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Vietnam War
File:Saigon T-54.jpg Conclusion of a war: A North Vietnamese T-54 tank breaking into the grounds of the Presidential Palace.
Date 1959 – April 30 1975 Location Southeast Asia Result North Vietnamese victory, American defeat; Territorial changes Reunification of Vietnam under the rule of the Communist Party of Vietnam Communist rule in Laos and rise to power of Cambodia's Khmer Rouge.
Belligerents
Anti-communist forces South Vietnam United States South Korea Thailand Australia Philippines New Zealand Khmer Republic Kingdom of Laos	Communist forces North Vietnam Viet Cong China Khmer Rouge Soviet Union North Korea Pathet Lao
Commanders and leaders
Nguyen Van Thieu Ngo Dinh Diem † John F. Kennedy † Lyndon Johnson † Robert McNamara William Westmoreland Richard Nixon Creighton Abrams †	Ho Chi Minh † Le Duan Nguyen Chi Thanh † Vo Nguyen Giap Van Tien Dung Tran Van Tra Duong Van Nhut Đồng Sỹ Nguyên
Strength
~1,200,000 (1968) United States: 553,000 (1969)	~520,000 (1968)
Casualties and losses
South Vietnam dead: ~250,000; wounded: ~1,170,000 US dead: 58,209; 2,000 missing; wounded: 305,000 South Korea dead: 4,900; wounded: 11,000 Australia dead: 520; wounded: 2,400* New Zealand dead: 37; wounded: 187 Total dead: ~314,000 Total wounded: ~1,490,000	North Vietnam & NLF dead/missing: ~1,100,000; wounded: 600,000+ China dead: 1,446; wounded: 4,200 Total dead: ~1,101,000 Total wounded: ~604,000+
Vietnamese civilian dead: 2,000,000–5,100,000* Cambodian civilian dead: ~700,000* Laotian civilian dead: ~50,000* * = approximations, see Casualties below For more information on casualties see Vietnam War casualties

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The Vietnam War, also known as the Second Indochina War, and in Vietnam as the American War, occurred from 1965 to April 30, 1975. The Vietnam Conflict is often used normally to include what occurred from 1959 to April 30, 1975. The last American troops left Vietnam on April 30 1975. It concluded with the reunification of the country under North Vietnamese rule. Historians disagree whether the victory was militarily or policical. The war was fought between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) and the United States-supported Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). The war ended with the defeat of the United States and South Vietnam, resulting in the unification of Vietnam under the communist government of the North.

"If we use conventional military criteria, the Americans should have been victorious. They used 15 million tons of munitions (as much as they employed in World War Two), had a vast military superiority over their enemies by any standard one employs, and still they were defeated." Edward N. Luttwak of Time magazine said, "The customary reward of defeat, if one can survive it, is in the lessons thereby learned, which may yield victory in the next war. But the circumstances of our defeat in Vietnam were sufficiently ambiguous to deny the nation (that) benefit." "Richard Nixon said in 1985, "No event in American history is more misunderstood than the Vietnam War. It was misreported then, and it is misremembered now."

Over 1.4 million military personnel were killed in the war (approximately 6% were members of the United States armed forces), while estimates of civilian fatalities range from 2 to 5.1 million. On April 30 1975, the capital of South Vietnam, Saigon fell to the communist forces of North Vietnam, effectively ending the Vietnam War.

Names for the conflict

Various names have been applied to the conflict, and these have shifted over time, although Vietnam War is the most commonly used title in English. It has been variously called the Second Indochina War, the Vietnam Conflict, the Vietnam War, and, in Vietnamese, Chiến tranh Việt Nam (The Vietnam War) or Kháng chiến chống Mỹ (Resistance War against America).

1. Second Indochina War: places the conflict into context with other distinct, but related, and contiguous conflicts in Southeast Asia. Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia are seen as the battlegrounds of a larger Indochinese conflict that began at the end of World War II and lasted until communist victory in 1975. This conflict can be viewed in terms of the demise of colonialism and its after-effects during the Cold War.
2. Vietnam Conflict: largely a U.S. designation.
3. Vietnam War: the most commonly used designation in English, it suggests that the location of the war was exclusively within the borders of North and South Vietnam, failing to recognize its wider context.
4. Resistance War against the Americans to Save the Nation: the term favored by North Vietnam (and after North Vietnam's victory over South Vietnam, by Vietnam as a whole); it is more of a slogan than a name, and its meaning is self-evident. Its usage has been abolished in recent years as the government of Vietnam seeks better relations with the U.S. Official Vietnamese publications now refer to the conflict generically as "Chiến tranh Việt Nam" (Vietnam War).

Background to 1949

From 110 BC to 938 AD (with the exception of brief periods), much of present-day Vietnam was part of China. After gaining independence, Vietnam went through a long period of resisting outside aggression. In 1789 Quang Trung launched a surprise attack against the Chinese garrison of Hanoi during the Tết celebrations--a celebrated feat of arms in Vietnamese history. By 1802, centuries of internal feuding between the Trinh and Nguyen lords ended when Emperor Gia Long unified modern Vietnam under the Nguyen dynasty. The French gained control of Indochina (French Indochina included Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam) during a series of colonial wars, from 1859 to 1885. At the Versailles Conference in 1919, Ho Chi Minh (a pseudonym meaning the Enlightener) requested that a Vietnamese delegation be present to work toward independence for Vietnam. He hoped U.S. President Woodrow Wilson would support the effort. While he was sorely disappointed that Wilson gave no response to Ho's words, he did draw attention from some French socialists.

During the Second World War, the puppet government of Vichy France cooperated with Imperial Japanese forces. Vietnam was under de facto Japanese control, although the French continued to serve as the day-to-day administrators.

In 1941 the Communist-dominated national resistance group called the "League for the Independence of Vietnam" (better known as the Viet Minh) was formed. Ho Chi Minh returned to Vietnam and quickly assumed the leadership. He had been a Comintern agent since the 1920s, but as the leader of an independent Vietnamese communist party, Ho freed himself from the control of the Soviet Union. He maintained good relations with the Soviets, however. The Viet Minh began to craft a strategy to seize control of the country at the end of the war. Ho appointed Vo Nguyen Giap as his military commander.

Ho Chi Minh's guerrillas were given funding and training by the United States Office of Strategic Services (the precursor of the Central Intelligence Agency). These teams worked behind enemy lines in Indochina, giving support to indigenous resistance groups. The Viet Minh provided valuable intelligence on Japanese troop movements and rescued downed American pilots. The Pentagon, however, viewed Indochina as a sideshow to the more important theatre of the Pacific War. In 1944, the Japanese overthrew the Vichy French administration and humiliated its colonial officials in front of the Vietnamese population. The Japanese began to encourage nationalism and granted Vietnam nominal independence. On March 11 1945, Emperor Bao Dai declared the independence within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Following the Japanese surrender, Vietnamese nationalists, communists, and other groups hoped to take control of the country. The Japanese army transferred power to the Viet Minh. Emperor Bao Dai abdicated. On September 2 1945, Hồ Chí Minh declared independence from France, in what became known as the August Revolution. U.S. Army officers stood beside him on the podium. In an exultant speech, before a huge audience in Hanoi, Ho cited the U.S. Declaration of Independence:

"'All men are created equal. They are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.' This immortal statement was made in the Declaration of Independence of the United States of America in 1776 … We … solemnly declare to the world that Vietnam has the right to be a free and independent country. The entire Vietnamese people are determined … to sacrifice their lives and property in order to safeguard their independence and liberty."

Ho hoped that America would ally itself with a Vietnamese nationalist movement, communist or otherwise. He based this hope in part on speeches by U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt opposing a revival of European colonialism. As well, he was counting on a long series of anti-colonial U.S. pronouncements, stretching back to the American War of Independence. Indeed, Ho Chi Minh told an Office of Strategic Services officer that he would welcome "a million American soldiers … but no French." Power politics, however, intervened. The U.S. changed its position. It was recognized that France would play a crucial role in deterring communist ambitions in continental Europe. Thus, its colonial aspirations could not be ignored.

The new government lasted only a few days. At the Potsdam Conference the allies decided that Vietnam would be occupied jointly by China and Great Britain, who would supervise the disarmament and repatriation of Japanese forces. The Chinese army arrived a few days after Hồ's declaration of independence. Ho Chi Minh's government effectively ceased to exist. The Chinese took control of the area north of the 16th parallel north. British forces arrived in the south in October and restored order. The British commander of Southeast Asia, Lord Mountbatten, sent over 20,000 troops of the 20th Indian division under General Douglas Gracey to occupy Saigon. The first soldiers arrived on September 6, 1945 and increased to full strength over the following weeks. In addition, they re-armed Japanese prisoners of war, known as "Gremlin force". The British began to withdraw in December 1945, but this was not completed until May 1946. The last British casualties in Vietnam were suffered in June 1946. Altogether 40 British and Indian troops were killed and over a hundred were wounded. Vietnamese casualties were 600 . The French prevailed upon them to turn over control.

French officials immediately sought to reassert control. They negotiated with the Chinese Nationalists. By agreeing to give up its concessions in China, the French persuaded the Chinese to allow them to return to the north and negotiate with the Viet Minh. In the meantime, Hồ took advantage of the negotiations to kill competing nationalist groups. He was anxious for the Chinese to leave. "The last time the Chinese came," he remarked, "they stayed one thousand years … I prefer to smell French turd for five years, rather than eat Chinese dung for the rest of my life." After negotiations collapsed over the formation of a government within the new French Union, the French bombarded Haiphong. In December 1946, they reoccupied Hanoi. Several telegrams were sent by Ho Chi Minh to U.S. President Harry S. Truman asking for U.S. support. But they were ignored. Ho and the Việt Minh fled into the mountains to start an insurgency, marking the beginning of the First Indochina War. After the defeat of the Nationalist Chinese by the Communists in the Chinese Civil War, Chairman Mao Zedong provided direct military assistance to the Viet Minh. On the eve of the war, Ho Chi Minh had warned a French official that "you can kill ten of my men for every one I kill of yours, but even at those odds, you will lose and I will win". A long and bloody struggle ensued, with French military casualties exceeding those of the U.S. during its involvement.

The Pentagon Papers characterize the U.S. position at the time as ambivalent. On the one hand, the U.S. wished to persuade France to consider decolonization, while ultimately leaving the timetable up to them. During the war, Roosevelt had consistently stalled French demands for U.S. help in recolonizing Indochina. "France has milked it for one hundred years," he wrote. "The people of IndoChina are entitled to something better than that." After the war, the French argued that it was consistent with the principles of the new United Nations that some degree of autonomy should be granted to Indochina. France, however, claimed that it could do so only after it regained control.

Much hinged on the perception of Hồ's allegiances. In the wake of the Second World War, it was recognized that the Soviet Union would henceforth be a serious competitor to the West. America viewed the Soviet Union and its allies as a bloc. As far as Washington was concerned, the entire communist world was controlled by Moscow. In spite of Hồ's pleas for U.S. recognition, the U.S. gradually came to the conclusion that he was under Moscow's control. This perception suited the French. As United States Secretary of State Dean Acheson noted, "the U.S. came to the aid of the French … because we needed their support for our policies in regard to NATO … The French blackmailed us. At every meeting … they brought up Indochina … but refused to tell me what they hoped to accomplish or how. Perhaps they didn't know."

