sporadic fighting continued untill UNFICYP, was formed following UN Security Council Resolution 186, passed on 4 March 1964. This resolution also drew attention to the fact that the Treaty of Guarantee could not be used to justify unilateral military action by any of the guarantor powers since this violated Article 2 Paragraph 4 of the UN Charter. The resoultion made it clear that the Cyprus government "has the responsibility for the maintenance and restoration of law and order" and asked it "to take all additional measures necessary to stop violence and bloodshed in Cyprus." This lead to the formation of the Cypriot National Guard.

In August attempts of the Cypriot National Guard under control of General Grivas, to re-capture a beach-head at Kokkina which would enable a Turkish military supply route caused the intervention of the Turkish airforce which bombed the area with rockets, bombs and Napalm. A Turkish naval invasion was being prepared. In reply to this, Makarios threatened that unless these air attacks and invasion were called off within two hours he would order an attack on all Turkish forces on the island. In the end US President Lyndon B. Johnson intervened and threatened Turkey with retaliation; lacking direct military support from Greece and the Soviet Union, Grivas was forced to recall his forces. A UN mediated ceasefire was accepted by both Cyprus and Turkey afterwards.

The total reported number of casualties over the period 21 December 1963 to 9 August 1964 vary only slightly. Turkish sources estimate about 350 Turkish deaths and about 200 Greek fatalities. The numbers include deaths resulting from rogue paramilitary action, as well as from exclusively military confrontations.

At the request of the Cyprus government Greece sent 10,000-20,000 armed soldiers to Cyprus undercover. By this time in Lefka alone the TMT had 8,000 well-armed Turkish Cypriots and 1,000 TMT fighters at its disposal whose weapons were smuggled in by Turkey.

Peacemaking Efforts, 1964-1974

At the same time as the UN established a peacekepeing force for the island, it also instructed the Secreetary-General to appoint a mediator. In 1964-65 two major attempts to settle Cyprus by outside mediation failed: Dean Acheson proposed giving Cyprus the choice of unity with Greece, in exchange for self-administration of some predominantly Turkish Cypriot areas and a Turkish sovereign military base on the Karpas peninsula. George Papandreou's comment was : "We are offered a building with only being asked for the penthouse", however both his son and minister Andreas Papandreou and Makarios were not satisfied considering it a partition plan. The UN mediator's report (26 March 1965) foresaw that Cyprus renounce a union with Greece by popular referendum (not only were the wages higher on Cyprus, but also there was not an overall support for enosis even among the Greek Cypriots). Rejecting the Turkish proposal of a federation, it proposed a unitary constitutional system that embodied generous provision for minority rights, some of them of a transitional nature until Turks would have been more integrated into the Cypriot community. This attempt was instantly rejected by the Turks as being "grossly partisan" in its conclusions.

Following the military coup d'état in Greece in 1967 and the installation of an American backed junta, Turkish Cypriot paramilitary action intensified as the Turkish military saw an opportunity to form a bridgehead in the south. Turkish paramilitaries occupied positions on the high ground above Ayios Theodoros, the neighbouring village to Kofinou and thus prevented access to the junction of the Larnaka to Limasol main highway. Cypriot police patrols that tired to keep the junction open were repeatedly fired at and eventually armed conflict resulted prompting an appeal from the President of the Security Council on 24 November 1967. American intervention led to the withdrawal of the Greek army division. President Makarios distanced himself from his earlier enosis convictions in his 1968 presidential campaign and argued for the independence of Cyprus. There were negotiations between the two communities and there was relative peace until 1974. The Greek junta, however, began supporting armed Anti-Makarios groups with the backing of the American CIA such as Ethniko Metopo (National Front) and EOKA B.

In 1971, General Grivas returned to Cyprus and started a guerilla war against Makarios resurrecting EOKA (as EOKA B) which he led until his death in January 1974.

