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Winter War
Part of World War II
Finnish machine gun crew during the Winter War.
Date 30 November 1939 – 13 March 1940 Location Eastern Finland Result Interim Peace Territorial changes Moscow Peace Treaty
Belligerents
Finland	Soviet Union
Commanders and leaders
Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim	Kirill Meretskov Kliment Voroshilov Joseph Stalin Semyon Timoshenko
Strength
337,000–346,500 men 32 tanks 114 aircraft	425,640–998,100 men 2,514–6,541 tanks 3,880 aircraft
Casualties and losses
25,904 dead or missing 43,557 wounded 1,000 captured 957 civilians in air raids 20–30 tanks 62 aircraft	84,994–126,875 dead or missing 248,090–264,908 wounded 5,486 captured 3,543 tanks 261–515 aircraft (combat losses)

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The Winter War (Template:Lang-fi, Template:Lang-sv, Template:Lang-ru) was a military conflict between the Soviet Union and Finland. It began with a Soviet offensive on 30 November 1939, three months after the German invasion of Poland and the start of World War II, and ended on 13 March 1940 with the Moscow Peace Treaty. The League of Nations deemed the attack illegal, and the Soviet Union was expelled from the League on 14 December.

The Soviet forces had four times as many soldiers as the Finns, 30 times as many aircraft and 218 times as many tanks. However, the Red Army had recently been crippled by a drastic purge in 1937, reducing its morale and efficiency shortly before the outbreak of hostilities. With up to 50 percent of army officers executed or imprisoned, including the vast majority of those of the highest rank, the Red Army in 1939 had many inexperienced senior officers. Due to a combination of these factors as well as extremely high commitment and morale in the Finnish forces, Finland was able to successfully resist the Soviet invasion for far longer than the Soviets had expected.

Hostilities ceased in March 1940 with the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty. Finland ceded about 9 percent of its pre-war territory and 20 percent of its industrial capacity to the Soviet Union. Soviet losses on the front were heavy and the country's international standing also suffered. Moreover, the war cast doubt on the fighting ability of the Red Army, a factor that may have contributed to Adolf Hitler's decision to launch Operation Barbarossa. Finally, the Soviet forces did not accomplish their objective of the total conquest of Finland, but did gain sufficient territory along Lake Ladoga to provide a buffer for Leningrad. The Finns retained their sovereignty and improved their international reputation.

The peace treaty thwarted a half-hearted Franco–British plan to send troops to Finland through northern Scandinavia. One of the Allied operation's major goals had been to take control of northern Sweden's iron ore and cut deliveries to Germany.

Background

Background of Finnish politics before the War

Finland comprised the eastern part of the Swedish kingdom for centuries until 1809, when Imperial Russia conquered and converted it into an autonomous buffer state within the Russian Empire to protect Saint Petersburg, the imperial capital. Finland enjoyed wide autonomy and its own Senate until the turn of the century, when Russia began attempts to assimilate Finland as part of a general policy to strengthen the central government and unify the Empire by Russification. These attempts ruined relations with the Finns and increased the support of Finnish movements vying for self-determination.

The outbreak of the First World War and the collapse of the Russian Empire gave Finland a window of opportunity and on 6 December 1917, the Senate of Finland declared the country's independence. The new Bolshevik Russian government was weak, and with the threat of civil war looming, Soviet Russia recognized the new Finnish government just three weeks after the declaration of independence. However, the sovereignty was fully achieved in May 1918, after a short civil war and the expulsion of Bolshevik troops.

In 1920, Finland joined the League of Nations. Finland sought security guarantees from the League, but its prime goal was cooperation with the Scandinavian countries. The Finnish and Swedish militaries engaged in wide-ranging cooperation, but were more focused on the exchange of information and defence planning for the Åland islands than on military exercises or stockpiling or deployment of matériel. The Government of Sweden was aware of the military cooperation, but carefully avoided committing itself to Finnish foreign policy. There was also top secret military cooperation between the Finns and the Estonians.

The 1920s and early 1930s were a politically unstable time in Finland. The Communist Party of Finland was declared illegal in 1931, and the far-right Lapua Movement organized anti-communist violence, which culminated in a failed uprising in 1932. Thereafter the ultra-nationalist Patriotic People's Movement (IKL) had a minor presence—at best fourteen seats out of 200—in the parliament. By the late 1930s, the export-oriented Finnish economy was growing and the country had almost solved its problems with extreme political movements.

Soviet–Finnish relations and politics before the War

After the Soviet involvement in the Finnish Civil War in 1918, the countries initially lacked a formal peace treaty. In 1918 and 1919, Finnish volunteer forces conducted two unsuccessful military incursions, the Viena and Aunus expeditions, across the Russian border. In 1920, Finnish communists, based in Soviet Russia, attempted to assassinate the former Finnish White Guards Commander-in-Chief General C.G.E. Mannerheim. Finally on 14 October 1920 Finland and Soviet Russia signed the Treaty of Tartu, confirming the new Finnish-Soviet border as the old border between the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland and Imperial Russia proper. In addition, Finland received Petsamo, with its ice-free harbour on the Arctic Ocean. Despite signing the treaty, relations between the two countries remained strained. The Finnish government allowed volunteers to cross the border to support the East-Karelian Uprising in 1921, and the Finnish communists in the Soviet Union continued to prepare for a revanche and staged a cross-border raid into Finland, the so-called "Pork mutiny", in 1922.

In 1932, the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact with Finland, which was reaffirmed in 1934 for ten years. However, relations between the two countries remained largely de minimis. While foreign trade in Finland was booming, less than one percent of it was with the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union joined the League of Nations in 1934.

During the Stalin era, Soviet propaganda used cross-border comparisons with Finland to paint a picture of the country as a "vicious and reactionary Fascist clique". The Finnish Marshal C.G.E. Mannerheim and the leader of the Finnish Social Democrat Party Väinö Tanner were subjected to particular scorn.

With Joseph Stalin raised to near-absolute power by the Great Purge of 1938, the Soviet Union changed its foreign policy toward Finland in the late 1930s; it began pursuing the aim of recovering the provinces of Tsarist Russia lost during the chaos of the October Revolution and the Russian Civil War. The Soviet leadership believed that the old Empire had optimal security and territory, and wanted the newly-christened Leningrad to enjoy the same security.

Soviet-Finnish prewar negotiations

In April 1938, an NKVD-agent Boris Yartsev contacted the Finnish foreign minister Rudolf Holsti and prime minister Aimo Cajander, stating that the Soviets did not trust Germany and war was considered possible between the two countries. The Red Army would not wait passively behind the border but would rather "advance to meet the enemy." Finnish representatives assured Yartsev that Finland was committed to a policy of neutrality and that the country would resist any armed incursion. Yartsev suggested that Finland cede or lease, some islands in the Gulf of Finland along the seaward approaches to Leningrad. Finland refused.

Negotiations continued throughout that year without results. However, Finnish reception of Soviet entreaties was decidedly cool, as the violent collectivization and purges in Stalin's Soviet Union had given the country a bad reputation. In addition, most of the Finnish Communist elite in the Soviet Union had been executed during the Great Purge, further tarnishing the Soviet Union's image in Finland. Finland was at the same time trying to negotiate a military co-operation with Sweden, hoping for a joint defense of the Åland islands.

The Soviet Union and Nazi Germany signed the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact in August 1939. Nominally, the pact was a non-aggression treaty, but it included a secret protocol in which the Eastern European countries were divided into spheres of interest. Finland fell into the Soviet sphere of interest. On 1 September 1939, Germany began its invasion of Poland and two days later Great Britain and France declared war against Germany. Shortly afterwards, the Soviets invaded eastern Poland, and the Baltic states were later forced to accept treaties to allow the Soviets to establish military bases and to station troops on their soil. The government of Estonia accepted the ultimatum, signing the corresponding agreement in September. Latvia and Lithuania followed in October. Unlike the Baltic countries, the Finns started a gradual mobilization under the guise of "additional refresher training".

War preparations

On 5 October, the Soviet Union invited a Finnish delegation to Moscow for negotiations. The Finnish government sent its ambassador to Sweden, J.K. Paasikivi. The Soviets demanded that the border between the USSR and Finland on the Karelian Isthmus be moved westward to a point only 30 kilometres (19 mi) east of Viipuri and that the Finns destroy all existing fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus. The Soviets also demanded the cession of islands in the Gulf of Finland as well as the Kalastajansaarento peninsula. Furthermore, the Finns would lease the Hanko Peninsula for the thirty years and permit the Soviets to establish a military base there. In exchange, the Soviet Union would cede two parishes with twice the territory demanded from Finland.