Exit of the French, 1950–1954

In 1950, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and China recognized each other diplomatically. The Soviet Union quickly followed suit. U.S. President Harry S. Truman countered by recognizing the French puppet government of Vietnam. Washington feared that Hanoi was a pawn of Communist China and, by extension, Moscow. This flew in the face of the long historical antipathy between the two nations, of which the U.S. seems to have been completely ignorant. As Doan Huynh commented, "Vietnam a part of the Chinese expansionist game in Asia? For anyone who knows the history of Indochina, this is incomprehensible." Nevertheless, Chinese support was very important to the Viet Minh's success, and China largely supported the Vietnamese Communists through the end of the war.

The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 marked a decisive turning point. From the perspective of many in Washington, D.C., what had been a colonial war in Indochina was transformed into another example of communist expansionism directed by the Kremlin.

In 1950, the U.S. Military Assistance and Advisory Group (MAAG) arrived to screen French requests for aid, advise on strategy and train Vietnamese soldiers. By 1954, the U.S. had supplied 300,000 small arms and spent one billion dollars in support of the French military effort. The Eisenhower administration was shouldering 80% of the cost of the war. The Viet Minh received crucial support from the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. Chinese support in the Border Campaign of 1950 allowed supplies to come from China into Vietnam. Throughout the conflict, U.S. intelligence estimates remained skeptical of French chances of success.

The Battle of Dien Bien Phu marked the end of French involvement in Indochina. The Viet Minh and their mercurial commander Vo Nguyen Giap handed the French a stunning military defeat. On May 7, 1954, the French Union garrison surrendered. At the Geneva Conference the French negotiated a ceasefire agreement with the Viet Minh. Independence was granted to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. As a U.S. Army study noted, France lost the war primarily because it "neglected to cultivate the loyalty and support of the Vietnamese people." More than 400,000 civilians and soldiers had died during the nine year conflict.

Vietnam was temporarily partitioned at the 17th parallel, and under the terms of the Geneva Convention, civilians were to be given the opportunity to freely move between the two provisional states. Nearly one million northerners (mainly Catholics) fled south in "understandable terror" of Ho Chi Minh's new regime. It is estimated that as many as two million more would have left had they not been stopped by the Viet Minh. In the north, the Viet Minh established a socialist state—the Democratic Republic of Vietnam—and engaged in a land reform program in which the mass killing of perceived "class enemies" occurred. Ho Chi Minh later apologized. In the south a non-communist state was established under the Emperor Bao Dai, a former puppet of the French and the Japanese. Ngo Dinh Diem became his Prime Minister. In addition to the Catholics flowing south, up to 90,000 Viet Minh fighters went north for "regroupment" as envisioned by the Geneva Accords. However, in contravention of the Accords, the Viet Minh left roughly 5,000-10,000 cadres in South Vietnam as a “politico-military substructure within the object of its irredentism.”

Diem era, 1955–1963

As dictated by the Geneva Conference of 1954, the partition of Vietnam was meant to be only temporary, pending national elections on July 20, 1956. Much like Korea, the agreement stipulated that the two military zones were to be separated by a temporary demarcation line (known as the Demilitarized Zone or DMZ). The United States, alone among the great powers, refused to sign the Geneva agreement. The President of South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, declined to hold elections. This called into question the United States' commitment to democracy in the region, but also raised questions about the legitimacy of any election held in the communist-run North. President Dwight D. Eisenhower expressed U.S. fears when he wrote that, in 1954, "80 per cent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh" over Emperor Bao Dai. However, this wide popularity was expressed before Ho's disastrous land reform program and a peasant revolt in Ho's home province which had to be bloodily suppressed.

The cornerstone of U.S. policy was the Domino Theory. This argued that if South Vietnam fell to communist forces, then all of South East Asia would follow. Popularized by the Eisenhower Administration, some argued that if communism spread unchecked, it would follow them home by first reaching Hawaii and follow to the West Coast of the United States. It was better, therefore, to fight communism in Asia, rather than on American soil. Thus, the Domino Theory provided a powerful motive for the American creation of a client state in southern Vietnam. The theory underpinned American policy in Vietnam for five presidencies. Another important motive was the preservation of U.S. credibility and prestige.

The United States pursued a policy of containment. Following the North Atlantic Treaty Organization model, Washington established the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) to counter communist expansion in the region. The policy of containment was first suggested by George F. Kennan in the 1947 X Article, published anonymously in Foreign Affairs and remained U.S. policy for the next quarter of a century.

Rule

Ngo Dinh Diem was chosen by the U.S. to lead South Vietnam. A devout Roman Catholic, he was fervently anti-communist and was "untainted" by any connection to the French. He was one of the few prominent Vietnamese nationalist who could claim both attributes. Historian Luu Doan Huynh notes, however, that "Diem represented narrow and extremist nationalism coupled with autocracy and nepotism."

The new American patrons were almost completely ignorant of Vietnamese culture. They knew little of the language or long history of the country. There was a tendency to assign American motives to Vietnamese actions, and Diem warned that it was an illusion to believe that blindly copying Western methods would solve Vietnamese problems.

In April and June 1955, Diem (against U.S. advice) cleared the decks of any political opposition by launching military operations against the Cao Dai religious sect, the Buddhist Hoa Hao, and the Binh Xuyen organized crime group (which was allied with members of the secret police and some military elements). Diem accused these groups of harboring Communist agents. As broad-based opposition to his harsh tactics mounted, Diem increasingly sought to blame the communists.

Beginning in the summer of 1955, he launched the "Denounce the Communists" campaign, during which communists and other anti-government elements were arrested, imprisoned, tortured or executed. Opponents were labeled Viet Cong by the regime to demean their nationalist credentials. During this period refugees moved across the demarcation line in both directions. Around 52,000 Vietnamese civilians moved from south to north. 450,000 people, primarily Catholics, traveled from the north to south, in aircraft and ships provided by France and the U.S. CIA propaganda efforts increased the outflow with slogans such as "the Virgin Mary is going South." The northern refugees were meant to give Diem a strong anti-communist constituency.

In a referendum on the future of the monarchy, Diem rigged the poll which was supervised by his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu and received "98.2 percent" of the vote, including "133 percent" in Saigon. His American advisers had recommended a more modest winning margin of "60 to 70 percent." Diem, however, viewed the election as a test of authority. On October 26, 1955, Diem declared the new Republic of Vietnam, with himself as president. The creation of the Republic of Vietnam was largely because of the Eisenhower administration's desire for an anti-communist state in the region. Colonel Edward Lansdale, a CIA officer, became an important advisor to the new president.

As a wealthy Catholic, Diem was viewed by many ordinary Vietnamese as part of the old elite that had helped the French rule Vietnam. The majority of Vietnamese people were Buddhist, so his attack on the Buddhist community served only to deepen mistrust. Diem's human rights abuses increasingly alienated the population.

In May, Diem undertook a ten day state visit of the United States. President Eisenhower pledged his continued support. A parade in New York City was held in his honor. Although Diem was openly praised, in private Secretary of State John Foster Dulles conceded that he had been selected because there were no better alternative.

Insurgency in the South, 1956-1960

In 1956 one of the leading communists in the south, Le Duan, returned to Hanoi to urge the Vietnam Workers' Party to take a firmer stand on the reunification of Vietnam under Communist leadership. But Hanoi (then in a severe economic crisis) hesitated in launching a full-scale military struggle. The northern Communists feared U.S. intervention and believed that conditions in South Vietnam were not yet ripe for a people's revolution. However, in December 1956, Ho Chi Minh authorized the Viet Minh cadres still in South Vietnam to begin a low level insurgency. In North Vietnamese political theory, the action was a subset of "political struggle" called "armed propaganda," and consisted mostly in kidnappings and terrorist attacks.

Four hundred government officials were assassinated in 1957 alone, and the violence gradually increased. While the terror was originally aimed at local government officials, it soon broadened to include other symbols of the status quo, such as school teachers, health workers, agricultural officials, etc. One estimate purports that by 1958, 20% of South Vietnam's village chiefs had been murdered by the insurgents. What was sought was a method of completely destroying government control in South Vietnam's rural villages in order to be replaced by a NLF shadow government. Finally, in January 1959, under pressure from southern cadres who were being targeted by Diem's secret police, the north's Central Committee issued a secret resolution authorizing an "armed struggle." This authorized the southern Viet Minh to begin large scale operations against the South Vietnamese military. In response, Diem enacted tough new anti-communist laws. However, North Vietnam supplied troops and supplies in earnest, and the infiltration of men and weapons from the north began along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Observing the increasing unpopularity of the Diem regime, on December 12, 1960, Hanoi authorized the creation of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NLF). The NLF was made up of two distinct groups: nationalists and communists. While there were many non-communist members of the NLF, they were subject to party control and increasingly side-lined as the conflict continued. The principal objective of the NLF was to seize political power through a popular insurrection—military operations were secondary. The NLF emphasized patriotism, honesty and good government, while promising the reunification of Vietnam and an end to American influence.

Successive American administrations, as Robert McNamara and others have noted, over-estimated the control that Hanoi had over the NLF. Diem's paranoia, repression, and incompetence progressively angered large segments of the population of South Vietnam. Thus, many maintain that the origins of the anti-government violence were homegrown, rather than inspired by Hanoi. However, as historian Douglas Pike pointed out, “today, no serious historian would defend the thesis that North Vietnam was not involved in the Vietnam war from the start.... To maintain this thesis today, one would be obliged to deal with the assertion of Northern involvement that have poured out of Hanoi since the end of the war."

John F. Kennedy's escalation and Americanization, 1960–1963

When John F. Kennedy won the 1960 U.S. presidential election, one major issue Kennedy raised was whether the Soviet space and missile programs had surpassed those of the U.S. As Kennedy took over, despite warnings from Eisenhower about Laos and Vietnam, Europe and Latin America "loomed larger than Asia on his sights." In his inaugural address, Kennedy made the ambitious pledge to "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and success of liberty."

In June 1961, John F. Kennedy bitterly disagreed with Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev when they met in Vienna over key U.S.-Soviet issues. Cold war strategists concluded Southeast Asia would be one of the testing ground where Soviet forces would test the USA's containment policy - begun during the Truman Administration and solidified by the stalemate resulting from the Korean War.

Although Kennedy stressed long-range missile parity with the Soviets, he was also interested in using special forces for counterinsurgency warfare in Third World countries threatened by communist insurgencies. Originally intended for use behind front lines after a conventional invasion of Europe, Kennedy believed that the guerrilla tactics employed by special forces such as the Green Berets would be effective in a "brush fire" war in Vietnam. He saw British success in using such forces in Malaya as a strategic template.

The Kennedy administration remained essentially committed to the Cold War foreign policy inherited from the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. In 1961, Kennedy faced a three-part crisis - the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the construction of the Berlin Wall, and a negotiated settlement between the pro-Western government of Laos and the Pathet Lao communist movement - made Kennedy believe another failure on the part of the United States to gain control and stop communist expansion would fatally damage U.S. credibility with its allies and his own reputation. Kennedy determined to 'draw a line in the sand' and prevent a communist victory in Vietnam saying, "Now we have a problem making our power credible and Vietnam looks like the place" to James Reston of the New York Times (immediately after meeting Khrushchev in Vienna).