Invasion, Ethnic Cleansing and Occupation, 1974-1975

During the spring of 1974, Cypriot intelligence found evidence that EOKA B was planning a coup and was being supplied, controlled, and funded by the military government in Athens. Early in July, Makarios wrote to the president of Greece, accusing the junta of plotting against his life and against the government of Cyprus.

In the autumn of 1973 there had been a further military coup in Athens in which the original Greek junta had been replaced by one still more obscurantist headed in fact by the Chief of Military Police, Brigadier Ioannides, though the actual head of state was General Phaedon Gizikis. Makarios wrote to President Gizikis on 2 July 1974 in a letter which he made public complaining bluntly that 'cadres of the Greek military regime support and direct the activities of the 'EOKA B' terrorist organization'. The Greek Government's immediate reply was to order the go-ahead to the conspiracy that had been long maturing against Archbishop Makarios. On 15 July 1974 the National Guard, led by its Greek officers, overthrew the Government with the support of the United States CIA and Henry Kissinger who believed that Makarios was too pro-Russian.

Makarios narrowly escaped death in the attack. He fled the presidential palace and went to Pafos, where the British managed to retrieve him and smuggle him out of the country.

In the meantime, the EOKA B member Nicos Sampson was declared provisional president of the new government after Glafkos Clerides who was the coupists original candidate declined the offer at the last moment.

After unsuccessfully trying to get support from one of the other guarantor forces - Britan -, Turkey invaded on July 20, 1974, with troops landing shortly before dawn at Kyrenia (Girne) on the northern coast. Ankara claimed that it was invoking its right under the Treaty of Guarantee to protect the Turkish Cypriots and guarantee the independence of Cyprus – a claim which is still being contested by Greeks and Greek Cypriots. The operation, codenamed 'Atilla', is known in the North as 'the 1974 Peace Operation'.

Democracy was restored in Cyprus eight days after the coup against Makarios. By the time the UN Security Council was able to obtain a cease-fire on the 22 July the Turkish forces had only secured a narrow corridor between Kyrenia and Nicosia, which they succeeded in widening during the next few days in violation of the cease-fire. At a conference on 14 August 1974, Turkey demanded from the Cypriot government to accept its plan for a federal state, with 34% of the territory under Turkish Cypriot control. When the Cypriot president Clerides asked for 36 to 48 hours in order to consult with Athens and with Greek Cypriot leaders, the Turkish Foreign Minister denied Clerides that opportunity on the grounds that Makarios and others would notoriously use it to play for still more time. An hour and a half after the conference broke up, the new Turkish attack began. It rapidly occupied even more than was asked for at Geneva. Thirty-six-and a-half per cent of the land came under Turkish occupation reaching as far south as the Louroujina salient. In the process about 200,000 Greek Cypriots who made up 82% of the pupulation in the north became refugees; many of them forced out of their homes (violations of Human Rights by the Turkish army have been acknowledged by the European Court of Human Rights), the rest fleeing at the word of the approaching Turkish army. 5,000 Greek Cypriot civilians were killed, over 1,000 women were raped. Approximately 1,600 Greek Cypriots were abducted and remain missing, their whereabouts never disclosed by the Turkish authorities. There were also over 200 deaths among the Turkish Cypriot community.

The ceasefire line from 1974 today separates the two communities on the island, and is commonly referred to as the Green Line (or Atilla Line).

By 1975 on 20,000 Greek Cypriots remained in the north, enclaved in the Karpass peninsula.

Facing threats of a renewed Turkish offensive as well as threats to ethnically cleanse the enslaved Greek Cypriots the Cyprus government and the United Nations consented to the transfer of the remainder of the 51,000 Turkish Cypriots that had not left their homes in the south to settle in the north, if they wished to do so. While the Cyprus government de juro allows Turkish Cypriots to return to their homes in the south should they wish to do so (2,000 Turkish Cypriot have exercised this right), Greek Cypriots do not have equivalent rights in the north.

