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Croatian War of Independence

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Croatian War of Independence
Part of the Yugoslav Wars
Croatian War of Independence is located in CroatiaZagrebZagrebOsijekOsijekB.ManastirB.ManastirVukovarVukovarErdutErdutVinkovciVinkovciŽupanjaŽupanjaSlavonski BrodSlavonski BrodPakracPakracMaslenicaMaslenicaKarlovacKarlovacOgulinOgulinOtočacOtočacDubrovnikDubrovnikKonavleKonavlePrevlakaPrevlakaSplitSplitŠibenikŠibenikZadarZadarSisakSisakPetrinjaPetrinjaPlitvicePlitviceGospićGospićKninKninPeruća DamPeruća DamOkučaniOkučaniBihaćBihaćBanja LukaBanja LukaCroatian controlledCroatian controlledSerb controlledSerb controlledBosniak controlledBosniak controlled
Occupied areas in Croatia in January 1992
DateMarch 1991 – November 1995
LocationCroatia
Result

Croatian victory

Territorial
changes
The Croatian government gains control over the vast majority of Croatian territory previously held by rebel Serbs, with the remaineder coming under UNTAES control.
Belligerents

1991-1992:

Yugoslav People's Army Yugoslav People's Army
(Serb-controlled remnant)

Republic of Serbian Krajina Republic of Serbian Krajina

1991-1992:

Croatia Croatia

1992–1994:

Republic of Serbian Krajina Republic of Serbian Krajina

Republika Srpska Republika Srpska

1992–1994:

 Croatia

1994-1995:

Republic of Serbian Krajina Republic of Serbian Krajina

Republika Srpska Republika Srpska

AP Western Bosnia

1994–1995:

 Croatia

Bosnia and Herzegovina Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Commanders and leaders

SerbiaFederal Republic of Yugoslavia Slobodan Milošević
(President of Serbia)

Republic of Serbian Krajina Milan Babić
(President of RS Krajina)

Republic of Serbian Krajina Milan Martić
(President of RS Krajina)

Republic of Serbian Krajina Mile Mrkšić
(Army of RS Krajina Chief of Staff)

Republika Srpska Yugoslav People's Army Ratko Mladić
(Yugoslav People's Army Colonel General)


Fikret Abdić
(Commander of AP Western Bosnia)

Croatia Franjo Tuđman
(President of Croatia)

Croatia Gojko Šušak
(Minister of Defence)

Croatia Anton Tus
(HV Chief of Staff 1991-1992)

Croatia Janko Bobetko
(HV Chief of Staff 1992-1995)

Croatia Zvonimir Červenko
(HV Chief of Staff 1995-1996)


Bosnia and Herzegovina Atif Dudaković
(Commander, 5th Corps ARBiH 1995)
Casualties and losses

Serbian sources:

  • 8,039 killed or missing
    • 5,603+ combatants
      (RSK: 4,324+
      JNA: 1,279+)
    • 2,344+ civilians
  • 447,316 displaced

International sources:

  • 300,000 displaced

Croatian sources:

  • 13,583 killed or missing (10,668 confirmed killed, 2,915 "missing")
  • 37,180 wounded

or

  • 12,000+ killed or missing

or

  • 15,970 killed or missing
  • 8,147 soldiers
  • 6,605 civilians
  • 1,218 missing

UNHCR:

  • 221,000 displaced (2006)
  • 196,000 displaced (1995)
  • 500,000 refugees (1991)
About 20,000 killed on both sides

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Yugoslav Wars

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Croatian War
of Independence
1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

  • Timeline of all major events
  • Log Revolution
  • Events in Serbia
  • Template:Fix bunching

    The Croatian War of Independence was fought from 1991 to 1995, between the forces loyal to the government of Croatia, which declared independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and both the Serbia-controlled Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and local Serb forces, with the former ending combat operations in Croatia by 1992. In Croatian, the war is primarily referred to as the Homeland War (Template:Lang-hr) and also as Greater-Serbian aggression (Template:Lang-hr). In the Serbian language, the phrase War in Croatia (Template:Lang-sr) is the most common name.