The Soviet offer divided the Finnish government, but was eventually rejected. On 31 October, in the assembly of the Supreme Soviet, Molotov announced Soviet demands in public. The Finns made two counteroffers whereby Finland would cede the Terijoki area to the Soviet Union, far less than the Soviets had demanded.

As a result of the failure to receive what they wanted by negotiation, Soviets started an intensive rearmament near the Finnish border in 1938–1939. Necessary assault troop deployments were not initiated until October 1939, though operation plans made in September called for the invasion to start in November. Accepting Soviet demands would have forced the Finns to dismantle their defences in the Finnish Karelia.

Shelling of Mainila

On 26 November, there was a border incident near the village of Mainila. The Soviet Union claimed it was a Finnish artillery attack and that it had killed Soviet border guards, demanding that the Finns apologize for the incident and move their forces past a line that was 20–25 kilometres away from the border. Finland denied any responsibility for the attack and rejected the demands, calling for a joint Finnish-Soviet commission to examine the incident. The Soviet Union, claiming that the Finnish response was hostile, renounced the non-aggression pact. In the Finnish and the Western historiography the shelling became the official casus belli for the Soviet Union to gain a pretext for withdrawing from the non-aggression pact. The Soviet historiography saw the incident unilaterally as the Finnish aggression. However, after the Soviet Union's collapse the issue has divided Russian histography, with some historians believing that the incident was staged by the Soviet Union.

Soviet military and political attack

On 30 November, Soviet forces invaded Finland with 21 divisions, totaling some 450,000 men, and bombed Helsinki. Later the Finnish statesman J.K. Paasikivi commented that the Soviet attack without a declaration of war violated three different non-aggression pacts: the Treaty of Tartu signed in 1920, the non-aggression pact between Finland and the Soviet Union signed in 1932 and again in 1934, and also the Charter of the League of Nations, which the Soviet Union signed in 1934. C.G.E. Mannerheim was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Defense Forces after the Soviet attack. In further reshuffling, the Finnish government named Risto Ryti as the new prime minister and Väinö Tanner as foreign minister.

On 1 December, the Soviet Union formed a puppet government intended to rule Finland once the war was over. Called the Finnish Democratic Republic, it was headed by O. W. Kuusinen. The government was also called "The Terijoki Government", since the village of Terijoki was the first place liberated by the Red Army in the Soviet propaganda. The puppet regime was unsuccessful and was quietly disbanded during the winter of 1940. From the very outset of the war, working-class Finns stood behind the legal government in Helsinki. Finnish national unity against the Soviet invasion was later called the spirit of the Winter War.

At the start of the Winter War, Finland brought up the matter of the Soviet invasion before the League of Nations. The League expelled the Soviet Union on 14 December 1939 and exhorted its members to aid Finland.

Soviet advance to the Mannerheim Line

Soviet military plan

At the beginning of the war, Stalin expected a total victory within a few weeks. The Red Army had just finished the invasion of eastern Poland at a cost of less than a thousand casualties. Stalin's expectations of a quick Soviet triumph were backed up by the politician Andrei Zhdanov and military strategist Kliment Voroshilov, but other generals had their doubts. The chief of staff of the Red Army, Boris Shaposhnikov, advocated a serious buildup, extensive logistical and fire support preparations, and a rational order of battle, deploying the army's best units. Zhdanov's military commander Kirill Meretskov reported at the start of the hostilities: "The terrain of coming operations is split by lakes, rivers, swamps, and is almost entirely covered by forests... The proper use of our forces will be difficult." However, these doubts were not reflected in his troop deployments. Meretskov announced publicly that the Finnish campaign would take at the most two weeks. Soviet soldiers had even been warned not to cross the border into Sweden by mistake.

Stalin's purges had decimated the officer corps of the Red Army; those purged included three of its five marshals, 220 of its 264 division-level commanders or higher, and 36,761 officers of all ranks. Fewer than half of the officers remained in total. They were commonly replaced by soldiers who were less competent but more loyal to their superiors. Furthermore units were superseded a commissar, politruk, who ratified military decisions on their political merits.

Soviet order of battle

Soviet generals were impressed by the success of the German blitzkrieg tactics. However, the blitzkrieg had been tailored to central European conditions with a dense, well-mapped road network. Armies fighting in central Europe had clearly recognized supply and communications centers, which could be easily targeted by armored vehicle regiments. Finnish army centers, by contrast, were deep inside the country. Waging blitzkrieg in Finland was a highly difficult proposition, and the Red Army failed to meet the level of tactical coordination and local initiative required to execute blitzkrieg tactics in the Finnish theatre. Further complicating the Soviet advance was the fact that battlefield decisions had to be seconded by a political commissar. This system of dual command destroyed the independence of commanding officers.

The Soviet forces were positioned as follows:

• The Seventh Army was located on the Karelian Isthmus. Comprising nine divisions, a tank corps and three tank brigades, its objective was the city of Viipuri. The force was later divided into the Seventh and Thirteenth armies.
• The Eighth Army was located north of Lake Ladoga. Comprising six divisions and a tank brigade, its mission was to execute a flanking maneuver around the northern shore of Lake Ladoga to strike at the rear of the Mannerheim Line.
• The Ninth Army was positioned to strike into central Finland. It was composed of three divisions with one additional division on its way. Its mission was to thrust westward to cut Finland in half.
• The Fourteenth Army was based in Murmansk. Comprising three divisions, its objective was to capture the Arctic port of Petsamo and then advance to the town of Rovaniemi.

Finnish order of battle

The Finnish strategy was dictated by geography. The frontier with the Soviet Union was more than 1,000 kilometres (620 mi) long, but was mostly impassable except along a handful of unpaved roads. In prewar calculations, the Finnish General Staff, which had established its wartime headquarters at Mikkeli, estimated there were seven Soviet divisions on the Isthmus and no more than five along the whole border north of Lake Ladoga. In that case, the manpower ratio would favor the attacker by a ratio of 3:1. The true ratio was much higher; for example, twelve Soviet divisions were deployed to the north of Lake Ladoga.

An even greater problem than lack of soldiers was the lack of matériel; foreign shipments of antitank weapons and aircraft were arriving only in small quantities. The ammunition situation was alarming, as stockpiles had cartridges, shells and fuel only for 19–60 days. The ammunition shortage meant the Finns could seldom afford counterbattery or saturation fire. Finnish tank forces were operationally nonexistent.

The Finnish forces were positioned as follows:

• The Army of the Isthmus was composed of six divisions under the command of Hugo Österman. The II. Army Corps was positioned on its right flank and the III. Army Corps was positioned on its left flank.
• The IV. Army Corps was located north of Lake Ladoga. It was composed of two divisions under Juho Heiskanen, who was soon replaced by Woldemar Hägglund.
• The North Finland Group was a collection of Civic Guards, border guards, and drafted reservist units under Wiljo Tuompo.

First battles on the Karelian Isthmus

The Finnish main defensive line, which soon became known as the Mannerheim Line, was located on the Karelian Isthmus about 30 to 75 kilometres (19 to 47 mi) distant from the old Soviet/Finnish border. Red Army soldiers on the Isthmus numbered 250,000, against which were matched 130,000 Finns. The Finnish command had deployed covering forces of about 21,000 men into the area in front of the Mannerheim Line in order to delay and damage the Red Army before it reached the Mannerheim Line. In combat, the biggest cause of confusion among Finnish soldiers were Soviet tanks. The Finns had few anti-tank weapons and insufficient training in modern anti-tank tactics. However, the favored Soviet armored tactic was a simple frontal charge, the weaknesses of which could be exploited. The Finns learned that at close range, tanks could be dealt with in many ways; for example, logs and crowbars jammed into the bogie wheels would often immobilize a tank. Soon, Finns fielded a better ad hoc weapon, the Molotov Cocktail. It was a glass bottle filled with flammable liquids, with a simple hand-lit fuse. Molotov cocktails were eventually mass-produced by the Finnish Alko corporation and bundled with matches with which to light them. Eighty Soviet tanks were destroyed in the border-zone fighting.