On 13 February 1975 Turkey declared the occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus to be a "Federated Turkish State" to the universal condemnation of the international community (see UN Security Council Resolution 367 (1975)).

Human Rights Violations

In 1976 and again in 1983 the European Commission of Human Rights found Turkey guilty of repeated violations of the European Convention of Human Rights.

The European Commission of Human Rights reports of 1976 and 1983 state the following:

"Having found violations of a number of Articles of the Convention, the Commission notes that the acts violating the Convention were exclusively directed against members of one of two communities in Cyprus, namely the Greek Cypriot community. It concludes by eleven votes to three that Turkey has thus failed to secure the rights and freedoms set forth in these Articles without discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin, race, religion as required by Article 14 of the Convention."

The 20,000 Greek Cypriots who were enclaved in the occupied Karpass peninsula in 1975 were subjected by the Turks to violations of their human rights so that by 2001 when the European Court of Human Rights found Turkey guilty of the violation of 14 articles of the European Convention of Human Rights in its judgment of Cyprus v. Turkey (application no. 25781/94) less than 600 still remained. In the same judgment Turkey was found guilty of violating the rights of the Turkish Cypriots by authorising the trial of civilians by a military court.

Since the Turkish invasion over 120,000 Turks have been brought to the north from Anatolia in violation of Article 49 of the Geneva Convention, to occupy the homes of the Greek Cypriot refugees.

Approximately 70,000 Turkish Cypriots have been forced to emigrate from the north because of hardship brought on by the isolation of the subordinate local administration.

Negotiations and developments between 1974 and 1979

How the negotiations began

The Turkish military invasion changed the attitude of the United Nations towards the conflict on the island. In resolution No. 353 (external link), the UN Security Council called upon all states to "respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus" and demanded "an immediate end to foreign military intervention" as well as the "withdrawal ... of foreign military personnel present otherwise than under the authority of international agreements" (remark: the Turkish government claimed that their intervention was within the guarantee treaties, something which is heavily contested by the Cyprus government). After the second military intervention of Turkey on Cyprus, right after the failed negotiations in Geneva, the UN in its general assembly resolution 3212 again demanded that all foreign armed forces should be withdrawn from Cyprus soil. It also considered that all the refugees should return to their homes and called for negotiations, which eventually took place in 1975, for the purpose of implementing the provisions of the resolution.

Results of the negotiations

On February 12, 1977, Makarios and Rauf Denktaş signed an agreement laying the basis for further negotiations. Both sides agreed on their common aim to form an independent and bicommunal federal republic, stating that the definition of respective territory should be made according to the principles of economic potential, productivity and land ownership. On March 19, 1979, Kyprianou – successor of the late Makarios – and Denktaş concluded an agreement consisting of 10 major points. In this agreement, both parties agreed that the agreement dating from 1977 and the UN resolutions should form the basis of further negotiations, and that human rights as well as the civil rights of all citizens should be respected. Both parties agreed that the independence, sovereignty and non-alignment of Cyprus should be upheld; and it was also agreed that neither the island nor part of it would search to unite with any country, and that it was one country with no room for either enosis or taksim.

Turkish Cypriot Unilateral Declaration of Independence

On May 16, 1983, the UN General Assembly adopted resolution no. 37/253, initiated by the Spyros Kyprianou (external link). The Greek Cypriots celebrated it as a victory on international level, while the Turkish Cypriots called it an "execution order". The resolution demanded "the immediate withdrawal of all occupation forces from the Republic of Cyprus", welcomed the proposal for total demilitarization made by the Greek Cypriots and considered "that the de facto situation created by the force of arms should not be allowed to influence or in any way affect the solution of the problem of Cyprus".

The Turkish Cypriots' reaction was to declare the independence of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Only three days later, the UN Security Council declared this declaration of independence to be invalid. Ever since, only Turkey has recognised the TRNC as an independent state.

