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Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo

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Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
Flag of the Democratic Republic of the CongoFlag of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Founded1960
Service branchesArmy, Air Force, Navy
HeadquartersColonel Tshatshi Military Camp, Kinshasa
Leadership
Commander-in-ChiefPresident Joseph Kabila
(personally holds the rank of Major General)
Chief of StaffLieutenant General Dieudonné Kayembe Mbandakulu
Personnel
Military age18–45
Available for
military service		11,052,696, age 18–49 (2005 est)
Fit for
military service		5,851,292, age 18–49 (2005 est)
Reaching military
age annually		Unknown (2005 est)
Active personnelAround 130,000
Expenditure
BudgetUS$93.5 million (2004)
Percent of GDP2.5% (2006)
Industry
Domestic suppliersNone

The Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (Template:Lang-fr) is the state military organisation responsible for defending the Democratic Republic of Congo. The FARDC is being rebuilt as part of the peace process which followed the end of the Second Congo War in July 2003.

The majority of FARDC members are land forces, but they also have a small air force and an even smaller navy. Together the three services may number around 130,000 personnel. In addition, there is a presidential force called the Republican Guard, but the National Congolese Police (PNC) are not part of the Armed Forces.

In general, there is very little coherent information available on the FARDC.

The government in the capital city Kinshasa, the United Nations, the European Union, and bilateral partners which include Angola, South Africa, and Belgium are attempting to create a viable force with the ability to provide the DRC with stability and security. However, this process is being hampered by corruption, the near-impotence of the government, and inadequate donor coordination. The various military units now grouped under the FARDC banner are some of the most unstable in Africa after years of war and underfunding.

To assist the new government, since February 2000 the United Nations has had the United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC), which currently has a strength of over 16,000 peacekeepers in the country. Its principal tasks are to provide security in key areas, such as the Sud-Kivu and Nord-Kivu in the east, and to assist the government in reconstruction. Foreign rebel groups are also in the Congo, as they have been for most of the last half-century. The most important is the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), against which Laurent Nkunda's troops are fighting, but other smaller groups such as the anti-Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army are also present.

History

Main article: Force Publique

The first organized Congolese troops, known as the Error: {{Lang}}: text has italic markup (help) (FP), were created in 1888 by King Léopold II of Belgium in what was then known as the Congo Free State. It was first conceived in 1885 by King Léopold who held the Congo Free State as his private property, ordered his Secretary of the Interior to create military and police forces for the state. In 1908, under international pressure Léopold ceded administration of the colony to the government of Belgium as the Belgian Congo. The NME was renamed as the Error: {{Lang}}: text has italic markup (help), and remained under the command of a Belgian officer corps through the independence of the colony in 1960. The NME saw combat in Cameroun, and successfully invaded and conquered areas of German East Africa, notably present day Rwanda, during World War I. Elements of the NME were also used to form Belgian colonial units that fought in the East African Campaign during World War II.

With independence in 1960, the military elements of the FP were renamed the Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC), or Congolese National Army. The new army suffered from a dramatic deficit of trained leaders, particularly in the officer corps. This was because the FP had always only been officered by Belgian or other expatriate whites. The Belgian Government made no effort to train Congolese commissioned officers until the very end of the Colonial period and there were only about 20 African cadets in training on the eve of Independence. Ill-advised actions by Belgian officers led to an enlisted ranks' rebellion five days after independence in 1960, which helped spark the Congo Crisis. After five years of turbulence, in 1965 Mobutu Sese Seko used his position as ANC Chief of Staff to seize power in the Congo. As a general rule, since that time, the armed forces have not intervened in politics as a body, rather being tossed and turned as ambitious men have shaken the country. In reality, the larger problem has been the misuse and sometimes abuse of the military and police by political and ethnic leaders.

On 16 May 1968 a parachute brigade of two regiments (each of three battalions) was formed which eventually was to grow in size to a full division.

Zaire 1971–1997

The country was renamed Zaire in 1971 and the army was consequently designated the Error: {{Lang}}: text has italic markup (help) (FAZ). During 1975–1976, Mobutu directed the FAZ to intervene in the Angolan Civil War assisting the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA)'s fight against the Marxist Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). This policy backfired when the MPLA won in Angola, and then, acting ostensibly at least as the Error: {{Lang}}: text has italic markup (help) (Front for the National Liberation of the Congo), occupied Zaire's Katanga Province, then known as Shaba, in March, 1977, facing little resistance from the FAZ. This invasion is sometimes known as Shaba I. Mobutu had to request assistance, which was provided by Morocco in the form of regular troops who routed the MPLA and their Cuban advisors out of Katanga. The humiliation of this episode led to civil unrest in Zaire in early 1978, which the FAZ had to put down.