By 6 December, all the Finnish covering forces had withdrawn to the Mannerheim Line. The Soviets began their first major attack against the Line in Taipale – the area between the shore of Lake Ladoga, the Taipale river and the Suvanto waterway. Along the Suvanto sector, the Finns had a slight advantage of elevation and dry ground to dig into. The Finnish artillery had also scouted the area and made fire plans in advance, anticipating a Soviet assault. The Battle of Taipale began with a heavy Soviet artillery preparation. After a forty-hour barrage, the Soviet infantry attacked across open ground, but were repulsed with heavy casualties. From 6–12 December the Red Army continued trying to engage using only one division. The Red Army next strengthened its artillery and brought tanks and the 10th Rifle Division to the Taipale front. On 14 December, the bolstered Soviet forces launched a new attack, but were pushed back again. A third Soviet division entered the fight, but performed poorly and panicked under shell fire. The assaults continued without success and the Red Army suffered heavy losses. One typical Soviet attack during the battle lasted just an hour, but left 1,000 dead and twenty-seven tanks strewn on the ice.

North of Lake Ladoga, on the Ladoga Karelia front, the defending Finnish units relied on the terrain. Ladoga Karelia, as a large forest wilderness, did not have road networks for the modern Red Army. However, the Soviet 8th Army had extended a new railroad line to the border, which could double the supply capability on the front. But on 12 December, the advancing Soviet 139th Rifle Division, supported by the 56th Rifle Division, was defeated by a much smaller Finnish force under Paavo Talvela in the Tolvajärvi, the first Finnish victory of the war.

In central and northern Finland, roads were few and the terrain hostile. The Finns did not expect large-scale Soviet attacks but the Soviets sent eight divisions, heavily supported by armor and artillery. The 155th Rifle Division attacked at Lieksa and further north, the 44th attacked at Kuhmo. The Soviets deployed the 163rd Rifle Division at Suomussalmi, charged with cutting Finland in half by marching the Raate Road. In Finnish Lapland, the Soviet 88th and 122nd Rifle Divisions attacked at Salla. The arctic port of Petsamo was attacked by the 104th Mountain Rifle Division by sea and land, supported by naval gunfire.

Defense of Finland

Weather conditions

The winter of 1939–1940 was exceptionally cold. One location on the Karelian Isthmus experienced a record low temperature of −43 °C (−45 °F) on 16 January 1940. At the beginning of the war, only those Finnish soldiers who were in active service at the time had uniforms and weapons. The rest had to make do with their own clothing, which for many soldiers was their normal winter clothing with some semblance of an insignia added. Finnish soldiers were also skilled in cross-country skiing.

The cold, the snow, the forest, and the long hours of darkness were factors that the Finns could turn to their advantage. The Finns dressed in layers and the ski troopers wore a lightweight white snow cape. This snow-camouflage made the ski troopers almost invisible as the Finns executed guerrilla attacks against Soviet columns. At the beginning of the war, Soviet tanks were painted in standard olive drab and men dressed in regular khaki uniforms. Not until late January 1940 did the Soviets paint their equipment in white and issue snowsuits to their infantry.

Most Soviets had proper winter clothes, but this was not the case with every unit. In the battle of Suomussalmi, many Soviet soldiers died of frostbite. The Soviet troops lacked skill in skiing, so soldiers were restricted to movement by road and were forced to move in long columns. Furthermore, the Red Army lacked proper winter tents and men had to sleep in improvised shelters. Some Soviet units had frostbite casualties as high as 10 percent even before crossing the Finnish border. The cold weather did confer one advantage: Soviet tanks were able to move more easily over frozen terrain and bodies of water, rather than being immobilized in swamps and mud.

Finnish tactics

In battles from Ladoga-Karelia all the way north to the Arctic port of Petsamo, the Finns used guerrilla tactics. The Red Army was superior in men and matériel, but the Finns used the advantages of speed, daring, and economy of force. Particularly on the Ladoga-Karelia front and during the battle of Raate road, the Finns isolated smaller portions of numerically superior Soviet forces. With Soviet forces divided into smaller pieces, the Finns could deal with them individually and attack from all sides.

For many of the encircled Soviet troops in a pocket, (motti in Finnish), just staying alive was an ordeal comparable to combat. The men were freezing and starving, and endured poor sanitary conditions. The Soviet soldier had no choice. If he refused to fight, he would be shot. If he tried to sneak through the forest, he would freeze to death. And surrender was no option for him; Soviet propaganda had told him how the Finns would torture prisoners to death.

Defense of the Mannerheim Line

The terrain on the Karelian Isthmus did not allow the exercise of guerrilla tactics, so the Finns were forced to resort to more conventional means: a fortified defence line, the Mannerheim Line, with its flanks protected by large bodies of water. Soviet propaganda claimed that it was as strong as or even stronger than the Maginot Line. Finnish historians, for their part, have belittled the line's strength, insisting that it was mostly conventional trenches and log-covered dugouts.

The Finns had built 221 strongpoints along the Karelian Isthmus, mostly in the early 1920s. Many were extended in the late 1930s. Despite these defensive preparations, even the most fortified section of the Mannerheim Line had only one reinforced concrete bunker per kilometer. Overall, the line was weaker than similar lines in mainland Europe. According to the Finns, the real strength of the line was "stubborn defenders with a lot of sisu" – a Finnish idiom roughly translated as "guts".

On the eastern side of the Isthmus, the Red Army had attempted to break through the Mannerheim line in the battle of Taipale. On the western side, Soviet units faced the Finnish line at Summa, near the city of Viipuri, on 16 December. The Finns had built 41 reinforced concrete bunkers in the Summa area, making the defensive line in this area stronger than anywhere else on the Karelian Isthmus. However, due to a mistake in planning, the nearby Munasuo swamp had a kilometre-wide gap in the line. During the first battle of Summa, a number of Soviet tanks broke through the thin line on 19 December, but the Soviets could not benefit from the situation because of insufficient cooperation between branches of service. The Finns remained in their trenches, allowing the Soviet tanks to move freely behind the Finnish line, as the Finns had no proper anti-tank weapons. However, the Finns succeeded in repelling the main Soviet assault. The tanks, now stranded behind enemy lines, attacked the strongpoints at random until they were eventually destroyed, twenty in all, eliminating the threat they posed. By 22 December, the battle had ended in a Finnish victory.

The Soviet advance was stopped at the Mannerheim Line. Red Army troops suffered from poor morale and a shortage of supplies, eventually refusing to participate in more suicidal frontal attacks. The Finns, led by General Harald Öhquist decided to launch a counterattack and encircle three Soviet divisions into a motti near Viipuri on 23 December. Öhquist's plan was bold, but it failed. The Finns lost 1,300 men and the Soviets were later estimated to have lost a similar number.

Battles in Ladoga Karelia

The strength of the Red Army north of Lake Ladoga (in Ladoga Karelia), surprised the Finnish General Staff. Two Finnish divisions were deployed there: the 12th Division led by Lauri Tiainen and the 13th Division led by Hannu Hannuksela. They also had a support group of three brigades, bringing their total strength to over 30,000. The Soviets had deployed a division for almost every road leading west to the Finnish border. The Eighth Army was led by Ivan Khabarov, who was replaced by Grigori Shtern on 13 December. The Soviets' mission was to destroy the Finnish troops in the area of Ladoga Karelia and advance into the area between Sortavala and Joensuu within ten days. The Soviets had a three-to-one advantage in manpower and five-to-one advantage in artillery as well as air supremacy.

Finnish forces panicked and retreated in front of the overwhelming Red Army. The commander of the Finnish IV Army Corps was replaced by Woldemar Hägglund on 4 December. On the 7th of December, in the middle of the Ladoga Karelian front, Finnish units retreated near the small stream of Kollaa. The waterway itself did not offer any protection, but alongside there were ridges up to 10 metres (33 ft) high. The battle of Kollaa lasted until the end of the war. A memorable quote, "Kollaa holds" (Template:Lang-fi) became a legendary motto among the Finns. Further contributing to the legend of Kollaa was the sniper Simo Häyhä, dubbed "the White Death" by Soviets, who served in the Kollaa front. To the north, the Finns retreated from Ägläjärvi to Tolvajärvi on 5 December and then repelled a Soviet offensive in the battle of Tolvajärvi on December 11.