    Initially, the war was waged between Croatian police forces and Serbs living in the Yugoslav Republic of Croatia. As the JNA came under increasing Serbian influence in Belgrade, many of its units began assisting the Serbs fighting in Croatia. The Croatian side aimed to establish a sovereign country outside Yugoslavia, and the Serbs, supported by Serbia, opposed the secession and wanted to remain a part of Yugoslavia, effectively seeking new boundaries in Croatia with a Serb majority or significant minority, or by conquering as much of Croatia as possible. The goal was primarily to remain in the same state with the rest of the Serbian nation, which was interpreted as an attempt to form a "Greater Serbia" by Croats (and Bosniaks). The ICTY also condemned a "widespread and systematic campaign of crimes against non-Serbs inhabiting areas in Croatia" in its later verdict of Serbian leader Milan Martić who colluded with Slobodan Milošević and others to create a "unified Serbian state".

    At the beginning of the war, the JNA tried to forcefully keep Croatia in Yugoslavia by occupying the whole of Croatia. After failure of doing so, Serbian forces established the self-proclaimed Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK) within Croatia. By the end of 1991, most of Croatia was gravely affected by war, with numerous cities and villages heavily damaged in combat operations, and the rest supporting hundreds of thousands of refugees. After the final ceasefire of January 1992 and the international recognition of the Republic of Croatia as a sovereign state, the front lines were entrenched, UNPROFOR was deployed, and combat became largely intermittent in the following three years. In 1995, Croatia finally launched two major offensives known as Operation Flash and Operation Storm, which would effectively end the war in its favor. The remaining UNTAES zone was peacefully reintegrated into Croatia by 1998.

    The war ended with the total Croatian victory, as Croatia achieved goals declared at the beginning of the war: independence and preservation of its borders. However, much of Croatia was devastated with estimates ranging from 21-25% of its economy destroyed. The total number of deaths on both sides was around 20,000, and there were refugees on both sides displaced at some point: Croats mostly at the beginning of the war, and Serbs mostly at the end. While many people returned, and Croatia and Serbia progressively cooperated more with each other on all levels, some displeasure from both sides occurs because of verdicts by ICTY and a mutual lawsuit.

    Background

    See also: Timeline of Yugoslavian breakup

    Rise of nationalism in Yugoslavia

    See also: Anti-bureaucratic revolution and Gazimestan speech

    The war in Croatia resulted from the rise of nationalism in the 1980s which slowly led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia. A crisis emerged in Yugoslavia with the weakening of the Communist states in Eastern Europe towards the end of the Cold War, as symbolized by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. In Yugoslavia, the national communist party, officially called the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, had lost its ideological potency.

    In the 1980s, Albanian secessionist movements in the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo, Socialist Republic of Serbia, led to the repression of the Albanian majority in the Serbia's southern province. The more prosperous republics of SR Slovenia and SR Croatia wanted to move towards decentralization and democracy. Serbia, headed by Slobodan Milošević, adhered to centralism and single-party rule through the Yugoslav Communist Party. Milošević effectively ended the autonomy of the Kosovo and Vojvodina autonomous provinces.

    As Slovenia and Croatia began to seek greater autonomy within the federation, including confederate status and even full independence, the nationalist ideas started to grow within the ranks of the still-ruling League of Communists. As Milošević rose to power in Serbia, his speeches favoured continuation of a unified Yugoslav state, but one in which all power would be centralized in Belgrade. In the Gazimestan speech delivered on June 28, 1989, he remarked on the current battles and quarrels saying that even though those are not armed battles, such things as armed battle should not be excluded yet. The general political situation grew more tense when future Serbian Radical Party president Vojislav Šešelj visited the United States in 1989 and was later awarded a honorary title of "Vojvoda" (duke) by Momčilo Đujić, a World War II Chetnik leader, during a commemoration of the Battle of Kosovo. Years later, Milan Babić (Croatian Serb leader) testified that Momčilo Đujić had financially supported the Serbs in Croatia in the 1990s.

    In March 1989, the crisis in Yugoslavia deepened after the adoption of amendments to the Serbian constitution. This allowed the Serbian republic's government to re-assert effective power over the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. Before this point, a number of political decisions were legislated from within these provinces. They also had a vote on the Yugoslav federal presidency level (six members from the republics and two members from the autonomous provinces). Serbia, under president Slobodan Milošević, gained control over three out of eight votes in the Yugoslav presidency, and this was used on May 16, 1991, when the Serbian parliament exchanged Riza Sapunxhiu and Nenad Bućin, representatives of Kosovo and Vojvodina, for Jugoslav Kostić and Sejdo Bajramović. The fourth vote was provided by Montenegro, whose government survived a coup d'état in October 1988, but not second in January 1989. Serbia, having secured 4 out of 8 federal presidency votes, was able to heavily influence the decisions of the federal government because unfavorable decisions could be blocked, thus rendering the body ineffective. This situation led to objections in other republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia) and calls for reform of the Yugoslav Federation.