The poor performance of Zaire's military during Shaba I gave evidence of chronic weaknesses (which extend to this day). One problem was that some of the Zairian soldiers in the area had not received pay for extended periods. Senior officers often kept the money intended for the soldiers, typifying a generally disreputable and inept senior leadership in the FAZ. As a result, many soldiers simply deserted rather than fight. Others stayed with their units but were ineffective.

During the months following the Shaba invasion, Mobutu sought solutions to the military problems that had contributed to the army's dismal performance. He implemented sweeping reforms of the command structure, including wholesale firings of high-ranking officers. He merged the military general staff with his own presidential staff and appointed himself chief of staff again, in addition to the positions of minister of defense and supreme commander that he already held. He also redeployed his forces throughout the country instead of keeping them close to Kinshasa, as had previously been the case. The Kamanyola Division, at the time considered the army's best formation, and considered the president's own, was assigned permanently to Shaba. In addition to these changes, the army's strength was reduced by 25 percent. Also, Zaire's allies provided a large influx of military equipment, and Belgian, French, and American advisers assisted in rebuilding and retraining the force.

The army's structure changed during Mobotu's long rule, but as of July 1975, according to the IISS Military Balance, the FAZ was made up of 14 infantry battalions, seven "Guard" battalions, and seven other infantry battalions variously designated as "parachute" (or possibly "commando"; probably the units of the new parachute brigade originally formed in 1968). There were also an armored car regiment and a mechanized infantry battalion. Organizationally, the army was made up of seven brigade groups and one parachute division. In addition to these units, a tank battalion was reported to have formed by 1979.

The poor state of discipline of the Congolese forces became apparent again in 1990. Foreign military assistance to Zaire ceased following the end of the Cold War and Mobutu deliberately allowed the military's condition to deteriorate so that it did not threaten his hold on power. Protesting low wages and lack of pay, paratroopers began looting Kinshasa in September 1991 and were only stopped after intervention by French ('Operation Baumier') and Belgian ('Operation Blue Beam') forces.

Map of the DR of the Congo

In 1993, according to the Library of Congress Country Studies, the 25,000-member FAZ ground forces consisted of one infantry division (with three infantry brigades); one airborne brigade (with three parachute battalions and one support battalion); one special forces (commando/counterinsurgency) brigade; the Special Presidential Division; one independent armored brigade; and two independent infantry brigades (each with three infantry battalions, one support battalion). These units were deployed throughout the country, with the main concentrations in Shaba Region (approximately half the force). The Kamanyola Division, consisting of three infantry brigades operated generally in western Shaba Region; the 21st Infantry Brigade was located in Lubumbashi; the 13th Infantry Brigade was deployed throughout eastern Shaba; and at least one battalion of the 31st Airborne Brigade stayed at Kamina. The other main concentration of forces was in and around Kinshasa: the 31st Airborne Brigade was deployed at Ndjili Airport on the outskirts of the capital; the Special Presidential Division (DSP) resided adjacent to the presidential compound; and the 1st Armored Brigade was at Mbanza-Ngungu (in Bas-Congo, approximately 120 kilometers southwest of Kinshasa). Finally the 41st Commando Brigade was at Kisangani.

This superficially impressive list of units overstates the actual capability of the armed forces at the time. Apart from privileged formations such as the Presidential Division and the 31st Airborne Brigade, most units were poorly trained, divided and so badly paid that they regularly resorted to looting. What operational abilities the armed forces had were gradually destroyed by politicisation of the forces, tribalisation, and division of the forces, included purges of suspectedly disloyal group, intended to allow Mobutu to divide and rule. All this occurred against the background of increasing deterioration of state structures under the kleptocratic Mobutu regime.

Mobutu's overthrow and after

Much of the origins of the recent conflict in what is now the DRC stems from the turmoil following Rwandan Genocide of 1994, which then led to the Great Lakes refugee crisis. Within the largest refugee camps, beginning in Goma in Nord-Kivu, were Rwandan Hutu fighters, increasingly well-organised, who were launching attacks into Rwanda. Rwanda eventually backed Laurent-Desire Kabila and his quickly organised Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo in invading Zaire, aiming to stop the attacks on Rwanda in the process of toppling Mobutu's government. When the militias rebelled, backed by Rwanda, the FAZ, weakened as is noted above, proved incapable of mastering the situation and preventing the overthrow of Mobutu in 1997. When Kabila took power in 1997, the country was renamed the Democratic Republic of the Congo and so the name of the national army changed once again. By 1998, formations on the outbreak of the Second Congo War included the 50th Brigade, headquartered at Camp Kokolo in Kinshasa.