In the south, two Soviet divisions were united on the northern side of the Lake Ladoga coastal road. As before, these divisions were trapped as the more mobile Finnish units were able to successfully counterattack from the north to flank the Soviet columns. On 19 December, the Finns temporarily ceased their assaults, as the soldiers were exhausted. It was not until the period 6 January to 16 January 1940 that the Finns went on the offensive again, cutting Soviet division into smaller groups of different sized mottis.

Contrary to Finnish expectations, the encircled Soviet divisions did not try to break through to the east, but instead entrenched. They were expecting reinforcements and supplies to arrive by air. As the Finns lacked the necessary heavy artillery equipment and were short of men, they often did not directly attack mottis they had created; instead, they focused on eliminating only the most dangerous threats. Often the motti tactic was not part of pre-planned doctrine, but a Finnish adaption to respose to the behaviour of Soviet troops under fire.

In spite of the cold and hunger, the Soviet troops did not surrender easily, but fought bravely, often entrenching their tanks to be used as pillboxes and building timber dugouts. Some specialist Finnish soldiers were called in to attack the mottis; the most famous of them was Major Matti Aarnio, or "Motti-Matti," as he became known.

In northern Karelia, the Soviets were outmaneuvered at Ilomantsi and Lieksa. The Finns used effective guerrilla tactics, taking special advantage of superior skiing skills and snow-white layered clothing and executing many surprise ambushes and raids. By the end of December, the Soviets decided to retreat and transfer resources to more critical fronts.

Suomussalmi–Raate double operation

The Suomussalmi–Raate was a double operation, which would later be used by military academics as a classic example of what well-led troops and innovative tactics can do against a much larger adversary. Suomussalmi was a small provincial town of 4,000. The area has long lakes, many wild forests, and few roads. The Finnish command believed that the Soviets would not attack here, but the Red Army committed two divisions. The Soviet objective was to cut through the wilderness, capture the city of Oulu and effectively cut Finland in two. There were two roads leading to Suomussalmi from the frontier: the northern Juntusranta road and the southern Raate road.

The battle of Raate road, which occurred during the month-long battle of Suomussalmi, resulted in one of the largest losses in the Winter War. The Soviet 44th and some parts of the 163rd Rifle Divisions, comprising 25,000 troops, were almost completely destroyed by a Finnish ambush as they marched along the forest road. A small unit blocked the Soviet advance while Finnish Colonel Hjalmar Siilasvuo and his 9th Division of 3,600 troops cut off the retreat route, split the enemy force into smaller fragments, and then proceeded to destroy the remnants as they retreated. The Soviets suffered 7,000–9,000 casualties, while the Finnish lost only 400 men. In addition, the Finnish troops captured dozens of tanks, artillery pieces, anti-tank guns, hundreds of trucks, almost two thousands horses, thousands of rifles, and much-needed ammunition and medical supplies. Colonel Siilasvuo was later promoted to major-general.

Finnish Lapland

In Finnish Lapland the forests gradually thin out until in the north, there are no trees at all. Thus, the area offers more room for tank deployment, but it is also vastly underpopulated and experiences copious snowfall. The Finns expected nothing more than raiding parties and reconnaissance patrols, but instead the Soviets sent full divisions. On 11 December, the Finns rearranged the defense of Lapland and detached the Lapland Group from the North Finland Group. The Group was placed under the command of Kurt Wallenius.

In southern Lapland, near the tiny rural village of Salla, the Soviet force advanced with two divisions, the 88th and 112th, totaling 35,000 men. In the battle of Salla the Soviets advanced easily to Salla, where the road forked. The northern branch moved toward Pelkosenniemi while the rest pushed on toward Kemijärvi. On 17 December, the Soviet northern group, comprising an infantry regiment, a battalion, and a company of tanks, was outflanked by a Finnish battalion. The 112th retreated, leaving much of its heavy equipment and vehicles behind. Following this success, the Finns shuttled reinforcements down to the defensive line in front of Kemijärvi. The Soviets hammered the defensive line without success. The Finns counterattacked and the Soviets were pushed back to a new defensive line where they stayed for the rest of the war.

To the north was Finland's only ice-free port in the Arctic, Petsamo. The Finns did not have the manpower to defend it fully as the main front was down the Karelian Isthmus. In the battle of Petsamo, the Soviet 104th division attacked the Finnish 104th Independent Cover Company. The Finns gave up Petsamo easily and concentrated on delaying actions. The area was treeless, windy and relatively low, offering little defensible terrain. However, during the winter, the Finnish Lapland had the advantage of almost constant darkness and extreme temperatures. The Finns executed guerrilla attacks against Soviet supply lines and patrols. As a result, the Soviet movements were frozen solid by the efforts of one-fifth as many Finns.

Breakthrough of Mannerheim Line

Red Army reforms and starts massive preparations

Joseph Stalin was not pleased with the results of the first month of the Finnish campaign. The Red Army had been humiliated. By the third week of the war, Soviet propaganda was working hard to explain the failures of the Soviet army to the populace, blaming bad terrain, harsh climate, claiming that the Mannerheim Line was stronger than the Maginot Line, and that the Americans had sent 1,000 of their best pilots to Finland. Chief of Staff Boris Shaposhnikov was given full authority over operations in the Finnish theatre and he ordered the suspension of frontal assaults in late December. Kliment Voroshilov was replaced with Semyon Timoshenko as the commander of the Soviet forces in the war on 7 January.

The main focus of the Soviet attack would now be on the Karelian Isthmus. Timoshenko and Zhdanov reorganized and tightened control between different branches of service in the Red Army. They also changed tactical doctrines to meet the realities of the situation. All Soviet forces on the Karelian Isthmus were divided into two armies: the 7th and the 13th Armies. The 7th Army, now under Kirill Meretskov, would concentrate three-fourths of its strength against the 16-kilometre (10 mi) stretch of the Mannerheim Line between Taipale and the Munasuo swamp. Tactics would be basic: an armored wedge for the initial breakthrough, followed by the main infantry and vehicle assault force. The Red Army would prepare by pinpointing the Finnish frontline fortifications. The 123rd Assault Division then rehearsed the assault on life-size mockups. The Soviets shipped massive numbers of new tanks and artillery pieces to the theatre. Troops were increased from ten divisions to 25–26 divisions, 6–7 tank brigades and several separate platoons, totaling 600,000 men. On 1 February 1940, the Red Army began a massive offensive, firing 300,000 shells into the Finnish line in the first 24 hours of the bombardment.

Soviet all-out offensive on the Karelian Isthmus

Although the Karelian Isthmus front was less active in December than in January, the Soviets began increasing bombardments, wearing down the defenders and softening their fortifications. During daylight hours, the Finns took shelter inside their fortifications from the bombardments and repaired damage during the night. The situation led quickly to war exhaustion among the Finns, who lost over 3,000 men during the trench warfare. The Soviets also made occasional small infantry assaults with one or two companies. Due to the shortage of ammunition, Finnish artillery emplacements were under orders to fire only against directly threatening ground attacks. On 1 February, the Soviets further escalated their artillery and air bombardments.

Although the Soviets had refined their tactics and morale had improved, the generals were still willing to accept massive losses in order to reach their objectives. Some attacks were screened by smoke, heavy artillery, and armor support, but the infantry still charged in the open and in dense formations. Unlike their tactics in December, Soviet tanks now advanced in smaller numbers. The Finns could not easily eliminate tanks if infantry troops protected them. After ten days of round-the-clock artillery barrages, the Soviets achieved a breakthrough on the western Karelian Isthmus in the second battle of Summa.

On 11 February, the Soviets had about 460,000 men, over 3,350 artillery pieces, about 3,000 tanks, and about 1,300 aircraft deployed on the Karelian Ishtmus. The Red Army was constantly receiving new recruits after the breakthrough. Opposing them the Finns had 8 divisions, totaling about 150,000 men. One by one, the defenders' strongholds crumbled under the Soviet attacks and the Finns were forced to retreat. On 15 February, Mannerheim authorized a general retirement of the Second Corps to the Intermediate Line. On the eastern side of the Isthmus, the Finns continued to resist Soviet assaults, repelling them in the battle of Taipale.

Peace negotiations

Although the Finns attempted to re-open negotiations with Moscow by every means during the war, the Soviets did not respond. In early January, the Finnish communist and feminist playwright Hella Wuolijoki contacted the Finnish government. She offered to contact Moscow through the Soviet Union's ambassador to Sweden, Alexandra Kollontai. Wuolijoki departed for Stockholm and met Kollontai secretly at a hotel. Soon Molotov decided to extend recognition to the Ryti–Tanner government as the legal government of Finland and put an end to the puppet regime Terijoki Government of Kuusinen that the Soviets had set up.