In May 1961, Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson visited Saigon and enthusiastically declared Diem the "Winston Churchill of Asia." Asked why he had made the comment, Johnson replied, "Diem's the only boy we got out there." Johnson assured Diem of more aid, in order to mold a fighting force that could resist the communists.

Kennedy's policy towards South Vietnam rested on the assumption that Diem and his forces must ultimately defeat the guerrillas on their own. He was against the deployment of American combat troops and observed that "to introduce U.S. forces in large numbers there today, while it might have an initially favorable military impact, would almost certainly lead to adverse political and, in the long run, adverse military consequences."

The quality of the South Vietnamese military, however, remained poor. Bad leadership, corruption and political interference all played a part in emasculating the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). The frequency of guerrilla attacks rose, as the insurgency gathered steam. Hanoi's support for the NLF played a significant role. But South Vietnamese governmental incompetence was at the core of the crisis. Maxwell Taylor and Walt Rostow recommended that U.S. troops be sent to South Vietnam disguised as flood relief workers. Kennedy rejected the idea but increased military assistance yet again. In April 1962, John Kenneth Galbraith warned Kennedy of the "danger we shall replace the French as a colonial force in the area and bleed as the French did." By mid-1962, the number of U.S. military advisers in South Vietnam had risen from 700 to 12,000.

The Strategic Hamlet Program had been initiated in 1961. This joint U.S.-South Vietnamese program attempted to resettle the rural population into fortified camps. The aim was to isolate the population from the insurgents, provide education and health care, and strengthen the government's hold over the countryside. The Strategic Hamlets, however, were quickly infiltrated by the guerrillas. The peasants resented being uprooted from their ancestral villages. The government refused to undertake land reform, which left farmers paying high rents to a few wealthy landlords. Corruption dogged the program and intensified opposition. Government officials were targeted for assassination. The Strategic Hamlet Program collapsed two years later.

On July 23, 1962, fourteen nations, including, China, South Vietnam, the Soviet Union, North Vietnam and the United States, signed an agreement promising the neutrality of Laos.

Coup and assassinations

Some policy-makers in Washington began to conclude that Diem was incapable of defeating the communists and might even make a deal with Ho Chi Minh. He seemed concerned only with fending off coups. As Robert F. Kennedy noted, "Diem wouldn't make even the slightest concessions. He was difficult to reason with …" During the summer of 1963 U.S. officials began discussing the possibility of a regime change. The United States Department of State was generally in favor of encouraging a coup. The Pentagon and CIA were more alert to the destabilizing consequences of such an act and wanted to continue applying pressure for reforms.

Chief among the proposed changes was the removal of Diem's younger brother Ngo Dinh Nhu. Nhu controlled the secret police and was seen as the man behind the Buddhist repression. As Diem's most powerful adviser, Nhu had become a hated figure in South Vietnam. His continued influence was unacceptable to the Kennedy administration. Eventually, the administration concluded that Diem was unwilling to change.

The CIA was in contact with generals planning to remove Diem. They were told that the United States would support such a move. President Diem was overthrown and executed, along with his brother, on November 2, 1963. When he was informed, Maxwell Taylor remembered that Kennedy "rushed from the room with a look of shock and dismay on his face." He had not approved Diem's murder. The U.S. ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., invited the coup leaders to the embassy and congratulated them. Ambassador Lodge informed Kennedy that "the prospects now are for a shorter war".

Following the coup, chaos ensued. Hanoi took advantage of the situation and increased its support for the guerrillas. South Vietnam entered a period of extreme political instability, as one military government toppled another in quick succession. Increasingly, each new regime was viewed as a puppet of the Americans. For whatever the failings of Diem, his credentials as a nationalist had been impeccable.

Kennedy increased the number of U.S. military advisers from 800 to 16,300 to cope with rising guerrilla activity. The advisers were embedded at every level of the South Vietnamese armed forces. They were, however, almost completely ignorant of the political nature of the insurgency. The insurgency was a political power struggle, in which military engagements were not the main goal. The Kennedy administration sought to refocus U.S. efforts on pacification and "winning over the hearts and minds" of the population. The military leadership in Washington, however, was hostile to any role for U.S. advisers other than conventional troop training. General Paul Harkins, the commander of U.S. forces in South Vietnam, confidently predicted victory by Christmas 1963. The CIA was less optimistic, however, warning that "the Viet Cong by and large retain de facto control of much of the countryside and have steadily increased the overall intensity of the effort".

In a conversation with Nobel Peace Prize winner and Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson, Kennedy sought his advice. "Get out," Pearson replied. "That's a stupid answer," shot back Kennedy. "Everyone knows that. The question is: How do we get out?" Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963, just three weeks after Diem.

Kennedy had introduced helicopters to the war and created a joint U.S.-South Vietnamese Air Force, staffed with American pilots. He also sent in the Green Berets. He was succeeded by Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson, who reaffirmed America's support of South Vietnam. By the end of the year Saigon had received $500 million in military aid, much of which was lost to corruption.

United States goes to war, end of 1963–1968

Lyndon Johnson, more concerned with his great society and social progressive programs, did not consider Vietnam a priority as he took over the presidency after the death of Kennedy. Johnson had a difficult time with American foreign policy makers, specifically Harriman and Acheson, who to Johnson spoke a different language. Particularly heated was the relationship between the new president and national security advisor McGeorge Bundy. Shortly after the assassination of Kennedy, when Bundy called LBJ on the phone, LBJ responded:

"Goddammit, Bundy. I've told you that when I want you I'll call you."

On November 24, 1963, Johnson brought a small group together to talk with Henry Cabot Lodge, and the new president provided his support to help win the Vietnam war. But the pledge came at a time when Vietnam was deteriorating, especially in places like the Mekong Delta, because of the recent coup against Diem.

The military revolutionary council, meeting in lieu of a strong South Vietnamese leader, was made up of 12 members headed by General Minh--who Stanley Karnow, a journalist on the ground, later recalled as "a model of lethargy." His regime was overthrown in January 1964 by General Nguyen Khanh. Lodge, frustrated by the end of year, cabled home about Minh: "Will he be strong enough to get on top of things?"

On August 2 1964, the USS Maddox, on an intelligence mission along North Vietnam's coast, was attacked by torpedo boats in the Gulf of Tonkin. A second attack was reported two days later on the USS Turner Joy and Maddox in the same area. The circumstances of the attack were murky. Lyndon Johnson commented to Undersecretary of State George Ball that "those sailors out there may have been shooting at flying fish." The second attack led to retaliatory air strikes, prompted Congress to approve the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution,and gave the president power to conduct military operations in South East Asia without declaring war.

The second attack, however, was later called into question. "The Gulf of Tonkin incident," writes Louise Gerdes, "is an oft-cited example of the way in which Johnson misled the American people to gain support for his foreign policy in Vietnam." George C. Herring argues, however, that McNamara and the Pentagon "did not knowingly lie about the alleged attacks, but they were obviously in a mood to retaliate and they seem to have selected from the evidence available to them those parts that confirmed what they wanted to believe." Rising from 5,000 in 1959, there were now 100,000 guerrilla fighters in 1964. Some have argued that ten soldiers are needed to deal with one every insurgent. Thus, the total number of U.S. troops in 1964 needed to defeat the insurgents may have exceeded the entire strength of the United States Army.

The National Security Council recommended a three-stage escalation of the bombing of North Vietnam. On March 2, 1965, following an attack on a U.S. Marine barracks at Pleiku, Operation Flaming Dart and Operation Rolling Thunder commenced. The bombing campaign, which ultimately lasted three years, was intended to force North Vietnam to cease its support for the NLF by threatening to destroy North Vietnam's air defenses and industrial infrastructure. As well, it was aimed at bolstering the morale of the South Vietnamese. Between March 1965 and November 1968, "Rolling Thunder" deluged the north with a million tons of missiles, rockets and bombs. Bombing was not restricted to North Vietnam. Other aerial campaigns, such as Operation Commando Hunt, targeted different parts of the NLF and PAVN infrastructure. These included the Ho Chi Minh Trail, which ran through Laos and Cambodia. The objective of forcing North Vietnam to stop its support for the NLF, however, was never reached. As one officer noted "this is a political war and it calls for discriminate killing. The best weapon … would be a knife … The worst is an airplane." The Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force Curtis LeMay, however, had long advocated saturation bombing in Vietnam and wrote of the Communists that "we're going to bomb them back into the Stone Age".

Escalation and ground war

After several attacks, it was decided that U.S. Air Force bases needed more protection. The South Vietnamese military seemed incapable of providing security. On March 8 1965, 3,500 United States Marines were dispatched to South Vietnam. This marked the beginning of the American ground war. U.S. public opinion overwhelmingly supported the deployment. Public opinion, however, was based on the premise that Vietnam was part of a global struggle against communism. In a statement similar to that made to the French, almost two decades earlier, Ho Chi Minh warned that if the Americans "want to make war for twenty years then we shall make war for twenty years. If they want to make peace, we shall make peace and invite them to afternoon tea." As former First Deputy Foreign Minister Tran Quang Co noted, the primary goal of the war was to reunify Vietnam and secure its independence. The policy of the DRV was not to topple other non-communist governments in South East Asia.

The Marines' assignment was defensive. The initial deployment of 3,500 in March was increased to nearly 200,000 by December. The U.S. military had long been schooled in offensive warfare. Regardless of political policies, U.S. commanders were institutionally and psychologically unsuited to a defensive mission. In May, ARVN forces suffered heavy losses at the Battle of Binh Gia. They were again defeated in June, at the Battle of Dong Xoai. Desertion rates were increasing, and morale plummeted. General William Westmoreland informed Admiral Grant Sharp, commander of U.S. Pacific forces, that the situation was critical. He said, "I am convinced that U.S. troops with their energy, mobility, and firepower can successfully take the fight to the NLF." With this recommendation, Westmoreland was advocating an aggressive departure from America's defensive posture and the sidelining of the South Vietnamese. By ignoring ARVN units, the U.S. commitment became open ended. Westmoreland outlined a three point plan to win the war:

"Phase 1. Commitment of U.S. (and other free world) forces necessary to halt the losing trend by the end of 1965.

Phase 2. U.S. and allied forces mount major offensive actions to seize the initiative to destroy guerrilla and organized enemy forces. This phase would be concluded when the enemy had been worn down, thrown on the defensive, and driven back from major populated areas.

Phase 3. If the enemy persisted, a period of twelve to eighteen months following Phase 2 would be required for the final destruction of enemy forces remaining in remote base areas."

The plan was approved by Johnson and marked a profound departure from the previous administration's insistence that the government of South Vietnam was responsible for defeating the guerrillas. Westmoreland predicted victory by the end of 1967. Johnson did not, however, communicate this change in strategy to the media. Instead he emphasized continuity. The change in U.S. policy depended on matching the North Vietnamese and the NLF in a contest of attrition and morale. The opponents were locked in a cycle of escalation. The idea that the government of South Vietnam could manage its own affairs was shelved.

Operation Starlite was the first major ground operation by U.S. troops and proved largely successful. U.S. soldiers engaged in search-and-destroy missions. Learning from their defeats, the NLF began to engage in small-unit guerrilla warfare, instead of conventional American-style warfare. This allowed them to control the pace of the fighting, engaging in battle only when they believed they had a decisive advantage. The guerrillas benefited from familiar terrain, a degree of popular support and from the fact the U.S. troops were unable to tell friend from foe. Control over a certain portion of the population gave the guerrillas access to manpower, intelligence and financial resources.