The FARDC performed poorly throughout the Second Congo War and "demonstrated little skill or recognisable military doctrine". At the outbreak of the war in 1998 the Army was ineffective and the DRC Government was forced to rely on assistance from Angola, Chad, Namibia and Zimbabwe. As well as providing expeditionary forces, these countries unsuccessfully attempted to retrain the DRC Army. North Korea and Tanzania also provided assistance with training. During the first year of the war the Allied forces defeated the Rwandan force which had landed in Bas-Congo and the rebel forces south-west of Kinshasa and eventually halted the rebel and Rwandan offensive in the east of the DRC. These successes contributed to a the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement which was signed in July 1999. In November 1999 the Government attempted to form a 20,000-strong paramilitary force designated the People's Defence Forces. This force was intended to support the FARDC and national police but never became effective.

The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was not successful in ending the war, and fighting resumed in September 1999. The FARDC's performance continued to be poor and both the major offensives the Government launched in 2000 ended in costly defeats. President Kabila's mismanagement was an important factor behind the FARDC's poor performance, with soldiers frequently going unpaid and unfed while the Government purchased advanced weaponry which could not be operated or maintained. The defeats in 2000 are believed to have been the cause of President Kabila's assassination in January 2001. Following the assassination Joseph Kabila assumed the presidency and was eventually successful in negotiating an end to the war in 2003. Much of the east of the country remains insecure, however, primarily due to the Ituri conflict, the continued activity of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda in the Kivus and the fighting between the government and forces under Laurent Nkunda.

Current organisation

Gén. Kisempia Sungilanga, former Chief of Staff of the FARDC, in December 2006.

The President, Major General Joseph Kabila is the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Chikez Diemu, Minister of Defence, Disarmament, and Veterans (Ancien Combattants), with the French acronym MDNDAC, succeeded the former Defence Minister Adolphe Onusumba Yemba (of RCD-G) in February 2007.

The Colonel Tshatshi Military Camp in the Kinshasa suburb of Ngaliema hosts the defense department and the Chiefs of Staff central command headquarters of the FARDC. There are no local defence industries.

Below the Chief of Staff, the current organisation of the FARDC is not fully clear. However, it is known to be broken up into the Army, Navy and Air Force, which are distributed around ten military regions following the ten provinces of the country. The numberings in the chart below however may not be completely accurate as re-designations have occurred. Military regional commanders were deployed around the country in 2003 as the first move in military reform, superimposed on top of the various groups of fighters, government and former rebels.

Chiefs of Staff

  • Early 1960s (1964–1965): Joseph-Desire Mobutu
  • November 1965 to at least 1972: General Louis Bobozo, Commandant en chef de l’Armée nationale congolaise. Bobozo was a Major General in 1965 and appears to have been a full General by 1972.
  • 1970s – circa 1990: unknown
  • 1991–1993 : General Mahele Lioko Bokoungo, Chief of Staff of the Forces Armées Zaïroises
  • 1993–1996 : General Eluki Monga Aundu (February 1993 – 20 November 1996)
  • 1996–1997 : General Mahele Lioko Bokungo (assassinated 16 May 1997)
  • 1997–1998 : James Kabarebe, Chef d'état-major des FAC, until July 1998.
  • 16 July 1998 – 15 August 1998: Célestin Kifwa
  • August 1998–2001? : Joseph Kabila (given rank of Major General, but has no military training)
  • 2001–2004 : Admiral Baudouin Liwanga Mata Nyamuniobo
  • 2004–2007 : Lieutenant Genéral Philemon Kisempia Sungilanga
  • June 2007 : Lieutenant General Dieudonné Kayembe Mbandakulu, former DEMIAP director

Command structure as of January 2005

  • FARDC chief of staff: Major General Sungilanga Kisempia (PPRD)
  • FARDC land forces chief of staff: General Sylvain Buki (RCD-G)
  • FARDC navy chief of staff: General Major Amuli Bahigwa (MLC)
  • FARDC air force chief of staff: Brigadier General Bitanihirwa Kamara (MLC)
  • 1st Military Region/Bandundu: Brigadier General Moustapha Mukiza (MLC)
  • 2nd Military Region/Bas-Congo: .Unknown
  • 3rd Military Region/Equateur: Brigadier-General Mulubi Bin Muhemedi (PPRD)
  • 4th Military Region/Kasai-Occidental: Brigadier-General Sindani Kasereka (RCD-K/ML)
  • 5th Military Region/Kasai Oriental: General Rwabisira Obeid (RCD)
  • 6th Military Region/Katanga: Brigadier-General Nzambe Alengbia (MLC)
  • 7th Military Region/Maniema: Brigadier-General Widi Mbulu Divioka (RCD-N)
  • 8th Military Region/North Kivu: General Gabriel Amisi (RCD)
  • 9th Military Region/Province Orientale: Major-General Bulenda Padiri (Mayi-Mayi)
  • 10th Military Region/South Kivu: Major Mbuja Mabe (PPRD)

Land forces

Congolese soldier near the Rwandan border, 2001.

