Misplaced Pages

This is an old revision of this page, as edited by Shanes (talk | contribs) at 21:00, 29 October 2007 (Reverted edits by 203.89.173.141 (talk) to last version by Saros136). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

Template:FixHTML

Attack on Pearl Harbor
Part of the Pacific Theater of World War II
The attackers came in two waves. The first wave was detected by U.S. Army radar at 136 nautical miles (252 km), but was misidentified as USAAF bombers from the mainland.
Date December 7, 1941 Location primarily Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, USA Result Decisive Japanese victory; United States declares war on the Empire of Japan and enters World War II on the side of Allies; Nazi Germany declares war on the United States.
Belligerents
United States	Empire of Japan
Commanders and leaders
Navy: Husband Kimmel Army: Walter Short	Navy: Chuichi Nagumo
Strength
8 battleships, 8 cruisers, 29 destroyers, 9 submarines, ~50 other ships, ~390 aircraft	Striking Force: 6 aircraft carriers, 9 destroyers, 2 battleships, 2 heavy cruisers, 1 light cruiser, 8 tankers, 23 fleet submarines, 5 midget submarines, 414 aircraft
Casualties and losses
2 battleships sunk, 6 battleships damaged, 3 cruisers damaged, 2 destroyers sunk, 1 damaged, 1 other ship sunk, 3 damaged, 188 aircraft destroyed, 155 aircraft damaged, 2,345 military and 57 civilians killed, 1,247 military and 35 civilians wounded	4 midget submarines sunk, 1 midget submarine run aground, 29 aircraft destroyed, 55 airmen, 9 submariners killed and 1 captured

Template:FixHTML

Template:FixHTML

Template:FixHTML

The attack on Pearl Harbor was a pre-emptive military strike on the United States Pacific Fleet base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii by the Empire of Japan's Imperial Japanese Navy, on the morning of Sunday, 7 December, 1941. Two attack waves, totalling 350 aircraft, were launched from six IJN aircraft carriers which destroyed two U.S. Navy battleships, one minelayer, two destroyers and 188 aircraft. Personnel losses were 2,333 killed and 1,139 wounded. Damaged warships included three cruisers, a destroyer, and six battleships. Of those six, one was deliberately grounded and was later refloated and repaired. Two sank at their berths but were later repaired and both rejoined the fleet late in the war. Vital fuel storage, shipyards, and submarine facilities were not hit. Japanese losses were minimal at 29 aircraft and five midget submarines, with 65 Japanese servicemen killed or wounded.

The pre-emptive strike's intent was to protect Imperial Japan's advance into Malaya and the Dutch East Indies – for their natural resources such as oil and rubber – by neutralizing the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Both the US and Japan had long-standing contingency plans for war in the Pacific, developed during the 1930s as tension between the two countries steadily increased, focusing on the other's battleships. Japan's expansion into Manchuria and later French Indochina were greeted with increasing levels of embargoes and sanctions from the United States. In 1940, the US halted further shipments of airplanes, parts, machine tools and aviation gas to Japan, which Japan interpreted as an unfriendly act. America continued to export oil to Japan, as it was understood in Washington that cutting off exports could mean Japanese retaliation. In the summer of 1941, the US ceased the export of oil to Japan due to Japan's continued aggressive expansionist policy and because an anticipated eventual American entrance to the war in Europe prompted increased stockpiling and less commercial use of gasoline. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had moved the fleet to Hawaii, and ordered a buildup in the Philippines, to reduce Japanese aggression in China and deter operations against others, including European colonies in Asia. The Japanese high command was certain any attack on the United Kingdom's colonies would inevitably bring the U.S. into the war. A pre-emptive strike appeared the only way Japan could avoid U.S. interference in the Pacific.

The attack was one of the most important engagements of World War II. Occurring before a formal declaration of war, it shocked the American public out of isolationism. Roosevelt called December 7, 1941 "… a date which will live in infamy."