Despite calls from the Pentagon to do so, Lyndon Johnson refused to mobilize Reserve units. He feared a political backlash. This led to larger draft call ups and the extension of some tours of duty. It also put a heavy strain on U.S. forces committed to other parts of the world.

The average U.S. serviceman was nineteen years old. This compares with twenty-six years of age for those who participated in World War II. Soldiers served a one year tour of duty. The one year tour of duty deprived units of experienced leadership. As one observer noted "we were not in Vietnam for 10 years, but for one year 10 times." As a result, training programs were shortened. Some NCO's were referred to as "Shake 'N' Bake" to highlight their accelerated training. Unlike soldiers in World War II and Korea, there were no secure rear areas in which to get rest and relaxation (R'n'R). American troops were vulnerable to attack everywhere they went.

Under the command of General Westmoreland, the U.S. increased its troop commitment to more than 553,000 servicemen by 1969. Westmoreland built a complex series of bases, ports, airstrips, medical facilities, fuel depots, warehouse, roads and bridges from scratch. South Vietnam was inundated with manufactured goods. As Stanley Karnow writes, "the main PX, located in the Saigon suburb of Cholon, was only slightly smaller than the New York Bloomingdale's …" The American build-up transformed the economy and had a profound impact on South Vietnamese society. A huge surge in corruption was witnessed. The country was also flooded by civilian specialists from every conceivable field to advise the South Vietnamese government and improve its performance.

Washington encouraged its SEATO allies to contribute troops. Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, and the Philippines all agreed to send troops. Major allies, however, notably NATO nations, Canada and Great Britain, declined Washington's troop requests. The U.S. and its allies mounted complex operations, such as operations Masher, Attleboro, Cedar Falls, and Junction City. However, the communist insurgents remained elusive and demonstrated great tactical flexibility.

Meanwhile, the political situation in South Vietnam began to stabilize somewhat with the coming to power of Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky and President Nguyen Van Thieu in 1967. Thieu, mistrustful and indecisive, remained president until 1975. This ended a long series of military juntas that had begun with Diem's assassination. The relative calm allowed the ARVN to collaborate more effectively with its allies and become a better fighting force.

The Johnson administration employed a "policy of minimum candor" in its dealings with the media. Military information officers sought to manage media coverage by emphasizing stories which portrayed progress in the war. Over time, this policy damaged the public trust in official pronouncements. As the media's coverage of the war and that of the Pentagon diverged, a so-called credibility gap developed.

In October 1967 a large anti-war demonstration was held on the steps of the Pentagon. Some protesters were heard to chant, "Hey, hey, LBJ (Lyndon Baines Johnson)! How many kids did you kill today?" One reason for the increase in the opposition to the Vietnam War was larger draft quotas.

Tet Offensive

Having lured General Westmoreland's forces into the hinterland at Khe Sanh in Quang Tri Province, in January 1968, the PAVN and NLF broke the truce that had traditionally accompanied the Tet (Lunar New Year) holiday. They launched the surprise Tet Offensive in the hope of sparking a national uprising. Over 100 cities were attacked, including assaults on General Westmoreland's headquarters and the U.S. embassy in Saigon.

Although the U.S. and South Vietnamese were initially taken aback by the scale of the urban offensive, they responded quickly and effectively, decimating the ranks of the NLF. In the former capital city of Huế, the NLF captured the Imperial Citadel and much of the city, executing nearly 3,000 residents, and leading to the month-long Battle of Huế. After the war, North Vietnamese officials acknowledged that the Tet Offensive had, indeed, caused grave damage to NLF forces. But the offensive had another, unintended consequence.

General Westmoreland had become the public face of the war. He was featured on the cover of Time magazine three times and was named 1965's Man of the Year. Time described him as "the sinewy personification of the American fighting man … (who) directed the historic buildup, drew up the battle plans, and infused the … men under him with his own idealistic view of U.S. aims and responsibilities."

In November 1967 Westmoreland spearheaded a public relations drive for the Johnson administration to bolster flagging public support. In a speech before the National Press Club he said that a point in the war had been reached "where the end comes into view." Thus, the public was shocked and confused when Westmoreland's predictions were trumped by Tet. The American media, which had been largely supportive of U.S. efforts, rounded on the Johnson administration, for what had become an increasing credibility gap. Despite its military failure, the Tet Offensive became a political victory and ended the career of President Lyndon B. Johnson, who declined to run for re-election. Johnson's approval rating slumped from 48% to 36%. As James Witz noted, Tet "contradicted the claims of progress … made by the Johnson administration and the military." The Tet Offensive was the turning point in America's involvement in the Vietnam War. It had a profound impact on domestic support for the conflict. The offensive constituted an intelligence failure on the scale of Pearl Harbor. Journalist Peter Arnett quoted an unnamed officer, saying of Ben Tre that "it became necessary to destroy the village in order to save it" (though the authenticity of this quote is disputed). Westmoreland became Chief of Staff of the Army in March, just as all resistance was finally subdued. The move was technically a promotion. However, his position had become untenable, because of the offensive and because his request for 200,000 additional troops had been leaked to the media. Westmoreland was succeeded by his deputy Creighton Abrams, a commander less inclined to public media pronouncements.

On May 10, 1968, despite low expectations, peace talks began between the U.S. and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Negotiations stagnated for five months, until Johnson gave orders to halt the bombing of North Vietnam. The Democratic candidate, Vice-President Hubert Humphrey, was running against Republican former Vice-President Richard Nixon. Through an intermediary, Nixon advised Saigon to refuse to participate in the talks until after elections, claiming that he would give them a better deal once elected. Thieu obliged, leaving almost no progress made by the time Johnson left office.

As historian Robert Dallek writes, "Lyndon Johnson's escalation of the war in Vietnam divided Americans into warring camps … cost 30,000 American lives by the time he left office, (and) destroyed Johnson's presidency …" His refusal to send more U.S. troops to Vietnam was Johnson's admission that the war was lost. As Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara noted, "the dangerous illusion of victory by the United States was therefore dead."

Vietnamization, 1969–1973

During the 1968 presidential election, Richard M. Nixon promised "peace with honor". His plan was to build up the ARVN, so that they could take over the defense South Vietnam (the Nixon Doctrine). The policy became known as "Vietnamization", a term criticized by Robert K. Brigham for implying that, to that date, only Americans had been dying in the conflict. Vietnamization had much in common with the policies of the Kennedy administration. One important difference, however, remained. While Kennedy insisted that the South Vietnamese fight the war themselves, he attempted to limit the scope of the conflict. In pursuit of a withdrawal strategy, Richard Nixon was prepared to employ a variety of tactics, including widening the war.

Nixon also pursued negotiations. Creighton Abrams shifted to smaller operations, aimed at NLF logistics, with better use of firepower and more cooperation with the ARVN. There was increased openness with the media. Nixon also began to pursue détente with the Soviet Union and rapprochement with China. This policy helped to decrease global tensions. Détente led to nuclear arms reduction on the part of both superpowers. But Nixon was disappointed that China and the Soviet Union continued to supply the North Vietnamese with aid. In September 1969, Ho Chi Minh died at age seventy-nine.

The anti-war movement was gaining strength in the United States. Nixon appealed to the "Silent Majority" of Americans to support the war. But revelations of the My Lai Massacre, in which U.S. forces went on a rampage and killed civilians, including women and children, provoked national and international outrage.

Prince Norodom Sihanouk had proclaimed the neutrality of Cambodia since 1955. "We are neutral," he noted, "in the same way Switzerland and Sweden are neutral." The PAVN/NLF, however, used Cambodian soil as a base. Sihanouk tolerated their presence, because he wished to avoid being drawn into a wider regional conflict. Under pressure from Washington, however, he changed this policy in 1969. The PAVN/NLF were no longer welcome. President Nixon took the opportunity to launch a massive secret bombing campaign, called Operation Menu, against their sanctuaries along the border. This violated a long succession of pronouncements from Washington supporting Cambodian neutrality. Richard Nixon wrote to Prince Sihanouk in April 1969 assuring him that the United States respected "the sovereignty, neutrality and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Cambodia …" Over 14 months, however, approximately 2,750,000 tons of bombs were dropped, more than the total dropped by the Allies in World War II. The bombing was hidden from the American public. In 1970, Prince Sihanouk was deposed by pro-American general Lon Nol. The country's borders were closed, and the U.S. and ARVN launched incursions into Cambodia to attack PAVN/NLF bases and buy time for South Vietnam. The coup against Sihanouk and U.S. bombing destabilized Cambodia and increased support for the Khmer Rouge.

The invasion of Cambodia sparked nationwide U.S. protests. Four students were killed by National Guardsmen at Kent State University during a protest in Ohio, which provoked public outrage in the United States. The reaction to the incident by the Nixon administration was seen as callous and indifferent, providing additional impetus for the anti-war movement. Nixon was taken to Camp David for his own safety.

In 1971 the Pentagon Papers were leaked to the New York Times. The top-secret history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam, commissioned by the Department of Defense, detailed a long series of public deceptions. The Supreme Court ruled that its publication was legal.

The ARVN launched Operation Lam Son 719, aimed at cutting the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos. The offensive was a clear violation of Laotian neutrality, which neither side respected in any event. Laos had long been the scene of a Secret War. After meeting resistance, ARVN forces retreated in a confused rout. They fled along roads littered with their own dead. When they ran out of fuel, soldiers abandoned their vehicles and attempted to barge their way on to American helicopters sent to evacuate the wounded. Many ARVN soldiers clung to helicopter skids in a desperate attempt to save themselves. U.S. aircraft had to destroy abandoned equipment, including tanks, to prevent them from falling into enemy hands. Half of the invading ARVN troops were either captured or killed. The operation was a fiasco and represented a clear failure of Vietnamization. As Karnow noted "the blunders were monumental … The (South Vietnamese) government's top officers had been tutored by the Americans for ten or fifteen years, many at training schools in the United States, yet they had learned little."

In 1971 Australia and New Zealand withdrew their soldiers. The U.S. troop count was further reduced to 196,700, with a deadline to remove another 45,000 troops by February 1972. As peace protests spread across the United States, disillusionment grew in the ranks. Drug use increased, race relations grew tense and the number of soldiers disobeying officers rose. Fragging, or the murder of unpopular officers with fragmentation grenades, increased.

Vietnamization was again tested by the Easter Offensive of 1972, a massive conventional invasion of South Vietnam. The PAVN/NLF quickly overran the northern provinces and in co-ordination with other forces, attacked from Cambodia, threatening to cut the country in half. U.S. troop withdrawals continued. But American airpower came to the rescue with Operation Linebacker, and the offensive was halted. However, it became clear that without American airpower South Vietnam could not survive. The last remaining American ground troops were withdrawn in August. But a force of civilian and military advisers remained in place.

The war was the central issue of the 1972 presidential election. Nixon's opponent, George McGovern, campaigned on a platform of withdrawal from Vietnam. Nixon's National Security Adviser, Henry Kissinger, continued secret negotiations with North Vietnam's Le Duc Tho. In October 1972, they reached an agreement. However, South Vietnamese President Thieu demanded massive changes to the peace accord. When North Vietnam went public with the agreement's details, the Nixon administration claimed that the North was attempting to embarrass the President. The negotiations became deadlocked. Hanoi demanded new changes. To show his support for South Vietnam and force Hanoi back to the negotiating table, Nixon ordered Operation Linebacker II, a massive bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong. The offensive destroyed much of the remaining economic and industrial capacity of North Vietnam. Simultaneously Nixon pressured Thieu to accept the terms of the agreement, threatening to conclude a bilateral peace deal and cut off American aid. Popularly known as the Christmas Bombings, Operation Linebacker II provoked a fresh wave of anti-war demonstrations.