In September 1984, the negotiations continued in New York. At the end of the third round of negotiations, on November 24, 1984, the Secretary-General made a proposal based on an offer from Turkey for an independent, non-aligned, federal and bizonal republic, in which both communities were to enjoy equal political status. The proposal also included the conceding of 25% of Turkish Cypriot-administered territory to the Greek Cypriots and it also provided for the partial withdrawal of Turkish troops. Rauf Denktaş accepted the agreement with the provision that the Greek Cypriot side should accept it without any changes. In January 1985, when the agreement was to be signed, Spyros Kyprianou voiced his objection with the backing of Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou, as the agreement only provided for a partial withdrawal of the Turkish troops, not a total one. He asked for a reopening of the negotiations. Kyprianou's objection was met with support from the vast majority of the Greek Cypriot population who felt that such an agreement was neither democratic nor did it respect their basic human rights. The Turkish Cypriots considered this position a rejection of the solution in form of a bizonal federal state. A new proposal worked out by the UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar was rejected by Denktaş in April 1985, the reason being that the Turkish Cypriot side had not taken part in the working out of this plan.

The negotiations were stalled for a few years. Only when George Vasiliou was elected president of the Republic of Cyprus in 1988 were negotiations reopened. On January 30, 1989, the general conditions for the foundation of a federal republic and the solution of the Cyprus issue were presented to the UN. The talks between Vassiliou and Denktaş were conducted without help of the UN, but did not produce any results, as no compromise could be achieved regarding the level of sovereignty of the two constituent states.

The Set of Ideas

The set of ideas, worked out by UN Secretary-General Pérez de Cuéllar, was the most extensive and detailed proposal for the solution of the Cyprus conflict at that time. Its intention was to have both parties distance themselves from former positions. It provided for the establishment of three basic rights; it denied, however, the Greek Cypriot demands that all Greek Cypriots should have the right to return to their former homes. The treaties of guarantee dating form 1960 were confirmed, leaving both Greece and Turkey with the right to station troops "of equal force" on the island. Vassiliou agreed to the set of ideas; this time, the negotiations were blocked by Denktaş, who rejected the planned border drawing.

After the failure of the set of ideas, the UN put a stress on confidence-building measures on Cyprus. These included a perceivable reduction of Turkish troops on Cyprus, a reduction of Greek Cypriot military expenses, bicommunal contacts on expert level, cooperation on the issue of fresh water supply (a topic problematic for both sides) and on the reopening of the airport of Nikosia, as well as the return of the abandoned city of Varosha to the Greek Cypriots. After a promising start of negotiations, these proposals failed to produce any results. The Greek Cypriots feared that these confidence-building measures would recognise the existence of a Turkish Cypriot state. In the end, the Greek Cypriot president Glafkos Klerides aborted the negotiations, accusing the UN to have unilaterally concluded deals with the Turkish Cypriots.

The application for accession to the European Union by the Republic of Cyprus in 1990 introduced another controversial topic into the discussion of the Cyprus situation. The Turkish Cypriot government as well as the Turkish one protested, claiming that the Greek Cypriot government could not claim sole representation of the island. While the Greek Cypriots praised the positive effect the accession would have on the solution of the Cyprus issue, Denktaş rigorously rejected this argument and put forth that the conditions for his approval to the plan were EU membership for Turkey and the solution of the Cyprus question.

In June 1997, Klerides and Denktaş met in New York; the talks yielded no results, however both politicians agreed on discussing humanitarian questions during the following round of talks. The last round of negotiations took part in Switzerland in 1997, again without any results: The EU in the meantime had decided to invite the Republic of Cyprus for accession negotiations.

