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The Iraqi insurgency comprises diverse groups of armed resistance to the American-led coalition occupation of Iraq. These groups may also resist the newly created Iraqi government. The fighting appears both as a resistance to occupation as well as a civil war in Iraq among the diverse groups. The dissidents use Asymmetric warfare, with assistance from non-governmental organizations. The Iraqi Resistance has led to numerous human rights violations by both Resistance groups and coalition forces.

The Resistance began shortly after the 2003 coalition Invasion of Iraq and before the establishment of a new Iraqi government. In the early stages of the Occupation, Resistance primarily targeted coalition forces and the interim government (e.g., the Coalition Provisional Authority) formed under the occupation. As the security situation within Iraq evolved, Resistance forces gradually shifted their focus to targeting rival sectarian and political factions. Many militant attacks have been directed at the police and military forces of the new Iraqi government. They have continued during the transitional reconstruction of Iraq, as the new Iraqi government tries to establish itself. As in most guerrilla warfare, civilians on all sides bear the brunt of the violence. According to a February-March 2007 poll, 51% of the Iraqi population approve of the attacks on Coalition forces. When broken down along sectarian lines, over 90% of the Arab Sunni, many of whom were among those who held power under President Saddam Hussein, approve of the attacks.

Iraq's deep sectarian divides have been a major dynamic in the Resistance, the Resistance finding much weaker support from some segments of the population than others.

Composition

The Iraqi Resistance is composed of at least a dozen major guerrilla organizations and perhaps as many as 40 distinct groups. These groups are subdivided into countless smaller cells. Because of its clandestine nature, the exact composition of the Iraqi Resistance is difficult to determine. Since most of these Resistance are civilians fighting against an organized domestic army and a foreign occupying army, many consider them to be guerrillas:

• Shi'a militias, including the southern, Iran-linked Badr Organization, the Mahdi Army, and the central-Iraq followers of Muqtada al-Sadr
• Ba'athists, the armed supporters of Saddam Hussein's former regime, e.g. army or intelligence officers;
• Nationalists, mostly Sunni Muslims, who fight for Iraqi self-determination;
• anti-Shi'a Sunni Muslims who fight to regain the prestige they held under the previous regime (the three preceding categories are often indistinguishable in practice);
• Iraqi Sunni Islamists, the indigenous armed followers of the Salafi movement, as well as any remnants of the Kurdish Ansar al-Islam;
• Foreign Islamist volunteers, including those often linked to al Qaeda and largely driven by the Sunni Wahabi doctrine (the two preceding categories are often lumped as "Jihadists");
• Various socialist revolutionaries (such as the Iraqi Armed Revolutionary Resistance);
• Criminal Resistance who are fighting simply for money; and
• Nonviolent resistance groups and political parties (not technically part of the resistance).

Shia militia

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The southern, Iran-linked Badr Organization is seeking to establish an Islamic Republic of Iraq.

The Shia militias have presented Nouri al-Maliki with perhaps the greatest conundrum of his administration given the capture of Amarah. American officials have pressed him hard to disarm the militias and rid the state security forces of their influence. Yet Mr. Maliki has hesitated to move against them, particularly the Mahdi Army and Badr Organization, for fear of alienating fundamentalist Shia leaders inside his fractious coalition.

Muqtada al-Sadr

Supporters of the young Shi'a Islamist cleric Muqtada al-Sadr are largely impoverished men from the Shi'a urban areas and slums in Baghdad and the southern Shi'a cities. The Mahdi Army area of operation stretches from Basra in the south to the Sadr City section of Baghdad in central Iraq (some scattered Shi'a militia activity has also been reported in Baquba and Kirkuk, where Shi'a minorities exist).

Sadr was suspected by U.S. and Iraqi authorities of ordering the assassination of a returning moderate Shia cleric, Imam Abdul Majid al-Khoei, in Najaf on April 12 2003. On April 5 2004, a warrant was issued for Sadr's arrest in connection with this killing; this, in addition to the closing of his newspaper al-Hawza on March 29, the arrest of one of his aides and other actions to suppress his movement, led to an armed attack by the Mahdi Army in April 2004. This initial attack in southern Iraq was suppressed by June. A second attack by his militia, centered in a mosque in Najaf, began in August; this was resolved in an agreement brokered by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Since that point, Sadr's opposition to the multinational occupation has been mainly in the realm of politics. Since the handover of sovereignty, the Mahdi Army has been maintained as an organized force. Sadr supporters also continue to engage in peaceful resistance such as the large protests in Baghdad on April 9 2005.

Supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr are driven by a variety of beliefs and grievances which combine both the nationalist and ultra-conservative religious tendencies of the movement. They believe that the U.S. and UK are foreign occupiers and oppressors, that they have failed to live up to their promises, and that Islamic law must eventually be established in Iraq. Al-Sadr's movement also opposes any breakup of Iraq along ethnic, religious, or other lines.

During his group's active militant phase, Al-Sadr enjoyed wide support from the Iraqi people. A poll by the Iraq Center for Research and Studies found that 32% of Iraqis "strongly supported" him and another 36% "somewhat supported" him, making him the second most popular man in Iraq, behind only Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The Mahdi Army is believed by some sources to number between 3,000 and 10,000 guerrillas. Pentagon and other source believe Mahdi Army numbers are as great as 40,000 to 60,000.

After the December 2005 elections in Iraq, al-Sadr's party captured 32 seats giving him substantial political power in the divided Iraqi Parliament. In January 2006, he used these seats to swing the vote for prime minister to Ibrahim al-Jaafari, giving al-Sadr a legitimate stake in the new Iraqi government and allying al-Jaafari with the controversial cleric.

On November 27, 2006, a senior American intelligence official told reporters that the Iranian-backed group Hezbollah had been training members of the Mahdi Army. The official said that 1,000 to 2,000 fighters from the Mahdi Army and other Shia militias had been trained by Hezbollah in Lebanon, and a small number of Hezbollah operatives have also visited Iraq to help with training. Iran has facilitated the link between Hezbollah and the Shia militias in Iraq, the official said. "There seems to have been a strategic decision taken sometime over late winter or early spring by Damascus, Tehran, along with their partners in ait Lebanese Hezbollah, to provide more support to Sadr to increase pressure on the U.S.," the American intelligence official said.

Ba'athists

The Ba'athists include former Ba’ath Party officials, the Fedayeen Saddam, and some former agents of the Iraqi intelligence elements and security services, such as the Mukhabarat and the Special Security Organization. Their goal, at least before the capture of Saddam Hussein, was the restoration of the former Ba'athist regime to power. The pre-war organization of the Ba'ath Party and its militias as a cellular structure aided the continued pro-Saddam resistance after the fall of Baghdad, and Iraqi intelligence operatives may have developed a plan for guerrilla war following the toppling of Saddam Hussein from power. Following Saddam's capture, the rhetoric of the Ba'athist resistance gradually shifted to become either nationalist or Islamist, with the goal of restoring the Ba'ath Party to power as it once was seemingly out of reach. Many former Ba'athists have adopted an Islamist façade in order to attract more credibility within the country, and perhaps support from outside Iraq. Others, especially following the January 2005 elections, became more interested in politics.

The fall of Baghdad effectively ended the existence of the Fedayeen Saddam as an organized paramilitary. Several of its members died during the war. A large number survived, however, and were willing to carry on the fight even after the fall of Saddam Hussein from power. Many former members joined guerilla organizations, collectively known as the Iraqi Resistance that began to form to resist the U.S-led occupation. By June, a resistance was clearly underway in the central and northern Iraq, especially in an area known as the Sunni Triangle. Some units of the Fedayeen also continued to operate independently of other resistance organizations in the Sunni areas of Iraq. On November 30, 2003, a U.S. convoy traveling through the town of Samarra in the Sunni Triangle was ambushed by over 100 Iraqi guerillas, reportedly wearing trademark Fedayeen Saddam uniforms.

Following the execution of former ruler of Iraq and leader of the Iraqi Baath Party Saddam Hussein, Deputy Leader of the Iraqi Baath Party and former Vice President of Iraq Izzat Ibrahim ad-Douri was a leading candidate to succeed him as Leader of the Iraqi Baath Party, he had taken over the running of the Iraqi Baath Party following Saddam Hussein's capture in 2003 and had been endorsed by a previously unknown group calling itself Baghdad Citizens Gathering, on 3 January 2007 the website of the banned Iraqi Baath Party confirmed that he is now the new leader of the Baath Party Increasing Syrian influence in the Iraqi Baath Party may well have a major effect on result in a fragmentation of Baathist parts of the resistance.