Background to conflict

More than a decade's worth of events leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor occurred prior to the actual engagement. War between Japan and the United States had been a possibility that each nation's militaries planned for since the 1920s, though real tension did not begin until the 1931 invasion of Manchuria by Japan. Over the next decade, Japan expanded slowly into China leading to all out war between the two in 1937. In 1940 Japan invaded French Indochina in an effort to embargo all imports into China, including war supplies purchased from the US. This move prompted an eventual American embargo on exporting oil to Japan, which in turn led the Japanese to execute an attack on Pearl Harbor, ensuring the US fleet would be unable to interfere with their simultaneous invasion of the Dutch East Indies for its oil and other resources as part of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere Japan envisioned in the Pacific.

Preliminary planning for an attack had begun in very early 1941, initially by Isoroku Yamamoto under orders from Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff. After much contention with Naval Headquarters, full scale planning was underway by early spring 1941. Over the next months, pilots were trained, equipment prepared, and intelligence gathered. Despite these preparations, the actual order to attack was not given until December 1st, after it was apparent diplomacy would not facilitate the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Approach and attack

At 03.42 Hawaiian Time, even before Nagumo began launching strike aircraft, the minesweeper USS Condor spotted a midget submarine outside the harbor entrance and alerted destroyer USS Ward. Ward was initially unsuccessful in locating the target. Hours later it fired America's first shots when Ward eventually attacked and sank a midget submarine, possibly the same one, at 06:37.

Five midget submarines had been assigned to torpedo U.S. ships after the bombing started. None of these returned, and only four have since been found. Of the ten sailors aboard, nine died; the only survivor, Kazuo Sakamaki, was captured, becoming the first Japanese prisoner of war. United States Naval Institute analysis of photographs from the attack, conducted in 1999, indicates one of these mini-subs entered the harbor and successfully fired a torpedo into the USS West Virginia, what may have been the first shot by the attacking Japanese. Her final disposition is unknown.

First wave

The first attack wave consisted of 90 B5Ns (50 armed with bombs and 40 with torpedoes), 54 D3As, and 45 A6Ms (a total of 189 aircraft), launched north of Oahu, commanded by Captain Mitsuo Fuchida. It comprised:

• 1st Group
  • 50 Nakajima B5Ns armed with 800 kg (1760 lb) armor piercing bombs, in four sections.
  • 40 B5Ns armed with Type 91 torpedoes, also in four sections.
• 2nd Group - 55 Aichi D3As armed with Template:Auto lb general purpose bombs
  • 27 D3As - Hangars and aircraft on Ford Island
  • 27 D3As - Hangars and aircraft on Wheeler Field
• 3rd Group - 45 A6Ms for air control and strafing, divided into three sections:
  • 15 A6Ms - Ford Island and Hickam Field
  • 15 A6Ms - Wheeler Field and Barbers Point
  • 15 A6M - Kāneʻohe Marine Corps Air Station,

The first attack wave divided into 3 groups. One unit went to Wheeler Field. Each of the aerial waves started with the bombers and ended with the fighters to deter pursuit. As the attack groups approached Oahu, Army Radar at Opana Point station (an SCR-270 radar, located near the northern tip of Oahu, which had not entered official service, having been in training mode for months), detected them and called in a warning. Although the operators at Opana Point reported a target echo larger than anything they had ever seen, an untrained new officer at the new and only partially activated Intercept Center, Lieutenant Kermit A. Tyler, presumed the scheduled arrival of six B-17 bombers was the cause because of the direction from which the aircraft were coming (only a few degrees separated the two inbound courses); because he presumed the operators had never seen a formation as large as the U.S. bombers' on radar; and possibly because the operators had only seen the lead element of incoming attack.