EU Accession and the Settlement Process, 1997-Present

After twenty years of talks, a settlement seemed as far off as ever. However, the basic papameters of a settlement were by now internationally agreed. Cyprus would be a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. A solution would also be expected to address the following issues:

• Constitutional framework
• Territorial adjustments
• Return of property to pre-1974 owners and/or compensation payments
• Return of displaced persons
• Demiliterisation of Cyprus
• Residency rights/repatriation of Turkish settlers (estimated to be 120,000)
• Future peacekeeping arrangements

In 1997 the basic parameters of the Cyprus Dispute changed. A decision by the European Union to open up accession negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus created a new catalyst for a settlement. Among those who supported the move, the argument was made that Turkey could not have a veto on Cypriot accession and that the negotiations would encourage all sides to be more moderate. However, opponents of the move argued that the decision would remove the incentive of the Greek Cypriots to reach a settlement. They would instead wait until they became a member and then use this strength to push for a settlement on their terms. In response to the decision, Rauf Denktash announced that he would no longer accept federation as a basis for a settlement. In future he would only be prepared to negotiate on the basis of a confederal solution. In December 1999 tensions between Turkey and the European Union eased somewhat after the EU decided to declare Turkey a candidate for EU membership, a decision taken at the Helsinki European Council. At the same time a new round of talks started in New York. These were short lived. By the following summer they had broken down. Tensions started to rise again as a showdown between Turkey and the European Union loomed over the island's accession.

Perhaps realising the gravity of the situation, and in a move that took observers by surprise, Rauf Denktash wrote to Glafcos Clerides on 8 November 2001 to propose a face-to-face meeting. The offer was accepted. Following several informal meetings between the two men in November and December 2001 a new peace process started under UN auspices on 14 January 2002. At the outset the stated aim of the two leaders was to try to reach an agreement by the start of June that year. However, the talks soon became deadlocked. In an attempt to break the impasse, Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General visited the island in May that year. Despite this no deal was reached. After a summer break Annan met with the two leaders again that autumn, first in Paris and then in New York. As a result of the continued failure to reach an agreement, the Security Council agreed that the Secretary-General should present the two sides with a blueprint settlement. This would form the basis of further negotiations. The original version of the UN peace plan was presented to the two sides by Annan on 11 November 2002. A little under a month later, and following modifications submitted by the two sides, it was revised (Annan II). It was hoped that this plan would be agreed by the two sides on the margins of the European Council, which was held in Copenhagen on 13 December. However, Rauf Denktash, who was recuperating from major heart surgery, refused to attend. The EU therefore decided to confirm that Cyprus would join the EU on 1 May 2004, along with Malta and eight other states from Central and Eastern Europe.

Although it had been expected that talks would be unable to continue, discussions resumed in early January 2003. Thereafter, a further revision (Annan III) took place in February 2003, when Annan made a second visit to the island. During his stay he also called on the two sides to meet with him again the following month in The Hague, where he would expect their answer on whether they were prepared to out the plan to a referendum. While the Greek Cypriot side, which was now led by Tassos Papadopoulos, agreed to do so, albeit reluctantly, Rauf Denktash refused to allow a popular vote. The peace talks collapsed. A month later, on 16 April 2004, Cyprus formally signed the EU Treaty of Accession at a ceremony in Athens.

Throughout the rest of the year there was no effort to restart talks. Instead, attention turned to the Turkish Cypriot elections, which were widely expected to see a victory by moderate pro-solution parties. In the even, the assembly was evenly split. A coalition administration was formed that brought together the pro-solution CTP and the Democrat Party, which had traditionally taken the line adopted by Rauf Denktash. This opened the way for Turkey to press for new discussions. After a meeting between Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Kofi Annan in Switzerland, the leaders of the two sides were called to New York. There they agreed to start a new negotiation process based on two phases: phase one, which would just involve the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, being held on the island and phase two, which would also include Greece and Turkey, being held elsewhere. After a month of negotiations in Cyprus, the discussions duly moved to Burgenstock, Switzerland. The Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash rejected the plan outright and refused to attend these talks. Instead, his son Serdar Denktash and Mehmet Ali Talat attended in his place. There a fourth version of the plan was presented. This was short-lived. After final adjustments, a fifth and final version of the Plan was presented to the two sides on 31 March 2004.

