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Platine War
Clockwise from top left: Brazilian 1st Division in the Caseros; Uruguayan infantry aiding Entre Rios cavalry in Caseros; Beginning of the Passage of the Tonelero; Charge of Urquiza´s cavalry in Caseros; Passage of the Tonelero.
Date 1851–1852 Location Uruguay, Argentina northeast, Río de la Plata Result Allied victory, Brazilian hegemony on South America
Belligerents
Empire of Brazil Uruguay Entre Rios Corrientes	Argentine Confederation Blancos
Commanders and leaders
Pedro II John Pascoe Grenfell Duke of Caxias Count of Porto Alegre Justo José de Urquiza Eugenio Garzón José Miguel Galán	Juan Manuel de Rosas Lucio Norberto Mansilla Manuel Oribe
Strength
1851: 37,000 Brazilians (20,000 mobilized) 15,000+ Argentines and Uruguayans	1851: 34,500+ Argentines and Uruguayans
Casualties and losses
400+ dead	1,200+ dead

The Platine War, also known as the War against Oribe and Rosas (August 18, 1851 – February 3, 1852) was fought between the Argentine Confederation and an alliance of the Empire of Brazil, Uruguay and the Argentine provinces of Entre Ríos and Corrientes. The war was part of a long-running contest between Argentina and Brazil for influence over Uruguay and Paraguay and hegemony of the region of the Río de la Plata (River Plate). The conflict took place in Uruguay, over the Río de la Plata and in the northeast of Argentina.

Causes

Juan Manuel de Rosas dictatorship

Don Juan Manuel de Rosas was elected governor of Buenos Aires after the brief period of anarchy that followed the end of the Argentina-Brazil War in 1828. In theory, Rosas had as much power as the governor of any other Argentine province, but in reality he ruled over all Argentina, or the Argentine Confederation as the country was then known. Although allied with the Federalists, a faction that demanded more provincial autonomy, in practice Rosas controlled the other provinces through a mixture of negotiations, bribery and military pressure, drawing on the wealth of Buenos Aires, due in part because all Argentina's international trade had to pass through its port. With the exception of the short period of 1832-5, he governed the country for more than 20 years as a dictator until his defeat in 1852 at Caseros. As time passed, Rosas' government became more corrupt and despotic; some 14,000 of his political adversaries, the Unitarians, fled to Uruguay to escape his repression.

Rosas, like many of his countrymen, wished to recreate the former Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata, placing Argentina at the centre of a powerful, republican state. To achieve this, it would be necessary to occupy the three neighbouring countries of Bolivia, Uruguay and Paraguay, and part of the southern region of Brazil. To accomplish this, Rosas searched for allies across the region that shared his vision, becoming involved in the internal politics of his neighbours, financing rebellions and wars.

Paraguay had considered itself a sovereign nation since 1811, but it was not recognized as such by any other country and Argentina saw it only as a rebellious province. The Paraguayan dictator José Gaspar Rodríguez de Francia decided that the best way to maintain his own rule, and the independence of Paraguay from Argentina, was to completely isolate the country from any type of contact with the exterior world. For this reason, up until 1840 the country had established no diplomatic contact with any other nation. With the death of Francia, this policy began to shift; his successor Don Carlos Antonio López signed two treaties in July 1841 - 'Friendship, Commerce and Navigation' and 'Limits' - with the Argentine province of Corrientes, which had rebelled against Rosas. Meanwhile, Rosas began to place pressure on Paraguay; Rosas continued to refuse to recognise Paraguayan independence and began to block the Paraná river to international traffic with Paraguay.