Nationalists

Nationalists from the Sunni Arab regions are drawn from former members of the Iraqi military as well as other Sunnis. Their reasons for opposing the coalition vary from a rejection of the foreign presence as a matter of principle to the failure of the multinational forces to fully restore public services and to quickly restore complete sovereignty. Some Iraqis who have had relatives killed by coalition soldiers may also be involved in the resistance. Most likely, the majority of the low-level members of the indigenous Sunni resistance (such as foot soldiers) fall under this broad category. A smaller number of Shi'a nationalist fighters also exist, who are usually recruited from left-wing backgrounds. Sunni nationalists are mainly left-wing or, more commonly, ex-regime adherents.

Some of these resistance pursue the restoration of the power previously held by the Sunni minority in Iraq, who controlled all previous Iraqi regimes since the departure of the British in the 1950s. One former minister in the interim government, Ayham al-Samarai, "launched a new political movement, saying he aimed to give a voice to figures from the legitimate Iraqi resistance. 'The birth of this political bloc is to silence the skeptics who say there is no legitimate Iraqi resistance and that they cannot reveal their political face,' he told a news conference." There are some groups of Sunni Islamists who have taken a more explicitly anti-Shi'a role and frequently engage in revenge killings; these are mainly vigilante groups of local significance (as are most of their Shi'a counterparts).

One notable leader of the resistance among Nationalist Sunni is former aide to Saddam Hussein and a former Regional Baath Party Organiser Mohammed Younis al-Ahmed al-Muwali who has been crossing the border between Iraq and Syria disbursing funds, smuggling weaponry and organising much of the fighting in the central area of Iraq

Sunni Islamists

The Sunni Islamists are composed of Iraqis belonging to the Ikhwan movement or the Salafi branch of Sunni Islam, who advocate a return to the pure Islam of the time of the Prophet Mohammed and oppose any foreign non-Muslim influence. The beliefs of Salafi Islam are roughly similar to the Wahabi sect of nearby Saudi Arabia (of which Osama bin Laden is a member). One difference is that Salafis in Iraq do not usually condone intolerance towards the Shi'a. Hard-line clerics and remaining underground cells of the Muslim Brotherhood in Iraq have helped provide support for the indigenous militant Islamist movement.
Emerging as the most public face supportive of the resistance, is the founder of the ultra-conservative Association of Muslim Scholars, Sheikh Hareth al-Dhari.

Marxists

On May 15, 2007 a Communist resistance group called the Iraqi Armed Revolutionary Resistance distributed leaflets in the Mid-Euphrates area around Najaf, Hilla and Karbala calling for “resistance against American, British and Zionist occupiers in order to liberate Iraq and form a free socialist, democratic alternative,” according to the Al-Badeel Al-Iraqi website. The group, which described itself as a “movement of Iraqi Communists and Marxists experienced in armed struggle, leftist Iraqi nationalists, and their supporters,” claimed responsibility for an attack against U.S. troops at the Khan Al-Nus area between Najaf and Karbla on Sunday. The leaflets, which carried a photo of Argentine Marxist revolutionary Che Guevara, announced the launch of the resistance in the Mid-Euphrates and condemned the “puppet government, the so-called Council of Representatives, terrorist Salafis, militias, the Interior Ministry, Iraqi traitors who came on American tanks, the American and British mercenaries, contractors, and their servants from the South Lebanese Army.” Printed in both Arabic and English, the statement said car bombs and roadside bombs killing Iraqis are planted by the above groups to damage the reputation of Iraqi resistance groups.

Foreign Resistance

When Saddam Hussein was captured in December 2003, several documents were found in his possession. One particular document, which was apparently written after he lost power, appeared to be a directive to his Ba'athist loyalists warning them to be wary of Islamist mujahideen and other foreign Arabs entering the country to join the Resistance. The directive supposedly shows Saddam having concerns that foreign fighters would not share the same objectives as Ba'ath loyalists (i.e. the eventual return of Saddam to power and the restoration of his regime). A US official commenting on the document stressed that while Saddam urged his followers to be cautious in their dealings with other Arab fighters, he did not order them to avoid contact or rule out co-operation. Bruce Hoffman, a Washington counter-terrorism expert stated that the existence of the document underscores the fact that "this is an Resistance cut of many different cloths... everybody's jockeying for their position of power in the future Iraq." Many experts believe that fighters from other countries who have flocked to Iraq to join the Resistance are motivated by animosity toward the United States and the desire to install an Islamic state in place of the Ba'ath Party's secular regime.

Foreign Resistance consist mostly of Arab fighters from neighboring countries, who have entered Iraq, primarily through the porous desert borders of Syria and Saudi Arabia, to assist the Iraqi Resistance. Many of these fighters are Wahhabi fundamentalists who see Iraq as the new "field of jihad" in the battle against U.S. forces. It is generally believed that most are freelance fighters, but a few members of Al-Qaeda and the related group Ansar al-Islam are suspected of infiltrating into the Sunni areas of Iraq through the mountainous northeastern border with Iran. The U.S. and its allies point to Jordanian-born Al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi as the key player in this group. Zarqawi was considered the head of a Resistance group called Al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad ("Monotheism and Holy War") until his death on June 7, 2006, which according to U.S. estimates numbers in the low hundreds.

Usage of the term "foreign fighters" has received criticism as being Western-centric because, taken literally, the term would encompass all non-Iraqi forces, including coalition forces. Zarqawi himself has taken to taunting the American occupiers about the irony of the term: "Who is the foreigner, O cross worshippers? You are the ones who came to the land of the Muslims from your distant corrupt land." (Communiqué of 10 May 2005). Zarqawi's group has since announced the formation of the Ansar platoon, a squad of Iraqi suicide bombers, which an AP writer called "an apparent bid to deflect criticism that most suicide bombers in Iraq are foreigners."

While it is not known how many of those resisting the U.S. occupation in Iraq are from outside the country, it is generally agreed that foreign fighters make up a very small percentage of the Resistance. Major General Joseph Taluto, head of the 42nd Infantry Division, said that "99.9 per cent" of captured Resistance are Iraqi. The estimate has been confirmed by the Pentagon's own figures; in one analysis of over 1000 Resistance captured in Fallujah, only 15 were non-Iraqi. According to the Daily Telegraph, information from military commanders engaging in battles around Ramadi exposed the fact that out of 1300 suspected Resistance arrested in five months of 2005, none were non-Iraqi, although Colonel John Gronski stated that foreigners provided money and logistical support: "The foreign fighters are staying north of the river, training and advising, like the Soviets were doing in Vietnam" In September 2006, the Christian Science Monitor reported, "It's true that foreign fighters are in Iraq, such as the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. But they are a small minority of the Resistance, say administration critics. Most Iraqi mujahideen are Sunnis who fear their interests will be ignored under Iraq's Shia-dominated government. They are fighting for concrete, local political goals - not the destruction of America." The paper quoted University of Michigan history professor Juan Cole: "If the Iraqi Sunni nationalists could take over their own territory, they would not put up with the few hundred foreign volunteers blowing things up, and would send them away or slit their throats."

Despite the low numbers of foreign fighters their presence has been confirmed in several ways and coalition forces believe the majority of suicide bombings are believed to be carried out by non-Iraqi foreigners. Kenneth Katzman, a Middle East expert with the Congressional Research Service, stated in June 2005: "I still think 80 percent of the Resistance, the day to day activity, is Iraqi - the roadside bombings, mortars, direct weapons fire, rifle fire, automatic weapons fire... the foreign fighters attract the headlines with the suicide bombings, no question."

On September 7 2005, an Iraqi Army Captain claimed that Iraqi forces arrested 150 non-Iraqi Arabs in Tal Afar. But other accounts of the same battle do not mention these arrests, and U.S. Army commander Colonel H. R. McMasters said the "vast majority" of Resistance captured there were "Iraqis and not foreigners." Iraqi journalist Nasir Ali claimed that there were "very few foreign combatants" in Tal Afar and charged "Every time the US army and the Iraqi government want to destroy a specific city, they claim it hosts Arab fighters and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi."