On January 15 1973, Nixon announced the suspension of offensive action against North Vietnam. The Paris Peace Accords on "Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam" were signed on January 27, 1973, officially ending direct U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. A cease-fire was declared across South Vietnam, but North Vietnamese forces were allowed to remain on South Vietnamese territory. U.S. POWs were released. The agreement guaranteed the territorial integrity of Vietnam and, like the Geneva Conference of 1954, called for national elections in the north and south. The Paris Peace Accords stipulated a sixty day period for the total withdrawal of U.S. forces. "This article," noted Peter Church, "proved … to be the only one of the Paris Agreements which was fully carried out."

The ARVN was supplied with hundreds of millions of dollars of new equipment. It became the fourth largest fighting force in the world. Nixon promised Thieu that he would use airpower to support his government. The growing Watergate scandal and an American public tired of the war, however, made it impossible to keep his promise. The balance of power shifted decisively in North Vietnam's favor.

South Vietnamese government stands alone, 1974–1975

Total U.S. withdrawal

As Stanley Karnow noted, Americans "turned against the war long before America's political leaders did." Doubts began surfacing in Congress. In December 1974, it passed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, which provided "that after June 30, 1976, no military assistance shall be furnished to South Vietnam unless authorized under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or the Foreign Military Sales Act.". The act fixed the numbers of U.S. military personnel allowed in Vietnam: 4,000 within six months of enactment and 3,000 within one year. Richard Nixon having resigned because of the Watergate Scandal, President Gerald Ford signed the act into law. However, as the act was not to come into force until 1976, it was never implemented and had no direct effect on the outcome of the war. Robert McNamara writes that " there is no evidence that the South Vietnamese would ever have been able to accomplish on their own what they failed to achieve with massive American assistance. The level of congressional funding was irrelevant … The Nixon administration, like the Johnson administration before it, could not give the South Vietnamese the essential ingredient for success: genuine indigenous political legitimacy."

By 1975 the South Vietnamese Army was much larger than its opponent. However, they faced a well-organized, highly determined and well-funded North Vietnam. Much of the North's material and financial support came from the communist bloc. Within South Vietnam, there was increasing chaos. The withdrawal of the American military had compromised an economy dependent on U.S. financial support and the presence of large numbers of U.S. troops. Along with the rest of the non-oil exporting world, South Vietnam suffered from the price shocks caused by the Arab oil embargo and the subsequent global recession.

Between the signing of the 1973 Paris Peace Accord and late 1974, both antagonists had been satisfied with minor land-grabs. The North Vietnamese, however, were growing impatient with the Thieu regime, which remained intransigent in its opposition to national elections. Hanoi was also concerned that the U.S. would once again support its former ally if large scale operations were resumed.

By late 1974, the Politburo gave its permission for a limited VPA offensive from Cambodia into Phuoc Long Province. The strike was designed to solve local logistical problems, gauge the reaction of Saigon forces and determine if the U.S. would return to the fray. In late December and early January, the offensive kicked off, and Phuoc Long Province quickly fell to the VPA. There was considerable relief when American air power did not return. The speed of this success led the Politburo to reassess its strategy. It was decided that operations in the Central Highlands would be turned over to General Van Tien Dung and that Pleiku should be seized, if possible. Before he left for the south, General Van was addressed by First Party Secretary Le Duan: "Never have we had military and political conditions so perfect or a strategic advantage as great as we have now."

Campaign 275

On March 10, 1975, General Dung launched Campaign 275, a limited offensive into the Central Highlands, supported by tanks and heavy artillery. The target was Ban Me Thuot, in Daklak Province. If the town could be taken, the provincial capital of Pleiku and the road to the coast would be exposed for a planned campaign in 1976. The ARVN proved incapable of resisting the onslaught, and its forces collapsed on March 11. Once again, Hanoi was surprised by the speed of their success. Van now urged the Politburo to allow him to seize Pleiku immediately and then turn his attention to Kontum. He argued that with two months of good weather remaining until the onset of the monsoon, it would be irresponsible to not take advantage of the situation.

President Nguyen Van Thieu, a former general, made a strategic blunder. Fearful that his forces would be cut off in the north by the attacking communists, Thieu ordered a retreat. The president declared this to be a "lighten the top and keep the bottom" strategy. But in what appeared to be a repeat of Operation Lam Son 719, the withdrawal soon turned into a bloody rout. While the bulk of ARVN forces attempted to flee, isolated units fought desperately. ARVN General Phu abandoned Pleiku and Kontum and retreated toward the coast, in what became known as the "column of tears". As the ARVN tried to disengage from the enemy, refugees mixed in with the line of retreat. The poor condition of roads and bridges, damaged by years of conflict and neglect, slowed Phu's column. As the North Vietnamese forces approached, panic set in. Often abandoned by their officers, the soldiers and civilians were shelled incessantly. The retreat degenerated into a desperate scramble for the coast. By April 1 the "column of tears" was all but annihilated. It marked one of the poorest examples of a strategic withdrawal in modern military history.

On March 20, Thieu reversed himself and ordered Hue, Vietnam's third-largest city, be held at all costs. Thieu's contradictory orders confused and demoralized his officer corps. As the North Vietnamese launched their attack, panic set in and ARVN resistance withered. On March 22, the VPA opened the siege of Hue. Civilians flooded the airport and the docks hoping for any mode of escape. Some even swam out to sea to reach boats and barges anchored offshore. In the confusion, routed ARVN soldiers fired on civilians to make way for their retreat. On March 31, after a three-day battle, Hue fell. As resistance in Hue collapsed, North Vietnamese rockets rained down on Da Nang and its airport. By March 28, 35,000 VPA troops were poised to attack the suburbs. By March 30, 100,000 leaderless ARVN troops surrendered as the VPA marched victoriously through Da Nang. With the fall of the city, the defense of the Central Highlands and Northern provinces came to an end.

Final North Vietnamese offensive

With the northern half of the country under their control, the Politburo ordered General Van to launch the final offensive against Saigon. The operational plan for the Ho Chi Minh Campaign called for the capture of Saigon before May 1. Hanoi wished to avoid the coming monsoon and prevent any redeployment of ARVN forces defending the capital. Northern forces, their morale boosted by their recent victories, rolled on, taking Nha Trang, Cam Ranh, and Da Lat.

On April 7, three North Vietnamese divisions attacked Xuan-loc, 40 miles (64 km) east of Saigon. The next day a rogue South Vietnamese pilot bombed the presidential palace in Saigon. No one was injured. The North Vietnamese met fierce resistance at Xuan-loc from the ARVN 18th Division. For two bloody weeks, severe fighting raged as the ARVN defenders, in a last-ditch effort, tried to block their advance. By April 21, however, the exhausted garrison surrendered. An embittered and tearful President Thiệu resigned on the same day, declaring that the United States had betrayed South Vietnam. He left for Taiwan on April 25, leaving control of the government in the hands of General Duong Van Minh. At the same time, North Vietnamese tanks had reached Bien Hoa and turned towards Saigon, brushing aside isolated ARVN units along the way.

By the end of April, the Army of the Republic of South Vietnam had collapsed on all fronts. Thousand of refugees streamed southward, ahead of the main communist onslaught. On April 27, 100,000 North Vietnamese troops encircled Saigon. The city was defended by about 30,000 ARVN troops. To hasten a collapse and foment panic, the VPA shelled the airport and forced its closure. With the air exit closed, large numbers of civilians found that they had no way out.

Fall of Saigon

Chaos, unrest, and panic ensued as hysterical South Vietnamese officials and civilians scrambled to leave Saigon. Martial law was declared. American helicopters began evacuating South Vietnamese, U.S. and foreign nationals from various parts of the city and from the U.S. embassy compound. Operation Frequent Wind had been delayed until the last possible moment, because of U.S. Ambassador Graham Martin's belief that Saigon could be held and that a political settlement could be reached. "Frequent Wind" was arguably the largest helicopter evacuation in history. It began on April 29, in an atmosphere of desperation, as hysterical crowds of Vietnamese vied for limited seats. Martin pleaded with Washington to dispatch $700 million in emergency aid to bolster the regime and help it mobilize fresh military reserves. But American public opinion had long soured on this conflict halfway around the world.

In the U.S., South Vietnam was perceived as doomed. President Gerald Ford gave a televised speech on April 23, declaring an end to the Vietnam War and all U.S. aid. "Frequent Wind" continued around the clock, as North Vietnamese tanks breached defenses on the outskirts of Saigon. The song "White Christmas" was broadcast, as the final signal for withdrawal. In the early morning hours of April 30, the last U.S. Marines evacuated the embassy by helicopter, as civilians swamped the perimeter and poured into the grounds. Many of them had been employed by the Americans and were left to their fate.

On April 30, 1975, VPA troops overcame all resistance, quickly capturing key buildings and installations. A tank crashed through the gates of the Presidential Palace and at 11:30 a.m. local time the NLF flag was raised above it. Thieu's successor, President Duong Van Minh, attempted to surrender, but VPA Colonel Bui Quang Than informed him that he had nothing left to surrender. Minh then issued his last command, ordering all South Vietnamese troops to lay down their arms.

Aftermath

Effects on Vietnam

Phnom Penh, the capital of Cambodia, fell to the Khmer Rouge on April 17, 1975. The last official American military action in South East Asia occurred on May 15 1975. Forty-one U.S. military personnel were killed when the Khmer Rouge seized a U.S. merchant ship, the SS Mayagüez. The episode became known as the Mayagüez incident.

The Pathet Lao overthrew the royalist government of Laos in December 1975. They established the Lao People's Democratic Republic.

Hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese officials, particularly ARVN officers, were imprisoned in reeducation camps after the Communist takeover. Tens of thousands died and many fled the country after being released. Up to two million civilians left the country, and as many as half of these boat people perished at sea.

On July 2, 1976, the Socialist Republic of Vietnam was declared. In 1977, United States President Jimmy Carter issued a pardon for nearly 10,000 draft dodgers.

After repeated border clashes in 1978, Vietnam invaded Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia) and ousted the Khmer Rouge. As many as two million died during the Khmer Rouge genocide.

Vietnam began to repress its ethnic Chinese minority. Thousand fled and the exodus of the boat people began. In 1979, China invaded Vietnam in retaliation for its invasion of Cambodia, known as the Third Indochina War or the Sino-Vietnamese War. Chinese forces were repulsed.

The dire predictions of a generation did not come to fruition. Since Thailand and other South East Asian nations did not fall to systematic Vietnamese aggression, the Domino Theory, so widely trumpeted, was said to have been an illusion. Vietnam, without the presence of the United States, showed itself to be of little economic or strategic value to anyone.

Effect on the United States

In the post-war, Americans struggled to absorb the lessons of the military intervention. As General Maxwell Taylor, one of the principal architects of the war, noted "first, we didn't know ourselves. We thought that we were going into another Korean war, but this was a different country. Secondly, we didn't know our South Vietnamese allies … And we knew less about North Vietnam. Who was Ho Chi Minh? Nobody really knew. So, until we know the enemy and know our allies and know ourselves, we'd better keep out of this kind of dirty business. It's very dangerous."