    Electoral and constitutional moves

    See also: Croatian parliamentary election, 1990

    The weakening of the communist regime allowed nationalism to spread its political presence, even within the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. In January 1990, the League of Communists broke up on the lines of the individual republics. At the 14th Extraordinary Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, on January 20, 1990, the delegations of the republics could not agree on the main issues in the Yugoslav federation. The Croatian and Slovenian delegations demanded a looser federation, while the Serbian delegation, headed by Milošević, opposed this. As a result, the Slovenian and Croatian delegates left the Congress.

    File:Franjo Tudjman, election 1990.JPG
    The poster of Franjo Tuđman on the first free elections in Croatia

    The first free elections were then scheduled a few months later in Croatia and Slovenia. The first round of the elections in Croatia were held on April 22, and the second round on May 6. In 1989, a number of political parties had been founded, among them the Croatian Democratic Union (Template:Lang-hr) (HDZ), led by Franjo Tuđman. As the future leader of Croatia, Tuđman made international visits during the late 1980s in order to garner support from the Croatian diaspora for the Croatian national cause. The HDZ based its campaign on an aspiration for greater sovereignty of Croatia and on a general anti-Yugounitarist ideology, fueling the sentiment of Croats that "only the HDZ could protect Croatia from the aspirations of Serbian elements led by Slobodan Milošević towards a Greater Serbia". It topped the poll in the elections (followed by Ivica Račan's reformed communists, Social Democratic Party of Croatia) and formed a new Croatian Government.

    A tense atmosphere prevailed in 1990, and especially so during the period immediately before the elections. It became evident on May 13, 1990, when a football game was held in Zagreb between Zagreb's Dinamo team and Belgrade's Crvena Zvezda team. The game erupted into violence, between groups of supporters and the police. Serbs occupied a disproportionate number of state posts throughout Yugoslavia, including in Croatia.

    On 30 May 1990, the new Croatian Parliament held its first session. President Tuđman announced his manifesto for a new Constitution (ratified at the end of the year) and a multitude of political, economic, and social changes, notably to what extent minority rights (mainly for Serbs), would be guaranteed. Local Serb politicians opposed the new constitution on the grounds that the local Serb population would be threatened. Their prime concern was that a new constitution would not anymore designate Croatia a "national state of the Croatian people, a state of the Serbian people and any other people living in it" but a "national state of the Croatian people and any people living in it". After HDZ came to power, a part of Serbs from public administration, especially the police, lost their jobs and were replaced by Croats.

    Important factors in Croatia's preservation of its pre-war borders were Yugoslav Federal Constitution Amendments of 1971, and the new Yugoslav Federal Constitution of 1974, as subsequently confirmed by opinions of the Badinter Arbitration Committee. The 1971 amendments introduced a concept that sovereign rights are exercised by the federal units, and that the federation has only the authority specifically transferred to it by the constitution. The 1974 constitution confirmed and strengthened principles introduced in 1971. The borders themselves were defined by demarcation commissions in 1947, pursuant to decisions of AVNOJ of 1943 and 1945 regarding federal organization of Yugoslavia.

    On 22 December 1990, the Parliament of Croatia ratified the new constitution, changing the status of Serbs in Croatia from a "constituent nation" to a "national minority". The percentage of those declaring themselves as Serbs, according to the 1991 census, was 12% (78% of the population declared itself as Croats). This was read as taking away some of the rights from the Serbs granted by the previous Socialist constitution, thereby fueling extremism among the Serbs of Croatia. However, the constitution defined Croatia as "the national state of the Croatian nation and a state of members of other nations and minorities who are its citizens: Serbs... who are guaranteed equality with citizens of Croatian nationality....”

    Civil unrest and demands for autonomy

    See also: Log Revolution
    Map of the strategic offensive plan of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) in Croatia, 1991. The JNA was unable to advance as far as planned due to Croatian resistance and mobilization problems.

