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Revision as of 21:49, 3 February 2006 by SCUMATT (talk | contribs) (began de Jure versus de facto)(diff) ← Previous revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff)Strict scrutiny is the highest standard of judicial review used by courts in the United States. Along with the lower standards of rational basis review and intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny is part of a hierarchy of standards the Court employs to weigh an asserted government interest against a constitutional right or policy that conflicts with the manner in which the interest is being pursued. Strict scrutiny is applied based on the constitutional conflict at issue, regardless of whether a law or action of the U.S. federal government, a state government, or a local municipality is at issue. It arises in two basic contexts: when a "fundamental" constitutional right is infringed, particularly those listed in the Bill of Rights; or when the government action involves the use of a "suspect classification" such as race or national origin that may render it void under the Equal Protection Clause.
To pass strict scrutiny, the law or policy must first be justified by a "compelling governmental interest," and second must be the "least restrictive means" for achieving that interest. Many legal scholars, including judges and professors, often say that strict scrutiny is "strict in theory, fatal in fact," because most laws are struck that are subject to that highest standard. The exception is the Supreme Court's widely criticized opinion in Korematsu v. United States, upholding as constitutional the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II.
De jure versus de facto discrimination
As applied in Korematsu, strict scrutiny was limited to instances of de jure discrimination, where a racial classification is written into the language of a statute. Justice Byron White, in Washington v. Davis (1976), introduced the test to instances of de facto discrimination, where disproportional impact is coupled with discriminatory intent.
The court's decision in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. provided further definition to the concept of intent and suggested three particular areas in which such intent becomes apparent.
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