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Combatant Status Review Tribunals were held in a small trailer, the same width, but shorter, than a mobile home. The Tribunal's President sat in the big chair. The detainee sat with their hands and feet shackled to a bolt in the floor in the white, plastic garden chair. A one way mirror behind the Tribunal's President allowed observers to observe clandestinely. In theory the open sessions of the Tribunals were open to the press. Three chairs were reserved for them. In practice the Tribunal only intermittently told the press that Tribunals were being held. And when they did they kept the detainee's identities secret. In practice almost all Tribunals went unobserved. Navy photo by Photographer’s Mate 1st Class Christopher Mobley
Initially the Bush administration asserted that they could withhold all the protections of the Geneva Conventions to captives from the war on terror. This policy was challenged before the Judicial branch. Critics argued that the USA could not evade its obligation to conduct a competent tribunals to determine whether captives are, or are not, entitled to the protections of prisoner of war status.
Subsequently the Department of Defense instituted the Combatant Status Review Tribunals. The Tribunals, however, were not authorized to determine whether the captives were lawful combatants -- rather they were merely empowered to make a recommendation as to whether the captive had previously been correctly determined to match the Bush administration's definition of an enemy combatant.
Razzak chose to participate in his Combatant Status Review Tribunal.
allegations
The allegations against Razzak were:
a. -- The general summary of the allegations that establish an association with terrorism were missing from the transcript. --
Detainee served as a Taliban driver beginning in 1992.
Detainee was a commander of a Taliban terrorist cell in Afghanistan.
Detainee conducted an escort mission for Usama bin Laden in Jalalabad, Afghanistan.
Detainee provided goods and funding for Taliban terrorist cells in Afghanistan.
Detainee provided guidance in the terrorist training camp near Kandahar.
b. -- The general summary of the allegations of hostile activity were missing from the transcript. --
Detainee fought against United States forces in Kabul.
Detainee provided weapons and explosives to a Taliban terrorist cell in Afghanistan.
Detainee was involved in assassination attempts against Afghani government officials.
witnesses
Razak requested three witnesses; Abdul Wahled, Haji Abdul Zaher and Ismael Kahn. The Tribunal's President ruled that they were not reasonably available because they thought that they were all in Afghanistan, and the State Department's requests to the Afghan government had been gone unanswered.
Administrative Review Board hearings
Hearing room where Guantanamo captive's annual Administrative Review Board hearings convened for captives whose Combatant Status Review Tribunal had already determined they were an "enemy combatant".
Detainees who were determined to have been properly classified as "enemy combatants" were scheduled to have their dossier reviewed at annual Administrative Review Board hearings. The Administrative Review Boards weren't authorized to review whether a detainee qualified for POW status, and they weren't authorized to review whether a detainee should have been classified as an "enemy combatant".
They were authorized to consider whether a detainee should continue to be detained by the United States, because they continued to pose a threat -- or whether they could safely be repatriated to the custody of their home country, or whether they could be set free.
The following primary factors favor continued detention:
a.
Commitment
1.
The detianee said he was forced to serve the Taliban three months out of every year since they came to power in 1992.
2.
The detainee was a driver and fought in the Russian jihad for a commander of approximately 800 to 1000 soldiers.
The commander became a military commander in Afghanistan after the jihad.
3.
A source stated that Taliban fighters go to the military commander's compound in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.
The fighters receive money, supplies and orders at the compound.
b.
Training
1.
A source stated that the detainee was involved in a terrorist training training camp near Khotal-e-Morcha mountain pass outside of Knadahar, Afghanistan.
2.
A source stated that the detainee was directly involved in assassination attempts.
The source stated that the detainee also attempted to have other personnel participated in suicide missions.
The detainee provided training on how to use explosive vests.
c.
Connections/Associations
1.
A source stated that the detainee was originally a freedom fighter against the Soviets, a member of [[Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin has staged small attacks in its attempts to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan,
overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration and establish a fundamentalist state.
Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin has long-established ties with Usama bin Laden.
2.
The Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin has staged small attacks in its attempt to force United States troops to withdraw from Afghanistan,
overthrow the Afghan Transitional Administration and establish a fundamentalist state.
Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin has long established ties with Usama bin Laden.
A source stated that the detainee was paid to smuggle 50 Arab family members out of Afghanist and into Zabul, Iran through Afghanistan's Nimroz Province.
5.
A source stated that the detainee was high in the al Qaida hierarchy and acted as a smuggler and facilitator.
The detainee received money and weapons from Syria.
The source stated that al Qaida's operational leader provided weapons to the detainee.
6.
The detainee provided details of weapons shipments and weapons smuggling routes of Jamiat Islami.
7.
The Jamiat Ulema e Islami is a radical Sunni religious-political party best known for its anti-United States threats, vocal support of Usama bin Ladin and sponsorship of some 3,000
religious schools.
8.
The detainee was identified as a senior leader of a 40-man unit for the Taliban in Afghanistan.
A source stated that the unit receives money, weapons and support from al Qaida and continually plans to kill Americans.
9.
A source stated that the detainee was the number two commander of the unit and also the Taliban Supreme Commander in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.
10.
The detainee stated that the 40-man unit's commander gave the detainee his satellite phone number so President Karzai could contact the 40-man unit's commander and order him
to turn in the rest of his weapons if President Karzai desired it.
11.
A source stated that the 40=man units' leaders stayed in a contact through satellite telephones.
12.
The detainee was detained as a suspected member of a Taliban organization.
d.
Other Relevant Data
1.
The detainee helped an individual escapt from a Ministry of Intelligence Prison in Kandahar, Afghanistna.
2.
The individual is an exiled Afghan commander.
3.
In early 2004, the exiled Afghan commander was known to have distributed approximately 40,000 small arms of unknown origin to former mujahedin fighters and personal associates located in Herat Province, Afghanistan.
4.
A source stated that the detainee received weapons shipments, plastic explosives, night-vision equipment, missiles, small arms and ammunition from Syria.
The weapons come form Sytia to Zahedan, Iran and were smuggled into Afghanistan.
5.
A source stated that military weapons were delivered to the detainee who aided in it's [sic] distribution to a terrorist team.
The source stated that the detainee also had a night vision and telescopint optical device to use during mission preparation and for surveillance on United States Forces.
6.
A source stated that the detaioee was knowledgeable of an assassiation plot against President Karzai the day before it occurred.
7.
On 2 November 2001, source indicated that senior Taliban officials were extremely
concerned about stopping opposition leader Hamid Karzai.
During conversation between the detainee and a senior Taliban leader, they
discussed the fact that Karzai had escapted a Taliban attack.
8.
A source stated that the detainee attempted to have two other individuals kill the Kandahar, Afghanistan Governor.
9.
A source stated that in 2002, the detainee claimed that there were still suicide pilots in the United Stats who could carry out there missions.
The following primary factors favor release or transfer:
a.
The detainee claims he is not a Taliban member.
b.
The detainee vehemently denies that he is currently associated with the Taliban.
c.
The detainee states that the Taliban is a stupid organization.
d.
An individual that was part of a 40-man team was under the command of Abdul Razaq [sic].
e.
The individual described Abdbul Razaq [sic] as having dark eyes, a full beard, and taller than himself.
The individual claims this Abdul Razaq [sic] is not the same person as the detainee.