    The Serbs within Croatia did not initially seek independence before 1990. On July 25, 1990, a Serbian Assembly was established in Srb, north of Knin, as the political representation of the Serbian people in Croatia. The Serbian Assembly declared "sovereignty and autonomy of the Serb people in Croatia". On December 21, 1990, the SAO Krajina was proclaimed by the municipalities of the regions of Northern Dalmatia and Lika, in south-western Croatia. Article 1 of the Statute of the SAO Krajina defined the SAO Krajina as “a form of territorial autonomy within the Republic of Croatia” on which the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, state laws, and the Statute of the SAO Krajina were applied.

    Following Tuđman's election and perceived threat from the new constitution, Serb nationalists in the Kninska Krajina region began taking armed action against Croatian government officials. Many were forcibly expelled or excluded from the SAO Krajina. Croatian government property throughout the region was increasingly controlled by local Serb municipalities or the newly established "Serbian National Council". This would later become the government of the breakaway Republic of Serbian Krajina (RSK).

    In August 1990, an unrecognized mono-ethnic referendum was held in regions with a substantial Serb population which would later become known as the RSK (bordering western Bosnia and Herzegovina) on the question of Serb "sovereignty and autonomy" in Croatia. This was to counter the changes in the constitution. The Croatian government tried to block the referendum by sending police forces to police stations in Serb-populated areas to seize their weapons. Among other incidents, local Serbs from the southern hinterlands of Croatia, mostly around the city of Knin, blocked the roads to the tourist destinations in Dalmatia. This incident is known as the "Log revolution". Years later, during Milan Martić's trial, Milan Babić would claim that he was tricked by Martić into agreeing to the Log Revolution, and that it and the entire war in Croatia was Martić's responsibility, orchestrated by Belgrade. The statement was corroborated by Martić himself in an interview published in 1991. Babić also confirmed that by July 1991 Milošević took over the control of the Yugoslav People's Army. The Croatian government responded to the blockade of roads by sending special police teams in helicopters to the scene, but they were intercepted by SFR Yugoslav Air Force fighter jets and forced to turn back to Zagreb. The Serbs, who accuse the Croatian authorities of discrimination, felled pine trees or used bulldozers to block roads, sealing off towns like Knin and Benkovac near the Adriatic coast. On August 18, 1990, the Serbian newspaper Večernje Novosti said almost "two million Serbs were ready to go to Croatia to fight".

    Immediately after the Slovenian referendum on independence and the new Croat constitution, the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) announced that a new defense doctrine would apply across the country. The Josip Broz Tito-era doctrine of "General People's Defense", in which each republic maintained a Territorial defense force (Template:Lang-hr) (TO), would henceforth be replaced by a centrally-directed system of defense. The republics would lose their role in defense matters and their TOs would be disarmed and subordinated to JNA headquarters in Belgrade. Following the change of the doctrine, an ultimatum was issued, requesting disarming and disbanding of military forces considered illegal by the Yugoslav authorities. Since the original ultimatum did not specify which forces were considered illegal, the central Yugoslav authorities soon clarified that the request was actually aimed at official Croatian armed forces. Croatian authorities refused to comply, and six days after it was issued, the Yugoslav army withdrew the ultimatum at a Yugoslav presidency meeting.

    Military forces

    Serbian forces

    See also: Yugoslav People's Army and Military of Serbian Krajina

    The JNA was initially formed during World War II to carry out guerrilla warfare against Axis powers occupation. The success of the Partisan movement led to the JNA basing much of its operational strategy on guerrilla warfare as its plans normally entailed defending against NATO or Warsaw Pact attacks where other types of warfare would put JNA in a comparatively poor position. That approach led to maintenance of Territorial Defense system. On paper, the JNA looked like a powerful force with 2,000 tanks and 300 jet aircraft (all either Soviet or locally produced). However, by 1991, majority of this equipment was over 30 years old: it consisted substantially out of T-54/55 tank and the MiG-21 aircraft. Still, the JNA operated around 300 M-84 tanks (Yugoslav version of Soviet T-72) and a sizable fleet of ground-attack aircraft, such as Soko G-4 Super Galeb, Soko G-4 Super Galeb and most notably Soko J-22 Orao whose armaments included AGM-65 Maverick guided missiles. By contrast, more modern cheap anti-tank (like AT-5) and anti-aircraft (like SA-14) missiles were abundant and were designed to destroy much more advanced weaponry. Before the war the JNA had 169,000 regular troops, including 70,000 professional officers. The fighting in Slovenia brought about a great number of desertions, and the army responded by mobilization of Serbian reserve troops. Approximately 100,000 evaded the draft and new conscripts proved ineffective fighting force. As a result the JNA resorted to reliance on irregular militias. Thus paramilitary units like White Eagles, Serbian Guard, Dušan Silni or Serb Volunteer Guard, that committed numerous massacres against Croat and other non-Serbs civilians, became increasingly relied upon by the Yugoslav and Serb forces. With the retreat of the JNA forces in 1992, JNA units were reorganized as the Army of Serb Krajina, which was a direct heir to JNA organization with little improvement.