La Guerra Grande

The troubled country of Uruguay and its long civil war, "La Guerra Grande", heavily influenced the eventual Platine War. The old Brazilian province of Cisplatine had become the Oriental Republic of Uruguay after the Argentina-Brazil War in the 1820s and the adoption of Uruguay's first constitution in 1830, with Don Fructuoso Rivera elected its first president. The elections were disputed by Rivera's rival, Don Juan Antonio Lavalleja, however, who was famous for first declaring the independence of Cisplatine from Brazil in 1825 with the support of the "Thirty-Three Orientals". In due course Lavalleja attempted to resolve the dispute by force, marking the beginning of a long civil war. Rivera and Lavalleja became associated with two opposing political parties; the Blancos, supporting Lavalleja, and the Colorados, the partisans of Rivera.

Lavalleja soon discovered that Rosas in neighbouring Buenos Aires would be interested in aiding him financially and militarily. In 1832 Lavalleja started to receive aid from Bento Gonçalves, a soldier and farmer from the Brazilian province of Rio Grande do Sul. Gonçalves had been encouraged by Rosas to rebel against the Brazilian government, with the ultimate aim of enabling Argentina to annex the province of Rio Grande do Sul. Together, Lavalleja and Gonçalves began a military campaign in Uruguay, characterised by extensive violence and theft.

Rivera completed his term of office as President in October 1834 and Manuel Oribe, like Lavalleja a member of the Blanco party, was elected in March 1835, calling for an end to the anarchy of the previous years. The election of the new president shifted the alliances in the region; the outgoing president, Rivera, rebelled against Oribe but was militarily defeated and left for Rio Grande do Sul where he joined forces with Gonçalves and his men, until then allies of Rosas. Lavajella, however, remained loyal to Oribe. Rivera and Gonçalves then invaded Uruguay and conquered most of the country, with the exception of the capital, Montevideo. Defeated, Oribe renounced his position as president and retreated to Argentina. Rivera was then reelected president in 1838.

Rosas was determined to restore his authority in Uruguay and take revenge on Gonçalves, and launched a sequence of interventions. In 1839 an army led by Pascual Echagüe, Lavalleja, Oribe and the highly untrustworthy Justo José de Urquiza (Governor of Entre Rios) was quickly defeated by Rivera - Lavalleja left the conflict for good and did not participate any further in the civil war. Rosas sent another army of Argentines and Uruguayans in 1845, led by Oribe and Urquiza, and this time defeated Rivera's forces, slaughtering the survivors. Rivera was one of the few that managed to escape and departed to Rio de Janeiro in exile. The remains of the Colorado Uruguayan government chose Joaquín Suárez to succeed him as president and held onto Montevideo as Oribe placed it under siege. The violence in Uruguay grew, with Oribe's men killing more than 17,000 Uruguayans and 15,000 Argentinians during the conflict.

The conflict began to spread beyond the borders of Uruguay. In 1847, Francisco Solano López sponsored a revolt against Rosas' rule in Argentina by Joaquín Madariaga and José María Paz; the revolt was ultimately surpressed by de Urquiza. Meanwhile, now controlling almost all of Uruguay, Oribe allowed Rosas to invade the south of Brazil, his forces stealing cattle, assaulting ranches and killing political enemies as they went. More than 188 Brazilian farms were attacked, 814,000 cattle and 16,950 horses were stolen. Francisco Pedro de Abreu, Baron of Jacuí independently decided to retaliate, making raids into Uruguay that became known as "Califórnias", referring to the violence that occurred in the U.S. during the westward expansion into California. The conflict spread further still; the support of Rosas for the Blancos, the instability in the region and the threat to trade made the two greatest powers of the time, France and Great Britain, declare war on Argentina. Buenos Aires suffered repeated attack from the Anglo-French fleets and suffered several blockades. The Argentine government was capable of resisting, however, forcing the two powers to sign a peace accord in 1849.

