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Attack on Pearl Harbor

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Attack on Pearl Harbor
Part of the Pacific Theater of World War II

Photograph from a Japanese aircraft of the Pearl Harbor area including Battleship Row at the beginning of the attack.
DateDecember 7, 1941
Locationprimarily Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, USA
Result Japanese tactical victory, but a strategic and grand strategic failure; Empire of Japan declares war on the United States and the British Empire; United States declares war on the Empire of Japan; Nazi Germany declares war on the United States, which enters World War II on the side of Allies.
Belligerents
 United States  Empire of Japan
Commanders and leaders
Navy:
United States Husband Kimmel
Army:
United States Walter Short
Navy:
Empire of Japan Chuichi Nagumo
Strength
8 battleships,
8 cruisers,
29 destroyers,
9 submarines,
~50 other ships,
~390 aircraft
Mobile Unit:
6 aircraft carriers,
9 destroyers,
2 battleships,
2 heavy cruisers,
1 light cruiser,
8 tankers,
23 fleet submarines,
5 midget submarines,
414 aircraft
Casualties and losses
2 battleships sunk,
2 destroyers sunk, 1 damaged
1 other ship sunk, 3 damaged
6 battleships damaged,
3 cruisers damaged

188 aircraft destroyed, 155 aircraft damaged,
2,345 military and 57 civilians killed,
1,247 military and 35 civilians wounded
4 midget submarines sunk,
1 midget submarine run aground,
29 aircraft destroyed,
55 airmen, 9 submariners killed and 1 captured

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Japanese offensives,
1940–1942
1940

1941

1942

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Pacific War
Central Pacific
Indian Ocean (1941–1945)
Southeast Asia
Burma and India
Southwest Pacific
North America
Japan
Manchuria and Northern Korea

Second Sino-Japanese War

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The attack on Pearl Harbor was a preventive attack on the United States Pacific Fleet base at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii by the Empire of Japan's Imperial Japanese Navy, on the morning of Sunday, December 7, 1941 resulting in the United States becoming involved in World War II. Two aerial attack waves, totaling 353 aircraft, were launched from six Japanese aircraft carriers, with the intention of reducing or eliminating the United States' military power in the Pacific.

The attack wrecked two U.S. Navy battleships, one minelayer, and two destroyers beyond repair, and destroyed 188 aircraft; personnel losses were 2,388 killed and 1,178 wounded. Damaged warships included three cruisers, a destroyer, and six battleships (one deliberately grounded, later refloated and repaired; two sunk at their berths, later raised, repaired, and eventually restored to Fleet service). Vital fuel storage, shipyard, maintenance, and headquarters facilities were not hit. Japanese losses were minimal, at 29 aircraft and five midget submarines, with 65 servicemen killed or wounded.

The intent of the strike was to protect Imperial Japan's advance into Malaya and the Dutch East Indies – for their natural resources such as oil and rubber – by neutralizing the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Both the U.S. and Japan had long-standing contingency plans for war in the Pacific, continuously updated as tension between the two countries steadily increased during the 1930s. Japan's expansion into Manchuria and French Indochina were greeted with steadily increasing levels of embargoes and sanctions by the United States and others. In 1940, under the Export Control Act, the U.S. halted shipments of airplanes, parts, machine tools, and aviation gas, which Japan saw as an unfriendly act. Nevertheless, the U.S. continued to export oil to Japan, in part because it was understood in Washington cutting off oil exports would be an extreme step, given Japanese dependence on U.S. oil exports, likely to be taken as a provocation by Japan. In the summer of 1941, after Japanese expansion into French Indochina, the U.S. ceased oil exports to Japan, in part because American restrictions on internal oil use were beginning. President Franklin D. Roosevelt had earlier moved the Pacific Fleet to Hawaii and ordered a buildup in the Philippines, hoping to deter Japanese aggression in the Far East. The Japanese high command was (mistakenly) certain an attack on the United Kingdom's colonies would bring the U.S. into the war, so a preventive strike appeared to be the only way Japan could avoid U.S. interference in the Pacific.

The attack was one of the most important engagements of World War II. Occurring as it did before a formal declaration of war, it pushed U.S. public opinion from isolationism to an acceptance war was unavoidable, as Roosevelt called December 7, 1941 "… a date which will live in infamy."