    Croatian forces

    See also: Croatian National Guard and Military of Croatia
    Seizing of JNA's barracks in the Battle of the barracks slightly alleviated the Croatian problem of equipment shortage.

    By contrast to that force, Croatian military was in a much worse state. At the early stages of the war, lack of military units meant that the Croatian Police force would take the brunt of fighting — eventually the police would form the core of the new armed force — initially named "Croatian National Guard" (Template:Lang-hr), later "Croatian Army" (Template:Lang-hr) - that was formed on April 11, 1991, but not really developed until 1993. Weaponry was always lacking and many units were formed either unarmed or with WW2-era rifles. The Croatian Army had just a handful of tanks (even older WW2 veterans like the T-34) and its air-force was even worse: a few old Antonov An-2 biplane crop-dusters were converted to drop makeshift bombs. However, since the soldiers were defending their homeland and their families the army was exceptionally motivated, and was formed into local fighting units — so people from a village would defend their own village — which meant they were fairly effective in their home grounds.

    In August 1991, the Croatian Army had fewer than 20 brigades, which would grow to 60 by the end of the year through general mobilization which was initiated in October. Seizing of JNA's barracks in the Battle of the barracks would slightly alleviate the problem of equipment shortage. By 1995, balance of power significantly changed. Serb forces in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina combined were estimated to be capable of fielding at most 130,000 troops. On the other hand, Croatian Army, Croatian Defence Council (Template:Lang-hr) (HVO) and Army of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina could field a combined force of 250,000 soldiers. In addition the three forces commanded a total of 570 tanks.

    Course of the war

    See also: Timeline of the Croatian War of Independence

    1991: Open hostilities begin

    First armed incidents

    See also: Pakrac clash, Gospić massacre, Battle of Šibenik (1991), Plitvice Lakes incident, Borovo Selo killings, and Battle of Dalmatia

    "Croats became refugees in their own country."

    Mirko Kovač on the 10th anniversary of the end of the Croatian War of Independence
    Water tower in Vukovar—a symbol of the early conflict.

    Ethnic hatred grew and various incidents fueled the propaganda machines on both sides, thereby causing even more hatred. The conflict soon escalated into armed incidents in the majority-Serb populated areas. Serbs began a series of attacks on Croatian police units, killing more than 20 by the end of April. The Plitvice Lakes incident in late March 1991 stands out, with Josip Jović from Aržano being the first police officer killed by Serb forces. In April 1991, the Serbs within Croatia began to make serious moves to secede from that territory, that in turn seceded from Yugoslavia. It is a matter of debate to what extent this move was locally motivated and to what degree the Milošević-led Serbian government gave the push to self-declare. In any event, the Republic of Serbian Krajina was declared consisting of Croatian territory with a substantial Serb population — which the Croatian government saw as a rebellion.

    The Croatian Ministry of the Interior consequently started arming an increasing amount of special police forces, and this led to the building of a real army. On 9 April 1991, Croatian President Franjo Tuđman ordered the special police forces to be renamed Zbor Narodne Garde ("National Guard"), marking the creation of a separate military of Croatia. The newly constituted military units were publicly displayed in a military parade and review held at Stadion Kranjčevićeva in Zagreb on May 28, 1991.

