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People's Liberation Army operations in Tibet (1950-1951) | |||||||
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A Peaceful Liberation Monument was raised by the PRC in 2001 to commemorate the event's 50th anniversary despite the many controversies surrounding the event. | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Tibetan Army | File:Peoples Liberation Army Flag of the Peoples Republic of China.svg People's Liberation Army | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
5,000 | 40,000 |
The People's Liberation Army (PLA) defeated the Tibetan army in a bloody war at Chamdo on October 7 1950. This attack marked the beginning of Beijing’s campaign to reincorporate Tibet into People's Republic of China. This is called an invasion by the Tibetans in Exile, the US Congress, military analysts including Jane's, media sources and NGOs such as the International Commission of Jurists and the Center for World Indigenous Studies. Instances exist, however, when the PRC government gained support from a portion of the Tibetan population, including monastic leaders, monks, nobility and ordinary Tibetans prior to the crackdown in 1959. The PRC government and some Tibetan leaders characterize PLA's operation as a peaceful liberation of Tibetans from a "feudal serfdom system."(和平解放西藏).
Timeline
According to Samdhong Rinpoche and the 14th Dalai Lama, on January 1 1950 the PRC promised to "liberate" Tibet. The People's Liberation Army first entered eastern Tibet (Chamdo) on October 7 1950. The highly mobile units of the PLA quickly surrounded the outnumbered Tibetan forces, and by October 19 1950, 5,000 Tibetan troops had surrendered. After confiscating their weapons, the PLA soldiers gave their prisoners lectures on socialism, and a small amount of money, and allowed them to return to their homes.
The PLA then continued on to central Tibet, but halted its advance 200km to the east of Lhasa, at what China claimed was the de jure boundary of Tibet, where they stopped and demanded Tibet's "peaceful liberation."
The PLA, while possessing overwhelming military advantage, was also set on winning the hearts and minds of the Tibetan populace. At first, they treated the local populace very well, building roads, and paying locals for their labor. According to Tenzin Gyatso, the current Dalai Lama, the PLA did not attack civilians: "The Chinese were very disciplined. They were like the British soldiers (in 1904). Even better than the British, because they distributed some money (to villagers and local leaders). So they carefully planned."
The PLA sent released prisoners (among them Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme, a captured governor) to Lhasa to negotiate with the Dalai Lama on the PLA's behalf. The PLA promised that if Tibet was "peacefully liberated", the Tibetan elites would keep their privileges and power. At the same time, Jigme and other released captives testified to their good treatment by the PLA. As the PLA had stopped and was asking for peaceful negotiations instead of entering Lhasa unimpeded, the United Nations unanimously dropped the issue from the agenda. The combination of military pressure, reports of good treatment from locals and released prisoners, and the lack of international support convinced the Tibetan representatives to enter negotiations with the PLA.
Several months later, in May 1951, the Tibetan representatives signed a seventeen-point agreement in Beijing with the PRC's Central People's Government affirming China's sovereignty over Tibet. The agreement was ratified in Lhasa a few months later. Point 15 of the agreement stated that the Chinese government would set up a military and administrative committee and a military area headquarters in Tibet. PLA troops entered Lhasa peacefully in the fall of 1951. An article releasd by the Tibetan Government in Exile in 1996 states that the treaty was imposed on Tibet by force and it "was never validly concluded and was rejected by Tibetans", a position that was supported by a UK parliamentary review.
Statistics of Casualties
Tibetans
Samdhong Rinpoche, the 14th Dalai Lama, and other Tibetans in exile have accused the PRC government of a campaign of terror which led to the destruction of monasteries and disappearance of up to 1.2 million Tibetans. By 1962 only 70 of the original 2,500 monasteries in the Tibet Autonomous Region were left and 93% of the monks were forced out. The "1.2 million" figure for deaths since 1950 dates to a figure from the Tibetan Government-in-exile which they break down to 433,000 through military action, 343,000 through famine, 173,000 through imprisonment, 157,000 through execution, 93,000 through torture and 9,000 through suicide.
The high casualty reported by the Tibetans has been questioned by western scholars. Tom Grunfeld finds that the figure is "without documentary evidence." According to Patrick French, a supporter of the Tibetan cause who was able to view the data and calculations, the estimate is not reliable. The Tibetans were not able to process the data well enough to produce a credible total. French says this total was based on refugee interviews, but prevented outsider access to the data. French, who did gain access, found no names, but "the insertion of seemingly random figures into each section, and constant, unchecked duplication." Prior to 1950, population figures for Tibet, estimated by the Lhasa government and foreign visitors, generally ranged from 1 to 1.5 million. The official Tibetan census in 1953 only recorded a population of 1,273,969.
A document allegedly sourced to the PLA claims 87,000 deaths in the 1959-60 period.