Several U.S. aircraft were shot down as the first wave approached land; one at least radioed a somewhat incoherent warning. Other warnings from ships off the harbor entrance were still being processed, or awaiting confirmation, when the planes began bombing and strafing. Nevertheless, it is not clear any warnings would have had much effect even had they been interpreted correctly and much more promptly. For instance, the results the Japanese achieved in the Philippines were essentially the same as at Pearl Harbor, though MacArthur had almost nine hours warning the Japanese had attacked at Pearl (and specific orders to commence operations) before they actually struck his command. The air portion of the attack on Pearl Harbor began at 7:48 a.m. December 7 Hawaiian Time (3:18 a.m. December 8 Japanese Standard Time, as kept by ships of the Kido Butai), with the attack on Kaneohe. Japanese planes attacked in two waves; a total of 360 planes reached Oʻahu. Slow, vulnerable torpedo bombers led the first wave, exploiting the first moments of surprise to attack the most important ships present (the battleships), while dive bombers attacked U.S. air bases across Oʻahu, starting with Hickam Field, the largest, and Wheeler Field, the main AAC fighter base. The 171 planes in the second wave attacked the Air Corps' Bellows Field near Kaneohe on the windward side of the island, and Ford Island. The only significant air opposition came from a handful of P-36 Hawks and P-40 Warhawks that flew 25 sorties.

Men aboard U.S. ships awoke to the sounds of alarms, bombs exploding, and gunfire prompting bleary eyed men into dressing as they ran to General Quarters stations. (The famous message, "Air raid Pearl Harbor. This is not drill.", was sent from the headquarters of Patrol Wing Two, the first senior level Hawaiian command to respond.) Despite a lack of readiness, which included locked ammunition lockers, aircraft parked wingtip to wingtip to prevent sabotage, and no heightened alert status, many American military personnel served with distinction during the battle. Rear Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, and Captain Franklin Van Valkenburgh, commander of USS Arizona, both rushed to the bridge to direct her defense, until both were killed by an explosion in the forward magazine from an armor piercing bomb hit next to turret two. Both were posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. Ensign Joe Taussig got his ship, USS Nevada, under way from a dead cold start during the attack. One of the destroyers, USS Aylwin, got underway with only four officers aboard, all Ensigns, none with more than a year's sea duty. That ship operated at sea for four days before her commanding officer managed to get aboard. Captain Mervyn Bennion, commanding USS West Virginia (Kimmel's flagship), led his men until he was cut down by fragments from a bomb hit in USS Tennessee, moored alongside.

Gallantry was widespread. In all, 14 officers and sailors were awarded the Medal of Honor. A special military award, the Pearl Harbor Commemorative Medal, was later authorized for all military veterans of the attack.

Second wave composition

The second wave consisted of 54 B5Ns, 81 D3As, and 36 A6Ms (a total of 171), launched from much the same location, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Shigekazu Shimazaki. This wave and its targets comprised:

• 1st Group - 54 B5Ns armed with Template:Auto lb and Template:Auto lb general purpose bombs
  • 27 B5Ns - Aircraft and hangars on Kaneohe, Ford Island and Barbers Point
  • 27 B5N - Hangars and aircraft on Hickam Field
• 2nd Group
  • 81 D3As armed with Template:Auto lb general purpose bombs, in four sections
• 3rd Group - 36 A6Ms for defense and strafing
  • 9 A6M - Ford Island
  • 9 A6M - Hickam Field
  • 9 A6M - Wheeler Field
  • 9 A6M - MCAS Kāneʻohe

The second wave was divided into three groups. One unit was tasked to attack Kāneʻohe, the rest Pearl Harbor proper. The separate sections arrived at the attack point almost simultaneously, from several directions.

Ninety minutes after it began, the attack was over. 2,386 Americans died (55 were civilians, most killed by unexploded American anti-aircraft shells landing in civilian areas), a further 1,139 wounded. Eighteen ships were sunk, including five battleships.

Nearly half of the 1102 American fatalities were caused by the explosion and sinking of USS Arizona, the result of her forward magazine exploding after it was hit by a modified 40 cm (16in) shell.

Nevada attempted to exit the harbor, but was deliberately beached to avoid blocking the harbor entrance. Already damaged by a torpedo and on fire forward, Nevada was targeted by many Japanese bombers as she got underway, sustaining more hits from 250 lb (113 kg) bombs as she beached.

USS California was hit by two bombs and two torpedoes. The crew might have kept her afloat, but were ordered to abandon ship just as they were raising power for the pumps. Burning oil from Arizona and West Virginia drifted down on her, and probably made the situation look worse than it was. The disarmed target ship USS Utah was holed twice by torpedoes. USS West Virginia was hit by seven torpedoes, the seventh tearing away her rudder. USS Oklahoma was hit by four torpedoes, the last two above her belt armor, which caused her to capsize. USS Maryland was hit by two of the converted 40 cm shells, but neither caused serious damage.