The war begins

The Empire of Brazil reacts

By the middle of the 19th century, the Empire of Brazil was the richest and most powerful country in Latin America. In comparison to its neighbours, it enjoyed a democratic and constitutional monarchy, and prided itself on the absence of the caudillos, dictators and coups d'Etat seen across the rest of the continent. During the minority of emperor Dom Pedro II, however, there had been internal rebellions driven by local disputes for power within a small number of provinces. As noted above, one of these, the War of Tatters had been led by Gonçalves and although it had started out as another local dispute in the Rio Grande do Sul, had escalated into a fully fledged separatist rebellion with the help of financial support from Rosas. In the absence of external intervention, however, Brazil was confident of stability: most of the Rio Grande do Sul, including the largest and richest cities, remained loyal to the Emperor, who instead of persecuting the rebels instead chose to pardon them, restoring order and generally stabilizing the country. Once defeated, even Gonçalves, who had remained a firm monarchist even whilst he had been in revolt against the crown, swore loyalty to the Emperor when Pedro II visited the south in 1845.

For imperial Brazil then, a powerful republican neighbor in the region - such as Argentina could become if it managed to succeed with its plans - was seen as an existential threat to the monarchy. It also represented a threat to Brazilian hegemony across the south. Argentina incorporating Paraguay and Uruguay into a new Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata would mean an effective nationalization of the Platine river network, cutting off communicating between the Brazilian province of Mato Grosso and Rio de Janeiro - in the absence of the rivers, travelling by land would take over six months. Brazil was not keen to share a direct border with Argentina either, fearing a potential invasion by Rosas.

The members of the Brazilian Cabinet could not reach an agreement of what to do about Rosas. Some ministers advocated pursuing a peaceful solution at any cost, whilst others believed the only answer was a military solution. The then President of the Council of Ministers, Pedro de Araújo Lima, firmly advocated a policy of peace. He feared that Brazil was not prepared for war and that a defeat would harm the monarchy, leading to a situation similar to that in the 1820s, when the loss of Cisplatine contributed to the abdication of the emperor's father, Dom Pedro I. In 1849, however, Araújo Lima concluded that his position had become untenable and resigned from office, opening up the way for the Emperor to call José da Costa Carvalho to take over the cabinet. Paulino José Soares de Sousa, a member of the pro-war faction, was chosen as the new minister of Foreign Affairs. Soares made clear his intent to deal with Argentina, but without foreign assistance, announcing that the “Imperial Government does not desire or judge convenient an alliance with France or any other European nation related to the matters in the Platine region. It understands that they must be resolved by the nations that are closely connected with... It will not admit European influence over America”. The Empire of Brazil was determined to make of South America its own zone of influence.

The new Council of Ministers chose a risky alternative to resolve the complicated situation in the Platine region. Instead of undertaking a period of conscription to build up the Brazilian Army, which would have been highly expensive, the Council decided to rely on its standing army, sending a contingent south to secure the region. Brazil had the advantage of a powerful and modern navy, and a sufficiently experienced professional army hardened by years of internal and external wars. No other country in South America had until then real navies or regular armies. Rosas' and Oribe's forces were largely made up of irregular troops on loan from the caudillos who supported them, and even more than ten years later, Argentina would only have an army of 6,000 men. Brazil decided to adopt Rosas' own tactics by financing his opponents to weaken him both internally and externally.

The Alliance against Rosas

The Brazilian government set about creating a regional alliance against Rosas, sending a delegation to the region led by Honório Hermeto Carneiro Leão, assisted by José Maria da Silva Paranhos. Leão signed a treaty with Bolívia agreeing that whilst Bolívia would not contribute any troops to a war with Argentina, Bolivia would however strengthen its border defenses to deter any attack by Rosas. Isolationist Paraguay would be harder. Brazil made the first steps, being the first country to formally recognise Paraguay in 1844 and soon had excellent diplomatic relations. The Brazilian ambassador in Paraguay, Pimenta Bueno, became a private councilor to Carlos López. A defensive alliance was signed on December 25, 1850, between Brazil and Paraguay, in which López agreed to supply the Empire with horses for its army, but refused to contribute troops to fight Rosas, believing that Justo José Urquiza, Rosas' rival in the neighbouring province of Entre Rios, secretly wished to annex Paraguay.