The land forces are made up of about 14 integrated brigades, of fighters from all the former warring factions which have gone through a 'brassage' integration process, and a not-publicly known number of non-integrated brigades which remain solely made up from single factions (the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD)'s Armee National Congolaise, the ex-government former Congolese Armed Forces (FAC), the ex-RCD KML, the ex-Movement for the Liberation of Congo, the armed groups of the Ituri conflict (the Mouvement des Révolutionnaires Congolais (MRC), Forces de Résistance Patriotique d’Ituri (FRPI) and the Front Nationaliste Intégrationniste (FNI)) and the Mai-Mai).

Following the early 2007 'mixage' process, Laurent Nkunda gained control of five brigades (the former ANC 81st and 83rd Brigades combined with three FAC brigades, along with a nascent mixed sixth that never finished forming) in North Kivu. However after Nkunda used the 'mixage' brigades to fight the FDLR, strains arose between the FARDC and Nkunda-loyalist troops within the 'mixage' brigades and they fell apart in the last days of August 2007. The International Crisis Group says that 'by 30 August Nkunda's troops had left the mixed brigades and controlled a large part of the Masisi and Rutshuru territories' (of North Kivu).

Both formally integrated brigades and the non-integrated units continue to conduct arbitrary arrests, rapes, robbery, and other crimes; military justice is a continuing problem.

The various brigades and other formations and units number at least 100,000 troops. The status of these brigades has been described as "pretty chaotic" and there is no reliable information available on whether they resemble normal brigades in strength (brigades typically have a strength of 3000 to 5000 personnel).

The reform plan adopted in 2005 envisaged the formation of eighteen integrated brigades through the 'brassage' process as its first of three stages. The process consists firstly of regroupment, where fighters are disarmed. Then they are sent to orientation centres, run by the National Commission for Demobilisation and Reinsertion (CONADER), where fighters take the choice of either returning to civilian society or remaining in the armed forces. Combatants who choose demobilisation receive an initial cash payment of US $110. Those who choose to stay within the FARDC are then transferred to one of six integration centres for a 45-day training course. The centres are spread out around the country at Kitona, Kamina, Kisangani, Rumangabo and Nyaleke (within the Virunga National Park) in Nord-Kivu, and Luberizi (on the border with Burundi) in South Kivu. The process has suffered severe difficulties due to construction delays, administration errors, and the amount of travel former combatants have to do, as the three stages' centres are widely separated. Following the first 18 integrated brigades, the second goal is the formation of a ready reaction force of two to three brigades, and finally, by 2010 when MONUC is anticipated to have withdrawn, the creation of a Main Defence Force of three divisions.

Known integrated brigades

This is an incomplete listing.

  • 1st Brigade (integrated), human rights reports in April and August 2007 place the Brigade in the Mahagi territory, Ituri area, Orientale.
  • 2nd Brigade (integrated), Butembo, North Kivu, 28 July 2007
  • 3rd Brigade (integrated), Bukavu area, late March 2007(now 101st Brigade)
  • 4th Brigade (integrated), elements reported at Lopa, Ituri area, 24–25 July 2007
  • 5th Brigade (integrated), previously stationed in North Kivu but now at Kananga, Kasai-Occidental
  • 6th Brigade (integrated), Jiba, Ituri area, Orientale, May 2007 Ordered to leave Ituri for North Kivu for offensive against Laurent Nkunda, June 2007.
  • 7th Brigade (integrated), finished forming Kitona March 2006. Stationed in Kinshasa August 2006. Elements of this brigade at Bolobo, Bandundu province, May 2007.
  • 8th Brigade (integrated), elements at Luberizi & Luvungi, in South Kivu
  • 9th Brigade (integrated), North Kivu
  • 10th Brigade (integrated), Gemena, Equateur
  • 12th Brigade (integrated), HQ at Baraka, DRC, South Kivu
  • 13th Brigade (integrated), Marabo, North Kivu, mid June 2007. Second battalion of this brigade in process of formation near Bunia mid August 2007.
  • 14th Brigade (integrated), Kalima, South Kivu, May 2007, now numbered 105th Brigade
  • 15th Brigade (integrated) (waiting for deployment as of May 30, 2007, with 2,837 men assigned.Ordered to leave Kisangani for North Kivu for offensive against Laurent Nkunda, June, and then routed by Nkunda troops in the Sake area, early September 2007.
  • 16th and 17th Brigades (integrated)(beginning 'brassage' integration process as of May 30, 2007, both over 4,000 strong at the beginning of the process)
  • 103rd Brigade (integrated)—previously designated 11th Brigade. Elements reported at Walungu, 110 km SW of Bukavu, South Kivu in the course of rape allegation 27 March 2007.