By mid-February, it had become clear that the Finnish forces were rapidly approaching exhaustion. For the Soviets, casualties had been high, the situation was a source of political embarrassment of the Soviet regime, and there was a risk of Franco–British intervention. Furthermore, with the spring thaw approaching, the Soviet forces risked becoming bogged down in the forests. The Finnish foreign minister Väinö Tanner arrived in Stockholm on 12 February and negotiated the peace terms with the Soviets through the Swedes. German representatives, not aware that the negotiations were underway, suggested on 17 February that Finland negotiate with the Soviet Union.

Both the Germans and the Swedish were keen to see an end to the Winter War. The Germans feared losing iron ore fields in Northern Sweden and threatened to attack at once if the Swedes granted the Allied forces right of passage. The Germans even had a theoretical invasion plan called the Studie Nord, which later would be the full-blown Operation Weserübung. As Finland's Cabinet hesitated in the face of the harsh Soviet conditions, Sweden's King Gustav V made a public statement on 19 February in which he confirmed having declined Finnish pleas for support from Swedish troops. On 25 February, the Soviet peace terms were spelled out in detail. On 29 February, the Finnish government accepted the Soviet terms in principle and was willing to enter into negotiations.

Last days of war

On 5 March, the Red Army had advanced 10 to 15 kilometres (6 to 9 mi) past the Mannerheim Line and had entered the suburbs of Viipuri. That same day, the Red Army also established a beachhead on the western Gulf of Viipuri. The Finns proposed an armistice on that day, but the Soviets, wanting to keep the pressure on the Finnish government, declined the offer the next day. The Finnish peace delegation went to Moscow via Stockholm and arrived on 7 March. The Soviets made further demands as their military position was strong and improving. On 9 March, the Finnish military situation on the Karelian Isthmus was dire as troops were experiencing heavy casualties. In addition, artillery ammunition supplies were exhausted and weapons were wearing out. The Finnish government, noting that the hoped-for Franco–Anglo military expedition would not arrive in time, as Norway and Sweden had not given the right of Allied passage, had little choice but to accept the Soviet terms. The formal peace treaty was signed in Moscow on 12 March. A cease-fire took effect the next day at noon Leningrad time, 11 a.m. Helsinki time.

Aerial warfare

Soviet bombings

Aerial activity in the Winter War was one-sided. The Soviet Air Force, supporting the Red Army's invasion with about 2,500 aircraft, the most common of which was the Tupolev SB-2, was not as effective as the Soviets might have hoped. The material damage by the bomb raids was slight, as Finland did not offer many valuable targets for strategic bombing. Very often, targets were small village depots with little value. The country had only a few modern highways in the interior, therefore making railway systems the main targets for bombers. The rail tracks were cut thousands of times, but they were easy to repair and Finns usually had trains running again in a matter of hours. The Soviet air force learned from its early mistakes and by late February they had instituted more effective tactics.

The capital of Finland, Helsinki, received its worst bombing attacks on the first day of the war, and was the target of raids only a few times thereafter. All in all, Finland lost only 5 percent of total man-hour production time due to Soviet bombings. Nevertheless, Soviet air attacks affected thousands of civilians, killing 957, as the Soviets recorded 2,075 bombing attacks in 516 localities. The city of Viipuri, a major Soviet objective close to the Karelian Isthmus front, was almost leveled by nearly 12,000 bombs. No attacks on civilian targets were mentioned in Soviet radio or newspaper reports. In January 1940 Pravda continued to stress that no civilian targets in Finland had been struck, even by accident.

Finnish Air Force

At the beginning of the war, Finland had a very small air force, with only 114 combat airplanes fit for duty. Because of this, missions were very limited and fighter aircraft were mainly used to repel Soviet bombers. Strategic bombings could also double as opportunities for military observation. Old-fashioned and few in number, aircraft could not offer support for Finnish ground troops. In spite of losses, the number of planes in the Finnish Air Force had risen by over 50 percent by the end of the war. The Finns received shipments of British, French, Italian, Swedish and American aircraft.

Finnish fighter pilots would often fly their motley collection of planes into Soviet formations that outnumbered them ten or even twenty times. Finnish fighters shot down a confirmed 200 Soviet aircraft, losing 62 of their own. In addition, Finnish anti-aircraft brought down more than 300 enemy aircraft. Many times a Finnish forward air base consisted of a frozen lake, a windsock, a telephone set and some tents. Air-raid warnings were given by Finnish women organized by the Lotta Svärd. In addition to combat, it is estimated that the Soviet air force lost about 400 aircraft due to inclement weather, lack of fuel and tools, and during transportation to the front. The Soviet Air Force flew approximately 44,000 sorties during the war.

Naval warfare

Navies in frost

Naval activity during the Winter War was low. The Baltic Sea had started to freeze by the end of December, which made the movement of warships very difficult and in mid-winter only ice-breakers and submarines could still move. The other reason for low naval activity was the nature of Soviet Navy forces in the area. The Baltic Fleet was a provincial coastal defense force which did not have the training, logistical structure, or landing craft to undertake large-scale operations. Furthermore, the Soviet Navy was technologically inferior to the British Royal Navy or the German Kriegsmarine. Still, the Baltic Fleet was strong; it possessed two battleships, one heavy cruiser, almost twenty destroyers, 50 motor torpedo boats, 52 submarines, and other miscellaneous vessels. The Soviets used naval bases in Paldiski, Tallinn and Liepāja for their operations.

The Finnish Navy was a coastal defense force with two coastal defence ships, five submarines, four gunboats, seven motor torpedo boats, one minelayer and six minesweepers. The two coastal defence ships, Ilmarinen and Väinämöinen, were moved to the harbour in Turku where they were used to stiffen the air-defences. Their anti-aircraft guns knocked down one or two planes over the city and the ships remained there for the rest of the war. In addition to their role in coastal defense, the Finnish Navy also protected the Åland islands and Finnish merchant vessels in the Baltic sea, as only a minor part of the fleet could execute offensive warfare maneuvers.

Soviet aircraft bombed Finnish vessels and harbours and dropped mines into Finnish seaways. Still, Finnish losses were relatively low, numbering 26 merchant vessels, only four of which were lost inside Finnish territorial waters.

Coastal artillery

In addition to its navy, Finland had its coastal artillery batteries to defend important harbours and naval bases along its coast. Most batteries were left over from the Russian period, with 15.2 cm guns being the most numerous. However, Finland had attempted to modernize its old guns and had installed a number of new batteries, the largest of which featured a 305 mm gun battery originally intended to block the Gulf of Finland to Soviet ships with the help of batteries on the Estonian side.

The first naval battle took place on 1 December, near the island of Russarö, 5 kilometres (3 mi) south of Hanko. That day, the weather was fair and the visibility excellent. The Finns spotted the Soviet cruiser Kirov and two destroyers. After the ships were at a range of 24 kilometres (15 mi), the Finns opened fire with 234 mm coastal guns. After five minutes of firing by four coastal guns, the cruiser had been damaged by near misses and it retreated. The destroyers remained undamaged, but the Kirov suffered 17 dead and 30 wounded. The Soviets already knew the locations of the Finnish coastal batteries but were surprised that their firing range was much longer than expected. Although their coastal artillery was largely old-fashioned, the Finns had managed to modernize and improve it.

The coastal artillery had its greatest effect upon the land war and helped steady the defence in conjunction with army artillery. Two sets of fortress artillery made significant contributions to the early battles on the Karelian Ishtmus and in Ladoga-Karelia. These were located at Kaarnajoki on the eastern Isthmus, and at Mantsi on the north-eastern shore of Lake Ladoga. Furthermore, the fortress of Koivisto provided similar support from the south-western coast of the Ishtmus. Coastal artilleries had the ability to fire high-explosive shells of 152 millimetres (6 in) calibre to a range of 25 kilometres (16 mi). In March, when the Soviets had broken through the front, all Finnish reserves were thrown into the fighting near Viipuri. The Soviets tried to cross the ice of the Gulf of Viipuri to come up behind the city, but the Finnish coastal artillery fired its heaviest guns to break the ice under the Soviets and prevent a clean breakthrough.