In the decades since end of the conflict, discussions have ensued as to whether America's defeat was a political rather than military defeat. Some have suggested that "the responsibility for the ultimate failure of this policy lies not with the men who fought, but with those in Congress..." Alternatively, the official history of the United States Army noted that "tactics have often seemed to exist apart from larger issues, strategies, and objectives. Yet in Vietnam the Army experienced tactical success and strategic failure … The … Vietnam War('s) … legacy may be the lesson that unique historical, political, cultural, and social factors always impinge on the military … Success rests not only on military progress but on correctly analyzing the nature of the particular conflict, understanding the enemy's strategy, and assessing the strengths and weaknesses of allies. A new humility and a new sophistication may form the best parts of a complex heritage left to the Army by the long, bitter war in Vietnam." U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote in a secret memo to President Gerald Ford that "in terms of military tactics, we cannot help draw the conclusion that our armed forces are not suited to this kind of war. Even the Special Forces who had been designed for it could not prevail." Even Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara concluded that "the achievement of a military victory by U.S. forces in Vietnam was indeed a dangerous illusion."

Doubts surfaced as to the effectiveness of large scale, sustained bombing. As Chief of Staff of the United States Army Harold K. Johnson noted, "if anything came out of Vietnam, it was that air power couldn't do the job. Even General William Westmoreland admitted that the bombing had been ineffective. As he remarked, "I still doubt that the North Vietnamese would have relented." The inability to bomb Hanoi to the bargaining table also illustrated another U.S. miscalculation. The North's leadership was composed of hardened communists who had been fighting for independence for thirty years. They had successfully defeated the French, and their tenacity as both nationalists and communists was formidable.

The loss of the war called into question U.S. Army doctrine. Marine Corps General Victor Krulak heavily criticised Westmoreland's attrition strategy, calling it "wasteful of American lives … with small likelihood of a successful outcome." As well, doubts surfaced about the ability of the military to train foreign forces. The defeat also raised disturbing questions about the quality of the advice that was given to successive United States Presidents by the Pentagon.

As the number of troops in Vietnam increased, the financial burden of the war grew. One of the rarely mentioned consequences of the war were the budget cuts to President Johnson's Great Society programs. As defense spending and inflation grew, Johnson was forced to raise taxes. The Republicans, however, refused to vote for the increases unless a $6 billion cut was made to the administration's social programs.

Almost 3 million Americans served in Vietnam. Between 1965 and 1975, the United States spent $120 billion on the war. This resulted in a large federal budget deficit. The war demonstrated that no power, not even a superpower, has unlimited strength and resources. But perhaps most significantly, the Vietnam War illustrated that political will, as much as material might, is a decisive factor in the outcome of conflicts.

Other countries' involvement

China

China's involvement in the Vietnam War began in 1949, when the communists took over the country. The Communist Party of China (CPC) provided material and technical support to the Vietnamese communists. In the summer of 1962, Mao Zedong agreed to supply Hanoi with 90,000 rifles and guns free of charge. After the launch of "Rolling Thunder", China sent anti-aircraft units and engineering battalions to North Vietnam to repair the damage caused by American bombing, rebuild roads, railroads and to perform other engineering works. This freed North Vietnamese army units for combat in the South. Between 1965 and 1970, over 320,000 Chinese soldiers served in North Vietnam. The peak was 1967, when 170,000 served there. Although Chinese assistance was accepted gladly, the North Vietnamese remained distrustful of their larger neighbour, because of the historical antipathy between the two nations. China emerged as the principle backer of the Khmer Rouge. The People's Republic of China briefly launched an invasion of Vietnam in 1979, in retaliation for its invasion of Cambodia to depose the Khmer Rouge. In April 2006, a ceremony was held in Vietnam to honor the almost 1,500 Chinese soldiers who were killed in the Vietnam War.

South Korea

On the anti-communist side, South Korea had the second-largest contingent of foreign troops in South Vietnam after the United States. South Korea dispatched its first troops in 1964. Large combat battalions began arriving a year later. South Korean troops developed a reputation for ruthlessness. Approximately 320,000 South Korean soldiers were sent to Vietnam. As with the United States, soldiers served one year. The maximum number of South Korean troops peaked at 50,000. More than 5,000 South Koreans were killed and 11,000 were injured in the war. All troops were withdrawn in 1973.

Australia & New Zealand

Australia and New Zealand, both close allies of the United States and members of SEATO, sent ground troops to Vietnam. Both nations had gained experience in counterinsurgency and jungle warfare during the Malayan Emergency. Geographically close to Asia, their governments subscribed to the "Domino Theory" of communist expansion and felt that their national security would be threatened if communism spread further in South East Asia.

Australia began by sending advisers to Vietnam, the number of which rose steadily until 1965, when combat troops were committed. New Zealand began by sending a detachment of engineers and an artillery battery, and then started sending special forces and regular infantry. Australia's peak commitment was 7,672 combat troops, New Zealand's 552. Most of these soldiers served in the 1st Australian Task Force, a brigade group-type formation, which was based in Phuoc Tuy province.

Australia re-introduced conscription to expand its armed forces, in the face of significant public opposition to the war.

Several Australian and New Zealand units were awarded U.S. unit citations for their service in South Vietnam, while the last Victoria Crosses — the highest award for bravery in the Commonwealth — awarded to members of the Australian armed forces were for actions in Vietnam.

Philippines

Some 1,450 Filipino troops were dispatched to South Vietnam. They were primarily engaged in medical and other civilian pacification projects. These forces operated under the designation PHLCAAG or Philippines Civil Affairs Assistance Group.

Thailand

Thai Army formations, including the "Queen's Cobra" battalion saw action in South Vietnam between 1965 and 1971. Thai forces saw much more action in the covert war in Laos between 1964 and 1972. There, Thai regular formations were heavily outnumbered by the irregular "volunteers" of the CIA-sponsored Police Aerial Reconnaissance Units or PARU, who carried out reconnaissance activities on the western side of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

Soviet Union

The Soviet Union supplied North Vietnam with medical supplies, arms, tanks, planes, helicopters, artillery, ground-air missiles and other military equipment. Fewer than a dozen Soviet citizens lost their lives in this conflict. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russian officials acknowledged that the Soviet Union had stationed up to 3,000 troops in Vietnam during the war.

North Korea

As a result of a decision of the Korean Workers' Party in October 1966, in early 1967, North Korea sent a fighter squadron to North Vietnam to back up the North Vietnamese 921st and 923rd fighter squadrons defending Hanoi. They stayed through 1968, and 200 pilots were reported to have served. In addition, at least two anti-aircraft artillery regiments were sent as well. North Korea also sent weapons, ammunition and two million sets of uniforms to their comrades in North Vietnam. Kim Il Sung is reported to have told his pilots to "fight in the war as if the Vietnamese sky were their own".

Canada

Canadian, Indian and Polish troops formed the International Control Commission, which was supposed to monitor the 1954 ceasefire agreement. The Canadian government also lent diplomatic assistance to the United States to establish contact with the North Vietnamese regime. The government of Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson resisted considerable U.S. pressure to send troops to Vietnam. Although not a major arms supplier, Canadian-made military hardware was used in Vietnam, including large amounts of Agent Orange manufactured by Dow Chemical. Most Canadians who served in the Vietnam War were members of the United States military with estimated numbers ranging from 30,000 to 40,000. Many became U.S. citizens upon returning from Vietnam or were dual citizens prior to joining the military. The Canadian government gave political asylum to significant numbers of American deserters and draft dodgers during the conflict. Canada hosted 30,000–90,000 Americans seeking asylum. A large number returned to the United States after a pardon was issued by President Jimmy Carter. The remainder, roughly half, chose to stay in Canada.

Use of chemical defoliants

One of the most controversial aspects of the U.S. military effort in South East Asia was the widespread use of herbicides between 1961 and 1971 . They were used to defoliate large parts of the countryside. These chemicals continue to change the landscape, cause diseases and birth defects, and poison the food chain.

Early in the American military effort it was decided that, since PAVN/NLF were hiding their activities under triple-canopy jungle, a useful first step might be to defoliate certain areas. This was especially true of growth surrounding bases (both large and small) in what became known as Operation Ranch Hand. Corporations like Dow Chemical and Monsanto were given the task of developing herbicides for this purpose. The defoliants (which were distributed in drums marked with color-coded bands) included the Rainbow Herbicides Agent Pink, Agent Green, Agent Purple, Agent Blue, Agent White, and, most famously, Agent Orange, which included dioxin as a byproduct of its manufacture. About 12 million gallons (45 000 000 L) of Agent Orange were sprayed over Southeast Asia during the American involvement. A prime area of Ranch Hand operations was in the Mekong Delta, where the U.S. Navy patrol boats were vulnerable to attack from the undergrowth at the water's edge.

In 1961–1962, the Kennedy administration authorized the use of chemicals to destroy rice crops. Between 1961 and 1967, the U.S. Air Force sprayed 20 million U.S. gallons (75 700 000 L) of concentrated herbicides over 6 million acres (24 000 km²) of crops and trees, affecting an estimated 13% of South Vietnam's land. A 1967 study by the Agronomy Section of the Japanese Science Council concluded that 3.8 million acres (15 000 km²) of foliage had been destroyed, possibly also leading to the deaths of 1,000 peasants and 13,000 head of livestock.

As of 2006, the Vietnamese government estimates that there are over 4,000,000 victims of dioxin poisoning in Vietnam, although the United States government denies any conclusive scientific links between Agent Orange and the Vietnamese victims of dioxin poisoning. In some areas of southern Vietnam dioxin levels remain at over 100 times the accepted international standard.

The U.S. Veterans Administration has listed prostate cancer, respiratory cancers, multiple myeloma, type II diabetes, Hodgkin’s disease, non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma, soft tissue sarcoma, chloracne, porphyria cutanea tarda, peripheral neuropathy, and spina bifida in children of veterans exposed to Agent Orange. Although there has been much discussion over whether the use of these defoliants constituted a violation of the laws of war, the defoliants were not considered weapons, since exposure to them did not lead to immediate death or incapacitation.

Casualties

The number of military and civilian deaths from 1959 to 1975 is debated. Some reports fail to include the members of South Vietnamese forces killed in the final campaign, or the Royal Lao Armed Forces, thousands of Laotian and Thai irregulars, or Laotian civilians who all perished in that peculiar conflict. They do not include the tens of thousands of Cambodians killed during the civil war or the estimated one and one-half to two million that perished in the genocide that followed Khmer Rouge victory

Documents declassified by the Vietnamese government in 1995 revealed that 5.1 million people died during the Hanoi's conflict with the United States. Four million civilians died in the North and South. Total military casualties were put at 1.1 million and 600,000 wounded. Hanoi concealed the figures during the war to avoid demoralizing the population.

Popular culture

The Vietnam war has been featured heavily in television and films. The war also influenced a generation of musicians and song writers. The musical Miss Saigon focuses on the end of the war and its aftermath. In cinema, noted films which have shaped the popular viewpoint of the war include Apocalypse Now, Platoon, The Deer Hunter and Full Metal Jacket. It is the scene for the computer game Battlefield Vietnam.