There are allegations that the U.S. government has attempted to inflate the number of foreign fighters in order to advance the theory that the Resistance is not a local movement. U.S. Army Specialist Tony Lagouranis spoke about his job identifying many of the bodies after the assault on Fallujah:

We had women and children, old men, young boys. . . were trying to prove that there were a lot of foreign fighters in Falujah, so that was mainly what we were going for. Very few of them had foreign IDs. . . In an effort to, sort of, "cook the books", you know, they would find a Qu'ran on the guy and the Qu'ran was printed in Algeria and they'd mark him down as an Algerian, or guys would come in with a black shirt and khaki pants, and they'd say, well, this is the Hezbollah uniform, and so they'd mark him down as a Lebanese. Which was ridiculous. . . I did say something to the Staff Sergeant, and, you know, I just got yelled down.

Foreign fighter nationality distribution

In July 2007, the Los Angeles Times reported that 45% of all foreign militants targeting U.S. troops and Iraqi civilians and security forces are from Saudi Arabia; 15% are from Syria and Lebanon; and 10% are from North Africa. 50% of all Saudi fighters in Iraq come as suicide bombers. In the last six months, such bombings have killed or injured 4,000 Iraqis.

According to a U.S. military press briefing on October 20, 2005, 312 foreign nationals from 27 different countries had been captured in Iraq from April to October of 2005. This represents a component of the Iraqi resistance movement, which also includes a nationalist movement encompassing over 30 Shia and Sunni militias.

Foreign Resistance captured in Iraq in the 7-month period April–October 2005:

Sorted by number of fighters captured Nationality No.  Egypt 78  Syria 66  Sudan 41  Saudi Arabia 32  Jordan 17  Iran 13  Palestine 12  Tunisia 10  Algeria 8  Libya 7  Turkey 6  Lebanon 3  India 2  Qatar 2  United Arab Emirates 2  United Kingdom 2  Denmark 1  France 1  Indonesia 1  Ireland 1  Israel 1  Kuwait 1  Macedonia 1  Morocco 1  Somalia 1  United States 1  Yemen 1 Total 312

Sorted alphabetically by nationality Nationality No.  Algeria 8  Denmark 1  Egypt 78  France 1  India 2  Indonesia 1  Iran 13  Ireland 1  Israel 1  Jordan 17  Kuwait 1  Lebanon 3  Libya 7  Macedonia 1  Morocco 1  Palestine 12  Qatar 2  Saudi Arabia 32  Somalia 1  Sudan 41  Syria 66  Tunisia 10  Turkey 6  United Arab Emirates 2  United Kingdom 2  United States 1  Yemen 1 Total 312

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi

The U.S. Government described Zarqawi as the single most dangerous and capable Resistance operative to work against the U.S.-led coalition and its Iraqi allies, responsible for a large number of major attacks. There are signs that an increasing rift is developing between supporters of al-Zarqawi, including both foreign guerrillas and some Iraqis who have adopted a hard-line Wahhabi philosophy, and the nationalists and more moderate religious elements of the Resistance. The main source of the divide is over the suicide bombings that have inflicted heavy Iraqi civilian casualties, along with disagreements about whether to cooperate with the Shi'a and their Resistance. However, the publicity given to Zarqawi has ensured that he has become an iconic figure to various Sunni Islamist groups, regardless of the actual scope of his influence, by much the same process that has made Osama bin Laden a symbol of the causes of various Islamist groups following the events of September 11 2001.

The extent of Zarqawi's influence is a source of much controversy. Zarqawi was reported killed in action in March 2004 in "a statement signed by a dozen alleged Resistance groups" (CBS/AP). His Jordanian family then held a funeral service on his behalf, although no body has been recovered and positively identified. Iraqi leaders have denied the presence of Zarqawi in Fallujah prior to the U.S. attack on that city in November 2004. Zarqawi's existence has even been questioned, for example by Pepe Escobar, an antiwar op-ed writer for the Asia Times. There exists considerable biographic information on Zarqawi suggesting that he is best described as a former street thug of limited education; it is improbable that he actively fulfils the often-claimed role of "terrorist mastermind" and in fact could be better described as a "terrorist celebrity". Actual involvement of Zarqawi in significant terrorist incidents is not usually proven, although his group often claims it perpetrated bombings. As al-Qaeda is an "opt-in" group (meaning that everyone who agrees to some basic Wahabi moral tenets and the fundamental goals may consider himself a member), it is most likely that "Al-Qaeda in Iraq" is a loose association of largely independent cells united by a common strategy and vision, rather than a unified organization with a firm internal structure.

On June 8, 2006, Iraqi officials confirmed that Zarqawi was killed by two 500lb laser guided bombs dropped from an F-16 the previous evening. Abu Ayyub al-Masri, an Egyptian who was trained in Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan has taken his place.

A document found in Zarqawi's safe house indicates that the guerrilla group was trying to provoke the U.S. to attack Iran in order to reinvigorate the Resistance in Iraq and to weaken American forces in Iraq. "The question remains, how to draw the Americans into fighting a war against Iran? It is not known whether American is serious in its animosity towards Iraq, because of the big support Iran is offering to America in its war in Afghanistan and in Iraq. Hence, it is necessary first to exaggerate the Iranian danger and to convince America and the west in general, of the real danger coming from Iran...". The document then outlines 6 ways to incite war between the two nations. Iraqi national security adviser Mouwafak al-Rubaie said the document, shows al-Qaeda in Iraq is in "pretty bad shape." He added that "we believe that this is the beginning of the end of al-Qaeda in Iraq."

On August 21, 2006, Jill Carroll, a journalist for the Christian Science Monitor, published part 6 of her story detailing her capitivity in Iraq. In it, she describes how one of her captors, who identified himself as Abdullah Rashid and leader of the Mujahideen Shura Council in Iraq, conveyed to her that "The Americans were constantly saying that the mujahideen in Iraq were led by foreigners...So, the Iraqi Resistance went to Zarqawi and insisted that an Iraqi be put in charge." She continued by stating: "But as I saw in coming weeks, Zarqawi remained the Resistance hero, and the most influential member of their council, whatever Nour/Rashid's position...At various times, I heard my captors discussing changes in their plans because of directives from the council and Zarqawi."

Schism between foreign Resistance and Iraqi Resistance

Large-scale terrorist attacks against civilians carried out by foreign fighters, as well as the interpretation of Islam that they attempt to impose on the local population in areas under their control, have increasingly turned Iraqis against them, in some cases breaking out into open fighting between different groups in the Resistance . There are signs that local Islamist Resistance groups have also increasingly caused the population to turn against them

Opinions differ on how broad this schism is - terrorism expert Jessica Stern warned that "in the run-up to the war, most Iraqis viewed the foreign volunteers who were rushing in to fight against America as troublemakers, and Saddam Hussein's forces reportedly killed many of them." This opinion contradicts Iraqi scholar Mustapha Alani, who says that these foreigners are increasingly welcomed by the public, especially in the former Ba'athist strongholds north of Baghdad.

While some have noted an alliance of convenience that existed between the foreign fighters and the native Sunni Resistance, there are signs that the foreign militants, especially those who follow Zarqawi, are increasingly unpopular among the native Resistance. In the run-up to the December 2005 elections, Sunni Resistance were warning al Qaeda members and foreign fighters not to attack polling stations. One former Ba'athist told Reuters, "Sunnis should vote to make political gains. We have sent leaflets telling al Qaeda that they will face us if they attack voters." And a Sunni Resistance leader specifically commented on Zarqawi: "Zarqawi is an American, Israeli and Iranian agent who is trying to keep our country unstable so that the Sunnis will keep facing occupation."

By early 2006, the split between the Sunni Resistance and the Zarqawi-led foreign fighters had grown dramatically, and Sunni Resistance began targeting al Qaeda forces for assassination. One senior intelligence official told the Telegraph that Zarqawi had fled to Iran as a result of the attacks. In response to al Qaeda killings in Iraq, Sunni Resistance in al-Anbar province led by former Ba'athist intelligence officer Ahmed Ftaikhan formed an anti-al-Qaeda militia called the Anbar Revolutionaries. All of the militia's core members have relatives who have been killed by al-Qaeda in Iraq, and they have sought to prevent foreign jihadis from entering the country. The group "claims to have killed 20 foreign fighters and 33 Iraqi sympathizers.". The schism became all the more apparent in when a tape claiming to be from the Mujahedeen Shura Council urged Osama Bin Laden to replace Al Qaida in Iraq's current head with an Iraqi national. The Mujahedeen Shura Council, however, issued a statement shortly afterwards denying the authenticity of this tape.