Foreign support

Foreign volunteers

World opinion largely supported the Finnish cause and the Soviet aggression was generally deemed unjustified. The World War had not yet begun in earnest; at that time, the Winter War was the only real fighting in Europe and thus held major world interest. Several foreign organizations sent material aid, and many countries granted credit and military materiel to Finland. Nazi Germany allowed arms to pass through Sweden to Finland, but after a Swedish newspaper broke the story Adolf Hitler initiated, as an ally of the Soviet Union, a policy of silence towards Finland.

Volunteers arrived from various countries. By far the largest foreign contingent came from neighbouring Sweden, which provided nearly 8,760 volunteers during the war. The Swedish Volunteer Corps (Svenska Frivilligkåren), formed from the Swedes, the Norwegians (727 men) and the Danes (1,010 men), fought on the quiet northern front during last weeks of the war. The Corps mainly took care of the air defence of northern Finland. Further volunteers arrived from Estonia (about 1,000 men), Ingria (375 men), and Hungary (366 men). Also, 350 American citizens of Finnish background volunteered, and 210 volunteers of other nationalities made it to Finland before the war was over.

Franco–British plans for intervention

France had been one of the earliest supporters of Finland during the Winter War. The French saw an opportunity to weaken Germany's major ally if they were to attack the Soviet Union. France had other motives as well, because it preferred to have a major war in a remote part of Europe than on French soil. France planned to re-arm the Polish exile units and transport them to the Finnish Arctic port of Petsamo. Another scheme was to execute a massive air strike with Turkish co-operation against the Caucasus oil fields.

The British, for their part, wanted to block the flow of iron ore from Swedish mines to Germany, because the Swedes supplied up to 40 percent of Germany's need. The matter was raised by the British Admiral Reginald Plunkett on 18 September 1939, and next day Winston Churchill brought the subject in the Cabinet. On 11 December Churchill opined that the British would gain a foothold in Scandinavia with the object of helping them but without war on the Soviet Union. Due to heavy German reliance on Swedish iron, Hitler had made it clear to the Swedish government in December that any Allied troops on Swedish soil would immediately provoke a German invasion.

On 19 December the French Prime Minister Édouard Daladier introduced his plan to the General Staff and the British War Cabinet. In his plan, Daladier created linkage between the war in Finland and the iron ore in Sweden. There was a danger of Finland's collapse under Soviet hegemony. Or even worse, Nazi Germany could occupied both Norway and Sweden. These two dictatorships could divide Scandinavia between them, as they had already done to Poland. The French main motivation was to export the European battle front to Scandinavia to protect the soil of France, as the British concerned throttling the German war-making ability.

The military coordination Committee of the War Cabinet met the next day in London and two days later the French plan was put forward. The Supreme War Council elected to send notes to Norway and Sweden on 27 December in which they urged the Norwegians and Swedes to help Finland and offer the Allies their support. Norway and Sweden rejected the offer on 5 January 1940. The Allies then came up with a new plan, in which they would demand that Norway and Sweden give them right of passage by citing the League of Nations resolution as justification. The expedition troops would disembark at the Norwegian port of Narvik and proceed by rail toward Finland, passing through the Swedish ore fields on the way. This demand was made in new notes sent to Norway and Sweden on 6 January, but these too were rejected six days later.

Stymied but not yet dissuaded from the possibility of action, the Allies formulated a new plan on 29 January. First, the Finns would make a formal request for assistance. Then the Allies would ask Norway and Sweden for permission to move the "volunteers" across their territory. Finally, in order to protect the supply line from German actions, the Allies would send additional units ashore at Namsos, Bergen, and Trondheim. The operation would require 100,000 British and 35,000 French soldiers with naval and air support. The supply convoys would sail on 12 March and the landings would begin on 20 March.

Peace of Moscow

The Moscow Peace Treaty was signed on 12 March 1940 and took effect the following day. Finland ceded its portion of Karelia – the entire Karelian Isthmus as well as a large swath of Karelia north of Lake Ladoga. The area included the city of Viipuri, the country's second largest, much of Finland's industrialized territory, and significant parts still held by Finland's army, all in all, over 10 percent of pre-war Finland. Some 422,000 Karelians, 12 percent of Finland's population, lost their homes.

Finland also had to cede a part of the region of Salla, the Kalastajansaarento peninsula in the Barents Sea, and four islands in the Gulf of Finland. The Hanko Peninsula was also leased to the Soviet Union as a military base for 50 years. While the Soviet troops had captured Petsamo during the war, they returned it to Finland according to the treaty.

Aftermath

Finnish views

The 105-day war had a profound and depressing effect in Finland. Useful international support had been minimal and had arrived late, and the German blockade had prevented most armament shipments. The short time between the Winter War and the Continuation War, lasting a little over a year, was later called the Interim Peace.

At the end of the war, the situation of the Finnish army on the Karelian Isthmus had been the subject of some debate. The orders were already given to prepare a retreat to the next line of defence in the Taipale sector. The estimates of how long the enemy could have been held in these kinds of retreat-and-stand operations varied from a few days to a couple of months, most averaging around a few weeks.

The Finnish Karelians evacuated from the ceded areas established an interest group Karjalan Liitto. The group was to defend the rights and interests of Karelian evacuees and to find a way to return Karelia to Finland.

Soviet views

During the period between the war and the perestroika in late 1980s, Soviet historiography leaned solely on Vyacheslav Molotov's speeches on the Winter War. In his radio speech of 29 November 1939, Molotov argued that the Soviet Union had tried for two months to negotiate guarantees of security for Leningrad. However, the Finns had taken a hostile stance to "please foreign imperialists." The Finns had undertaken military provocation and the Soviets could no longer hold to nonaggression pacts. According to Molotov, the Soviets did not want to occupy or annex Finland; the goal was purely to secure Leningrad.

Another source later used widely in Soviet historiography was Molotov's speech in front of the Supreme Soviet on 29 March 1940, in which he blamed Western countries for starting the war and argued that they had used Finland as a proxy to fight the Soviet Union. The Western Allies had furthermore tried to take neutral Sweden and Norway along with them. The main "villains" for the Soviets were the United Kingdom and France, but also Sweden, the United States, and Italy, who had issued massive amounts of matériel, money, and men to Finland. According to Molotov, the Soviet Union was merciful in peace terms, as the problem of Leningrad security had been solved.

On 18 May 1994, the president of Russia, Boris Yeltsin, denounced the Winter War in a joint press conference with the president of Finland, Martti Ahtisaari, agreeing that it was a war of aggression.

Military consequences

The Supreme Military Soviet met in April 1940, sifted through the lessons of the Finnish campaign, and recommended reforms. The role of frontline political commissars was reduced and old-fashioned ranks and forms of discipline were reintroduced. Clothing, equipment and tactics for winter operations were improved. However, not all of these reforms had been completed when the Germans began Operation Barbarossa fifteen months later.

The Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania had consented Soviet demands in Autumn 1939, but that did not save them from the occupation in June 1940. States were annexed as "Soviet Socialist Republics", and within another year, some 100,000 citizens had lost their lives. That same year, the Finns and Swedes successfully negotiated a military alliance, but the negotiations ended once it became clear that both Germany and the Soviet Union opposed such an alliance.

Germany

The Winter War was a success for the Germans. Both the Red Army and the League of Nations were humiliated and furthermore, the Allied Supreme War Council had been revealed to be chaotic and powerless. However, the German policy of neutrality was not popular in the homeland and relations with Italy had also suffered badly. After the Peace of Moscow, the Germans did not hesitate to move to improve ties, and within two weeks, Finno-German relations were at the top of the agenda.

During the Interim Peace, the Finns allied with Germany for a chance to reclaim areas ceded to the Soviet Union. Three days after the beginning of Operation Barbarossa, Soviet–Finnish hostilities resumed with the start of the Continuation War.

Western Allies

The Winter War put in question the organisation and effectiveness of not only the Red Army, but also that of the Western Allies. The Supreme War Council was unable to formulate a workable plan, revealing its total unsuitability to make effective war in either Britain or France. This failure led to the collapse of the Daladier government in France.

