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Bosnian mujahideen

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Mujahideen came in Bosnia during the 1992-1995 Bosnian war after the massacres committed by the Serb forces on Bosnian Muslim (Bosniak) civilians. They intended to vage a holy war against the perpetrators. The number of volunteers is estimated by some newspaper reports to have been about 4,000, but some recent research discards such claims estimating 400 foreign volunteers. They came from countries such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Egypt and Algeria, to quote summary of the ICTY judgement:

The evidence shows that foreign volunteers arrived in central Bosnia in the second half of 1992 with the aim of helping their Muslim brothers against the Serbian aggressors. Mostly they came from North Africa, the Near East and the Middle East. The foreign volunteers differed considerably from the local population, not only because of their physical appearance and the language they spoke, but also because of their fighting methods.

It is alleged that mujahideen participated in some incidents considered to be war crimes according to the international law. However no indictment was issued by the ICTY against them, but a few Bosnian Army officers were indicted on the basis of superior criminal responsibility. Amir Kubura was found not guilty on all counts related to the incidents involving mujahideen. On the other hand Enver Hadzihasanović was found guilty for failing to prevent the death of a prisoner of war. He appealed against the first-instance judgment and was released provisionally in June 2007 pending the judgement of the Appeals Chamber.

Background

During the Yugoslav wars, Bosnia-Herzegovina received humanitarian aid from Islamic countries as well as from the West, because of intensive and widespread killing, mass rapes, death camps, ethnic cleansing committed by Serb and, to a lesser extent, Croat forces. The main targets were Bosnian Muslim civilians. The world's highest court concluded that these crimes, committed during the 1992 -95 war, were crimes against humanity and genocide (dolus specialis) regarding Srebrenica region according to the Genocide Convention. Following such massacres, Arab volunteers came across Croatia into Bosnia to help the Bosnian Army protect the Bosnian Muslim civilian population. The number of the El-Mudžahid volunteers is still disputed, from around 300 Cite error: The <ref> tag has too many names (see the help page). to 1,500. According to witness at the trial of Bosnian commander Rasim Delic a group of foreign fighters of Arab origin entered Bosnia from Zagreb together with the Croatian Army unit "Zengas". These caused particular controversy: foreign fighters, styling themselves mujahiddin, turned up in Bosnia around 1993 with Croatian identity documents, passports and IDs. They quickly attracted heavy criticism, who considered their presence to be evidence of violent Islamic fundamentalism at the heart of Europe. However, the foreign volunteers became unpopular even with many of the Bosniak population, because the Bosnian army had thousands of troops and had no need for more soldiers, but for arms. Many Bosnian Army officers and intellectuals were suspicuos regarding foreign volunteers arrival in central part of the country, because they came from Split and Zagreb in Croatia, and were passed through the self-proclaimed Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia without problems unlike Bosnian Army soldiers who were regularly arrested by Croat forces. According to general Stjepan Šiber, the highest ranking ethnic Croat in Bosnian Army, the key role in foreign volunteers arrival was played by Franjo Tuđman and Croatian counter-intelligence underground with the aim to justify involvement of Croatia in Bosnian War and mass crimes committed by Croat forces. Although Izetbegović regarded them as symbolically valuable as a sign of the Muslim world's support for Bosnia, they appear to have made little military difference and became a major political liability. Cite error: The <ref> tag has too many names (see the help page).

El Mujahid Detachment

A small group of Arab volunteers arrived in central Bosnia in the second half of 1992 with the aim of helping their Bosnian Muslim coreligionists to defend from the Serb and Croat attacks. Mostly they came from North Africa, the Near East and the Middle East. On August 13, 1993, the Bosnian Army decided to form a unit, Kateebat al-Mujahideen ("Battalion of the Holy Warriors") or El Mudžahid in order to impose control over the foreign fighters whose number increased. Initially, the foreign Mujahideen gave food and other basic necessities to the local Muslim population, deprived many necessities by the Serb forces. Once hostilities broke out between the Bosnian government (ABiH) and the Croat forces (HVO), the Mujahideen also participated in battles against the HVO alongside Bosnian Army units.