Background to conflict

Main article: Events leading to the attack on Pearl Harbor

War between Japan and the United States had been a possibility each nation had been aware of (and developed contingency planning for) since the 1920s, though tension did not begin to seriously rise until Japan's 1931 invasion of Manchuria. Over the next decade, Japan continued to expand into China leading to all out war between the two in 1937. In 1940, Japan invaded French Indochina, partly in an effort to control supplies reaching China, and partly as a first step to gain improved access to resources in Southeast Asia. This move prompted an American embargo on oil exports to Japan, which caused the Japanese to decide to commence the planned takeover of oil supplies in the Dutch East Indies.

Preliminary planning for an attack at Pearl Harbor, to protect this move into the "Southern Resource Area" (the Japanese term for the East Indies and Southeast Asia generally), had begun in very early 1941, under the auspices of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, then commanding Japan's Combined Fleet. He won assent to formal planning and training for an attack from the Imperial Japanese Navy General Staff only after much contention with Naval Headquarters, including a threat to resign his command. Full-scale planning was under way by early spring 1941 primarily by Captain Minoru Genda. Over the next several months, pilots trained, equipment was adapted, and intelligence gathered. Despite these preparations, the actual order to attack was not issued until after the second of two Imperial Conferences which considered the matter, and final release to attack was not given until December 1st, after Japanese leaders decided that the US was not likely to accommodate Japanese demands to avoid interference with Japanese expansion. Hostilities between the US and Japan were expected by many observers, including President Roosevelt, who read a decrypted Japanese message and told his assistant Harry Hopkins, "This means war."

Spongebob! I eat them.

Aftermath

Main article: Results of the attack on Pearl Harbor
USS Pennsylvania, behind the wreckage of the USS Downes and USS Cassin.

Though the attack was notable for its large-scale destruction, the damage was not significant in terms of American fuel storage, maintenance and intelligence capabilities. Had Japan destroyed the American carriers, the U.S. would have sustained significant damage to the Pacific Fleet's ability to conduct offensive operations for a year or so (given no diversions from the Atlantic Fleet). As it was, the elimination of the battleships left the U.S. Navy with no choice but to place its faith in aircraft carriers and submarines—the very weapons with which the U.S. Navy halted and eventually reversed the Japanese advance. A major flaw of Japanese strategic thinking was a belief the ultimate Pacific battle would be between battleships of both sides, in keeping with the doctrine of Captain Alfred Mahan. As a result, Yamamoto (and his successors) hoarded battleships for a "decisive battle" that never happened.

Ultimately, targets not on Genda's list, such as the Submarine Base and the old Headquarters Building, proved more important than any battleship. It was submarines that immobilized IJN's heavy ships and brought Japan's economy to a standstill by crippling transportation of oil and raw materials. And in the basement of the old Administration Building was the cryptanalytic unit, HYPO, which contributed significantly to the Midway ambush and the Submarine Force's success.

Media

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See also

Notes

  1. CinCP report of damage to ships in Pearl Harbor from www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar. Unless otherwise stated, all vessels listed are salvageable.
  2. Conn 2000, p. 194 (Navy and Marines: 2,117 killed in action or died of wounds, 779 wounded; Army 215 killed in action or died of wounds, 360 wounded)
  3. GPO 1946, pp. 64–65
  4. Parillo, Mark. "The United States in the Pacific", in Higham, Robin, and Harris, Stephen, Why Air Forces Fail: the Anatomy of Defeat (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 2006), p.288.
  5. GPO 1943, p. 96 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFGPO1943a (help) After it was announced in September export of iron and steel scrap would be prohibited, Japanese Ambassador Horinouchi protested to Secretary Hull on October 8, 1940, this might be considered an "unfriendly act".
  6. GPO 1943, p. 94 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFGPO1943a (help)
  7. Toland, Japan's War.
  8. GPO 1943, p. 125 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFGPO1943a (help)
  9. ^ Peattie 1997 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFPeattie1997 (help)
  10. An invasion of the Philippines was taken as necessary by Japanese planners, and reconquest had been a given in War Plan Orange as far back as 1897.
  11. This was mainly a Navy preference; the Army would rather have attacked the Soviet Union. Peattie & Evans, Kaigun; Coox, Kobun.
  12. Gailey 1995, p. 68 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFGailey1995 (help)
  13. Gailey 1995, p. 70 harvnb error: no target: CITEREFGailey1995 (help)
  14. Theobold 1954, p. 28