The UN plan for the reunification of Cyprus (Annan Plan)

Under the final proposals, The Republic of Cyprus would become the United Cyprus Republic. It would be a loose confederation composed of two component states. The northern Turkish Cypriot constituent state would encompass about 28.5% of the island, the southern Greek Cypriot constituent state would be made up of the remaining 71.5%. Each part would have had its own parliament. There would also be a bicameral parliament on the federal level. In the Chamber of Deputies, the Turkish Cypriots would have a minimum of 25% of the seats. Numerically the split between the island's two communities is 88% or 642,600 Greek Cypriots to 12% or 87,400 Turkish Cypriots (in 2002 based on RoC figures). The Senate would have consisted of equal parts of members of each ethnic group. Executive power would be vested in a presidential council. The chairmanship of this council would rotate between the communities. Each community would also have the right to veto all legislation.

One of the most controversial elements of the plan concerned property. During Turkey's military intervention/invasion in 1974, many Greek Cypriots (who owned 90% of the land and property in the north) were forced to abandon their homes. (A large number of Turkish Cypriots also left their homes.) Since then, the question of restitution of their property has been a central demand of the Greek Cypriot side. However, the Turkish Cypriots argue that the complete return of all Greek Cypriot properties to their original owners would be incompatible with the functioning of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal settlement. To this extent, they have argued compensation should be offered. The Annan Plan attempted to bridge this divide. In certain areas, such as Morphou (Guzelyurt) and Famagusta (Gazimagusa), which would be returned to Greek Cypriot control, Greek Cypriot refugees would have received back all of their property but the Turkish Cypriots who were currently occupying it would have been allowed to continue using it indefinitely unless they could find somewhere else acceptable for them to live. In other areas, such as Kyrenia (Girne) and the Karpas Peninsula, which would remain under Turkish Cypriot control, they would be given back a proportion of their land (usually one third assuming that it had not been extensively developed) and would receive compensation for the rest. All land and property (that was not used for worship) belonging to businesses and institutions, including the Church the largest property owner on the island, would have been expropriated. While many Greek Cypriots found these provisions unacceptable in themselves, many others resented the fact that the Plan envisaged all compensation claims by a particular community to be met by their own side. This was seen as unfair as Turkey would not be required to contribute any funds towards the compensation.

The plans legality was highly questionable and in order to cover himself Annan inserted a clause which asked the leaders of the two communities to sign an attached letter which asked the European Court of Human Rights to dismiss all pending cases regarding property rights and to bar all new cases from being allowed. The Greek Cypriots resented this clause since it would prevent them from having any form of legal redress and the Republic of Cyprus president Tassos Papadopoulos stated that he was barred from signing such a document by the constitution.

Other controversial issues existed. According to the plan the number of Greek Cypriots who would be allowed to return to the north and stay would be restricted to 18% of the population after 19 years on a village by village basis which meant that it would be extremely difficult if not impossible for the Greek Cypriots to bring up and educate their children. This restriction would have had no impact on the Turkish Cypriots wishing to return to the south since they made up less than 18% of the population anyway. Greek Cypriots who returned to the north would not have been given full democratic rights by the constitution of the Turkish Cypriot constituent state. They would not have been allowed to vote in elections for the state assembly unless they spoke fluent Turkish and restrictions were allowed to be placed on the formation of political parties.