    On May 15, Stjepan Mesić, a Croat, was scheduled to be the chairman of the rotating presidency of Yugoslavia. Serbia, aided by Kosovo, Montenegro and Vojvodina, whose presidency votes were at the time under Serbian control, upped the ante by blocking the move, otherwise seen as largely ceremonial. This maneuver technically left Yugoslavia without a head of state and without a commander-in-chief. Two days later, a repeated attempt to vote on the issue also failed, prompting the prime minister of Yugoslavia, Ante Marković, to propose appointing a panel which would wield presidential powers. It was not immediately clear who would the panel members be, apart from defense minister Veljko Kadijević, nor who would fill position of JNA commander-in-chief. The move was quickly rejected by Croatia as unconstitutional. The crisis was resolved after a six-week stalemate, and Stipe Mesić was voted in president of the presidency—the first non-communist to become Yugoslav head of state in decades. Meanwhile, the federal army, the JNA and the local Territorial Defense Forces remained led by Federal authorities controlled by Milošević. On occasion, the JNA sided with the local Croatian Serb forces.

    Declaration of independence

    See also: Croatian independence referendum, 1991

    On May 19, 1991, the Croatian authorities held a referendum on independence with the option of remaining in Yugoslavia as a looser union. Serb local authorities issued calls for a boycott, which were largely followed by Croatian Serbs, so the referendum was passed with 94% in favor. Croatia declared independence and dissolution (Template:Lang-hr) of its association with Yugoslavia on June 25, 1991, but the European Commission urged Croatian authorities to place a three-month moratorium on the decision. Croatia subsequently agreed to freeze its independence declaration for three months, helping to ease tension a little.

    93.24%
    6.76%
    For
    Against

    One month after Croatia declared its independence, Yugoslav army and other Serb forces held approximately 30 percent of the country, mostly parts with a predominantly ethnic Serb population. They had obvious superiority in weaponry and equipment. The military strategy of the Yugoslav and Serbian forces partly consisted of extensive shelling, at times irrespective of civilians. As the war progressed, the cities of Dubrovnik, Gospić, Šibenik, Zadar, Karlovac, Sisak, Slavonski Brod, Osijek, Vinkovci and Vukovar all came under attack by the Yugoslav forces. The United Nations (UN) imposed a weapons embargo, which did not affect JNA-backed Serb forces significantly as they had JNA arsenal at their disposal, but caused serious trouble for the newly-formed Croatian army. This led the Croatian government to start smuggling weapons over its borders.

    Ten-Day war in Slovenia

    See also: Ten-Day War
    File:Jna t-55 slovenia.jpg
    A column of JNA tanks in Slovenia during the Ten-Day War

    In June and July of 1991, the short armed conflict in Slovenia came to a speedy and fairly peaceful conclusion, partly because of the ethnic homogeneity of the population of Slovenia. During the war in Slovenia, a great number of Croatian and Slovenian soldiers refused to fight and deserted from the JNA. In July, in an attempt to salvage what remained of Yugoslavia, the JNA forces found themselves involved in operations against predominantly Croat areas—such as the Dalmatian coastal areas in the Battle of Dalmatia. Full-scale war erupted in August. As in Slovenia, where Croatian soldiers had refused to take part in the fight, with the start of military operations in Croatia, Croats, a number of Serbian conscripts likewise started to desert the JNA en masse (especially since some kind of ceasefire was agreed at the end of the War in Slovenia, and the alert level was lowered). Albanians and Macedonians started to search for a way to legally leave the JNA or serve their conscription term in Macedonia. In 1981, 60 % of the Yugoslav Army Non-commissioned officers and officer corps were Serbs, overrepresented by a factor of 1.51. Despite efforts to homogenize the military ethnically, the JNA officer corps was dominated by Serbs and Montenegrins. Serbs and Montenegrins collectively reflected 38.8 per cent of the Yugoslav population, but made up 70 per cent of the JNA officer corps by 1990.

    Escalation of the conflict

    Further information: Battle of Vukovar, Siege of Dubrovnik, Erdut massacre, Operation Otkos 10, Battle of the barracks, Operation Orkan 91, and Battle of the Dalmatian channels
    The JNA breakthrough in eastern Slavonia

    In August 1991, the border city of Vukovar came under attack and the Battle of Vukovar began. Serbian troops eventually completely surrounded the city. The Croat population of Vukovar, Croatian troops including the 204th Vukovar Brigade, entrenched themselves within the city and held their ground against JNA elite Armoured and Mechanized brigades, as well as Serb paramilitary units. A certain number of ethnic Croatian civilians had taken shelter inside the city. Other elements of the civilian population fled the areas of armed conflict en masse. Death toll estimates for Vukovar, resulting from the siege, range from 1,798 to 5,000. Further 22,000 were exiled from Vukovar immediately after capture of the town.