See also

Template:Multi-video start Template:Multi-video item Template:Multi-video end

• Aircraft losses of the Vietnam War
• Army of the Republic of Vietnam
• Boat people
• Canada and the Vietnam War
• Cambodian Civil War
• Cold War
• Comparison of Iraq and Vietnam wars
• Cu Chi tunnels
• Democratic Kampuchea
• History of Cambodia
• History of Laos
• History of Vietnam
• Ho Chi Minh Campaign
• Indochina Wars
• Khmer Rouge
• Kit Carson Scouts
• Laotian Civil War
• Military Assistance Command, Vietnam Studies and Observations Group
• Opposition to the Vietnam War
• News media and the Vietnam War
• Phoenix Program
  • United States Air Force In South Vietnam
  • United States Air Force In Thailand
• Vietnam
• Vietnam People's Army
• Vietnam Veterans against the War
• Vietnam War casualties
• Vietnam War (lists)
• Weapons of the Vietnam War
• Winter Soldier Investigation

Notes

1. There was a slow build-up to this war from 1954 onwards, with different parties joining combat at various stages; however, the Hanoi Politburo did not make the decision to go to war in the South until 1959.
2. Summers Jr, Harry G; Vietnam War Almanac (1985: New York: Facts on File Publications, 1985) p. 113, cited in Record, Jeffrey & Terrill, Andrew W.; Iraq and Vietnam: Differences, Similarities and Insights, (2004: Strategic Studies Institute)
5. BBC News: On this Day in 1975: Saigon surrenders
6. Praeger, "America at War since 1945"
7. http://www.counterpunch.org/kolko04292005.html
8. http://www.counterpunch.org/kolko04292005.html
9. http://www.counterpunch.org/kolko04292005.html
10. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1101850415-141574,00.html
11. http://www.vietnamwar.com/
12. Dennis J. Duncanson, Government and Revolution in Vietnam, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 53
13. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin Books, 1997), 133 suggests, "In 1919, when President Woodrow Wilson arrived at Versailles for the conference that formally ended World War I. Ho drafted a statement to him. Inspire by WIlson's famous doctrine of self-determination, he wrote that 'all subject peoples are filled with hope by the prospect that an era of right and justice is opening to them... in the struggle against barbarism."
14. Karnow, Vietnam: A History, 133
15. Sexton, Michael "War for the Asking" 1981
16. Peter Church, ed. A Short History of South-East Asia.Singapore. John Wiley & Sons, 2006, p. 190.
17. ^ Demma. "The U.S. Army in Vietnam." American Military History
18. Ho Chi Minh. "Vietnam Declaration of Independence," Selected Works. Hanoi. Foreign Language Publishing House, (1960-1962), vol. 3, pp 17-21.
19. ^ Karnow Vietnam: A History p. 163.
20. http://www.globusz.com/ebooks/LuisSilva/00000013.htm
21. quoted in The Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking in Vietnam. Gravel, ed. Boston. Beacon Press, 1971, vol. 1, pp 49–50.
22. Karnow, Vietnam: A History p. 20
23. Franklin D. Roosevelt. "Franklin Roosevelt Memorandum to Cordell Hull."Major Problems in American Foreign Policy. Lexington, M.A. D.C. Heath and Company, 1995, vol. II, p. 198.
24. Karnow Vietnam: A History p. 378.
25. Ho Chi Minh sent no fewer than eight letters and telegrams to President Truman between October 1945 and February 1946. Ho urged Truman to support Vietnamese independence. He was ignored.
26. quoted in Chester L. Cooper. The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam. New York, NY. Dodd, Mead, 1970, pp 55–56.
27. ^ McNamara, Argument Without End pp 377-79
28. Pentagon Papers, Gravel, ed, Chapter 2, 'U.S. Involvement in the Franco-Viet Minh War', p. 54.
29. Herring, George C.: "America's Longest War", p. 18.
30. Zinn, "A People's History of the United States", p. 471.
31. The Pentagon Papers. Gravel, ed. vol. 1, pp 391–404.
32. 1 PENTAGON PAPERS (The Senator Gravel Edition), 248 (Boston, Beacon Press, 1971)
33. Robert Turner, VIETNAMESE COMMUNISM: ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT, 102 (Stanford Ca: Hoover Institution Press, 1975)
34. 1 PENTAGON PAPERS (The Senator Gravel Edition), 247, 328 (Boston, Beacon Press, 1971)
35. McNamara Argument Without End p. 60.
36. Dwight D. Eisenhower. Mandate for Change. Garden City, NJ. Doubleday & Company, 1963, p. 372.
37. Pentagon Papers
38. McNamara Argument Without End p. 19.
39. John F. Kennedy. "America's Stakes in Vietnam." Speech to the American Friends of Vietnam, June, 1956.
40. Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon.
41. McNamara Argument Without End p. 200–201.
42. Robert K. Brigham Battlefield Vietnam: A Brief History
43. John Prados, 'The Numbers Game: How Many Vietnamese Fled South In 1954?', The VVA Veteran, January/February 2005; accessed 2007-01-21
44. Karnow Vietnam: A History p. 238.
45. Karnow Vietnam: A History p. 239.
46. Gerdes (ed.) Examining Issues Through Political Cartoons: The Vietnam War p. 19.
47. Robert K. Brigham. Battlefield Vietnam: A Brief History.
48. ^ Karnow Vietnam: A History p. 230.
49. James Olson and Randy Roberts, WHERE THE DOMINO FELL: AMERICA AND VIETNAM, 1945-1990, 67 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991)(Ho Chi Minh ordered, "Do not engage in military operations; that will lead to defeat. Do not take land from a peasant. Emphasize nationalism rather than communism. Do not antagonize anyone if you can avoid it. Be selective in your violence. If an assassination is necessary, use a knife, not a rifle or grenade. It is too easy to kill innocent bystanders with guns and bombs, and accidental killing of the innocent bystanders will alienate peasants from the revolution. Once an assassination has taken place, make sure peasants know why the killing occurred.”)
50. Vo Nguyen Giap, The Political and Military Line of Our Party, in THE MILITARY ART, 179-80
51. PENTAGON PAPERS GRAVEL, 335.
52. PENTAGON PAPERS GRAVEL,337.
53. See Mark Moyar, The War Against the Viet Cong Shadow Government, in THE REAL LESSONS OF THE VIETNAM WAR (John Norton Moore and Robert Turner eds., 2002) 151-67.
54. U.S. Department of Defense, U.S.-Vietnam Relations, vol. 2, p. 2.
55. U.S. Department of Defense, U.S.-Vietnam Relations, vol. 2, pp 28-30.
56. Douglas Pike, The Origins of the War: Competing Perceptions in THE VIETNAM DEBATE: A FRESH LOOK AT THE ARGUMENTS 83-89, 86 (John Norton Moore ed., 1990).
57. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History, (New York: Viking Press, 1983), 264
58. The Avalon Project at Yale Law School. .
59. Karnow, Vietnam, 265 suggested that "Kennedy sidestepped Laos, whose rugged terrain was no battleground for American soldiers."
60. The case of John F. Kennedy and Vietnam Presidential Studies Quarterly
62. Karnow Vietnam: A History p. 267.
63. U.S. Department of Defense, U.S.-Vietnam Relations, vol. 3, pp 1-2.
64. McNamara Argument Without End p. 369.
65. John Kenneth Galbraith. "Memorandum to President Kennedy from John Kenneth Galbraith on Vietnam, 4 April 1962." The Pentagon Papers. Gravel. ed. Boston, Mass. Beacon Press, 1971, vol. 2. pp 669–671.
66. International Agreement on the Neutrality of Laos
67. Live interview by John Bartlow Martin. Was Kennedy Planning to Pull out of Vietnam? New York, NY. John F. Kennedy Library, 1964, Tape V, Reel 1.
68. Karnow Vietnam: A History p. 326.
69. Karnow Vietnam: A History p. 327.
70. McNamara Argument Without End p. 328.
71. Douglas Blaufarb. The Counterinsurgency Era. New York, NY. Free Press, 1977, p. 119.
72. George C. Herring. America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975. Boston, Mass. McGraw Hill, 1986, p. 103
73. Foreign Relation of the United States, Vietnam, 1961-1963. Washington, DC. Government Printing Office, 1991, vol. 4., p. 707.
74. quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. Robert Kennedy and His Times. New York, NY. Ballantine, 1978, p. 767.
75. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin books, 1983), 336 and specifically on 338-339 where presidential aid Jack Valenti recalls, "Vietnam at the time was a could no bigger than a man's fist on the horizon. We hardly discussed it because it was not worth discussing."
76. Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin books, 1983), 338 who notes also that Johnson viewed many members whom he inherited from Kennedy's cabinet with distrust because he had never penetrated their circle early in Kennedy's presidency.
77. Brian VanDeMark, Into the Quagmire (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 13
78. Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin books, 1983), 339 notes Johnson as saying "the battle against communism... must be joined... with strength and determination. We should stop playing cops and robbers and get back to... winning the war... tell the generals in Saigon that Lyndon Johnson intends to stand by our word... win the contest against the externally directed and supported Communist conspiracy."
79. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin books, 1983), 339 notes, talking about the Mekong Delta, that, "At a place called Hoa Phu, for example, the strategic hamlet built during the previous summer now looked like it had been hit by a hurricane.... Speaking through an interpreter, a local guard explained to me that a handful of Vietcong agents had entered the hamlet one night and told the peasants to tear it down and return to their native villages. The peasants complied without question."
80. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin books, 1983), 340 who quote Minh as enjoying playing tennis more than bureaucratic work.
81. Quoted from Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin books, 1983), 341
82. Brian VanDeMark, Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 17
83. Gerdes (ed.) Examining Issues Through Political Cartoons: The Vietnam War p. 26.
84. Gerdes (ed.) Examining Issues Through Political Cartoons: The Vietnam War p. 25.
85. George C. Herring, America's longest war: the United States and Vietnam 1950-1975 (New York: Wiley, 1979), 121
86. Earl L. Tilford, Setup: What the Air Force did in Vietnam and Why. Maxwell Air Force Base AL: Air University Press, 1991, p. 89.
87. Karnow Vietnam: A History p. 468.
88. Lt. Colonel John Paul Vann
89. Gen. Curtis E LeMay
90. Pew Research Center note, (October 2002) Generations Divide Over Military Action in Iraq
91. Ho Chi Minh. Letter to Martin Niemoeller. December, 1966. quoted in Marilyn B. Young. The Vietnam Wars: 1945–1990. New York, NY. Harper, 1991, p. 172.
92. McNamara, Argument Without End p. 48
93. ^ McNamara, Argument Without End pp 349-51
94. U.S. Department of Defense, U.S.-Vietnam Relations vol. 4, p. 7
95. McNamara Argument Without End p. 353
96. U.S. Department of Defense, U.S.-Vietnam Relations vol. 5, pp 8-9.
97. U.S. Department of Defense, U.S.-Vietnam Relations vol. 4, pp 117–119. and vol. 5, pp 8–12.
98. Public Papers of the Presidents, 1965. Washington, DC. Government Printing Office, 1966, vol. 2, pp 794–799.
99. ^ McNamara Argument Without End pp 353–354.
100. John Paul Vann. John Paul Vann: Information from Answers.com. at
101. Karnow Vietnam: A History p. 453.
102. Karnow Vietnam: A History p. 566.
103. Peter Church. ed. A Short History of South-East Asia. Singapore, John Wiley & Sons, 2006, p. 193.
104. Karnow Vietnam: A History p. 706.
105. ^ Karnow Vietnam: A History p. 18.
106. McNamara Argument Without End pp 363-365
107. ^ "The Guardians at the Gate," Time: The Weekly Newsmagazine January 7, 1966, vol. 87, no.1.
108. ^ Witz The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War pp 1–2
109. Larry Berman. Lyndon Johnson's War. New York, W.W. Norton, 1991, p. 116.
110. Karnow Vietnam: A History. p. 556.
111. Harold P. Ford. CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers pp 104–123.
112. "Peter Arnett: Whose Man in Baghdad?", Mona Charen, Jewish World Review, April 1, 2003
113. Gerdes (ed.) Examining Issues Through Political Cartoons: The Vietnam War p. 27.
114. McNamara Argument Without End pp 366–367.
115. Robert K. Brigham. Battlefield Vietnam: A Brief History.
116. Prince Norodom Sihanouk. "Cambodia Neutral: The Dictates of Necessity." Foreign Affairs. New York, NY. Council on Foreign Relations, 1958, pp 582–583.
117. quoted in Nonaligned Foreign Policy.
118. Joe Angio. Nixon a Presidency Revealed. Television Documentary, The History Channel, February 15, 2007.
119. The Pentagon Papers Case.-4k-
120. International Agreement on the Neutrality of Laos
121. Karnow Vietnam: A History pp 644–645.
122. Peter Church, ed. A Short History of South-East Asia. Singapore. John Wiley & Sons, 2006, pp 193–194.
123. Karnow Vietnam: A History p. 24.
125. Congressional Research Service. Congressional Use of Funding Cutoffs Since 1970 Involving U.S. Military Forces and Overseas Deployments. January 10, 2001, p. 2.
126. McNamara Argument Without End pp 367–368.
127. Clark Dougan, David Fulgham et al., The Fall of the South. Boston: Boston Publishing Company, 1985, p. 22.
128. CIA World Factbook
129. By The President Of The United States Of America, A Proclamation Granting Pardon For Violations Of The Selective Services Act, August 4, 1964 To March 28, 1973. January 21, 1977.
130. Zhang Xiaoming "China's 1979 War With Vietnam: A Reassessment," China Quarterly. Issue no. 184, December, 2005.
131. Schell The Time of Illusion p. 361.
132. Gerdes (ed). Examining Issues Through Political Cartoons: The Vietnam War pp 14–15.
133. Karnow Vietnam: A History p. 23.
134. Taylor paraphrases Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Samuel B. Griffith, trans. Oxford, UK. Oxford University Press, 1963.
135. http://www.vietnamwar.com/presidentnixonsrole.htm
136. see the conclusion in Demma's "The U.S. Army in Vietnam."
137. Henry A. Kissinger. Lessons of Vietnam. Secret Memoranda to The President of the United States, May 12, 1975, p. 3.
138. McNamara Argument Without End p. 368.
139. ^ Quoted in Bob Buzzano. "25 Years After The End Of Vietnam War: Myths Keep Us From Coming To Terms With Vietnam," The Baltimore Sun Times, April 17, 2000.
141. http://www.anzacday.org.au/education/medals/vc/austlist.html
142. Soviet Involvement in the Vietnam War, Historical Text Archive
143. Asia Times, August 18 2006, Richard M Bennett [http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/HH18Dg02.html Missiles and madness
144. Merle Pribbenow, 'The 'Ology War: technology and ideology in the defense of Hanoi, 1967' Journal of Military History 67:1 (2003) p. 183.
145. Gluck, Caroline (7 July, 2001). "N Korea admits Vietnam war role". BBC News. Retrieved 2006-10-19. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); also see "North Korea fought in Vietnam War". BBC News. 31 March, 2000. Retrieved 2006-10-19. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); also see "North Korea honours Vietnam war dead". BBC News. 12 July, 2001. Retrieved 2006-10-19. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
146. Canadians in Vietnam
147. Anthony Failoa, In Vietnam, Old Foes Take Aim at War's Toxic Legacy, Washington Post, November 13, 2006
148. Agence France Press, 3 April, 1995