Apart from the property issue, the freedoms of movement and settlement and democratic rights, there were many other parts of the plan that sparked controversy. For example the plan envisaged only a gradual reduction in the number of Turkish troops on the island to 6,000 after six years. This would fall to 600 after 19 years or when Turkey joined the EU. Greece would have been allowed to maintain 1,200 troops on the island and the Cypriot National Guard would have been completely disbanded. This fell short of Greek Cypriot demands for complete demilitarisation and for all foreign troops to be seedily withdrawn from the island before any constitutional changes took effect. The Greek Cypriots feared that Turkey would not comply since it was not party to any formal agreement and if any Turkish troops remained on the island they could be used to gain a bridgehead as the had done in 1963 and 1967. There was also a considerable degree of debate about the decision to retain the Treaty of Guarantee. This treaty, which was an integral part of the 1960 constitution, gave Britain, Greece and Turkey a right to unilaterally intervene military in the island's affairs. Such intervention would contravene Article 2 Paragraph 4 of the UN Charter and the Greek Cypriots had demanded that the Treaty be altered so that any intervention must first have to be authorise by the UN Security Council. Most Turkish Cypriots felt that a continued Turkish military presence was necessary to ensure their security. Another element of the plan the Greek Cypriots objected to was that it allowed up to 120,000 Turkish citizens who had been brought to the island to remain. (The exact number of Turkish settlers is highly disputed. Some argue that the figure is as high as 200,000 or as low as 80,000. The generally accepted figure is 120,000 based on the Turkish Cypriots own figures given to the UN.) They are seen as settlers illegally brought to the island in contravention of international law. The Greek Cypriots also argued that since the vast majesty of these colonists had been given paramilitary training they would pose a considerable threat to their security. However, while many accepted Greek Cypriot concerns on this matter, there was a widespread feeling that it would be unrealistic to forcibly remove every one of the these settlers, especially as many of them had been born and raised on the island.

Referendums, 24 April 2004

Under the terms of the plan, the Annan plan would only come into force if accepted by the two sides in simultaneous referendums. These were set for 24 April 2004. In the weeks that followed there was intense campaigning in both communities. However, and in spite of opposition from Rauf Denktash, who had boycotted the talks in Switzerland, it soon became clear that the Turkish Cypriots would vote in favour of the agreement. Among Greek Cypriots opinion was heavily weighted against the plan. Tassos Papadopoulos, the president of Cyprus, in a speech delivered on 7 April called on Greek Cypriots to reject the plan. He position was supported by most of the small parties. His coalition partner AKEL, one of the largest parties on the island, chose to reject the plan because it did not provide sufficient security guarantees. Support for the plan was voiced by Democratic Rally (DISY), the main right-wing party, and the United Democrats, a small centre-left party led by George Vasiliou, a former president. Glafcos Clerides, now retired from politics, also supported the plan. Prominent members of DISY who did not support the plan split from the party and formed a new party "For Europe" which opposed the plan.

The United Kingdom (a Guarantor Power), the United States came out in favour of the plan. Turkey also signalled its clear support for the plan. The Greek Government decided to ramian neutral. However, Russia was troubled by an attempt by Britain and the US to introduce a resolution in the UN Security Council supporting the plan and used its veto to block the move. This was done as they felt that Britain the US were trying to put unfair pressure on the Greek Cypriots.

In the 24 April referendum the Turkish Cypriots endorsed the plan by a margin of two to one. However, the Greek Cypriots resoundingly voted against the plan, by a margin of three to one.

Referendum Results:

(Note: The 120,000 Turkish colonists who have been brought into the Turkish occupied areas of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey in violation of Article 49 of Geneva Convention are not recognised as Cypriot citizens by any member state of the United Nations.)

The Cyprus Dispute after the Referendum

On 1 May 2004, a week after the referendum, Cyprus joined the European Union. Under the terms of accession the whole island is considered to be a member of the European Union. However, the terms of the acquis communautaire, the EU's body of laws, have been suspended in the north.