Equipment

Attempting to list the equipment available to the DRC's land forces is difficult; most figures are unreliable estimates based on known items delivered in the past. The IISS's Military Balance 2007 and Orbat.com's Concise World Armies 2005 give only slightly differing figures however (the figures below are from the IISS Military Balance 2007). Much of the Army's equipment is non-operational due to insufficient maintenance—in 2002 only 20 percent of the Army's armoured vehicles were estimated as being serviceable.

Republican Guard

In addition to the other land forces, President Joseph Kabila also has a Republican Guard presidential force, formerly known as the Special Presidential Security Group (GSSP). FARDC military officials state that the Garde Républicaine is not the responsibility of FARDC, but the Head of State. Apart from Article 140 of the Law on the Army and Defence, no legal stipulation on the DRC's Armed Forces makes provision for the GR as a distinct unit within the national army. In February 2005, President Joseph Kabila passed a decree which appointed the GR's commanding officer and 'repealed any previous provisions contrary' to that decree. The GR is more than 10,000 strong (the ICG said 10,000–15,000 in January 2007), and has better working conditions and is paid regularly, but still commits rapes and robberies nearby their bases.

In an effort to extend his personal control across the country, Joseph Kabila has deployed the GR at key airports, ostensibly in preparation for an impending presidential visit. At the end of 2005, there were Guards deployed in Mbandaka, Kindu, Lubumbashi, Bukavu, Kolwezi, staying many months after the President had left. They are still deployed at Kisangani airport, where they appear to answer to no local commander and have caused trouble with MONUC troops there.

The GR is also supposed to undergo the integration process, but as of January 2007, only one battalion had been announced as been integrated. Formed at a brassage centre in the Kinshasa suburb of Kibomango, the battalion included 800 men, half from the former GSSP and half from the MLC and RCD Goma.

Other forces active in the country

There are currently large numbers of United Nations troops stationed in the DRC. The United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) currently has a strength of over 16,000 peacekeepers and has a mission of assisting Congolese authorities maintain security. The UN and foreign military aid missions, the most prominent being EUSEC DR Congo, are attempting to assist the Congolese in rebuilding the armed forces, with major efforts being made in trying to assure regular payment of salaries to armed forces personnel and also in military justice.

Groups of anti-Rwandan government rebels like the FDLR, and other foreign fighters remain inside the DRC. The FDLR which is the greatest concern, is some 6,000 strong, as of July 2007, while the other groups are smaller: the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army, the Ugandan rebel group the Allied Democratic Forces, in the remote area of Mt Rwenzori, and the Burundian Parti pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu—Forces Nationales de Liberation (PALIPEHUTU-FNL).

Finally there is a government paramilitary force, created in 1997 under President Laurent Kabila. The National Service is tasked with providing the army with food and with training the youth in a range of reconstruction and developmental activities'. There is not much further information available, and no internet-accessible source details the relationship of the National Service to other armed forces bodies; it is not listed in the constitution. President Kabila, in one of the few comments available, says National Service will provide a gainful activity for street children.

Air Force

All military aircraft in the DRC are operated by the Air Force. Jane's World Air Forces states that the Air Force has an estimated strength of 1,800 personnel and is organised into two Air Groups. These Groups command five wings and nine squadrons, of which not all are operational. 1 Air Group is located at Kinshasa and consists of Liaison Wing, Training Wing and Logistical Wing and has a strength of five squadrons. 2 Tactical Air Group is located at Kaminia and consists of Pursuit and Attack Wing and Tactical Transport Wing and has a strength of four squadrons. Foreign private military companies have reportedly been contracted to provide the DRC's aerial reconnaissance capability using small propeller aircraft fitted with sophisticated equipment. Jane's states that People's Air and Air Defence Force of Angola fighter aircraft would be made available to defend Kinshasa if it came under attack.

Like the other services, the Congolese Air Force is not capable of carrying out its responsibilities. Few of the Air Force's aircraft are currently flyable or capable of being restored to service and it is unclear whether the Air Force is capable of maintaining even unsophisticated aircraft. Moreover, Jane's states that the Air Force's Ecole de Pilotage is 'in near total disarray' though Belgium has offered to restart the Air Force's pilot training program.

In comparison with the extensive Aviation Week and Space Technology table of aircraft below, the IISS Military Balance 2007 lists the Air Force with 6 combat capable aircraft (2 MiG-23 Flogger and 4 Su-25 Frogfoot) and 7+ helicopters (6 Mi-24 Hind, 1 Mi-26 Halo, and an unknown number of Mi-8 Hips. The IISS estimates air force strength at 4,000. It is likely that in compiling the list below, AW&ST, a specialist U.S. aviation magazine with limited specific knowledge of the DRC, simply recorded known deliveries and removals from service without fully checking on the exact current status of the Air Force.