On July 19 2007 seven domestic resistance groups informed journalists in Damascus that they were forming a united front independent of Al-Qaeda.

Non-violent groups

Apart from the armed Resistance, there are important non-violent groups that resist the foreign occupation through other means. The National Foundation Congress set up by Sheikh Jawad al-Khalisi includes a broad range of religious, ethnic, and political currents united by their opposition to the occupation. Although it does not reject armed Resistance, which it regards as any nation's right, it favors non-violent politics and criticizes the formation of militias. It opposes institutions designed to implement American plans, such as the former Iyad Allawi government and the U.S.-organized national conference designed as the antecedent to a parliament. Although the CPA enforced a 1987 law banning unions in public enterprises, trade unions such as the Iraqi Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU) and Iraq's Union of the Unemployed have also mounted effective anti-occupation opposition.

Trades unions, however, have themselves been subject to attacks from the Resistance. Hadi Saleh of the IFTU was assassinated under circumstances that pointed to a Ba'athist Resistance group on 3 January 2005. No trades unions support the armed Resistance.

Another union federation, the General Union of Oil Employees (GUOE) opposes the occupation and calls for immediate withdrawal but was neutral on participation in the election. Whereas the GUOE wants all foreign troops out immediately, both the IFTU and the Workers Councils call for replacement of U.S. and British forces with neutral forces from the UN, the Arab League and other nations as a transition. Many unions see the war as having two dimensions: military and economic. The GUOE has won strikes against both the Governing Council for pay raises and against Halliburton over the use of foreign workers.

Insurgency group logos

• Islamic Army in Iraq logo Islamic Army in Iraq logo
• Islamic Resistance Movement and the 20th Revolution Brigades Islamic Resistance Movement and the 20th Revolution Brigades
• Shura Council of the Mujahideen of Iraq Shura Council of the Mujahideen of Iraq
• Jaish Al Naqshbandia (a.k.a Sufi Army) Jaish Al Naqshbandia (a.k.a Sufi Army)
• Jaish al-Fatiheen Jaish al-Fatiheen
• Salah al-Din al-Ayoubi Brigades Salah al-Din al-Ayoubi Brigades
• Islamic State of Iraq Islamic State of Iraq
• Ansar Al-Sunnah Ansar Al-Sunnah
• Jaish al-Mujahideen Jaish al-Mujahideen
• Asayab al-Iraq al-Jihadiyah Asayab al-Iraq al-Jihadiyah
• Hamas of Iraq Hamas of Iraq

Tactics

Resistance tactics vary widely, as well as the targets. Jihadist elements of the resistance favor the use of car bombs, kidnappings, hostage-taking, shootings and other types of attacks to target Iraqi collaborators and U.S. forces with little regard for civilian casualties. Other groups claim to target their attacks on U.S. forces and avoid the targeting of civilians.

Analysis and polls

A series of several polls have been conducted to ascertain the position of the Iraqi public further on Al Qaeda in Iraq and the U.S. presence. Some polls have found the following:

• Polls suggest the majority of Iraqis disapprove of the presence of coalition forces.
• A majority of both Sunnis and Shi'as want an end to the U.S. presence as soon as possible, although Sunnis are opposed to the occupation by somewhat greater margins.

Polls conducted in June 2005 suggest even more anti-occupation sentiment; most alarming to U.S. policymakers is rising support for the Resistance. According to the Boston Globe (10 June 2005): "a recent internal poll conducted for the U.S.-led coalition found that nearly 85 percent of the population supported the terrorist attacks, making accurate intelligence difficult to obtain. Only 15 percent of those polled said they strongly supported the U.S.-led coalition." A later 2005 poll by British intelligence said that 45% of Iraqis support attacks against coalition forces, rising to 65% in some areas, and that 82% are "strongly opposed" to the presence of foreign troops. Demands for U.S. withdrawal have also been signed on by one third of Iraq's Parliament. These results are consistent with a January 2006 poll that found an overall 47% approval for attacks on US-led forces. That figure climbed to 88% among Sunni terrorists. Attacks on Iraqi security forces and civilians, however, were approved of by only 7% and 12% of respondents respectively. 87% favored a U.S. withdrawal, but only 23% believe the U.S. would actually withdraw if asked. 80% believed the U.S. plans permanent bases in Iraq.

A September 2006 poll of both Sunnis and Shias found that 71% of Iraqis wanted the U.S. to leave within a year, with 65% favoring an immediate pullout and 77% voicing suspicion that the U.S. wanted to keep permanent bases in Iraq. 61% approved of attacks on U.S. forces.

A later poll from March 2007 suggests the precentage of Iraqis who approve of attacks on coalition forces has dropped to 51%.

A great deal of attention has been focused on how much success the guerrillas have had in consolidating support among the Iraqi population. It appears Al Qaeda in Iraq retains a degree of popular support in the "Sunni triangle," especially in cities like Fallujah. The tribal culture of the area and its concepts of honor, the prestige many received from the former regime, and civilian casualties resulting from intense coalition "counter-resistance" operations have resulted in the opposition of many Sunni Arabs to the occupation.

Polls indicate that the greatest support for the terrorists is in al-Anbar province, a vast area extending from the Syrian border to the western outskirts of Baghdad. This is attributed to a number of reasons, including a lack of opportunities for members of the old regime, lack of employment, tribal customs, suspicion of outsiders, and the religious conservatism of the area. Coalition "counter-resistance" operations have suffered heavy casualties in the province.

Some observers, such as political scientist Wamidh Nadhmi, believe that the major division in Iraq is not along ethnic and religious divisions nor between the general population and violent groups, but between those who collaborate with the foreign occupation and those who resist it.

U.S. and British forces tend to suffer fewer casualties in the Shia and Kurdish areas outside the "Sunni triangle." Many, however, especially in the Shia community, although supportive of the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, are very unhappy with the occupation. Farther north in the Kurdish areas, there is some pro-U.S. sentiment and a strong opposition to the groups constituting the terrorist.

Support for the terrorist is less strong in the Shi'a areas of the country than in the Sunni areas since the Shi'as, like the Kurds, did not dominate the ruling factions of the old regime. Shi'as have also been influenced by a moderate clerical establishment under Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani that has advocated a political solution. However, Muqtada al-Sadr (a radical Shi'a cleric who has advocated militant Resistance) has drawn support from a portion of the Shi'a community, mainly young and unemployed men in urban areas. Sadr's support varies region by region; while likely not drawing considerable support in Najaf (a stronghold of the clerical establishment which was occupied by Sadr's militia and has been the scene of some of the heaviest fighting), some polls have indicated Sadr's support among the Shi'as of Baghdad may be as high as 50%. However, this support did not translate into direct electoral winnings for Sadr supporters during the January 2005 elections.

Spontaneous peaceful protests against the occupation have appeared in Shi'a areas. The Shi'a intellectuals and the upper classes, as well as the inhabitants of rural regions in the south and followers of more moderate clerics such as Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, tend to cooperate with the coalition and the Iraqi interim government and eschew militant protest. Sistani's political pressure is largely credited with enabling the elections of January 2005.

The Shi'a and Kurdish populations of Iraq have had long histories of strained relations with past Iraqi regimes, which have long been dominated by the Sunni. Their favored status in Iraq since the 2003 U.S.-led invasion is also a factor attributed to the fewer instances of attacks against coalition forces in Shi'a and Kurdish regions of the country. This is in contrast to the more radical Muqtada al-Sadr, who draws his support from the lower classes and much of the Shia urban population. Both united, however, on the United Iraqi Alliance ticket that brought in the largest share of the votes in the January 2005 elections.