    There is evidence of extreme hardship imposed on the population at the time. Some estimates include 220,000 Croats and 300,000 Serbs internally displaced for the duration of the war in Croatia. However, at the peak of fighting in late 1991, around 550,000 people temporarily became refugees on the Croatian side alone. The 1991 census data and the 1993 RSK population data for the territory of Krajina differ by some 102,000 Serbs and 135,000 Croats. In many places, large numbers of civilians were forced out by the military. This was labeled ethnic cleansing, a term whose meaning at the time ranged from eviction to murder. It was at this time that the term ethnic cleansing first entered the English lexicon.

    On 3 October the Yugoslav Navy began a blockade of the main ports of Croatia. The blockade was challenged by civilian ships and the confrontation culminated on November 14-16 during the Battle of the Dalmatian channels, when Croatian coastal and island based artillery damaged, sunk or captured (PB 62 Šolta, ex-Mukos PČ 176) a number of Yugoslav navy vessels. After the battle the Yugoslav naval operations were effectively limited to the southern Adriatic.

    On October 5, president Tuđman made a speech in which he called upon the whole population to mobilize and defend against Greater-Serbian imperialism pursued by the Serb-led JNA, Serbian paramilitary formations and rebel Serb forces. On 7 October, an explosion occurred within the main government building in Zagreb while Tuđman, Mesić and Marković were present. The explosion destroyed several rooms of Banski dvori, but failed to kill any of the leaders. The government claimed that it was caused by a JNA air raid. Apparently, the Croatian army received the information from Bihać, Bosnia and Herzegovina JNA airfield the day before, about a top secret air mission being prepared for the next day, but these were not taken seriously due to lack of details. The JNA denied the responsibility and in turn claimed that the explosion was set up by the Croatian government itself. The next day, as a previously agreed three-month moratorium on implementation of the declaration of independence expired, the Croatian Parliament severed all remaining ties with Yugoslavia. October 8 is now celebrated as Croatia's Independence Day. The bombing of the government and the Siege of Dubrovnik that started in October were contributing factors to European Union (EU) sanctions against Serbia. However, focus of the international media on (and exaggeration of) damage to Dubrovnik's cultural heritage pushed concern with civilian casualties, and pivotal battles such as the one in Vukovar, out of public view. Nonetheless, the artillery attacks on Dubrovnik damaged 56% of its buildings to some degree, as the historic walled city, a UNESCO world heritage site, sustained 650 hits by artillery rounds.

    In October and early November, the situation for Croats in Vukovar became ever more desperate as the JNA escalated the war. On November 18, 1991, Vukovar fell to the Serbs after a three-month siege and the Vukovar massacre took place, while the survivors were transported to prison camps such as Ovčara and Velepromet, the majority ending up in Sremska Mitrovica prison camp. The city of Vukovar was almost completely destroyed, as 15,000 houses were destroyed. During the 87 day long battle, the city was struck by 8,000 to 9,000 artillery shells every day, for a total of more than one million rounds. The sustained focus on a siege facilitated the attraction of heavy international media attention. Many international journalists were present at the time in or near Vukovar, as was the UN peace mediator, Cyrus Vance, former US President Carter's Secretary of State.

    Rudolf Perešin, a fighter jet pilot who switched sides and left Yugoslav People's Army to join the Croatian Army, next to his MiG-21

    On December 19, the fighting increased, as Croatia won its first diplomatic recognition by a western nation—Iceland while the Serbian Autonomous Regions in Krajina and western Slavonia officially declared themselves the Republic of Serbian Krajina. Four days later, Germany also recognized Croatian independence, and on December 26, 1991, Serb-dominated federal presidency announced plans for a smaller Yugoslavia that could include the territory captured from Croatia during the war, in apparent realization that the Croatian independence was now irreversible. In early November 1991 the Croatian army began a successful counterattack in Western Slavonia, marking a turning point of the war. Operation Otkos 10, lasting from October 31 until November 4, resulted in Croatia recapturing 300 square kilometres (120 square miles) of area between Bilogora and Papuk mountains. Further advances were made in the second half of December—Operation Orkan 91—but at that point a lasting ceasefire was about to be signed (in January 1992). In the six months of fighting, 10,000 people had died, hundreds of thousands had fled, and tens of thousands of homes had been destroyed.