Although the Japanese concentrated on battleships (the largest vessels present), they did not ignore other targets. The light cruiser USS Helena was torpedoed, and the concussion from the blast capsized the neighboring minelayer USS Oglala. Two destroyers in dry dock were destroyed when bombs penetrated their fuel bunkers. The leaking fuel caught fire; flooding the dry dock in an effort to fight fire made the burning oil rise, and so the ships were burned out. The light cruiser USS Raleigh was holed by a torpedo. The light cruiser USS Honolulu was damaged but remained in service. The destroyer USS Cassin capsized, and destroyer USS Downes was heavily damaged. The repair vessel USS Vestal, moored alongside Arizona, was heavily damaged and beached. The seaplane tender USS Curtiss was also damaged. USS Shaw was badly damaged when two bombs penetrated her forward magazine.

Almost all of the 188 American aircraft in Hawaii were destroyed or damaged, 155 of those on the ground. Almost none were actually ready to take off to defend the base, having been parked wingtip to wingtip as a sabotage protection measure. Of 33 PBYs in Hawaii, 24 were destroyed, and six others damaged beyond repair. (The three on patrol returned undamaged.) Attacks on barracks killed additional personnel. Friendly fire brought down several U.S. planes, including some from an inbound flight from USS Enterprise.

Fifty-five Japanese airmen and nine submariners were killed in the action. Of Japan's 414 available planes (360 took part in the attack), 29 were lost during the battle (nine in the first attack wave, 20 in the second). with another 74 damaged by antiaircraft fire from the ground.

Possible third wave

Several Japanese junior officers, including Fuchida and Genda, urged Admiral Nagumo to carry out a third strike in order to destroy as much of Pearl Harbor's fuel storage, maintenance, and dry dock facilities as possible. Some military historians have suggested the destruction of these oil tanks and repair facilities would have crippled the U.S. Pacific Fleet far more seriously than did loss of its battleships. If they had been wiped out, "serious operations in the Pacific would have been postponed for more than a year." Nagumo, however, decided to forgo a third attack in favor of withdrawal for several reasons:

• American anti-aircraft performance had improved considerably during the second strike, and two-thirds of Japan's losses were incurred during the second wave (20 out of 29 lost planes). Nagumo felt if he launched a third strike, he would be risking three-quarters of the Combined Fleet's strength to wipe out the remaining targets (which included the port facilities) while suffering higher aircraft losses.
• The location of the American carriers remained unknown to Nagumo. In addition, the Admiral was concerned his force was now within range of American land-based bombers. Nagumo was uncertain whether the U.S. had enough surviving planes remaining on Hawaii to launch an attack against Japan's carriers.
• A third wave attack would have required substantial preparation and turn-around time, and would have meant returning planes would have faced night landings. At the time, no Navy had developed night carrier techniques, so this was a substantial risk.
• The task force's fuel situation did not permit him to remain in waters north of Pearl Harbor much longer since he was at the very limits of logistical support. To do so risked running unacceptably low on fuel, perhaps even having to abandon destroyers en route home.
• He believed the second strike had essentially satisfied the main objective of his mission—the neutralization of the Pacific Fleet—and did not wish to risk further losses.

At a conference aboard Yamato the following morning, Yamamoto initially supported Nagumo's decision to withdraw. In retrospect, however, Nagumo's decision to spare the vital dockyards, maintenance shops, and oil depots meant the U.S. could respond relatively quickly to Japanese activities in the Pacific. Yamamoto later regretted Nagumo's decision and categorically stated it had been a great mistake not to order a third strike.