According to the Arab fighters who testified as the prosecution witnesses at the trial of Bosnian general Rasim Delic indicted by ICTY on the basis of superior criminal responsibility, the El Mujahid Detachment was only formally part of the Bosnian Army chain of command. All decisions were taken by the emir and the shura, the Mujahideen commander and the Mujahideen supreme council respectively. This was because the ‘Army couldn’t be trusted’.

Incidents

On June 8, 1993, Bosnian Army attacked Croat forces in the area of Maline village. After the village was taken, a military police unit of the 306th Brigade of Bosnian Army arrived in Maline. These policemen were to evacuate and protect the civilians in the villages taken by the Bosnian Army. The wounded were left on-site and around 200 people, including civilians and Croat soldiers, were taken by the police officers towards Mehurici. The commander of the 306th Brigade authorised the wounded be put onto a truck and transported to Mehurici. Suddenly, a number of mujahideen stormed the village of Maline. Even though the commander of the Bosnian Army 306th Brigade forbade them to approach, they didn't submit. The 200 villagers who were being escorted to Mehurici by the 306th Brigade military police were intercepted by the mujahideen in Poljanice. They took 20 military-aged Croats and a young woman wearing a Red-Cross armband. The prisoners were taken to Bikoci, between Maline and Mehurici. 23 Croatian soldiers and one young woman were executed in Bikoci while they were being held prisoner.

Propaganda

Main article: Serb propaganda

Although Serb and Croat media created much controversy about alleged war crimes committed by the squad, no indictment was issued by ICTY against any of these foreign volunteers. The only foreign person convicted of war crimes was Swedish neo-nazi Jackie Arklöv, who fought in the Croatian army (first convicted by a Bosnian court, later by a Swedish court).

According to Predrag Matvejević, a notable Italian and Croatian modern prosaist who analyzed the situation, the number of Arab volunteers who came to help the Bosnian Muslims, was much smaller than the number presented by Serb and Croat propaganda.

According to the ICTY verdicts, Serb propaganda was very active, constantly propagated false information about the foreign fighters in order to inflame anti-muslim hatred among Serbs. After the takeover of Prijedor by Serb forces in 1992, Radio Prijedor propagated Serb nationalistic ideas characterising prominent non-Serbs as criminals and extremists who should be punished for their behaviour. One example of such propaganda was the derogatory language used for referring to non-Serbs such as mujahedin, Ustasa or Green Berets, although at the time there were no foreign volunteers in Bosnia. According to ICTY conclusion in Stakić verdict Mile Mutić, the director of Kozarski Vjesnik and the journalist Rade Mutić regularly attended meetings of Serb politicians (local authorities) in order to get informed about next steps of spreading propaganda.

Another example of propaganda about Islamic holy warriors is presented in the ICTY Kordić and Čerkez verdict for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia leadership on Bosniak civilians. Gornji Vakuf was attacked by Croatian Army (HV) and Croatian Defence Forces (HVO) in January 1993 followed by heavy shelling of the town by Croat artillery. During cease-fire negotiations at the Britbat HQ in Gornji Vakuf, colonel Andrić, representing the HVO, demanded that the Bosnian forces lay down their arms and accept HVO control of the town, threatening that if they did not agree he would flatten Gornji Vakuf to the ground. The HVO demands were not accepted by the Bosnian Army and the attack continued, followed by massacres on Bosnian Muslim civilians in the neighbouring villages of Bistrica, Uzričje, Duša, Ždrimci and Hrasnica. The shelling campaign and the attackes during the war resulted in hundreds of injured and killed, mostly Bosnian Muslim civilians. Although Croats often cited it as a major reason for the attack on Gornji Vakuf in order to justify attacks and massacres on civilians, the commander of the British Britbat company claimed that there were no Muslim holy warriors in Gornji Vakuf and that his soldiers did not see any.