Brazil also began to deepen its involvement in the Uruguayan civil war. Luis Alves de Lima e Silva, the Count of Caxias, assumed the presidency, or governorship, of Rio Grande do Sul and the command of the four divisions of the Brazilian Army headquartered in the province. From 1849 the imperial government directly assisted the besieged Colorado Uruguayan government in Montevideo; on September 6, 1850 the Uruguayan representative Andres Lamas signed an agreement with Irineu Evangelista de Sousa to transfer money to the Montevideo government through his bank. On March 16, 1851, the Empire of Brazil publicly declared that it would support Colorado Uruguay against Oribe, something by then that it already had been doing secretly for more than two years. This did not please the Argentine government and they began preparing for war.

Brazil had also been searching for support against Rosas within Argentina, with some success. On May 1, 1851, the Argentine province of Entre Rios governed by Urquiza declared to Rosas that "it is the will of its people to reassume the entire exercise of its own sovereignty and power that had delegated to the governor of Buenos Aires". It was followed by the province of Corrientes, governed by Benjamín Virasoro, which also sent the same message. Brazil encouraged and financially supported both uprisings. One of the reasons for Urquiza´s betrayal of Rosas was their long-running rivalry - Rosas had tried to remove him from power several times since 1845, fearing that the caudillo was seeking to overthrow him. This was the trigger for military intervention: Brazil sent a naval force to the Platine region, basing it around the port of Montevideo. The British Rear admiral John Pascoe Grenfell, a veteran of the Brazilian War of Independence and of the Argentina–Brazil War was appointed to lead the fleet, reaching Montevideo on May 4, 1851. His command included one frigate, seven corvettes, three brigs and six steamships.

On May 29, 1851 Uruguay, Brazil and the Argentine provinces of Entre Rios and Corrientes formed an offensive alliance against Rosas. The text of the treaty declared that the objective was to protect Uruguayan independence and to pacify its territory, expelling Oribe's forces. Urquiza would command the Argentine forces and Eugenio Garzón the Colorado Uruguayans, with both receiving financial and military aid from the Empire of Brazil. This was followed on August 2, 1851, by the landing of the first Brazilian force in Uruguay, approximately 300 soldiers of the 6th Battalion of Skirmishers sent to protect Fuerte del Cerro (Cerro Fort). In response, Rosas declared war against Brazil on August 18, 1851.

Allied invasion of Uruguay

The defeat of Oribe

The Count of Caxias led a Brazilian army of 16,200 professional soldiers across the border between Rio Grande do Sul and Uruguay on September 4, 1851. His force consisted of four divisions, with 6,500 infantrymen, 8,900 cavalrymen, 800 artillerymen and 26 cannons, a little under half the total Brazilian army (37,000 men); around 4,000 of his men remained in Brazil to protect her border.

The Brazilian Army entered Uruguay in three groups: the main force, consisting of the 1st and 2nd divisions - around 12,000 men, under Caxias's personal command - left from Santana do Livramento. The second force, under the command of Colonel David Canabarro departed from Quaraim, comprising the 4th division, protecting Caxias' right flank. The third force, the 3rd Division under Brigadier General José Fernandes, left from Jaguarão, protecting Caxias' left. Canabarro's 4th Division joined Caxias's troops a little after arriving at the Uruguayan town of Frutuoso, the combined force then joining up with Fernandes just before reaching Montevideo.