See also

• Phoney War
• Timeline of the Winter War
• Military history of Finland during World War II
• Military history of the Soviet Union
• List of Finnish corps in the Winter War
• List of Finnish divisions in the Winter War
• List of wars involving Finland

Notes

1. Commander of the Leningrad Military District Kiril Meretskov ran the overall operation against the Finns. However due to failures, the command was passed on 9 December 1939 to the General Staff Supreme Command (Stavka), directly under Kliment Voroshilov and Joseph Stalin. In January 1940, the Leningrad Military District was reformed and renamed "North-Western Front". Semyon Timoshenko was chosen Army Commander to break the Mannerheim Line.
2. At the beginning of the war, the Finns had 337,000 men. The Finnish army had only 250,028 rifles (total 281,594 firearms), but White Guards brought their own rifles (over 114,000 rifles, total 116,800 firearms) to the war. The Finnish army reached its maximum strength at the beginning of March 1940 with 346,000 men in uniform.
3. Since 1919, the Finns had had 32 French Renault tanks and few lighter tanks. These were unsuitable for the War, and they were subsequently used as fixed pillboxes. The Finns bought 32 British Vickers tanks during 1936–39, but without weapons, as these were meant to be manufactured and installed in Finland. Only ten tanks were fit for combat at the beginning of the war.
4. Situation for the 1st of December, 1939. The Finns had 114 combat airplanes fit for duty and 7 airplanes for communication and observation purposes. There were also less than a hundred planes for flight training purposes, not suitable for combat, and some planes were under repair. In total, the Finns had 235 aircraft.
5. At the beginning of the war the Soviets had 2,514 tanks and 718 armoured cars. The main battle field was the Karelian Isthmus where the Soviets deployed 1,450 tanks. At the end of the war the Soviets had 6,541 tanks and 1,691 armoured cars. The most common tank type was T-26, but also BT type was very common.
6. Finnish detailed death casualties: Dead, buried 16,766; Wounded, died of wounds 3,089; Dead, not buried later declared as dead 3,503; Missing, declared as dead 1,712; Died during prisoner of war 20; Other reasons (diseases, accidents, suicides) 677; Unknown 137
7. After the War, the Soviet Union returned home 847 Finns. Finnish and Russian researchers have estimated total number of POWs between 800–1,100 Finns, and the number of deaths 10–20. See more: Finnish prisoners of war in the Soviet Union
8. The number of the Soviet casualties has many estimates. The official Soviet figure in 1940: 48,745 dead, Russian professors in 1990 Mikhail Semiryaga: 53,522 dead and N. I. Baryshikov: 53,500 dead, the Russian historian Grigoriy Krivosheyev in the early-1990s: 126,875 dead; total casualties 391,783 men, and the Russian professor Juri Kilin in 1999: 63,990 dead; total casualties 271,528 men. The results of the Krivosheyev's research group has a "semi-official" status. Juri Kilin, professor of Petrozavodsk State University, has co-written several books with Finnish historians.
9. The official number was 611 tank casualties. However, the Russian historian Yuri Kilin found a note received by the head of the Soviet General Staff Boris Shaposhnikov which reports 3,543 tank casualties where 316 tanks were destroyed unrepairable. According to the Finnish historian Ohto Manninen the 7th Soviet Army lost 1,244 tanks alone during the breakthough battles of the Mannerhem Line in mid-Winter. Instantly after the end of the Winter War the Finns estimated then that the Red Army had lost 1,000–1,200 tanks (Kantakoski 1998, p. 286).
10. The name Soviet–Finnish War 1939–1940 (Template:Lang-ru) is often used in Russian historiography.
11. A Soviet division consists of 17,500 men, 14,000 rifles, 419 light machine guns, 200 machine guns, 261 infantry mortars, 40 mortars, 48 anti-tank guns. A Finnish division consists of 14,200 men, 11,000 rifles, 250 submachine guns, 250 light machine guns, 116 machine guns, 18 mortars, 18 anti-tank guns. A Soviet division had more men and was better equipped.

References

Citations

1. Edwards 2006, p. 93
2. Edwards 2006, p. 125
3. Trotter 2002, p. 204
4. ^ Palokangas, Markku (1999). "Suomalaisjoukkojen aseistus ja varustus". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. pp. 299–300.
5. Juutilainen, Antti; Koskimaa, Matti (2005). "Maavoimien joukkojen perustaminen". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Jatkosodan pikkujättiläinen. p. 83.
6. Palokangas, Markku (1999). "Suomalaisjoukkojen aseistus ja varustus". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. p. 318.
7. ^ Peltonen, Martti (1999). "Ilmasota talvisodassa". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. pp. 607–608.
8. Soviet archive data (425,640 men on 30 November, 550,757 men on 1 January 1940 and 760,578 men in the beginning of March). These are numbers of the standing forces during the various time periods. РГВА. Ф.37977. Оп.1. Д.595. Л.57—59, 95; Д.722. Л.414—417; Зимняя война. Кн.1. С.150.
9. At the end of the invasion, the figure is 22,6 percent of the total Red Army strength. Kilin, Juri (1999). "Puna-armeijan Stalinin tahdon toteuttajana". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. p. 383.
10. Kantakoski 1998, p. 260
11. ^ Ries 1988
12. Ohto Manninen, Talvisodan salatut taustat, 1994, ISBN 952-90-5251-0, Using declassified Soviet archive material, Manninen found 12 previously unrecognized infantry divisions ordered to the Finnish front
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22. "League of Nations' expulsion of the U.S.S.R." League of Nation. 14 December 1939. Retrieved 24 July 2009.
23. Bullock 1993, p. 489
24. Glanz 1998, p. 58
25. ^ Jowett and Snodgrass 2006, p. 10
26. ^ Edwards 2006, pp. 272–273
27. Trotter 2002, p. 239
28. Kilin and Raunio 2007, p. 10
29. ^ Trotter 2002, pp. 4–6
30. Jowett and Snodgrass 2006, p. 3
31. Turtola, Martti (1999). "Kansainvälinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. pp. 21–24.
32. Turtola, Martti (1999). "Kansainvälinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. pp. 33–34.
33. Edwards 2006, pp. 26–27
34. Edwards 2006, p. 18
35. ^ Turtola, Martti (1999). "Kansainvälinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. pp. 30–33.
36. Edwards 2006, p. 31
37. Edwards 2006, pp. 32–33
38. Edwards 2006, pp. 28–29
39. Turtola, Martti (1999). "Kansainvälinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. pp. 32–33.
40. Trotter 2002, pp. 12–13
41. Turtola, Martti (1999). "Kansainvälinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. pp. 34–35.
42. Engle and Paananen 1985, p. 6
43. ^ Turtola, Martti (1999). "Kansainvälinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. pp. 38–41.
44. Trotter 2002, pp. 14–16
45. Turtola, Martti (1999). "Kansainvälinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. pp. 41–43.
46. Manninen, Ohto (1999). "Neuvostoliiton tavoitteet ennen talvisotaa ja sen aikana". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. pp. 141–148.
47. ^ Jowett and Snodgrass 2006, p. 4
48. Tanner 1950
49. Edwards 2006, p. 105
50. ^ Turtola, Martti (1999). "Kansainvälinen kehitys Euroopassa ja Suomessa 1930-luvulla". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. pp. 44–45. Cite error: The named reference "talvisodanpikkujattilainen-turtola13" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
51. Kilin, Juri (2007). "Leningradin sotilaspiirin rahakahakka". In Jokisipilä, Markku (ed.). Sodan totuudet. pp. 99–100.
52. Aptekar, Pavel. "Casus belli" (in Russian). Rabotse-Krestyanskaya Krasnaya Armiya. Retrieved 2 September 2009.
53. ^ Kilin and Raunio 2007, p. 13
54. Jowett and Snodgrass 2006, p. 6
55. ^ Trotter 2002, pp. 48–51
56. Trotter 2002, p. 58
57. ^ Trotter 2002, p. 61
58. Soikkanen, Timo (1999). "Talvisodan henki". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. p. 235.
59. Trotter 2002, p. 34
60. Conquest 2007, p. 450
61. ^ Edwards 2006, p. 189
62. Trotter 2002, pp. 35–36
63. ^ Trotter 2002, pp. 38–39
64. ^ Trotter 2002, pp. 42–44
65. Trotter 2002, p. 47
66. Geust and Uitto 2006, p. 54
67. Trotter 2002, p. 69
68. Trotter 2002, pp. 72–73
69. Trotter 2002, pp. 76–78
70. Trotter 2002, pp. 51–55
71. Trotter 2002, p. 121
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73. Paulaharju, Jyri (1999). "Pakkastalven kourissa". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. p. 292.
74. Paulaharju, Jyri (1999). "Pakkastalven kourissa". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. pp. 289–290.
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76. ^ Paulaharju, Jyri (1999). "Pakkastalven kourissa". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. pp. 297–298.
77. Trotter 2002, pp. 131–132
78. Trotter 2002, pp. 148–149
79. ^ Trotter 2002, pp. 62–63
80. Vuorenmaa, Anssi; Juutilainen, Antti (1999). "Myytti Mannerheim-linjasta". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. pp. 494–495.
81. Laaksonen, Lasse (1999). "Kannaksen taistelut". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. p. 407.
82. Laaksonen, Lasse (1999). "Kannaksen taistelut". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. pp. 411–412.
83. Trotter 2002, pp. 87–89
84. Kilin and Raunio 2007, p. 113
85. Juutilainen, Antti (1999). "Laatokan karjalan taistelut". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. pp. 504–505.
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87. Juutilainen, Antti (1999). "Laatokan karjalan taistelut". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. p. 520.
88. Trotter 2002, p. 110
89. Juutilainen, Antti (1999). "Laatokan karjalan taistelut". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. pp. 510–511.
90. Juutilainen, Antti (1999). "Laatokan karjalan taistelut". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. p. 514.
91. Jowett and Snodgrass 2006, p. 44
92. Juutilainen, Antti (1999). "Laatokan karjalan taistelut". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. pp. 516–517.
93. Vuorenmaa, Anssi (1999). "Korpitaistelujen rintamat". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. pp. 559–561.
94. Vuorenmaa, Anssi (1999). "Korpitaistelujen rintamat". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. p. 550.
95. Trotter 2002, p. 150
96. Ilo, Juha. "The Finnish Winter War 1939-1940". Feldgrau. Retrieved 24 July 2009.
97. Kulju 2007, p. 229. See also the section Casualties of the battle in the article of the Battle of the Raate road.
98. Kantakoski 1998, p. 283: 310 dead, 92 missing and 618 wounded.
99. Bell, Morgan. "Hjalmar Siilasvuo". World War II Database. Retrieved 24 July 2009.
100. ^ Trotter 2002, pp. 171–174
101. Vuorenmaa, Anssi (1999). "Korpitaistelujen rintamat". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. pp. 545–549.
102. Trotter 2002, p. 178–180
103. Trotter 2002, pp. 203–204
104. Laaksonen, Lasse (1999). "Kannaksen taistelut". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. pp. 424–425.
105. ^ Trotter 2002, pp. 214–215
106. Laaksonen, Lasse (1999). "Kannaksen taistelut". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. pp. 426–427.
107. Laaksonen, Lasse (1999). "Kannaksen taistelut". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. p. 430.
108. Trotter 2002, p. 218
109. Geust and Uitto 2006, p. 77
110. Trotter 2002, p. 233
111. Laaksonen, Lasse (1999). "Kannaksen taistelut". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. p. 452.
112. Trotter 2002, pp. 234–235
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114. Edwards 2006, p. 261
115. Trotter 2002, pp. 247–248
116. Kilin and Raunio 2007, p. 260
117. Trotter 2002, pp. 249–251
118. Trotter 2002, p. 254
119. Trotter 2002, p. 187
120. ^ Trotter 2002, p. 193
121. Trotter 2002, pp. 187–188
122. Tillotson 1993, p. 157
123. Trotter 2002, p. 189
124. Trotter 2002, pp. 191–192
125. Elfvegren, Eero (1999). "Merisota talvisodassa". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. p. 681.
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127. Elfvegren, Eero (1999). "Merisota talvisodassa". In Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti (eds.). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen. p. 692.
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130. Tillotson 1993, pp. 152–153
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136. ^ Trotter 2002, p. 237
137. ^ Edwards 2006, p. 146
138. Trotter 2002, pp. 237–238
139. Trotter 2002, pp. 238–239
140. Engle and Paananen 1985, pp. 142–143
141. Jowett and Snodgrass 2006, p. 10
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Bibliography

