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Revision as of 12:34, 18 October 2005 by Itpastorn (talk | contribs) (→Sources: Addition and correction)(diff) ← Previous revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)Prokhorovka is a small village in central Russia. It is located along the Psel River southwest of the city of Kursk. The village became famous as it was the site of a major armoured confrontation during the Second World War.
On July 12, 1943 Prokhorovka was the site of the pivotal battle of Operation Citadel (the German offensive to encircle Soviet forces in the Kursk salient.
From July 4-11, 1943 Generaloberst Hermann Hoth's 4.Panzer-Armee, spearheaded by the SS-Panzerkorps, had fought through 10-15 miles of Soviet defenses consisting of high-density minefields, entrenched infantry and anti-tank guns arranged in elaborate kill zones (see pakfront).
By the end of July 11, SS-Panzerkorps was close to driving a wedge between the Soviet 1st Tank Army and 69th Army. Unknown to the Germans, the Soviets released two fresh armies 5th Guards Tank Army under General Pavel Rotmistrov and 5th Guards Army from their strategic reserve to meet the German threat. After forced road marches, the Soviet forces reached Prokhorovka on the night of July 11th. The stage was now set for the largest and most decisive single tank battle of World War II.
On the morning of July 12, SS-Panzerkorps advanced on Prokhorovka at the same time that 5th Guards Tank Army launched a series of attacks in an attempt to catch the Germans off balance. The SS and Guards units collided west of Prokhorovka in open country punctuated by farms, rolling hills and gullies. What happened next is open to debate with the release of new information from archives.
Many books written in the 1970's and '80's depict the Battle of Prokhorovka as waves of speedy Soviet T-34 tanks closing with the heavier German Tiger and Panther tanks and then blasting them at point-blank range. This depiction is now accepted as incorrect for several reasons.
- First, the Waffen SS units involved at Prokhorovka mostly consisted of Panzer III tanks, up-gunned Panzer IV tanks and only a handful of Tigers (certainly less than 100). The Waffen SS did not have any of the new Panther tanks at Prokhorovka (These had been issued exclusively to Heer Panzer formations, most noteably Panzergrenadier-Division Großdeutschland. The Soviets were handicapped as well with some tank formations consisting of inferior British tanks (Valentines and Churchills).
- Second, while the Germans did suffer casualties when 5th Guards Tank Army's attack hit their first echelon of tanks, SS Panzerkorps was able to set up quick defensive positions and repulse the 5th Guards and 5th Guards Tank Armies. The Soviets suffered considerably heavier losses than the Germans. According to German tank strength reports, their heaviest tank losses occurred in the first four days of Operation Citadel when 4.Panzer-Armee was fighting through Soviet minefields and pakfronts (not to mention mechanical breakdowns; especially with the Panther-equipped units).
The reality is that the sudden and violent attack by strong Soviet reserves and the failure of the 9.Armee on the northern end of the Kursk salient broke the will of Adolf Hitler to continue an attack, the implications of which made him sick to his stomach when he considered it (conversation with Generaloberst Heinz Guderian in the spring of 1943). Hitler also had to draw on German troops at the Eastern Front to bolster Mussolini's tottering regime in Italy (Anglo-American forces invaded Sicily on July 10th, 1943).
The Battle of Prokhorovka was a critical psychological victory for the Red Army as it had stopped a major German offensive dead in its tracks. The German advantage in quality of officers and men was now eroding and the self-confident Soviets were ready to drive out the invaders. From this point forward, the strategic initiative would remain with the Red Army.
Sources
Cross, Robin (1993). Citadel: The Battle of Kursk, Barnes & Noble Edition (1998). Zetterling, Niklas and Anders Frankson. Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis, London: Frank Cass, 2000.
Kursk Reconsidered: Germany's Lost Victory from Historynet.com.
Review of Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis with a detailed comparison with the statistics provided by Walter Dunn's "Kursk: Hitler's Gamble, 1943", George Nipe's "Decision in the Ukraine", "The Battle of Kursk" by David Glantz and Jonathan House, and "The Battle for Kursk, 1943" from the Soviet General Staff.