Meanwhile, the troops of Urquiza and Eugenio Garzón had surrounded the army of Oribe near Montevideo. Their forces numbered roughly 15,000 men, almost double Oribe's 8,500. Realising that the Brazilians were approaching and knowing that there was no hope of victory, Oribe orderered his troops to surrender without a fight on 19th October, and retreated into seclusion on his farm in Paso del Molino. The Brazilian fleet, with their ships scattered throughout the River Plate and tributaries, prevented the defeated army of Oribe from escaping into Argentina. Urquiza suggested to Grenfell that they should simply kill the resulting prisoners of war, but Grenfell refused to harm any of them. Instead, Oribe's Argentine soldiers were incorporated into the army of Urquiza, and the Uruguayans into Garzon's.

The Brazilian army safely took the remaining Blanco Uruguayan territory, fighting off Oribe's troops, who attacked their flanks in several skirmishes. On November 21 the representatives of Brazil, Uruguay, Entre Rios and Corrientes then formed another alliance in Montevideo with the objective of "freeing the Argentine people of the oppression that suffers under the tyrant rule of the Governor Rosas”.

Allied invasion of Argentina

The Passage of the Tonelero

Shortly after the surrender of Oribe, the allied forces split into two groups with the intent of one force manouvring upriver to sweep down on Buenos Aires from Santa Fe, whilst the other would make a landing in the port of Buenos Aires itself. The first of these groups, an allied army composed of Uruguayan and Argentine troops plus the 1ª Division of the Brazilian Army commanded by Brigadier General Manuel Marques de Sousa initially based itself in the town of Colonia del Sacramento, in the south of Uruguay and the other side of the estuary to the city of Buenos Aires.

In December 17, 1851, a squadron of Brazilian ships - four steamships, three corvettes and one brig - under the command of Grenfell forced the passage of the Paraná River. The Argentinians had formed a powerful defensive line at Tonelero, near the precipice of Acevedo, protected by 16 pieces of artillery and 2,000 riflemen, under the command of general Lucio Norberto Mansilla. The Argentine troops exchanged fire with the Brazilian warships but were unable to prevent from them from progressing upriver. The following day, more Brazilian ships forced their way past Tonelero, carrying the remaining troops of Marques de Sousa's Brazilian division towards Gualeguaichu. This second influx of ships caused Mansilla and his soldiers to withdraw in chaos, abandoning their artillery, believing that the allies were in fact intending to land and attack their own location.

The allied army continued to make its way to Gualeguaichu, with Urquiza and his cavalry travelling by land from Montevideo, whilst the infantry and artillery were carried by Brazilian warships up the Uruguay River. After meeting up, they marched west until they reached the city of Diamante on the east side of the Paraná River in the middle of December 1851. Eugenio Garzón and his the Uruguayan troops were taken from Montevideo up to Potrero Perez by Brazilian warships and continued on foot until also reaching Diamante on 30 December of 1851, when all the allied forces were finally reunited. From Diamante they were carried to the other side of the Paraná River, landing at Santa Fé. The Confederate Argentine troops in the region ran away without opposing any resistance. The Allied Army, or the “Grand Army of South America” as it was officially called by Urquiza, marched on towards Buenos Aires.

Meanwhile, the second force, comprising the majority of the Brazilian troops - about 12,000 men - under the command of Caxias, had remained in Colonia del Sacramento. The Brazilian commander took the steamship Dom Afonso, and entered the port at Buenos Aires to choose the best place to disembark his troops in the city. He expected to have to defeat the Argentine flotilla anchored there, but the force did nothing to stop him and he safely returned to Sacramento to plan his assault. The attack was prematurely aborted, however, with the news of the allied victory in Caseros.

The Battle of Caseros

In the days before the Battle of Caseros, the Allied army had been advancing on the Argentinian capital of Buenos Aires by land, while the Brazilian Army commanded by Caxias planned an attack by sea. By 1 February 1852 the Allied troops were camped about nine kilometers alway from Buenos Aires. The next day at the Battle of Alvarez Field the Allied vanguard defeated an Argentinian force under the command of General Ángel Pacheco that had been sent to slow down their advance.