Perspective
PRC perspective
Traditionally, a portion of the population in Tibet were serfs ("mi ser"), bound to land often owned by wealthy Tibetan monasteries and Tibetan aristocrats. This however was untrue of eastern and northeastern two-thirds of Tibet where the nomads owned their own land. The Chinese government claims that most Tibetans were still serfs in 1951, and have proclaimed that the Tibetan government inhibited the development of Tibet during its self-rule from 1913 to 1959, and opposed any modernization efforts proposed by the Chinese government. Announcements were made via Radio Peking on October 25 to state the troops were there to "free Tibetans from imperialist oppression". First generation Communist party leaders such as Mao Zedong stated that the decision to unite Tibet into the PRC was done to achieve ethnic equality.
In July 2001 a monument was established to commermorate the event. Beijing says that Tibet was under an uninterrupted series of Chinese governments that has ruled Tibet and China since Genghis Khan. In 2005 president Hu Jintao asserted Tibet has been an "inalienable part of Chinese territory" from the time of the Mongol conquest onward. This has been taught to Chinese students since 1912.
Other perspectives
The UN General Assembly passed resolutions condemning China for "violations of fundamental human rights of the Tibetan people" in 1959, 1961 and 1965. German Federal Parliament held hearings on Tibet on June 19 1995, and passed a resolution on June 20 1996 stating they were "deeply concerned that this independent identity has been threatened by destruction since the Chinese action by brutal force of arms in 1950" and that China had deprived the Tibetans of self-determination. The US Congressional Human Rights Caucus in 1987 reviewed testimony from Tibetans who detailed human rights abuses, resulting in a congressional motion that condemned Chinese actions in Tibet. In 2006 a lawsuit was filed by the Madrid-based Committee to Support Tibet in a Spanish court. The group said that more than one million Tibetans had been killed or gone missing since China occupied Tibet in 1951. The China Quarterly notes that there has been "little easing in Chinese repression there nor any improvement in the anti-Chinese attitude of the local population."
Aftermath
The seventeen-point agreement was initially put into effect in Tibet proper. However, Eastern Kham and Amdo (the provinces of Xikang and Qinghai in the Chinese administrative hierarchy) were outside the administration of the Tibetan government in Lhasa, and were thus treated like any other Chinese province with land redistribution implemented in full.
According to the Tibetan Government in Exile during the struggle tens of thousands of Tibetans were killed by the Chinese. The 14th Dalai Lama and other government principals fled to exile in India. Isolated resistance continued in Tibet until 1972 when President Nixon pursued a new policy towards China and withdrew military and financial support.
The 1959 uprising failed to gain support from the Tibetans, who fled by the thousands to India. The CIA officer, Bruce Walker, who oversaw the operations of CIA trained Tibetan agents, was troubled by the hostility from the Tibetans: “the radio teams were experiencing major resistance from the population inside Tibet.” The CIA trained Tibetans, mostly Buddhists, from 1957 to 1972, in the United States, and parachuted them back into Tibet to organize rebellions against the PLA. But with little support from fellow Tibetans they often fell to the hands of the PLA quickly. In one incident, one agent was immediately reported by his own brother and all three agents in the team were arrested. They were not mistreated. After less than a month of propaganda sessions they were escorted to the Indian border and released.
References
- ^ Goldstein, M.C., "A History of Modern Tibet", p812-813
- ^ Thomas Laird, The Story of Tibet: Conversations with the Dalai Lama, ISBN 080214327X, pp. 301-307
- The Status of Tibet: "At the time of its invasion by troops of the People's Liberation Army of China in 1949, Tibet was an independent state in fact and law...."
- US Congressional Concurrent Resolution dated May 21, 1991, "To express the sense of the Congress that Tibet, including those areas incorporated into the Chinese provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Gansu and Qinghai that have historically been a part of Tibet is an occupied country under established principles of international law" ... "Whereas in 1949-50, China launched an armed invasion of Tibet in contravention of international law..."
- Jane's 'Intelligence Review', 001122: 'China invaded the country in 1959 and has since been accused of bloody tactics to reduce the indigenous population and ensure it is outnumbered by the Chinese.'
- Reborn supremacy: China's control of Tibetan reincarnation, 21 January 2008: 'Since invading the then-independent Tibet in 1950, Beijing has ensured tight military and political control over the strategically important area.'
- International Commission of Jurists, June 5 1959, "In 1950 China assured India that China had no intention of incorporating Tibet into China by force or otherwise and was willing to negotiate with Tibet regarding the future relationship of Tibet with China. But a few weeks later the invasion of Tibet took place..."
- Snellgrove, David L. and Hugh Richardson. A Cultural History of Tibet, Orchard Press, (c)2003, pg 267
- Missions to Tibet, University of Texas, Dallas, May 29, 2006: "When Communist China invaded Tibet in August 1950...."
- Margolis, Eric. War At The Top Of The World. Routledge, (c)2002 ISBN: 978-0415934688
- Global Security: "On October 1, 1949, the People's Republic of China was formally proclaimed in Beijing and the following year launched an armed invasion of Tibet..."