Aftermath

Though the attack was notable for its large-scale destruction, the attack was not significant in terms of American fuel storage, maintenance and intelligence capabilities. Had Japan destroyed the American carriers, the U.S. would have sustained significant damage to the Pacific Fleet's ability to conduct offensive operations for a year or so (given no further diversions from the Atlantic Fleet). As it was, the elimination of the battleships left the U.S. Navy with no choice but to place its faith in aircraft carriers and submarines—the very weapons with which the U.S. Navy halted and eventually reversed the Japanese advance. A major flaw of Japanese strategic thinking was a belief the ultimate Pacific battle would be between battleships of both sides, in keeping with the doctrine of Captain Alfred Mahan. As a result, Yamamoto (and his successors) hoarded his battleships for a "decisive battle" that never happened.

Ultimately, targets not on Genda's list, such as the Submarine Base and the old Headquarters Building, were more important than any battleship. It was submarines that immobilized IJN's heavy ships and brought Japan's economy to a standstill by crippling transportation of oil and raw materials. And in the basement of the old Administration Building was the cryptanalytic unit, HYPO, which contributed significantly to the Midway ambush and the Submarine Force's success.

Media

Template:Multi-listen start Template:Multi-listen item Template:Multi-listen item Template:Multi-listen end

See also

• Attacks on North America during World War II
• Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor
• List of United States Navy losses in World War II
• Pearl Harbor
• Pearl Harbor advance-knowledge debate
• Pearl Harbor Survivors Association
• USS Arizona Memorial
• Tora! Tora! Tora!

References

1. Testimony of Joseph Lockard, Signal Corps, United States Army
2. CinCP report of damage to ships in Pearl Harbor from www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar. Unless otherwsie stated, all vessels listed are salvageable.
3. ^ Stetson Conn; et al. (2000), Guarding the United States and Its Outposts; Chapter 7 - The Attack on Pearl Harbor, Washington D.C.: Center of Military History United States Army, pp. 193, 194 and Note 62 {{citation}}: Explicit use of et al. in: |last= (help)CS1 maint: extra punctuation (link) (Navy and Marines: 2,117 killed in action or died of wounds, 779 wounded; Army 215 killed in action or died of wounds, 360 wounded)
4. ^ CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES (1946), INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE PEARL HARBOR ATTACK, Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, pp. 64–65
5. Peace and War United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941 United States Government Printing Office 1983 Page 96:The "moral embargoes" of 1938 and 1939, referred to previously, brought about the cessation of the export to Japan of airplanes, aeronautic equipment, and certain other materials. As the rearmament program in the United States gained momentum and required more and more available strategic materials, this Government gradually adopted measures, legislative and administrative, which resulted in a steady decline of export to Japan of such materials. The Export Control Act of July 2, 1940 authorized the President, in the interest of national defense, to prohibit or curtail the export of basic war materials. Under that act, licenses were refused for the export to Japan of aviation gasoline and most types of machine tools, beginning in August 1940. After it was announced in September that the export of iron and steel scrap would be prohibited, Japanese Ambassador Horinouchi protested to Secretary Hull on October 8, 1940 that this might be considered an "unfriendly act".