Jane's World Air Forces 2007 can only confirm that the Air Force has four fixed wing aircraft in service (2 C-130, 1 DHC-5D, 1 Boeing 727) and a unknown number of Su-25s (no more than 8 in the air force's fleet following losses), C-47s, MB-326GBs and possibly some MiG-23s. Jane's also states that the Air Force operates between 9 and 22 Mil Mi-24/35s attack helicopters, a Super Puma transport helicopter and possibly a single Mi-26. The condition of the DRC's aircraft which are not currently in service is generally so poor that they cannot be repaired and returned to flyable status.

Of the thirteen aircraft in service that AW&ST and the IISS agree on, probably the latest available information concerns the DRC's single Mil Mi-26 'Halo'. Air Forces Monthly (AFM)'s July 2007 issue includes a photo of the helicopter without obvious rust and appearing to be in good condition which was taken on April 12, 2007, at Lubumbashi. It was delivered in 2005. AFM says that a second Mi-26 prepared for the DRC has been stored with Skytech at Bierset, Belgium since at least June 2002, and was still there in May 2007.

The Air Combat Information Group has published the best account of the aerial fighting during the First and Second Congo Wars available.

Template:Standard table ! style="text-align: left; background: #aacccc;"|Aircraft ! style="text-align: left; background: #aacccc;"|Origin ! style="text-align: left; background: #aacccc;"|Type ! style="text-align: left; background: #aacccc;"|Versions ! style="text-align: left; background: #aacccc;"|In service ! style="text-align: left; background: #aacccc;"|Notes |----- | Aermacchi MB-326 ||  Italy || trainer
attack || MB-326GB
MB-326K || 8
6 || |----- | Aermacchi SF-260 ||  Italy || trainer || SF-260M || 5 || |----- | Aérospatiale SA 316 Alouette III ||  France || utility helicopter || SA 316B || 2 || |----- | Aérospatiale SA 330 Puma ||  France || transport helicopter || SA 330 || 4 || |----- | Antonov An-26 Coke ||  Soviet Union || tactical transport || || 1 || |----- | Britten-Norman BN-2 Islander ||  United Kingdom || utility transport || BN-2A || 1 || |----- | Cessna 150 ||  United States || utility || || 12 || |----- | Cessna 310 ||  United States || utility || || 3 || |----- | de Havilland Canada DH-5 Buffalo ||  Canada || tactical transport || DHC-5D || 2 || |----- | Douglas C-47 Skytrain ||  United States || tactical transport || C-47 || 4 || |----- | Eurocopter AS 332 Cougar ||  Spain
 France
 Germany || transport helicopter || AS 332 || 1 || |----- | Lockheed C-130 Hercules ||  United States || tactical transport || C-130H || 2 || 2 more impounded in France |----- | Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-23 Flogger ||  Soviet Union || fighter || MiG-23MS
MiG-23UB|| 1
1 || |----- | Mil Mi-35 Hind-E ||  Soviet Union || attack helicopter || Mi-35 || 6 || |----- | Mil Mi-26 Halo ||  Soviet Union || transport helicopter || || 1 || Serial 9T-HM15 |----- | Reims Cessna 337 Skymaster ||  France || liaison || FTB 337 MILROLE || 10 || |----- | Sukhoi Su-25 Frogfoot ||  Soviet Union || attack || Su-25K || 4 || |}

Navy

The 2002 edition of Jane's Sentinel described the Navy as being 'in a state of near total disarray' and stated that it did not conduct any training or have operating procedures. The Navy shares the same discipline problems as the other services. It was initially placed under command of the MLC when the transition began: the current situation is uncertain.

The 2007 edition of Jane's Fighting Ships states that the Navy is organised into four commands. Several internet sources refer to Naval Regions, of which the 1st, 4th, and 5th definitely exist. Jane's reports the commands at Matadi (coastal), Kinshasa (riverine, which probably also includes the base the IISS reports at Boma), Kalemie (Lake Tanganyika) and Goma (Lake Kivu) The IISS confirms the bases Jane's mentions and adds the base at Boma. The Goma command is almost certainly the 5th Naval Region. Operations of the 1st Naval Region have been reported in both Kalamie and Kinshasa, and the 4th nearby Mbandaka.

The IISS in its 2007 edition of the Military Balance lists the Navy with 1,000 personnel, and a total of 8 patrol craft, of which only one is operational, a Shanghai II Type 062 class gunboat designated 102. There are also five other Shanghai II Type 062s along with 2 Swiftships which are currently non-operational, though some of these ships may be restored to service in the future. The Navy also operates barges and small patrol craft armed with machine guns.