- Tibet's Sovereignity and the Tibetan People's Right to Self-Determination, June 1, 1998
- ^ Rinpoche, Samdhong. Roebert, Donovan. The 14th Dalai Lama. (2006). Samdhong Rinpoche: Uncompromising Truth for a Compromised World: Tibetan Buddhism and Today's World. World Wisdom, Inc. ISBN 1933316209. pg 116-117
- "Improving the Human Rights Situation in Tibet." German Bundestag parliamentary resolution, Bonn, Germany, 20 June, 1996
- Richter, Conrad. "Tibetan Response to China's White on Tibet." Center for World Indigenous Studies, Olympia, WA, 1999
- ^ Goldstein, Melvyn C., "A history of modern Tibet", pp683-687
- Ford, R. W., "Wind between the Worlds", p178, saying: ' There was no sacking of monasteries at this time. On the contrary, the Chinese took great care not to cause offense through ignorance. They soon had the monks thanking the gods for their deliverance. '
- ^ Grunfeld, A.T., "The Making of Modern Tibet", p115, saying: ' By most accounts there were some Tibetans who were pleased to see the Han in Tibet. Peter Aufschneiter told British diplomats in Kathmandu that ordinary Tibetans liked the Han because they were honest and they distributed land. Among the younger generation of the nobility it was seen as an opportunity to make some positive changes. '
- Grunfeld, A.T., "The Making of Modern Tibet", M. E. Sharpe, 1996, p127, saying ' When the communists first arrived in Lhasa, only a few of the aristocracy joined them enthusiastically. In Kham, however, the upper classes welcomed them as potential liberators from the strongly disliked Lhasan officials. '
- Xinhuanet.com. "Xinhuanet.com." 人民解放軍和平解放西藏.
- "." Full Text of Speech By Chinese President Hu Jintao at Tibet's Peaceful Liberation Anniversary Rally
- Li T.T., "Historical Status of Tibet"(New York, Columbia University Press, 1956) saying: "Chamdo is in Kham and outside of Tibet proper. The Chinese Communist army, though it had captured Chamdo, which was considered a part of Sikang, could not be said to have entered Tibet proper"
- Gyatso, Tenzin, Dalai Lama XIV, interview, 25 July 1981.
- Invasion and illegal annexation of Tibet: 1949-1951
- House of Commons Publications and Records, August 13, 2006
- The Status of Tibet
- Robert McCorquodale, Nicholas Orosz (eds.) The Posiion of Tibet in International Law, Serindia Publishers.
- Grunfield, Tom. The Making of Modern Tibet. p247.
- Barry Sautman, June Teufel Dreyer, Contemporary Tibet: Politics, Development, And Society In A Disputed Region pp. 239
- See Leo A. Orleans,"A Note on Tibet's Population."
- Grunfield, Tom. The Making of Modern Tibet. p247.
- Goldstein, Melvyn, An Anthropological Study of the Tibetan Political System, 1968, p. 40
- Rahul, Ram, The Structure of the Government of Tibet, 1644–1911, 1962, pp. 263–98
- Grunfeld, Modern Tibet, 9.
- Jiawei, Wang, "The Historical Status of China's Tibet", 2000, pp. 194–7
- Gill, Farrer-Halls. Dalai lama. The World of the Dalai Lama: An Inside Look at his Life, His People and His Vision. (1998). ISBN 0835607682. pg 30-32
- ^ News.China.com. "News.China.com." Monument to the Peaceful liberation of tibet. Retrieved on 2008-03-18.
- UN Resolution 1353 (XIV), 21 October 1959
- UN Resolution 1723 (XVI), 20 December 1961
- UN Resolution 2079 (XX), 18 December 1965
- "Improving the Human Rights Situation in Tibet." German Bundestag parliamentary resolution, Bonn, Germany, 20 June, 1996
- Sanchez, Renee. "Dalai Lama Urges Tibetan Freedom; In D.C. Visit, Exiled Leader Tells China to End `Great Destruction'." The Washington Post, Sept. 22, 1987
- The Independent on-line.
- Feinerman, James V. "Chinese Participation in the International Legal Order: Rogue Elephant or Team Player?," The China Quarterly, March 1995
- Grunfeld, Modern Tibet, 9.
- Official Website of the Tibetan Government in Exile. History Leading up to March 10th 1959. 7 September 1998. Retrieved March 24 2008.
- Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison, The CIA’s Secret War in Tibet, page 247
- The UN Human Refugee Agency
- The CIA's Secret War in Tibet, page 220
- The Khampsa (Tibetans being trained) were Buddhists, CIA instructors wondered whether they would hesitate to kill a fellow human being. The CIA was fast coming to realize that the Khampas had few reservations about taking the life of a Chinese invader. Kenneth Conboy and James Morrison, The CIA's Secret War in Tibet, page 53
- The CIA's Secret War in Tibet, page 213