Mujahideen phenomenon is often used by Serb scholars as an instrument in denying and relativising war crimes committed by the Serbs. On September 20, 2003, former President Bill Clinton honored the Srebrenica genocide dead and condemned the genocidal madness. Soon after, Serb historian Carl Savich wrote that Clinton attended a memorial for dead mujahedeen troops in Bosnia.

Al Qaeda speculation

Following the end of the Bosnian War and, especially, after the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center, Serbian propaganda started to fabricate the links between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Al Qaeda, in order to move the focus from the genocide committed by Serb forces in Bosnia to more interesting topic such as terrorism in the War on terror era. According to Radio Free Europe produced research by Vlado Azinović about alleged links between Bosnia and Al Qaeda "Al Qaeda in Bosnia: Myth Or Present Danger", the claims about the alleged presence of Al Qaeda in Bosnia are unverified and mostly fabricated. The presence of Wahhabism and of the remaining Muslim fighters do not qualify Bosnia as a particular threat to international security, according to the Azinovic's conclusion. Furthermore, Azinovic quotes Evan F. Kohlmann:

Serb propaganda throughout the whole war had portrayed the Bosnian Muslims as violent extremists, fundamentalists, and as eager to jump on the bandwagon of the mujahedin.

Other information

After the war, many of the Arabs attained Bosnian citizenship and settled in several villages throughout Bosnia. It is known that those who remained are concentrated around the cities of Zenica, Maglaj and Bočinja and in villages near Brčko.

Notes

  • (ICTY conclusion) The evidence shows that foreign volunteers arrived in central Bosnia in the second half of 1992 with the aim of helping their Muslim brothers against the Serbian aggressors. Mostly they came from North Africa, the Near East and the Middle East. The foreign volunteers differed considerably from the local population, not only because of their physical appearance and the language they spoke, but also because of their fighting methods. Initially, the foreign volunteers gave food and other basic necessities to the local Muslim population. Once hostilities broke out between the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the HVO (Croat forces), they also participated in battles against the HVO alongside Army of BiH units.

References

  1. Bosnia Seen as Hospitable Base and Sanctuary for Terrorists
  2. Radio Free Europe (2007)- Vlado Azinović: Al-Kai'da u Bosni i Hercegovini - mit ili stvarna opasnost?
  3. ICTY: Summary of the judgement for Enver Hadžihasanović and Amir Kubura -
  4. SENSE Tribunal article
  5. Hadzihasanovic i Kubura - sažetak -
  6. Sense - APPELLATE HEARING IN HADZIHASANOVIC - KUBURA CASE
  7. ICJ: Serbia found guilty of failure to prevent and punish genocide
  8. SENSE Tribunal:ICTY - WE FOUGHT WITH THE BH ARMY, BUT NOT UNDER ITS COMMAND
  9. SENSE Tribunal:ICTY - WE FOUGHT WITH THE BH ARMY, BUT NOT UNDER ITS COMMAND
  10. Mujahideen came with Zengas
  11. ICTY, Summary of the Judgmenet for Enver Hadzihasanovic and Amir Kubura, 15 March 2006
  12. ICTY: MUJAHIDEEN DIDN’T TRUST THE ARMY -
  13. Judgement Summary - Kubura and Hadzihasanovic
  14. Predrag Matvejević analysis
  15. ICTY: Milomir Stakić judgement - The media
  16. ICTY: Kordić and Čerkez verdict - IV. Attacks on towns and villages: killings - 2. The Conflict in Gornji Vakuf
  17. SENSE Tribunal: Poziv na predaju
  18. SENSE Tribunal: Ko je počeo rat u Gornjem Vakufu
  19. SENSE Tribunal: "James Dean" u Gornjem Vakufu
  20. ICTY: Kordić and Čerkez verdict - IV. Attacks on towns and villages: killings - 2. The Conflict in Gornji Vakuf
  21. The New York Times - At Memorial In Bosnia, Clinton Helps Mourn 7,000
  22. Serbianna: Carl Savich -
  23. Al-Kai'da u Bosni i Hercegovini:Mit ili stvarna opasnost?
  24. ICTY: Summary of the judgement for Enver Hadžihasanović and Amir Kubura
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