Despite initial hopes that a new process to modify the rejected plan would start by autumn, most of the rest of 2004 was taken up with discussions over a proposal by the European Union to open up direct trade with the Turkish Cypriots and provide 259 million euros in funds to help them upgrade their infrastructure. This has provoked considerable debate. The Republic of Cyprus has argued that there can be no direct trade via ports and airports in northern Cyprus as these are unrecognised. Instead, it has offered to allow Turkish Cypriots to use Greek Cypriot facilities, which are internationally recognised. This has been rejected by the Turkish Cypriots. At the same time, attention turned to the question of the start of Turkey's future membership of the European Union. At a European Council held on 17 December 2004, and despite earlier Greek Cypriot threats to impose a veto, Turkey was granted a start date for formal membership talks on condition that it signed a protocol extending the customs union to the new entrants to the EU, including Cyprus. Assuming this is done, formal membership talks will begin on 3 October 2005.

Following the defeat of the UN plan in the referendum there has been no attempt to restart negotiations between the two sides. While both sides have reaffirmed their commitment to continuing efforts to reach an agreement, the UN Secretary-General has not been willing to restart the process until he can be sure that any new negotiations will lead to a comprehensive settlement based on the plan he put forward in 2004. To this end, he has asked the Greek Cypriots to present a written list of the changes they would like to see made to the agreement. This has been rejected by President Tassos Papadopoulos on the grounds that no side should be expected to present their demands in advance of negotiations. However, it appears as though the Greek Cypriots would be prepared to present their concerns orally. Another Greek Cypriot concern centres on the procedural process for new talks. Mr Papadopoulos has said that he will not accept arbitration or timetables for discussions. The UN fears that this would lead to another open-ended process that could drag on indefinitely. Although there have been indications that the UN is reviewing the situation, as of the end of May 2005 the general feeling is that there appears to be little likelihood that new talks will begin any time soon.

External links

• cyprus-conflict.net An exhaustive and neutral website including a lot of details, reports, documents, and personal accounts on the Cyprus dispute
• Aspects of the Cyprus Problem from The Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office
• A detailed Cyprus Problem site from The TFSC and Turkey

Sources

Official Publications and Sources

• The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee report on Cyprus.
• Letter by the President of the Republic, Mr Tassos Papadopoulos, to the U.N. Secretary-General, Mr Kofi Annan, dated 7 June, which circulated as an official document of the U.N. Security Council
• Legal Issues arising from certain population transfers and displacements on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus in the period since 20 July 1974
• Address to Cypriots by President Papadopoulos (FULL TEXT)
• The Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office, Aspects of the Cyprus Problem
• 1st Report of the European Commission of Human Rights; Turkey's invasion in Cyprus and aftermath (20 JULY 1974 - 18 MAY 1976)
• 2nd Report of the European Commission of Human Rights; Turkey's invasion in Cyprus and aftermath (19 May 1976 to 10 February 1983)
• European Court of Human Rights Case of Cyprus v. Turkey (Application no. 25781/94)

Books

• Brendan O'Malley and Ian Craig, "The Cyprus Conspiracy" (London: IB Tauris, 1999)
• Christopher Hitchens, "Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger" (New York: Verso, 1997)
• Christopher Hitchens, "The Trial of Henry Kissinger" (Verso, 2001)
• Christopher Hitchens, "Cyprus" (Quartet, 1984)
• Christopher Brewin, "European Union and Cyprus" (Huntingdon: Eothen Press, 2000)
• Claude Nicolet, "United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954-1974" (Mannheim: Bibliopolis, 2001)
• Farid Mirbagheri, "Cyprus and International Peacemaking" (London: Hurst, 1989)
• James Ker-Lindsay, "EU Accession and UN Peacemaking in Cyprus" (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005)
• Oliver Richmond, "Mediating in Cyprus" (London: Frank Cass, 1998)
• The Lobby for Cyprus study group, Cyprus: Origins of the present crisis – 1950s to 1970s
• Athanasios Strigas, "Kypros: Aporritos Fakelos"
• Athanasios Strigas, "Diethneis Synomotes"

Other Sources

• ITN documentary, "Cyprus, Britain’s Grim Legacy"

• Wars
• Cyprus