References and notes

  1. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, 2003, 2007
  2. Number derived from 80,000 estimate for non-integrated land forces (The Economist, note 24, July 2007) plus 2007 IISS estimates: 46,000 for integrated brigades and 5,000 for Air and Naval forces together.
  3. This article draws on multiple sources which sometimes disagree.
  4. International Crisis Group, Congo: Consolidating the Peace, Africa Report No.128, 5 July 2007
  5. Institute for Security Studies workshop,
  6. British Military Attache Kinshasa, Report for the Period Ending 30 June 1970, FCO 31/577, accessed at Public Records Office, Kew
  7. John Keegan, World Armies, New York: Facts on File, 1979, pp. 822–823.
  8. Ed. by Sandra W. Meditz and Tim Merrill, Country Study for Zaire, 1993, Library of Congress
  9. The Division was formed in 1974 and trained by North Korea. It was named after a June 1964 incident in the eastern town of Kamanyola. In 1993 it consisted of the 11th Infantry Brigade, the 12th Infantry Brigade, and the 14th Infantry Brigade. See Michela Wrong, The Emperor Mobutu, Transition—Issues 81 & 82 (Volume 9, Number 1 and 2), 2000, pp. 92–112
  10. IISS Military Balance 1975–76, p.45
  11. John Keegan, World Armies, New York: Facts on File, 1979, p. 823.
  12. Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—Central Africa. Issue 11—2002. Coulsdon: Jane’s Information Group. p. 289. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  13. Tom Cooper & Pit Weinert, Zaire/DR Congo since 1980, 2 September 2003, Air Combat Information Group, accessed August 2007
  14. Ed. by Sandra W. Meditz and Tim Merrill, Country Study for Zaire, 1993, Library of Congress
  15. Jacques Ebenga & Thierry N’Landu The Congolese National Army: In search of an identity, Evolutions and Revolutions, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2005, p.66–70, 73–74
  16. Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—Central Africa. Issue 11—2002. Page 289.
  17. Human Rights Watch, Democratic Republic of Congo Casualties of War: Civilians, Rule of Law, and Democratic Freedoms, Vol. 11, No. 1 (A), February 1999
  18. Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—Central Africa. Issue 11—2002. Page 284.
  19. Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—Central Africa. Issue 11—2002. Pages 284–285.
  20. Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—Central Africa. Issue 11—2002. Page 289.
  21. Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—Central Africa. Issue 11—2002. Pages 286–287.
  22. Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—Central Africa. Issue 11—2002. Page 289.
  23. Jane's Sentinel security assessment—Central Africa. Issue 11—2002. Page 314.
  24. Le Potential, 24 novembre 1965 : le communiqué du coup d'Etat du Lieutenant-général Mobutu. Bobozo was made C-in-C under Mobutu when Mobutu seized power, and it was stated initially that he would act as C-in-C 'while Mobutu was acting as President of the Republic.'
  25. Colonel S.C. Davis, British Military Attache Kinshasa, Report on the Zairean Armed Forces for the Period Apr 1971 – Apr 1972, DA/KIN/76, 5 May 1972, FCO 31/1170, accessed at Public Records Office, Kew
  26. Canadian Government Immigration Review Board, Issue Paper: Zaire: The Balance of Power in the Regions, April 1997
  27. www.congoned.dds.nl, Congo developments XXIV Chronicle: June 1 – August 26, 1998
  28. Many officers have now changed positions, but this list gives an outline of the present structure. Source is the Institute for Security Studies, at Democratic Republic of Congo Security Information (updated: 12 January 2005)
  29. Still in post January 2006. Le Potential (Kinshasa), Le chef d’état-major de la Force terrestre en visite éclair au centre de brassage de Rumangabo, 7 January 2006
  30. Henri Boshoff, The DDR Process in the DRC: a never-ending story, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2 July 2007
  31. International Crisis Group, Bringing Peace to North Kivu, Africa Report No.133, 31 October 2007, p.13
  32. Amnesty International, DRC Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and the Reform of the Army, 25 January 2007, AI Index: AFR 62/001/2007
  33. monuc.org: FARDC troops estimated at 100,000, says EUSEC ::: 20/03/2006
  34. "Only just staying in one piece". The Economist. 2007-07-28. p. 42. Retrieved 2007-08-04. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  35. This paragraph is drawn completely from the International Crisis Group's, Security Sector Reform in the Congo report of February 2006, p.17–18
  36. MONUC Human Rights report April 2007, paragraph 31 and MONUC via Le Potential Violation des droits de l’homme en RDC: état des lieux de la Monuc, 10 August 2007
  37. MONUC via Reliefweb, RD Congo : Rapport mensuel des droits de l'homme - juillet 2007, paragraph 14
  38. MONUC Human Rights Report via Le Potentiel Le Potentiel, 18 April 2007