Scope and size of the Resistance

The most intense Sunni Resistance activity takes place in the cities and countryside along the Euphrates River from the Syrian border town of al-Qaim through Ramadi and Fallujah to Baghdad, as well as along the Tigris river from Baghdad north to Tikrit. Heavy guerilla activity also takes place around the cities of Mosul and Tal Afar in the north, as well as the "Triangle of Death" south of Baghdad, which includes the "-iya" cities of Iskandariya, Mahmudiya, Latifiya, and Yusufiya. Lesser activity takes place in several other areas of the country. The Resistance is believed to maintain a key supply line stretching from Syria through al-Qaim and along the Euphrates to Baghdad and central Iraq, the Iraqi equivalent of the Ho Chi Minh trail. A second "ratline" (the U.S. term) runs from the Syrian border through Tal Afar to Mosul.

Although estimates of the total number of Iraqi guerrillas varies by group and fluctuates under changing political climate, the latest assessments put the present number at between 20,000 and 25,000 hardcore fighter, (but could be up to 100,000 Resistance.) along with numerous supporters and facilitators throughout the Sunni Arab community. At various points U.S. forces provided estimates on the number of fighters in specific regions. A few are provided here (although these numbers almost certainly have fluctuated):

• Fallujah (mid-2004): 2000-5000 (in a November 2004 operation, the Fallujah Resistance has been destroyed or dispersed, but has been staging a comeback, albeit not to former strength, in the course of 2005)
• Samarra (December 2003): 2000
• Baquba (June 2004): 1000
• Baghdad (December 2003): 1000 (this number may have increased by a significant amount)

Guerilla forces operate in many of the cities and towns of al-Anbar province, due to mostly ineffective Iraqi security forces in this area. There is extensive guerilla activity in Ramadi, the capital of the province, as well as al-Qaim, the first stop on an Resistance movement route between Iraq and Syria. as of 2006 Recent reports suggest that the Anbar capital Ramadi has largely fallen under Resistance control along with most of the Anbar region, as a result the US is sending an extra 3,500 marines to reestablish control of the region. In the early part of 2007 the Resistance suffered serious setbacks in Ramadi. With the help of the Anbar Salvation Council incidents fell from an average of 30 Resistance attacks per day in December 2006 to an average of fewer than four in April 2007.

Baghdad is still one of the most contested regions of the country, even after the 2007 troop surge more than two thirds of Baghdad is under the control of various Sunni insurgent groups and the Shiite Mahid Army. Resistance are waging intense guerilla warfare against the US Army and some Sunni neighborhoods such as Adhamiya are largely under Resistance control. Suicide attacks and car bombs are near daily occurrences in Baghdad. The road from Baghdad to the city airport is the most dangerous in the country, if not the world. Iraqi security and police forces had also been significantly built up in the capital and, despite being constantly targeted, had enjoyed some successes such as the pacification of Haifa Street, Haifa street however Subsequently saw a massive surge of Resistance activity. and after the failed Coalition Operation Together Forward fell under Sunni insurgent Control.

As time passed the insurgent grasp on Mosul has strengthened and by Mid 2007 insurgents had control of virtually all the city with the exception of the few coalition bases scattered throughout the city and their immediate surroundings.

Recent intelligence suggests that the base of foreign paramilitary operations has moved from Anbar to the religiously- and ethnically-mixed Diyala province. By July 2007 Diyala had fallen under almost total Insurgent control, and had become the Headquarters for the Sunni dominated Islamic State of Iraq which has issued a proclamation declaring the regional capital Baqubah its capital.

In response to a law allowing for the partitioning of Iraq into autonomous regions, members of the Mutayibeen Coalition (Khalf al-Mutayibeen), one of Iraq's largest Sunni Resistance groups, allegedly claimed the creation of an Islamic state encompassing parts of 6 of Iraq's 18 provinces on October 15. Yet another show of defiance came on October 18 when Sunni Resistance brazenly paraded in Ramadi. Similar parades were held two days later in several towns across western Iraq, two of which occurred within two miles of US military bases.

By October 2006, small radicalized militias had seemed to overshadow the larger and more organized Sunni groups which had composed the Resistance previously. As disagreements emerged in pre-existing Resistance groups for reason ranging from the rift in the Sunni Resistance between foreign and Iraqi Resistance, competition between Mahdi Army and Badr Brigade, and anger over various decisions such as Muqtada al Sadr's agreement to join the political process, dozens of Resistance groups sprung up across the country, though particularly in Baghdad where the US army has listed 23 active militias. Residents have described the capital as being a patchwork of militia run fiefs. As a result of the Resistance splintering nature, many established leaders in the Resistance seemed to lose influence. This was particularly illustrated on October 19, when members of the Mahdi army briefly seized control of Amarah. The attack, while demonstrating the influence of the Madhi army, is believed to have originated as a result of contention between local units of the Madhi army and the allegedly Badr brigade run security forces, and the timing suggested that neither Al Sadr nor his top commanders had known known or orchestrated the offensive.

Rate of attacks and casualties

In the July 4, 2005 issue of Newsweek, Fareed Zakaria reports that "Resistance" launched 700 attacks against U.S. forces last month, the highest number since the invasion. They are getting more sophisticated, now using shaped charges, which concentrate the blast of a bomb, and infrared lasers, which cannot be easily jammed. They kill enough civilians every week that Iraq remains insecure, and electricity, water and oil are still supplied in starts and stops."

As of January 29, 2007, 3080 U.S. soldiers, 130 British soldiers and 123 soldiers from other nations have died in Iraq. 22,834 U.S. soldiers had been wounded. According to Pentagon records, over 8000 American soldiers have deserted since the beginning of the conflict in Iraq.. While the Pentagon says that the rate of desertion is below normal peace-time levels, several servicemen have said that their desertion is connected with the war in Iraq. Pentagon spokesman have disagreed, stating very few have deserted because of the war but rather for the typical reasons of personal problems and difficulty adjusting to military life. They further state the figures show desertions have actually dropped since their height in pre-war 2001, trending down strongly ever since.

Since Coalition forces do not usually release public "body counts", it is very difficult to determine the exact number of Iraqi Resistance killed by US. Forces, however several sources have given good estimates based on known intelligence and figures. A Washington Post Op-Ed article on November 22, 2005, estimated the number of Resistance killed in action in Iraq at between 45,000 and 50,000. However this figure is very unreliable as it is estimated there are between 20-30,000 Resistance recently and their numbers are increasing. Resistance usually wear civilian attire (see the Lagouranis quote under "Foreign Resistance" above), wounded or killed fighters are regularly recovered by local citizens, and numbers of killed enemy fighters have sometimes been proven to be inflated for propagandistic reasons.

Iraqi coalition counter-Resistance operations

Toward the end of June 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority transferred the "sovereignty" of Iraq to a caretaker government, whose first act was to begin the trial of Saddam Hussein. Fighting continued in the form of an Resistance rebellion against the occupying forces as well as the new Iraqi government, with a small fraction of the Resistance composed of non-Iraqi Muslim militant groups like Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda (see "Foreign Resistance" above). The new government began the process of moving towards open elections, though the Resistance and the lack of cohesion within the government itself, has led to delays. Militia leader Muqtada al-Sadr took control of Najaf and Coalition forces attempted to dislodge him. Through July and August a series of skirmishes in and around Najaf culminated with the Imman Ali Mosque under siege, only to have a peace deal brokered by al-Sistani in late August. Al-Sadr then declared a national cease fire, and opened negotiations with the American and government forces on disbanding his militia and entering the political process.

United States position

On June 10, 2007, United States Senator Joseph Lieberman speaking on the CBS program, Face the Nation has gone on record stating that the United States should seriously consider a military strike against Iran because of their involvement with the Iraqi insurgency.

We've said so publicly that the Iranians have a base in Iran at which they are training Iraqis who are coming in and killing Americans. I think we've got to be prepared to take aggressive military action against the Iranians to stop them from killing Americans in Iraq. By some estimates they have killed as many as 200 American soldiers. And to me, that would include a strike over the border into Iran, where we have good evidence that they have a base at which they are training these people coming back into Iraq to kill our soldiers. They can’t believe that they have immunity for training and equipping people to come in and kill Americans. We cannot let them get away with it.