References

Books

U.S. Government Documents

Magazine articles

Online sources

Further reading

  • McCollum memo A 1940 memo from a Naval headquarters staff officer to his superiors outlining possible provocations to Japan, which might lead to war (declassified in 1994).
  • Gordon W. Prange, At Dawn We Slept (McGraw-Hill, 1981), Pearl Harbor: The Verdict of History (McGraw-Hill, 1986), and December 7, 1941: The Day the Japanese Attacked Pearl Harbor (McGraw-Hill, 1988). This monumental trilogy, written with collaborators Donald M. Goldstein and Katherine V. Dillon, is considered the authoritative work on the subject.
  • Larry Kimmett and Margaret Regis, The Attack on Pearl Harbor: An Illustrated History (NavPublishing, 2004). Using maps, photos, unique illustrations, and an animated CD, this book provides a detailed overview of the surprise attack that brought the United States into World War II.
  • Walter Lord, Day of Infamy (Henry Holt, 1957) is a very readable, and entirely anecdotal, re-telling of the day's events.
  • W. J. Holmes, Double-Edged Secrets: U.S. Naval Intelligence Operations in the Pacific During World War II (Naval Institute, 1979) contains some important material, such as Holmes' argument that, had the U.S. Navy been warned of the attack and put to sea, it would have likely resulted in an even greater disaster.
  • Michael V. Gannon, Pearl Harbor Betrayed (Henry Holt, 2001) is a recent examination of the issues surrounding the surprise of the attack.
  • Frederick D. Parker, Pearl Harbor Revisited: United States Navy Communications Intelligence 1924–1941 (Center for Cryptologic History, 1994) contains a detailed description of what the Navy knew from intercepted and decrypted Japan's communications prior to Pearl.
  • Henry C. Clausen and Bruce Lee, Pearl Harbor: Final Judgment, (HarperCollins, 2001), an account of the secret "Clausen Inquiry" undertaken late in the war by order of Congress to Secretary of War Stimson.
  • Robert A. Theobald, Final Secret of Pearl Harbor (Devin-Adair Pub, 1954) ISBN 0-8159-5503-0 ISBN 0-317-65928-6 Foreword by Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr.
  • Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemeyer Reports! (Henry Holt Co, 1958) ISBN 0-89275-011-1 ISBN 0-8159-7216-4
  • Hamilton Fish, Tragic Deception: FDR and America's Involvement in World War II (Devin-Adair Pub, 1983) ISBN 0-8159-6917-1
  • John Toland, Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath (Berkley Reissue edition, 1986 ISBN 0-425-09040-X) is an excellent account by a Pulitzer Prize winning author, though thought by some not to back up his claims as thoroughly as expected by academic conventions.
  • Robert Stinnett, Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor (Free Press, 1999) A study of the Freedom of Information Act documents that led Congress to direct clearance of Kimmel and Short. ISBN 0-7432-0129-9
  • Edward L. Beach, Scapegoats: A Defense of Kimmel and Short at Pearl HarborISBN 1-55750-059-2
  • Andrew Krepinevich, Template:PDFlink (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments) contains a passage regarding the Yarnell attack, as well as reference citations.
  • Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, (Stanford University Press: 1962). Regarded by many as the most important work in the attempt to understand the intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor. Her introduction and analysis of the concept of "noise" persists in understanding intelligence failures.
  • John Hughes-Wilson, Military Intelligence Blunders and Cover-Ups. Robinson, 1999 (revised 2004). Contains a brief but insightful chapter on the particular intelligence failures, and broader overview of what causes them.
  • Horn, Steve (2005). The Second Attack on Pearl Harbor: Operation K And Other Japanese Attempts to Bomb America in World War II. Naval Institute Press. ISBN 1-59114-388-8. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  • Seki, Eiji (2007). Sinking of the SS Automedon And the Role of the Japanese Navy: A New Interpretation. University of Hawaii Press. ISBN 1905246285. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  • Daniel Madsen, Resurrection-Salvaging the Battle Fleet at Pearl Harbor. U.S. Naval Institute Press. 2003. Highly readable and thoroughly researched account of the aftermath of the attack and the salvage efforts from December 8, 1941 through early 1944.

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