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Battle of Basantar

Part of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971

Date	December 4 to December 11, 1971
Location	Shabazpur, Shakargarh buldge, India
Result	Tactical and strategic Indian victory

Belligerents

India

Pakistan

Commanders and leaders

Lt Gen Khem Karan Singh
Brig. A. S. Vaidya
Lt.Col. B.T.Pandit

Lt Gen Irshad Ahmad Khan
Maj.Gen.Abdul Ali Malik

Strength

Casualties and losses

10 tanks destroyed

66 tanks destroyed
20 tanks captured

1971 Indo-Pakistani War
Battle of Hilli – Battle of Longewala – Battle of Basantar

The Battle of Basantar or the Battle of Barapind (December 4 - December 16, 1971) was one of the vital battles fought as part of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 in the western sector of India. Despite being much greater in number, the Indian troops barely won a hard fought battle that secured this area in the Punjab/Jammu sector.The name Battle of Basantar actually encompasses the entire gamut of battles and skirmishes fought in the Shakargarh sector.

Location of battle

Basantar river is a tributary of the Ravi River that flows in the states of Punjab and Himachal Pradesh. This battle took place in the Shakargarh Sector or the Shakargarh Bulge that includes Jarpal and surrounding areas. The bulge is a protrusion of Pakistan boundary into Indian territory. It was a strategic area for both sides as it comprised road links to Jammu from Punjab, which could be cut off by Pakistan if it wished to launch an offensive. It was also economically vital for both sides as it straddled the fertile area of the Indus river belt.

Reasoning behind the battle

As the war began on the eastern front, Pakistan decided to open up the western sector to divert Indian troops from the Eastern front in Bangladesh and prolong the war. Shakargarh bulge was a key strategic area for India as it comprised road links between Jammu and Indian Punjab. Therefore, securing the region was crucial for India as Pakistan had a military base nearby in Sialkot and therefore could have easily launched a massive invasion of the Shakargarh region, cutting Jammu and Kashmir from the rest of India. The Indian Army maintained a base at Pathankot, couple of hundred miles away from Shakargarh and quickly mobilized forces to defend the region. In an attempt to gain advantage through the element of surprise, the Indian Army, though outnumbered, attacked Pakistani positions in Jarpal area, triggering the Battle of Basantar.

Battle plan

Both the opposing sides were led by their army's I Corps. Pakistan's I Corp included three infantry divisions, one armoured division, an armoured brigade backed up by an unknown number of artillery and support units. Furthermore Pakistan had the advantage of bringing in the reserve troops stationed nearby. The Reserves totaled 5 divisions, commanded by none other than Lt. General Irshad Hassan Khan, who as DMI (Director Military Intelligence) had failed to act in the 1965 War despite of intercepting Indian war plans. The Indian I Corps had three infantry divisions, 2 Armoured Brigades, two independent artillery brigades and an engineer brigade. The aim of the Indian Army was to bridge the Basantar river - the entry to which was fully land mined - and take control of the Shakargarh bulge. It was reasoned that such an offensive would also secure the Pathankot army base from any attacks from Pakistan.

The battle

The offensive in this sector was launched a few days after war broke out between the two nations. The Indian I Corps moved into the sector to capture the key areas. The 54 Infantry Division and 16 Armoured Brigade moved towards the area. As they advanced they were met by stiff Pakistani resistance. Meanwhile, the Indian division was bogged down as they had not cleared all the mines or bridged the river. However, in a daring counter attack by the 17 Poona Horse, 2nd Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal led his 3 tanks headlong into the mined area. A fierce tank battle ensued where a Pakistan tank was taken down. After suffering initial setbacks, the 8th Armoured Brigade of Pakistan was called-in to help the Pakistani resistance in the area. However, the Indian Army continued the assault and Lt. Arun Khetarpal with his 2 remaining tanks fought off and gunned down 10 tanks before he was killed in action. Following the defeat in the battle, Pakistan launched a massive counter-attack which was planned into five phases:

Ph I To capture North Portion f Lalial Res forest and beat back any local Counter attack (2145h on 15 Dec 71)
Ph II to capture Jarpal and Lohal by 0500h 16 dec 71.
Ph III To Est Bridge H incl area North of Lalial Forest, Jarpal and Lohal on Ni 15/16 Dec 71.
Ph IV To to Break out

After days of intense fighting that saw both sides gaining and losing territory, the battle was turning into a stalemate. However, despite being at a quantitative and qualitative disadvantage, Indian troops made massive gains during the final days of the battle and also repelled the Pakistani thrust. Towards the tail end of the battle, Pakistan Army's Lieutenant Colonel Akram Raja made a frantic attempt to counter-attack the Indian stronghold near Shakargarh by jumping into an old-style cavalry charge with his tanks. Launched in broad daylight in view of the Indian defensive positions which were well secured, the campaign was a disaster. The Indians continued their military thrust deep inside Pakistan and came threateningly close to the Pakistan Army base at Sialkot. Because of being outnumbered by the advancing Indian Army, the Pakistan Army called-in the Pakistan Air Force to repel the Indian attack on the base. Expecting another massive assault by the Indian Army, this time backed by Indian Air Force-support, and in no position to launch any counter-offensive operations in the region, Pakistan offered unconditional surrender which led to ceasefire. India had gained control of more than thousand square miles before finally settling down to 350 mi² - 1000 km² of Pakistan territory that included approximately 500 villages.

Conclusion

Invading Shakargarh bulge was one of the most crucial components of Pakistan's war strategy in the western sector. Pakistan hoped that by occupying the bulge, the main link between Indian Army positions in Kashmir and Pathankot would be cut-off, following which, it could easily invade Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistani military forces stationed in Sialkot base would keep Pathankot at bay, thwarting any Indian attempts to recapture Shakargarh. However, Pakistan's battle plans were jeopardized because of the ingenuity of a bold attack by the Indians. The Indian Army attacked Pakistani positions in the region within four days of the declaration of the state of war, catching the Pakistanis by complete surprise. After a few days of intense fighting, the Indians had not only pushed the Pakistanis back, but had also come close to capturing Sialkot.

Pakistan Army generally regards this as their most humbling defeat, next only to the Battle of Longewala despite some numerical and qualitative superiority over the opposing force. Apart from Battle of Chawinda were Pakistan defended against Indian onslaughts despite being outnumbered and technologically behind, the entire military campaign in the region was not successful for Pakistan. In this battle alone, India had destroyed close to 70 tanks losing only a few in the process. Pakistan's Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report recommended that the Commander 1 Corps, who "surrendered to the enemy without a fight" should "be tried for criminal and wilful neglect of duty" and poor conduct of operations, that "seriously jeopardized the Army offensive in the south. The Indian Army, on the other hand, was criticized for their somewhat timid handling of the attack on Sialkot. The army, however, in its defense stated that it was planning another assault on Sialkot with assistance from the Indian Air Force, when the cease-fire was declared.

This and other battles put paid to any hopes of bargaining for territory lost in East Pakistan, by capturing Indian territory; in fact Pakistan had lost sizeable portions of land on both sides of the border.

Awards

Param Vir Chakra, India's highest military honour was awarded to Lieutenant Arun Khetarpal, 17th Poona Horse
Param Vir Chakra for Major Hoshiar Singh, 3rd Battalion, Bombay Grenadiers
Unusually, Colonel Mohammed Akram Raja was awarded Hilal-i-Jurat by the Pakistan Government on the basis of a citation written by Lieutenant Colonel, Ved Airy, who was Commanding Officer, 3Grenediars, Indian Army

Notes

References

Battle of Barapind-Jarpal
Hamoodur Rahman Commission Report Chapter 5
Poona Horse account of the battle
A newspaper format presentation of the battle
Casualties during war
Maj. Gen. Ian Cardozo (2003). Param Vir - Our Heroes in Battle. Roli Books. ISBN 81-7436-262-2.