— Joseph Lieberman

See also

• History of Iraqi Resistance
• United States occupation of Fallujah
• Casualties of the conflict in Iraq since 2003
• Post-invasion Iraq, 2003–2006
• 2004 in Iraq
• 2005 in Iraq
• 2006 in Iraq
• 2007 in Iraq
• Al Qaeda in Iraq
• Consolation payment
• Civil war in Iraq
• Juba (sniper)
• Hillbilly armor
• Zarqawi PSYOP program
• Challenge Project
• Operation Phantom Fury

References

1. Civilian Victims of Resistance Groups in Iraq, Human Rights Watch
2. Poll: Iraqis pessimistic about war’s outcome, MSNBC, March 2007{{citation}}: CS1 maint: year (link)
3. "Attack on Iraqi City Shows Militia's Power". The New York Times. 2006-10-20. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
4. Fairweather, Jack (2004-04-14). "Sadr City slum divided over firebrand cleric as calm returns". Telegraph.co.uk. Telegraph Group. Retrieved 2006-10-06.
5. Michael R. Gordon, Dexter Filkins (November 27, 2006). "Hezbollah Said to Help Shia Army in Iraq". New York Times.
6. A group of Iraqi Baathists pledges allegiance to Saddam's fugitive deputy, naming him leader International Herald Tribune, 31 December 2006
7. Jordan Baathists pledge loyalty to Saddam deputy Jerusalem Post, 31 January 2006
8. Saddam aide is new Baath leader BBC News, 3 January 2007
9. Wanted: the iceman: the last of Saddam's inner circle still at liberty continues to taunt his would-be captors with frequent sightings and leads a ruthless band of Ba'athist resistance., Access My Library, 01 December 2006
10. Battle for New Leader Likely The Guardian, 01 January 2007
11. Iraqis Unhappy with the Bush vow to stay on. aljazeerah.info News archives
12. Wanted: the iceman: the last of Saddam's inner circle still at liberty continues to taunt his would-be captors with frequent sightings and leads a ruthless band of Ba'athist resistance., Access My Library, 01 December 2006
13. Battle for New Leader Likely The Guardian, 01 January 2007
14. Iraqi Marxist Resistance Group Declared, Iraq Slogger, May 17, 2007
15. Saddam warning on Islamist forces, The Age, January 16, 2004.
16. Yamin Zakaria, Iran & Iraq: Blunders of the Ayatollahs. February 06 2005.
17. Charles Shaw, Unembedded, Independent. Newtopia Magazine.
18. "This is a Resistance Movement, Whether We Like It or Not" by Robert Fisk. Democracy Now, 30 October 2003.
19. Communication for Al-qaeda's Jihad committee in Mesopotamia
20. Iraq suicide bombers, Yahoo news, June 21 2005.
21. Phil Sands, 'Good and honest' Iraqis fighting US forces September 6 2005, 06:25 (UAE)
22. Peter Grier, "Is war in Iraq a shield against attacks at home?" Christian Science Monitor (18 September 2006) p. 3.
23. Interview with U.S. Army Specialist Tony Lagouranis on Democracy Now!
24. Saudis' role in Iraq insurgency outlined, LATimes, July 2007{{citation}}: CS1 maint: year (link)
25. The National Origins of Foreign Fighters in Iraq, by Alan B. Krueger, Princeton University and NBER, 30 December 2006.
26. Jonathan Steele, The Iraqi Leader Seeking a Peaceful Path to Liberation: A New Party unites Shi’as, Sunnis, Kurds and Christians. Guardian/UK, July 16 2004.
27. David Bacon, Iraq's Labor Upsurge Wins Support from U.S. Unions. FPIF Commentary. July 28 2004.
28. David Bacon, Murdered Iraqi Trade Unionist Trapped Between U.S. and Resistance. News Analysis, Pacific News Service, Jan 26 2005.
29. USLAW Statement on the Iraqi Labor Solidarity Tour of U.S.
30. Survey Finds Deep Divisions in Iraq; Sunni Arabs Overwhelmingly Reject Sunday Elections; Majority of Sunnis, Shias Favor U.S. Withdrawal, New Abu Dhabi TV / Zogby Poll Reveals. Zogby International, January 28 2005.
31. Bryan Bender, Resistance seen forcing change in Iraq strategy, New aim to bring Sunnis into fold. Globe Staff, June 10 2005.
32. Sean Rayment, Defence Correspondent,
33. Abdel-Wahed Tohmeh, 83 MPs Ask al-Jaafari to Put a Timetable for the Withdrawal of Foreign Troops. June 22 2005.
34. http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,,-6682256,00.html.S. Troop Drive Said Faltering in Iraq 6/4/07
35. Fareed Zakaria, Don't Make Hollow Threats. August 22 2005.
36. Pat Kneisler, Michael White, and Evan D., Iraq coalition casualties count. Operation Enduring Freedom Fatalities.
37. "US senator urges military strike on Iran". MSNBC. 10 June 2007. Retrieved 11 June 2007.
38. "US should attack Iran base : Lieberman". Associated Press. 11 June 2007. Retrieved 11 June 2007.
39. "Military plan against Iran is ready". The Jerusalem Post. 10 June 2007. Retrieved 11 June 2007.
40. "Lieberman Backs Limited U.S. Attacks on Iran". The New York Times. 10 June 2007. Retrieved 11 June 2007.

External articles

General

• "The Iraqi Resistance Movement" Christopher Alexander, Charles Kyle and William McCallister, Nov. 14, 2003
• "The Sunni Resistance in Iraq" by Dr. Ahmed S. Hashim - August 15, 2003
• "Resistance Iraq: Links to full-text online articles and reports about the Iraqi Resistance". Compiled by Project on Defense Alternatives, March 2006. Updated 22 August 2006.
• "400 Days and Out: A Strategy for Solving the Iraq Impasse". Carl Conetta, Project on Defense Alternatives, 19 July 2005.
• "Frontline: The Resistance" PBS Frontline Feb. 21, 2006
• "Iraqi Resistance Groups". GlobalSecurity.org, 2005.
• "Electronic Propaganda in Iraq". wadinet.de (PDF)
• "Iraq's Resistance: Who's Who". Washington Post, 19 March 2006.
• multimedia article by Australian Journalist Paul McGeogh of the Sydney Morning Herald
• "Who Are the Resistance? Sunni Arab Rebels in Iraq" United States Institute of Peace Special Report, April 2005
• Robert R. Tomes, Relearning Counter Resistance Warfare, Parameters Spring 2004 http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/04spring/tomes.pdf

Books

• Hashim, Ahmed S. Resistance and Counter-Resistance. I.B. Tauris. ISBN 0801444527.
• Chehab, Zaki. Iraq Ablaze: Inside the Resistance. I.B. Tauris. ISBN 1-84511-110-9.
• Enders, David. "Baghdad Bulletin:Dispatches on the American Occupation" University of Michigan Press (April 4, 2005) ISBN 0-472-11469-7
• Rogers, Paul. Iraq and the War on Terror: Twelve Months of Resistance. I.B. Tauris. ISBN 1-84511-205-9.

Middle East

• "An Inventory of Iraqi Resistance Groups." Al-Zawra (Baghdad). September 19, 2004.
• Biedermann, Ferry. "Portrait of an Iraqi Rebel." Salon. August 16, 2003, via globalpolicy.
• "Powell Denounces Iraqi Resistance Leader." The Guardian (UK). August 13, 2004.
• "Crushing Iraq's Resistance may take up to 10 years." Middle East Online (UK). August 23, 2004.
• "In Western Iraq, Fundamentalists Hold U.S. at Bay." New York Times. August 29, 2004.
• "Najaf assault turns allies against US." Reuters. August 13, 2004.
• "Families return to devastated Falluja." Al-Jazeera. May 1, 2004.
• "Falluja breathes easy." Al-Jazeera. May 1, 2004.
• "U.S. War Crimes: Torture of Iraqi Prisoners Exposed." Tehran Times. May 1, 2004.
• "NYT: Shia uprising may not be confined to al-Sadr followers." New York Times. April 8, 2004. Registration-free copies at Contra Costa Times and Smirking Chimp.
• Fisk, Robert. "Iraq on the brink of anarchy." The Independent (Fallujah). April 6, 2004.
• Rasan, Dhiya. "Resistance Reveals Post-US Plan." IWPR (Baghdad). February 23, 2004.
• "Diplomats stunned by abduction wave, Workers held in bid to force companies to leave." Detroit Free Press. July 27, 2004.
• "Al-Sadr's star fades among Iraqis." Mail & Guardian. August 30, 2004.
• "Saddam's Baath Party is back in business." Knight Ridder Newspapers. September 7, 2004.
• "Why the Resistance won't go away." Boston Review. October, 2004.
• "Secrets of Terror", Interview with Ryan Mauro, the author of the book Death to America: The Unreported Battle of Iraq ISBN 1-4137-7473-3