  39. MONUC Human Rights Report July 2007 (French), paragraph 11
  40. Charles Gba, Verbatim point de presse MONUC du mercredi 27 juin 2007
  41. 'Au cours du mois d'avril 2007, des soldats FARDC de la 6ème Brigade Intégrée basée à Jiba -60 km au Nord-Est de Bunia, Ituri-, ont été responsables de 14 cas de viol et de plusieurs cas de mauvais traitements à l'égard de la population locale.' MONUC via Le Potentiel (Kinshasa), Congo-Kinshasa: Violation des droits de l'homme en RDC, 22 June 2007
  42. International Crisis Group, Congo:Bringing Peace to North Kivu, 31 October 2007, p.12
  43. Groupe L'Avenir.Net
  44. http://www.lepotentiel.com/afficher_article.php?id_edition=&id_article=33347
  45. MONUC, Droits de l'Homme: Rapport Mensuel - Mai 2007, paragraph 22
  46. Societecivile.cd, Imminence d'une mutinerie à Luberizi, à l'Est de la RD.Congo, dans la Province du Sud Kivu, 23 May 2007
  47. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Situation humanitaire en RDC (Sud Kivu) - Rapport hebdomadaire du 30 juin au 06 juillet 2007, 6 July 2007
  48. MONUC via Congo Tribune, http://www.congotribune.com/nationale/article.php?article=1802
  49. MONUC, http://www.monuc.org/news.aspx?newsID=15189
  50. MONUC, http://www.monuc.org/news.aspx?newsID=14799, paragraph 25
  51. MONUC via allafrica.com at Congo-Kinshasa: La Monuc a rendu hommages aux 85 soldats de la paix décédés en RDC depuis le début de sa mission
  52. International Crisis Group, Congo:Bringing Peace to North Kivu, 31 October 2007, p.12
  53. Le Potential, Congo-Kinshasa: Rapport de la Monuc pour avril 2007, graves violations des droits de l'homme en RDC via Allafrica.com, 21 May 2007. There is an ambiguous reference to the 'eleventh and twelfth brigades' in the ICG's 31 October 2007 report, 'Bringing Peace to North Kivu, Appendix C, page 25, indicating that these two formations may have been principally raised from the all-Hutu Local Defence Force in North Kivu, revived by Governor Eugene Serufuli, probably during the 2000–2002 period.
  54. Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—Central Africa. Issue 11—2002. Page 291.
  55. Amnesty International, DRC Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and the Reform of the Army, Section VII A, 25 January 2007, AI Index: AFR 62/001/2007
  56. ICG February 2006 SSR report
  57. Amnesty International, DRC Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and the Reform of the Army, Section VII A, 25 January 2007, AI Index: AFR 62/001/2007
  58. 'Sortie officielle du premier bataillon integre de la Garde Republicaine des FARDC', Xinhua News Agency, 15 September 2006, cited in Amnesty International DRC Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and the Reform of the Army, Section VII A, 25 January 2007, AI Index: AFR 62/001/2007
  59. "EU security sector reform mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo". The Council of the European Union. Retrieved 2007-08-12.
  60. International Crisis Group, Congo: Consolidating the Peace, Africa Report No.128, 5 July 2007
  61. Jacques Ebenga & Thierry N’Landu The Congolese National Army: In search of an identity, Evolutions and Revolutions, Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, 2005
  62. Jane's World Air Forces. Issue 25, 2007. Coulsdon: Jane's Information Group. pp. 134–135. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  63. Jane's World Air Forces. Issue 25, 2007. Coulsdon: Jane's Information Group. p. 135. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  64. IISS Military Balance 2007 p.271
  65. Jane's World Air Forces. Issue 25, 2007. Pages 135–136.
  66. Air Forces Monthly No.232, July 2007, p.27
  67. Tom Cooper & Pit Weinert, Zaire/DR Congo since 1980, 2 September 2003, Air Combat Information Group, accessed August 2007
  68. "World Military Aircraft Inventory", Aerospace Source Book 2007, Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 15 2007.
  69. Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment—Central Africa. Issue 11—2002. Coulsdon: Jane’s Information Group. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  70. Saunders, Stephen (editor). Jane's Fighting Ships Vol. 110, 2007–2008. Coulsdon: Jane’s Information Group. p. 163. {{cite book}}: |first= has generic name (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
  71. Human Rights Division / MONUC, Monthly Human Rights Assessment: April 2007, 17 May 2007. The HR report stated a Goma student was shot by a soldier of the 5th Naval Region for refusing to hand over a cellphone.
  72. DanChurch Aid, Destruction of stockpiles in Kalemie, 2 May 2006
  73. Hilaire Kayembe, Naufrage dans une rivière à Mbandaka, Le Potential, 7 August 2006
  74. Saunders, Stephen (editor). Jane's Fighting Ships Vol. 110, 2007–2008. Coulsdon: Jane’s Information Group. p. 163. {{cite book}}: |first= has generic name (help); Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)

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