References

Primary sources

• Anonymous. We Had to Destroy it in Order to Save it. infamous quote from unidentified U.S. officer, illustrating the illogic which is sometime part of war.
• Carter, Jimmy. By The President Of The United States Of America, A Proclamation Granting Pardon For Violations Of The Selective Service Act, August 4, 1964 To March 28, 1973 (January 21, 1977)
• Central Intelligence Agency. "Laos," CIA World Factbook
• Eisenhower, Dwight D. Mandate for Change. (1963) a presidential political memoir
• Ho, Chi Minh. "Vietnam Declaration of Independence," Selected Works. (1960-1962) selected writings
• Inaugural Address of John F. Kennedy. (1961)
• International Agreement on the Neutrality of Laos. (1962)
• LeMay, General Curtis E. and Kantor, MacKinley. Mission with LeMay (1965) autobiography of controversial former Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force
• Kissinger, United States Secretary of State Henry A. "Lessons on Vietnam," (1975) secret memoranda to U.S. President Ford
• McMahon, Robert J. Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War: Documents and Essays (1995) textbook
• Kim A. O'Connell, ed. Primary Source Accounts of the Vietnam War (2006)
• McCain, John. Faith of My Fathers: A Family Memoir (1999) the Senator was a POW
• Marshall, Kathryn. In the Combat Zone: An Oral History of American Women in Vietnam, 1966–1975 (1987)
• Martin, John Bartlow. Was Kennedy Planning to Pull out of Vietnam? (1964) oral history for the John F. Kennedy Library, tape V, reel 1.
• Myers, Thomas. Walking Point: American Narratives of Vietnam (1988)
• Major General Spurgeon Neel. Medical Support of the U.S. Army in Vietnam 1965–1970 (Department of the Army 1991) official medical history; online complete text
• Roosevelt, Franklin D. "Franklin Roosevelt Memorandum to Cordell Hull." (1995) in Major Problems in American Foreign Policy
• Public Papers of the Presidents, 1965 (1966) official documents of U.S. presidents.
• Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr.Robert Kennedy and His Times. (1978) a first hand account of the Kennedy administration by one of his principle advisors
• Sinhanouk, Prince Norodom. "Cambodia Neutral: The Dictates of Necessity." Foreign Affairs. (1958) describes the geopolitical situation of Cambodia
• Sun Tzu. The Art of War. (1963), ancient military treatise
• Tang, Truong Nhu. A Vietcong Memoir (1985), revealing account by senior NLF official
• Terry, Wallace, ed. Bloods: An Oral History of the Vietnam War by Black Veterans (1984)
• The Pentagon Papers (Gravel ed. 5 vol 1971); combination of narrative and secret documents compiled by Pentagon. excerpts
• U.S. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States (multivolume collection of official secret documents) vol 1: 1964; vol 2: 1965; vol 3: 1965; vol 4: 1966;
• U.S. Department of Defense and the House Committee on Armed Services.U.S.-Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967. Washington, DC. Department of Defense and the House Committee on Armed Services, 1971, 12 volumes.
• Vann, John Paul Quotes from Answers.com Lt. Colonel, U.S. Army, DFC, DSC, advisor to the ARVN 7th Division, early critic of the conduct of the war.

Secondary sources

• Anderson, David L. Columbia Guide to the Vietnam War (2004).
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• Blaufarb, Douglas. The Counterinsurgency Era (1977) a history of the Kennedy Administration's involvement in South Vietnam.
• Brigham, Robert K. Battlefield Vietnam: A Brief History a PBS interactive website
• Buzzanco, Bob. "25 Years After End of Vietnam War: Myths Keep Us From Coming To Terms With Vietnam," The Baltimore Sun (April 17, 2000)
• Church, Peter ed. A Short History of South-East Asia (2006).
• Cooper, Chester L. The Lost Crusade: America in Vietnam (1970) a Washington insider's memoir of events.
• Demma, Vincent H. "The U.S. Army in Vietnam." American Military History (1989) the official history of the United States Army. Available online
• Duiker, William J. The Communist Road to Power in Vietnam (1996).
• Duncanson, Dennis J. Government and Revolution in Vietnam (1968).
• Fincher, Ernest Barksdale, The Vietnam War (1980).
• Ford, Harold P. CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes, 1962–1968. (1998).
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• Hammond, William. Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1962–1968 (1987); Public Affairs: The Military and the Media, 1068–1973 (1995). full-scale history of the war by U.S. Army; much broader than title suggests.
• Herring, George C. America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975 (4th ed 2001), most widely used short history.
• Hitchens, Christopher. The Vietnam Syndrome.
• Karnow, Stanley. Vietnam: A History (1983), popular history by a former foreign correspondent; strong on Saigon's plans.
• Kutler, Stanley ed. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War (1996).
• Lewy, Guenter. America in Vietnam (1978), defends U.S. actions.
• McMahon, Robert J. Major Problems in the History of the Vietnam War: Documents and Essays (1995) textbook.
• McNamara, Robert, James Blight, Robert Brigham, Thomas Biersteker, Herbert Schandler, Argument Without End: In Search of Answers to the Vietnam Tragedy, (Public Affairs, 1999).
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• Moss, George D. Vietnam (4th ed 2002) textbook.
• Moyar, Mark. Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965, (Cambridge University Press; 412 pages; 2006). A revisionist history that challenges the notion that U.S. involvement in Vietnam was misguided; defends the validity of the domino theory and disputes the notion that Ho Chi Minh was, at heart, a nationalist who would eventually turn against his Communist Chinese allies.
• Palmer, Bruce, Jr. The Twenty-Five Year War (1984), narrative military history by a senior U.S. general.
• Schell, Jonathan. The Time of Illusion (1976).
• Schulzinger, Robert D. A Time for War: The United States and Vietnam, 1941–1975 (1997).
• Spector, Ronald. After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam (1992), very broad coverage of 1968.
• Tucker, Spencer. ed. Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War (1998) 3 vol. reference set; also one-volume abridgement (2001).
• Witz, James J. The Tet Offensive: Intelligence Failure in War (1991).
• Young, Marilyn, B. The Vietnam Wars: 1945–1990. (1991).
• Xiaoming, Zhang. "China's 1979 War With Vietnam: A Reassessment," China Quarterly. Issue no. 184, (December, 2005)

External links

• The U.S. Army in Vietnam the official history of the United States Army
• Vietnam war timeline comprehensive timeline of the Vietnam War
• Documents Relating to American Foreign Policy-Vietnam primary sources on U.S. involvement in Vietnam
• War, propaganda, and the media: VIETNAM
• Timeline US - Vietnam (1947-2001) in Open-Content project History of US Interventions, by Derek, Mitchell
• Complete text of the Gravel Edition of the Pentagon Papers with supporting documents, maps, and photos
• Battlefield Vietnam PBS interactive site
• Vietnam War Bibliography covers online and published resources
• China Vietnam War Chronology
• Russia Vietnam War Chronology
• USA Vietnam War Chronology
• Vietnam Vietnam War Chronology
• U.S. Casualty Statistics
• Casualties - U.S. vs NVA/VC
• The Effects of Vietnamization on the Republic of Vietnam's Armed Forces, 1969–1972
• The American War: the U.S. in Vietnam—a Pinky Show online video Watch on YouTube
• UC Berkeley Library Social Activism Sound Recording Project: Anti-Vietnam War Protests

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