6. Peace and War United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941 United States Government Printing Office 1983 Page 94: Referring to the question of "sanctions", the Ambassador warned that the probability must be contemplated that drastic embargoes on such important products as oil would be interpreted in Japan as sanctions, and that some form of retaliation might and probably would follow.
7. Peace and War United States Foreign Policy 1931-1941 United States Government Printing Office 1983 Page 125 In the course of this conversation the President reminded the Japanese Ambassador that the United States had been permitting oil to be exported from the United States to Japan; that this had been done because we realized that if these oil supplies had been shut off or restricted the Japanese Government and people would have used this as an incentive or pretext for moving down upon the Netherlands Indies in order to assure themselves of a greater oil supply; that the United States had been pursuing this policy primarily for the purpose of doing its utmost to preserve peace in the Pacific region; that our citizens were unable to understand why, at a time when they were asked to curtail their use of gasoline, the United States should be permitting oil supplies to go to Japan when Japan had given every indication of pursuing a policy of force and conquest in conjunction with the policy of world conquest and domination being carried on by Hitler.
8. Peattie & Evans, Kaigun
9. ibid., p.72.
10. Sakamaki's unexpected survival was despised by many Japanese, who referred to his dead companions as "The Nine Young Gods."
11. John Rodgaard et al., "Pearl Harbor—Attack from Below," Naval History, December 1999 (accessed June 10 2005).
12. ^ AIRCRAFT ATTACK ORGANIZATION The Japanese Attack on Pearl Harbor, Planning and Execution. First wave: 189 planes, 50 Kates w/bombs 40 Kates with torps, 54 Vals, 45 Zekes Second wave: 171 planes, 54 Kates w/bombs, 81 Vals, 36 Zekes. CAP alternating 18 plane Zeke shifts every two hours with 18 more ready for takeoff on flight decks and an additional 18 ready on hanagar decks.
13. Prange et al., op.cit., p.98.
14. ibid., p.97.
15. ibid., p.174.
16. USAF Historical Study No.85 credits 6 pilots with 10 planes destroyed: 1st Lt Lewis M. Sanders (P-36) and 2nd Lts Philip M Rasmussen (P-36), Gordon H. Sterling Jr. (P-36, killed in action), Harry W. Brown (P-36), Kenneth M. Taylor (P-40, 2), and George S. Welch (P-40, 4). Three of the P-36 kills were not verified by the Japanese and may have been shot down by naval anti-aircraft fire.
17. Odd though it may sound, "not" is correct, in keeping with standard telegraphic practice. This was confirmed by Beloite and Beloite after years of research and debate.
18. Probably the most famous single defender is Doris "Dorie" Miller, an African-American cook aboard West Virginia, who went beyond his duty assignment when he took over an unattended anti-aircraft gun, on which he had no training, while bombs were hitting his ship. He earned a Navy Cross, first African-American sailor so decorated.
19. The wreck of Arizona has become a memorial to those lost that day, most of whom remain within the ship. She continues to leak small amounts of fuel oil, 65 years after the attack.
20. USS Shaw
21. USAAF pilots of the 46th and 47th Pursuit Squadrons, 15th Pursuit Group, claim to have destroyed 10.
22. Harry A. Gailey, The War in the Pacific: From Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay, Presidio Press: 1995. p.68
23. Gailey, op. cit., pp.97-98
24. Edwin P. Hoyt, Pearl Harbor, G.K. Hall & Co., 1991, p.190
25. Hoyt, op. cit., p.190
26. Hoyt, op. cit., p.190
27. Hoyt, op. cit., p.191
28. Prange et al., Pearl Harbor Papers.
29. Gailey, op. cit., p.97.
30. ibid.
31. Gailey, op. cit., p.98.