Supportive of the Resistance

• Fight Back! July 2007 - U.S. anti-war activist on speaking tour, tells of meeting with Iraqi resistance
• Fight Back! March 2007 - Voices of the Iraqi Resistance: Leaders of the Iraqi National Resistance Speak at an International Solidarity Conference
• Iraqi Resistance Reports from albasrah.net.
• With the Resistance of Baathist Iraq!.
• Soldz, Stephen. "Iraq Occupation and Resistance Report."
• "Iraqi resistance hailed in Brazil" Al-Jazeera. August 24, 2004.
• Kais al-Rubai, Ali. "Islamists Pledge Continued War on Coalition." IWPR (Baaqouba). May 14, 2004.
• "Sadr urges Iraqis to fight occupation." Al-Bawaba April 13, 2004. Sources claim negotiations with U.S.-led forces are progressing.
• "Washington Unleashes Bloodbath in Iraq." Tehran Times. April 29, 2004.
• Iraqi Resistance News and Discussion from Mirror of the World Foundation.

Editorials

Terrorism Sources

• Saddam's Martyrs "Men of Sacrifice" Fedayeen Saddam
• BBC Profile: Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
• Jaish Ansar al-Sunna

v t e Iraq War (2003–2011)
Beginning of the Iraqi conflict
Prelude Background Pre-1990 17 July Revolution Iranian Revolution 1979 Ba'ath Party Purge Iran–Iraq War British / U.S. support for Iraq Chemical attacks against Iran Anfal campaign Iran–Contra affair 1990–2003 Gulf War Invasion of Kuwait Nayirah testimony Sanctions against Iraq No-fly zones 1991 uprisings UNSCOM Arms-to-Iraq affair Oil-for-Food Programme Investigations September 11 attacks Aftermath War on terror 2001 anthrax attacks U.S. War in Afghanistan Invasion Rationale WMD claims Yellowcake uranium Aluminum tubes Biological weapons Chemical weapons "Curveball" Mobile weapon labs Saddam–al-Qaeda conspiracy theory Anthrax claims Prague Ricin claims Oil as a possible rationale Issues American imperialism Bush Doctrine Wolfowitz Doctrine Colin Powell's UN presentation Disarmament crisis UNMOVIC Failed peace initiatives Iraq resolution / UK parliament's support for invasion Iraqi–Kurdish conflict Legality Legitimacy of the invasion Media coverage Military analyst program Rapid response operation Saddam's alleged shredder Preemptive war Saddam Hussein and human rights Dossiers and memos Habbush letter Downing Street memo September Dossier Vilnius letter Letter of the eight Bush–Blair 2003 memo February Dossier Bush–Aznar memo
Overview Key events Invasion (2003) Occupation (2003–2011) Insurgency 2003–06 period Anbar campaign Fallujah Capture of Saddam Hussein Interrogation Trial Execution / Reactions 2006 al-Askari mosque bombing Civil war (2006–08) 2007 U.S. troop surge timeline U.S. withdrawal Status of forces agreement Invasion (2003) Timeline Preparations for invasion Multi-National Force Battle of Nasiriyah Fall of Baghdad Battle of Debecka Pass Firdos Square statue Mission Accomplished speech US public opinion Occupation (2003–2011) Occupation of Ramadi De-Ba'athification 100 Orders CPA Order 2 CPA Order 17 U.S. military bases Blackwater Reconstruction Development Fund Economic reform UNAMI Al Qa'qaa high explosives U.S. kill or capture strategy Replacement governments Coalition Provisional Authority Iraqi Governing Council Interim Government 2005 parliamentary elections Transitional Government Constitution Ratification
Participants Countries Australia Ba'athist Iraq Denmark Georgia Iran Italy Japan Poland South Korea Thailand Ukraine United Kingdom United States Insurgent groups Sunni groups Islamic Army in Iraq 1920 Revolution Brigades Jaish al-Rashideen Islamic Front for the Iraqi Resistance Hamas of Iraq Jeish Muhammad Mujahideen Shura Council Islamic State of Iraq Al-Qaeda in Iraq Jaish al-Ta'ifa al-Mansurah Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad Jamaat Ansar al-Sunna Ansar al-Islam in Kurdistan Black Banner Organization Wakefulness and Holy War Abu Theeb's group Abu Bakr Al-Salafi Army Mujahideen Army Shia groups Mahdi Army Abu Deraa's militia Badr Organization Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq Sheibani Network Soldiers of Heaven Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq Promised Day Brigade Kata'ib Hezbollah Ba'ath loyalists Fedayeen Saddam Al-Awda Popular Army Al-Abud Network Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order Supreme Command for Jihad and Liberation
Battles and operations Operations 2003 Ancient Babylon Catalyst Desert Scorpion Desert Thrust Falconer Iron Hammer Iron Justice Ivy Blizzard Northern Delay Airborne Dragon Panther Squeeze Peninsula Strike Planet X Capture of Saddam Hussein (Red Dawn) Telic 2004 Baton Rouge Bulldog Mammoth Iron Saber New Dawn (Al Fajr) Phantom Fury Phantom Linebacker Plymouth Rock Vigilant Resolve Warrior's Rage 2005 Able Rising Force Able Warrior Cyclone Iron Hammer Matador New Market Spear (Romhe) Squeeze Play Steel Curtain 2006 Al Majid Gaugamela Guardian Tiger Iron Triangle River Falcon Sinbad Swarmer Together Forward 2007 Alljah Arbead II Ardennes Black Eagle Commando Eagle Forsythe Park Imposing Law Leyte Gulf Marne Avalanche Marne Torch Mawtini Phantom Strike Phantom Thunder Polar Tempest Purple Haze Saber Guardian Sledgehammer Stampede 3 Tiger Hammer Valiant Guardian (Harris Ba'sil) 2008 Defeat Al Qaeda in the North Augurs of Prosperity Phantom Phoenix 2009–2011 New Dawn Battles 2003 Invasion Umm Qasr Al Faw Basra I Nasiriyah Karbala I Haditha Dam Najaf I Samawah I Karbala II Al Kut Hillah Karbala Gap Debecka Pass Baghdad I Majar al-Kabir Ramadan Offensive 2004 Spring fighting Karbala City Hall Fallujah I Siege of Sadr City Ramadi I Good Friday ambush Baghdad International Airport Husaybah Danny Boy Najaf II CIMIC House Samarra Fallujah II Mosul 2005 Lake Tharthar Abu Ghraib Al-Qa'im Hit convoy Haditha Tal Afar 2006 Baghdad II Ramadi II Diwaniya Al Rumaythah Amarah Turki 2007 Haifa Street Karbala provincial HQ Najaf III Shurta Nasir Basra II Baqubah Route Bismarck Donkey Island Karbala III 2008 Spring fighting Iraqi Day of Ashura Nineveh Basra III Al-Qaeda offensive 2009–2011 Palm Grove (2010) Related events Turkish incursions into northern Iraq 2007 2008 Abu Kamal raid
War crimes Occupation forces Killings and massacres During the 2003 invasion U.S. killings of journalists Fallujah killings Killing of Nadhem Abdullah (2003) Murder of Muhamad Husain Kadir Mukaradeeb wedding party massacre (2004) Haifa Street helicopter incident (2005) Tal Afar shootings (2005) Basra prison incident (2005) Haditha massacre (2005) Mahmudiyah rape and killings (2006) Ishaqi massacre (2006) Baghdad detainee killings (2006) Hamdania incident (2006) Iraqi bodyguard killing (2006) Iron Triangle Murders (2006) Baghdad airstrike (2007) Nisour Square massacre (2007) Iraq War Logs (2010) Chemical weapons Use of white phosphorus by the United States (2004–05) Torture and abuse Abu Ghraib prison (2003–06) Camp Bucca (2003–09) Camp Nama (2003–04) Balad Air Base (2003–2011) Death of Nagem Hatab (2003) Killing of Baha Mousa (2003) Death of Abed Hamed Mowhoush (2003) Killing of Manadel al-Jamadi (2003) Death of Fashad Mohamed (2004) § Other killings and bombings 2003 Jordanian embassy Canal Hotel Imam Ali mosque bombing Baghdad October 2003 2004 Erbil 2004 Ashura massacre Basra 2004 Mosul 2004 2004 church bombings Baghdad bombings 14 September 30 September Karbala and Najaf bombings Baqubah 2004 Kufa mosque bombing 2005 Al Hillah 2005 Erbil 2005 Musayyib bombing Baghdad bombings August September Balad 2005 Khanaqin bombings 2006 Karbala and Ramadi Al-Askari mosque 2006 Buratha mosque bombing Sadr City bombings July November Hayy Al-Jihad massacre 2007 Mustansiriya University Baghdad bombings 22 January 3 February 12 February 18 February 29 March 18 April 26 July 1 August Al Hillah 2007 Tal Afar 2007 Iraqi Parliament 2007 Karbala mosque bombings Massacres of Yazidis April massacre Qahtaniyah bombings Makhmour Abu Sayda Al-Askari mosque 2007 Al-Khilani mosque bombing Amirli bombing Kirkuk 2007 Al Amarah bombings 2008 Bagdad bombings February March June Balad 2008 Karbala 2008 Al-Karmah Dujail bombing Balad Ruz bombing Attacks on Christians in Mosul 2009 Bagdad bombings March 6 April June August October December Baghdad–Miqdadiyah Taza bombing Kirkuk 2009 Tal Afar 2009 2010 Nationwide attacks 10 May 25 August Bagdad bombings January February April August September November Baqubah 2010 Baghdad church massacre 2011 Nationwide attacks January August Bagdad bombings January August October Arba'een bombings Tikrit assault Al Hillah 2011 Samarra bombing Al Diwaniyah bombing Taji bombings Karbala 2011 Basra 2011 Other war crimes Raid on Camp Ashraf (2011) Archaeological looting Chlorine bombings Torture by the Wolf Brigade (2004–2011) Prosecution United States and the International Criminal Court Hague Invasion Act Prosecution for the 2003 invasion Abtan v. Blackwater Hamdan v. Rumsfeld Saleh v. Bush Taguba Report § All attacks listed in this group were either committed by insurgents, or have unknown perpetrators
Impact General Casualties Iraq Body Count Iraq Family Health Survey Lancet surveys ORB survey Damage to Baghdad Al-Aimmah Bridge disaster Human rights Humanitarian crisis 2007 cholera outbreak Financial cost Refugees Iraqi Christians Mandaeans Violence against Iraqi academics Political controversies Post-invasion WMD conjecture Iraq scandal in Finland Dixie Chicks comments Plame affair Hood event Death of David Kelly Hutton Inquiry Kidnapping of Angelo dela Cruz 2004 document leak Al Jazeera bombing memo Scott Thomas Beauchamp controversy MoveOn.org ad controversy Six Days in Fallujah Role of Canada War resisters Investigations Senate Report on WMD Intelligence Duelfer Report Chilcot Inquiry Reactions Pre-war Pre-war international reactions Khuy Voyne! Saddam Hussein interview Views on the invasion U.S. public opinion Opposition Criticism United Nations Oprah's Anti-war series Iraqi map pendant Winter Soldier: Iraq & Afghanistan Photo Op A Responsible Plan to End the War in Iraq Bush shoe-throwing incident Protests Halloween 2002 February 15, 2003 March 20, 2003 Bring Them Home Now Tour January 20, 2005 September 24, 2005 January 27, 2007 March 17, 2007 2007 Port of Tacoma September 15, 2007 March 19, 2008 Aftermath in Iraq The rise of ISIL Insurgency (2011–13) War in Iraq (2013–17) War against ISIL (2014–present) U.S.-led intervention in Iraq (2014–2021) Insurgency (2017–present)
Miscellaneous Terminology Axis of evil Outposts of tyranny "Baghdad Bob" "Chemical Ali" Coalition of the willing Dead checking Embedded journalism Freedom fries Friedman Unit "Mother of All Bombs" "Mrs. Anthrax" Old Europe and New Europe Regime change Shock and awe "Sixteen Words" "Smoking gun / mushroom cloud" Star Spangled Ice Cream Strategic reset "There are unknown unknowns" Triangle of Death "Yo, Blair" Critical Global arrogance Inverted totalitarianism "The wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time" Memorials Afghan–Iraqi Freedom Memorial (Salem, Oregon) Al-Shaheed Monument Iraq and Afghanistan Memorial (London) Northwood Gratitude and Honor Memorial Old North Memorial Garden Saving Iraqi Culture Lists Assassinations Aviation shootdowns and accidents Bombings Coalition military operations Documentaries Iraqi security forces fatality reports Most-wanted Iraqi playing cards Private contractor deaths Timeline 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Related Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Chelsea Manning CIA black sites Efforts to impeach George W. Bush "Enhanced interrogation techniques" Torture in the United States Extraordinary rendition Green Zone Guantanamo Bay detention camp Gulf of Tonkin incident Resolution Military–industrial complex Neoconservatism Patriot Act Petrodollar warfare theory Post-9/11 Special Relationship The Iraq War: A Historiography of Misplaced Pages Changelogs Unilateralism Unitary executive theory U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East WikiLeaks Ba'ath Party archives
Outline / Category / Wikinews / Multimedia