On February 3 the Allied army encountered the main Argentine force commanded by Rosas himself. On paper, the two sides were well matched. The Allies included 20,000 Argentines, 1,700 Uruguayans and 4,000 Brazilian elite soldiers, comprising as 16,000 cavalrymen, 9,000 infantrymen and 1,000 artillerymen, forming an army of 26,000 men, with 45 cannons. On the Argentine side, Rosas had 15,000 cavalrymen, 10,000 infantrymen and 1,000 artillerymen, a total of 26,000 men with 60 cannons. Rosas had been able to choose the best site for his army, placing it on top of a mount at Caseros, on the other side of a small river called the Arrojo Morón. His headquarters were based in a mansion at the top of Caseros.

Morale was high in the Allied camp. At dawn on the morning of the battle, the Allied commander-in-chief Urquiza passed by the Brazilian divison and cried out: “Hail to Brazil! Hail to the Emperor!” The soldiers gave a robust hail in reply to the commander-in-chief and their allies. The Allied commanders were de Sousa, Manuel Luis Osório, Jose Maria Pirán, Jose Miguel Galán (who replaced Garzón after his unexpected death on December 1851), Urquiza and the future Argentine presidents Bartolomé Mitre and Domingo Sarmiento. These men formed a Council of War, and decided to commence the attack. Almost immediately the forward units of the two armies began to engage in battle.

The Battle of Caseros, as the clash between the Allied and Argentine armies became known, resulted in a great victory for the opponents of Rosas. Although they started with the poorer position on the battlefield, the Allied soldiers managed to annihilate Rosas's troops in a fight that lasted for most of the day. A few minutes before the Allied forces reached de Rosas' headquarters, the Argentine dictator escaped the battlefield. Disguised as a sailor, de Rosas sought out and asked for the aid of Robert Gore, British ambassador in Buenos Aires. The ambassador agreed to have de Rosas taken to the United Kingdom, along with his daughter Manuelita, where he would spend the last twenty years of his life. The official report stated that 400 men on the Allied side had died, while the Argentine army lost 1,200. Given the duration and scale of the battle, however, this may be an underestimate.

To mark their victory, the Allied troops paraded in triumph at the streets of Buenos Aires. These parades included the Brazilian Army, which insisted that their parade occurred on February 20, to represent a payback for the defeat it had suffered at the hands of the Argentines in the Battle of Ituzaingó twenty five years before in the Argentina–Brazil War. The population of Buenos Aires was said to be ashamed, quiet and hostile as the Brazilians passed. The victorious Allies lavished praise on each other; according to Urquiza, the performance of de Sousa as commander of his troops was particularly impressive: "Mr. Brigadier General Marques, head of the center of the Brazilian forces, gave a day of glory to his fatherland, adding new laurels to his forehead, cultivating the respect and gratitude of his allies".

Aftermath

The triumph in Caseros was the most significant Brazilian military victory, making it possible to keep the independence of Paraguay and Uruguay, and preventing the planned Argentine invasion of Rio Grande do Sul. In only three years the Empire of Brazil was capable of destroying the long and planned work that was so desired by the Argentines since its independence of the reconstitution of the old Vice-Kingdom of the Rio de la Plata. What Great Britain and France, the great powers of that time, had not obtained through their powerful navies, Brazil achieved with its army and armada. It represented a watershed for the history of the region, as it not only implied in the consecration of the imperial hegemony in the Platine region but in all South America. The victory over Paraguay eighteen years later would be only a confirmation of this status.

The Hispanic-American nations from Mexico to Argentina suffered with coups d´Etat, revolts, dictatorships, politic and economic instability, civil wars and secession. Brazil, on the other hand, went out of the conflict with the monarchy stronger than ever and its internal revolts also disappeared. The problematic province of Rio Grande do Sul actively participated of the war effort, seeing as a consequence the disappearance of the desire of separatism of part of its population and also made it possible its effective integration with the country. The internal stability allowed Brazil to assume a position of prominence in the international scene at the side of the United States at the eyes of the European powers that perceived in the South American Empire a rare exception in a continent afflicted by civil wars and dictatorships. From 1850 and on the country passed through a period of great economic, scientific and cultural prosperity that unexisted on its neighbors that lasted until the end of the monarchy.