Further reading

• McCollum memo A 1940 memo from a Naval headquarters staff officer to his superiors outlining possible provocations to Japan, which might lead to war (declassified in 1994).
• Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept (McGraw-Hill, 1981), Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History (McGraw-Hill, 1986), and December 7, 1941: The Day the Japanese Attacked Pearl Harbor (McGraw-Hill, 1988). This monumental trilogy, written with collaborators Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, is considered the authoritative work on the subject.
• Larry Kimmett and Margaret Regis, The Attack on Pearl Harbor: An Illustrated History (NavPublishing, 2004). Using maps, photos, unique illustrations, and an animated CD, this book provides a detailed overview of the surprise attack that brought the United States into World War II.
• Walter Lord, Day of Infamy (Henry Holt, 1957) is a very readable, and entirely anecdotal, re-telling of the day's events.
• W. J. Holmes, Double-Edged Secrets: U.S. Naval Intelligence Operations in the Pacific During World War II (Naval Institute, 1979) contains some important material, such as Holmes' argument that, had the U.S. Navy been warned of the attack and put to sea, it would have likely resulted in an even greater disaster.
• Michael V. Gannon, Pearl Harbor Betrayed (Henry Holt, 2001) is a recent examination of the issues surrounding the surprise of the attack.
• Frederick D. Parker, Pearl Harbor Revisited: United States Navy Communications Intelligence 1924–1941 (Center for Cryptologic History, 1994) contains a detailed description of what the Navy knew from intercepted and decrypted Japan's communications prior to Pearl.
• Henry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee, Pearl Harbor: Final Judgment, (HarperCollins, 2001), an account of the secret "Clausen Inquiry" undertaken late in the war by order of Congress to Secretary of War Stimson.
• Robert A. Theobald, Final Secret of Pearl Harbor (Devin-Adair Pub, 1954) ISBN 0-8159-5503-0 ISBN 0-317-65928-6 Foreword by Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr.
• Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! (Henry Holt Co, 1958) ISBN 0-89275-011-1 ISBN 0-8159-7216-4
• Hamilton Fish, Tragic Deception: FDR and America's Involvement in World War II (Devin-Adair Pub, 1983) ISBN 0-8159-6917-1
• John Toland, Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath (Berkley Reissue edition, 1986 ISBN 0-425-09040-X) is an excellent account by a Pulitzer Prize winning author, though thought by some not to back up his claims as thoroughly as expected by academic conventions.
• Robert Stinnett, Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor (Free Press, 1999) A study of the Freedom of Information Act documents that led Congress to direct clearance of Kimmel and Short. ISBN 0-7432-0129-9
• Edward L. Beach, Scapegoats: A Defense of Kimmel and Short at Pearl HarborISBN 1-55750-059-2
• Andrew Krepinevich, Template:PDFlink (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments) contains a passage regarding the Yarnell attack, as well as reference citations.
• Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, (Stanford University Press: 1962). Regarded by many as the most important work in the attempt to understand the intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor. Her introduction and analysis of the concept of "noise" persists in understanding intelligence failures.
• John Hughes-Wilson, Military Intelligence Blunders and Cover-Ups. Robinson, 1999 (revised 2004). Contains a brief but insightful chapter on the particular intelligence failures, and broader overview of what causes them.
• Horn, Steve (2005). The Second Attack on Pearl Harbor: Operation K And Other Japanese Attempts to Bomb America in World War II. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-388-8. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)

• Seki, Eiji (2007). Sinking of the SS Automedon And the Role of the Japanese Navy: A New Interpretation. University of Hawaii Press. ISBN 1905246285. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)

• Daniel Madsen, Resurrection-Salvaging the Battle Fleet at Pearl Harbor. U.S. Naval Institute Press. 2003. Highly readable and thoroughly researched account of the aftermath of the attack and the salvage efforts from December 8, 1941 through early 1944.

External links

This article's use of external links may not follow Misplaced Pages's policies or guidelines. Please improve this article by removing excessive or inappropriate external links, and converting useful links where appropriate into footnote references. (Learn how and when to remove this message)

1. Part 1

Accounts

• Guarding The United States And Its Outposts Official U.S. Army history of Pearl Harbor
• War comes to Hawaii Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Monday, Sept. 13, 1999

Media

• Video of first Newsreel from December 23 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor
• Tour the Pearl Harbor Attack Graphical tour of the Attack on Pearl Harbor
• Roosevelt's Day Of Infamy Speech Audio of speech given by President Roosevelt shortly after Pearl Harbor Attack
• U.S. Naval Historical Center "Pearl Harbor Raid: Overview and Special Image Selection"
• Library of Congress: The day after

Historic documents

• US Coast Guard at Pearl Harbor attack December 7, 1941
• Second World War - USA Declaration of War on Japan.
• Collection of extensive Japanese preparation military documents
• Naval Institute Special Collections: Pearl Harbor — Articles, books, and pictures.
• Pearl Harbor Attack Hearings Detailed reports from various investigations.
• Pearl Harbor Attack at HyperWar
• Information and Photographs on the Attack on Pearl Harbor at WWII Archives

Miscellaneous

• "Pearl Harbor Attacked" Message Board — A website featuring personal recollections.
• Template:Dmoz
• Pearl Harbor website (reference only)

21°22′N 157°57′W / 21.367°N 157.950°W / 21.367; -157.950

Template:Link FA Template:Link FA Template:Link FA Template:Link FA

• 1941 in the United States
• Asia and the Pacific 1941-42
• Attack on Pearl Harbor
• Battles involving Japan
• Battles involving the United States
• Conflicts in 1941
• History of Hawaii
• History of the United States (1918–1945)
• Japanese American history
• Military history of the United States 1900-1999
• World War II Pacific Theatre