• Bullock, Alan (1993). Hitler and Stalin: Parallel Lives. Vintage Books. ISBN 978-0679729945.
• Conquest, Robert (2007) . The Great Terror: A Reassessment. Oxford University Press, USA; 40th anniversary edition. ISBN 978-0195317008.
• Cox, Geoffrey (1941). The Red Army Moves. Victor Gollancz, London.
• Edwards, Robert (2006). White Death: Russia's War on Finland 1939–40. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. ISBN 13 978 0 297 84630 2. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: length (help)
• Engle, Edwards; Paananen, Lauri (1985) . The Winter War: The Russo-Finnish Conflict, 1939–40. United States: Westview Press. ISBN 0-8133-0149-1.
• Geust, Carl-Fredrik; Uitto, Antero (2006). Mannerheim-linja: Talvisodan legenda (in Finnish). Ajatus kirjat. ISBN 951-20-7042-1.
• Glanz, David (1998). Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War. University Press of Kansas. ISBN 978-0700608799.
• Jokisipilä, Markku, ed. (2005). Sodan totuudet : Yksi suomalainen vastaa 5.7 ryssää (in Finnish). Gummerus Kirjapaino : Ajatus Kirjat. p. 272. ISBN 978-951-20-7533-1. {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |year= / |date= mismatch (help)
• Jowett, Philip; Snodgrass, Brent (2006). Finland at War 1939–45. United Kingdom: Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84176-969-1.
• Kantakoski, Pekka (1998). Punaiset panssarit : Puna-armeijan panssarijoukot 1918-1945 (in Finnish). Hauho: PS-Elso. ISBN 951-98057-0-2.
• Kilin, Juri; Raunio, Ari (2007). Talvisodan taisteluja (in Finnish). Karttakeskus. p. 322. ISBN 978-951-593-068-2.
• Kulju, Mika (2007). Raatteen tie : Talvisodan pohjoinen sankaritarina (in Finnish). Helsinki: Ajatus kirjat. ISBN 978-951-20-7218-7.
• Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti, eds. (1999). Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (in Finnish) (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. p. 976. ISBN 951-0-23536-9.
• Leskinen, Jari; Juutilainen, Antti, eds. (2005). Jatkosodan pikkujättiläinen (in Finnish) (1st ed.). Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö. p. 1276. ISBN 951-0-28690-7.
• Manninen, Ohto (2002). Stalinin kiusa – Himmlerin täi (in Finnish). Helsinki: Edita. ISBN 951-37-3694-6.
• Ries, Tomas (1988). Cold Will: The Defense of Finland (1st ed.). London: Brassey's Defence Publishers. ISBN 0080335926.
• Soviet Information Bureau (1948). Falsifiers of History (Historical Survey) (1st ed.). Moscow: Gospolitizdat (Russian 1st ed.) Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House (English 1st. ed). Edited and partially re-written by Joseph Stalin
• Tanner, Väinö (1950). The Winter War: Finland against Russia 1939-1940 (1st ed.). California: Stanford University Press.
• Tillotson, H.M. (1993). Finland at peace & war 1918–1993. Michael Russell (publishing). ISBN 0-85955-196-2.
• Trotter, William R. (2002, 2006) . The Winter war: The Russo–Finnish War of 1939–40 (5th ed.). New York (Great Britain: London): Workman Publishing Company (Great Britain: Aurum Press). ISBN 1 85410 881 6. First published in the United States under the title A Frozen Hell: The Russo–Finnish Winter War of 1939–40 {{cite book}}: Check date values in: |year= (help)CS1 maint: year (link)
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External links

• The Battles of the Winter War comprehensively covered by Sami H. E. Korhonen
• Telegrams from each day of the Winter War Template:Fi icon Template:Sv icon Template:En icon
• USSR expulsion from League of Nations from the League of Nations' Official Journal
• The Front Museum on the Hanko Peninsula, documenting the lease of Hanko to the USSR
• Finnish wartime photos and history website Stories by veterans, historians, and wartime pictures.
• Those Burly Finns, History House magazine article

Template:Link FA Template:Link FA

• Winter War
• Wars involving Finland
• Wars involving the Soviet Union
• World War II
• League of Nations
• Barents Sea
• Karelian Isthmus
• 1939 in Finland
• 1940 in Finland
• 1939 in the Soviet Union
• 1940 in the Soviet Union
• Sweden during World War II
• Occupation of the Baltic states