Soon after Caseros, it was signed the Agreement of San Nicolas that completely modified the unitary pact in the Argentine Confederation, decentralizing the country and allowing great autonomy to the provinces. Such agreement was not accepted by Buenos Aires, as it could not allow to accept the possibility of losing its influence and power over the other provinces and so it left the confederation. From 1854 up to 1862, Argentina was divided in two rival countries that fought to overwhelm one another. On one side, the federalists of the Argentine Confederation, led by Justo José Urquiza, and, at the other, the Unitarians of Buenos Aires under Bartolomé Mitre. The armed conflicts between both were extinguished with the victory of the Unitarians over the federalists at the Battle of Pavón in 1861 that resulted in the incorporation of the Argentine Confederation by Buenos Aires, forming as consequence the Republic of Argentina in 1862 with Mitre as its first president.

Paraguay, by its turn, with the opening of the Platine rivers found it possible to contract European technicians and Brazilian specialists and also enabled the country to purchase military technology from the exterior. During great part of the 1850s, the dictator Carlos López made it difficult for the free navigation of the River Paraguay by the Brazilians. Lopez allowed this because he feared that the province of Mato Grosso could be used as a base of operations for an eventual Brazilian aggression and also to coerce the Imperial government to accept his territorial demands in the region. The country also passed through difficulties to delimit its borders with Argentina that wanted the Chaco all for itself which would be more than half of the national borders of Paraguay.

The end of the Platine War could not bring peace to the region and even less to Uruguay which remained unstable and constantly in crisis caused by the conflicts between Blancos and Colorados. The disputes for the bordering limits, for power between the diverse factions in the region and over the hegemony would years later propitiate first the beginning of the Uruguayan War and later the War of the Triple Alliance.

See also

• Order of Battle at the Platine War
• Brazilian intervention in Uruguay (1853)
• Uruguayan War
• War of the Triple Alliance