v t e Armed groups in the Iraqi conflict
Iraqi government	Iraqi Armed Forces Iraqi Army Iraqi Air Force Iraqi Navy Iraqi security forces Iraqi Police Iraqi Police Service National Police Supporting Forces Facilities Protection Service
Ba'athists	Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order Fedayeen Saddam General Military Council for Iraqi Revolutionaries Al-Awda General Command of the Armed Forces, Resistance and Liberation in Iraq Popular Army New Return Patriotic Front Political Media Organ of the Ba'ath Party Popular Resistance for the Liberation of Iraq Al-Abud Network Free Iraqi Army
Militias and others	Shia Islamic militias Popular Mobilization Forces Mahdi Army Abu Deraa's Mahdi Army faction Badr Organization Sheibani Network Soldiers of Heaven Free Iraqi Forces Special Groups (Iraq) Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq Promised Day Brigade Kata'ib Hezbollah Saraya Ansar al-Aqeeda Kata'ib al-Imam Ali Kata'ib Jund al-Imam Harakat Hezbollah al-Nujaba Saraya al-Jihad Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas Forces Harakat Ansar Allah al-Awfiya Quwwat Sahl Ninawa Mukhtar Army Hezbollah Liwa Abu al-Fadhal al-Abbas Jaysh al-Mu'ammal Liwa Ali al-Akbar Islamic Resistance in Iraq Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada Sunni Islamic militias Tribal Mobilization Awakening groups 1920 Revolution Brigades Jaish al-Rashideen Islamic Army in Iraq Islamic Front for the Iraqi Resistance Hamas of Iraq Harakat Ahrar al-Iraq Kurdish militias Peshmerga Kurdistan Workers' Party Kurdistan Freedom Hawks Asayîşa Êzîdxanê Turkmen militias Iraqi Turkmen Front 16Brigade 52nd Brigade 92nd Brigade Brigade of Imam Hussein Sayyid al-Shuhada Bashir Regiment Assyrian militias Nineveh Plains Nineveh Plain Protection Units Nineveh Plain Forces Qaraqosh Protection Committee Dwekh Nawsha Syriac Military Council Kataib Rouh Allah Issa Ibn Miriam Babylon Brigade Yazidi militias Asayîşa Êzîdxanê Êzîdxan Protection Force Sinjar Alliance Sinjar Resistance Units Êzîdxan Women's Units
Insurgents	Nationalist Salafis Mujahideen Army Mujahideen Battalions of the Salafi Group of Iraq Islamic Salafist Boy Scout Battalions Mohammad's Army Salafi Jihadists Al-Mustafa Army in Iraq Ansar al-Islam in Kurdistan Black Banner Organization Abu Theeb's group Abu Bakr Al-Salafi Army Hassan Al-Basri Brigades Jamaat Ansar al-Sunna Jamaat Jaysh Ahl al-Sunnah wa-l-Jamaah Islamic State Mujahideen Shura Council Jaish al-Ta'ifa al-Mansurah Al-Qaeda in Iraq Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad Shield of Islam Brigade Wakefulness and Holy War White Flags

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