Bibliography

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References

1. ^ Vainfas, p.447
2. Holanda, p.113
3. Vianna, p.528
4. Estado-maior do Exército, p.546
5. Doratioto (2002), p.25
6. Maia, p.255
7. Lima, p.158
8. Pedrosa, p.50
9. ^ Lyra (v.1), p.160
10. Doratioto (2002), p.24
11. ^ Doratioto (2002), p.26
12. ^ Holanda, p.113
13. Holanda, p.113, 114
14. ^ Holanda, p.116
15. Vainfas, p.448
16. Holanda, p.114
17. Holanda, p.114
18. Furtado, p.7
19. Holanda, p.117
20. ^ Estado-maior do Exército, p.546
21. Holanda, p.119
22. Holanda, p.120
23. Holanda, p.120
24. Furtado, p.7
25. Holanda, p.121
26. Vainfas, p.303
27. Vianna, p.526
28. Holanda, p.120
29. Costa, p.145
30. ^ Estado-maior do Exército, p.547
31. Vianna, p.526
32. Costa, p.146
33. Vianna, p.527
34. Pedrosa, p.110
35. Calmon (1975), p.371
36. Bueno, p.207
37. Lima, p.158
38. Pedrosa, p.232
39. Pedrosa, p.35
40. Pedrosa, p.35 "quando o Brasil firmou-se como um país de governo sólido e situação interna estabilizada, a partir da vitória sobre a Farroupilha, em 1845, e contra a revolta pernambucana, consolidando, definitivamente, sua superioridade no continente. Compete admitir que, nesta mesma época, as novas repúblicas debatiam-se em lutas internas intermináveis iniciadas em 1810 e sofriam de visível complexo de insegurança em relação ao Brasil"
41. Dolhnikoff, p.206
42. Piccolo, p.43, 44
43. Bueno, p.190
44. Lyra (v.1), p.142
45. ^ Doratioto (2002), p.28
46. ^ Furtado, p.6
47. Furtado, p.8
48. The former regent and future Marquis of Olinda.
49. Later Marquis of Monte Alegre.
50. Later Viscount of Uruguay.
51. Lyra (v.1), p.158-162
52. Calmon (1975), p.391
53. Costa, p.148
54. Barroso, p.119
55. Furtado, p.21
56. Calmon (1975), p.390
57. Holanda, p.114, 115
58. Maia, p.255
59. Future Marquis of Paraná.
60. Future Viscount of Rio Branco.
61. Lima, p.159
62. Estado-maior do Exército, p.546
63. Doratioto (2002), p.26
64. Lyra (v.1), p.163
65. Estado-maior do Exército, p.547
66. Golin, p.41
67. Furtado, p.8
68. Furtado, p.10
69. Bueno, p.207
70. Later Viscount of Mauá.
71. Calmon (1975), p.387
72. Golin, p.35
73. Furtado, p.8
74. Maia, p.256
75. Lyra (v.1), p.163
76. Lyra (v.1), p.164
77. Estado-maior do Exército, p.547
78. Lima, p.159
79. Maia, p.256
80. Estado-maior do Exército, p.548
81. The Brazilian Armada had a total of 59 vessels of various types in 1851: 36 armed sailing ships, 10 armed steamships, 7 unarmed sailing ships and 6 sailing transports; Carvalho, p.181.
82. Vianna, p.527
83. Maia, p.256
84. Maia, p.256, 257
85. Furtado, p.9
86. Golin, p.22
87. Pedrosa, p.229
88. Golin, p.22
89. Carvalho, p.185,186
90. Lima, p.159
91. Lyra (v.1), p.164
92. Maia, p.256
93. Costa, p.150
94. Barroso, p.101
95. Golin, p.23
96. Costa, p.150
97. Golin, p.38
98. Maia, p.257
99. Future count of Porto Alegre.
100. Estado-maior do Exército, p.551
101. Maia, p.257
102. Barroso, p.112
103. Maia, p.258
104. Estado-maior do Exército, p.553
105. ^ Estado-maior do Exército, p.553
106. Named in honor of the deceased Prince Afonso.
107. Costa, p.155, 156
108. Costa, p.158
109. Maia, p.258
110. Magalhães, p.64
111. Estado-maior do Exército, p.554
112. Calmon (1975), p.407
113. Calmon (2002), p.196
114. ^ Golin, p.42
115. Costa, p.156
116. Golin, p.43
117. Costa, p.157
118. Costa, p.156
119. Costa, p.158
120. Golin, p.42
121. Lima, p.159
122. Doratioto (2009), p.80
123. Through the bulletin nº 26, actually written by Sarmiento, Costa, p.158
124. Golin, p.42, 43
125. Lyra (v.1), p.164
126. Calmon (2002), p.195
127. Furtado, p.10
128. Golin, p.42
129. Lyra (v.2), p. 9 "The end of the Paraguayan War marked the apogee of the imperial regime in Brazil. It is the Golden Age of the monarchy." and "...Brazil had a reputation in the international community that, with the sole exception of the United States of America, no other country in the Americas had."
130. Golin, p.43
131. Lyra (v.1), p.200
132. Bueno, p.196
133. Lyra (v.1), p.199
134. Doratioto (2002), p.29
135. Furtado, p.10
136. Furtado, p.17
137. Pedrosa, p.168
138. Furtado, p.8
139. Furtado, p.14
140. Furtado, p.14
141. Doratioto (2002), p.95, 96
142. Furtado, p.13

• Military history of Brazil
• Wars involving Brazil
• History of South America
• 19th-century conflicts
• Platine War