    In the second half of 1991, all the Croatian democratic parties gathered together to form a government of national unity and to confront the JNA and the Serbian paramilitaries, with Franjo Gregurić as the prime minister and 16 out of 27 government posts filled by parliamentary opposition parties. Ceasefires were frequently signed, mediated by foreign diplomats, but also frequently broken. This was part of the tactics on both sides. The Croatians lost much territory, but profited by being able to expand the Croatian Army—from seven brigades it had at the time of the first ceasefire to 60 brigades and 37 independent battalions it had by December 31, 1991.

    1992: Ceasefire

    See also: United Nations Protection Force and Miljevci plateau incident
    A destroyed Serbian T-55 Main Battle Tank on the road leading to Drniš.

    A new UN-sponsored ceasefire, the fifteenth one in just six months, was agreed on January 2, 1992 and it came into force the next day. After the series of unsuccessful ceasefires, the United Nations started to deploy a protection force in Serbian-held Croatia—the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR)—to supervise and maintain the agreement. The UNPROFOR was officially created by UN Security Council Resolution 743 on February 21, 1992. On 7 January 1992, JNA pilot Emir Šišić shot down a European Community helicopter in Croatia, killing five truce observers. Croatia was officially recognized by European Community on January 15, 1992. The JNA began to withdraw from Croatia—even Krajina—although Serb paramilitary groups clearly retained the upper hand in the newly occupied territories. The warring parties mostly moved to entrenched positions as The JNA soon retreated from Croatia into Bosnia and Herzegovina where a new conflict was on the rise. Croatia became a member of the United Nations on May 22, 1992, which was conditional upon Croatia amending its constitution to protect the human rights of minority groups and dissidents.

    The Yugoslav People's Army took thousands of prisoners during the war in Croatia, and interned them in camps in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. The Croatian forces also captured some Serbian prisoners, and the two sides agreed to several prisoner exchanges, which caused most of them to be freed by the end of 1992. Some of the infamous prisons have included the Sremska Mitrovica camp, the Stajićevo camp and the Begejci camp in Serbia and the Morinj camp in Montenegro. The Croatian Army also established detention camps, like Lora prison camp in Split.

    Croatian soldiers preparing to fire at a rebel Serbian tank during the Miljevci plateau incident, 21 June 1992.

    Armed conflict in Croatia continued intermittently at a smaller scale. There were several smaller operations undertaken by Croatian forces, in order to relieve the siege of Dubrovnik, and other Croatian cities (Šibenik, Zadar and Gospić) from the Krajina grip. The most notable ones were Miljevci plateau incident (between Krka and Drniš), on June 21–22, 1992, Operation Jaguar at Križ Hill near Bibinje and Zadar, on May 22, 1992, and a series of military actions in Dubrovnik hinterland: Operation Tigar, on July 1–13, 1992, in Konavle, on September 20–24, 1992 and at Vlaštica, on September 22–25, 1992. The combat near Dubrovnik was followed by withdrawal of JNA from Konavle, between September 30 and October 20, 1992, when the Prevlaka peninsula guarding entrance to the Bay of Kotor was demilitarized and turned over to the UNPROFOR, while the remainder of Konavle was restored to the Croatian authorities. Expulsions of non-Serb civilian population remaining in the occupied territories continued despite presence of the UNPROFOR peacekeeping troops, and in some cases, with the UN troops being virtually enlisted as accomplices of the expulsions.

    1993: Croatian military advances

    Further information: Operation Maslenica and Operation Medak pocket
    Map of Operation Medak pocket

    In 1993, there were three notable military operations. Croatian army recaptured the hydroelectric Peruća Dam on January 27 and 28, 1993. Retreating Serb forces detonated explosives within the 65-metre (213 ft) high dam attempting to cause the dam to fail and the reservoir to flood the area downstream. Even though the explosive charges were set off, the disaster was prevented by Mark Nicholas Gray, a Colonel in the British Royal Marines, a lieutenant at the time, acting as a UN military observer at the site. He risked being disciplined for acting beyond his authority by lowering the reservoir level behind the dam holding 0.54 cubic kilometres (0.13 cubic miles) of water before it was blown up. His action saved lives of 20,000 people who would otherwise be drowned or become homeless.

    Operation Maslenica took place in area around Maslenica, near Zadar, on January 22 - February 10 1993, while Operation Medak pocket took place in area near Gospić, on September 9–17, 1993. While most of these above operations were a relative success for the Croatian government, the successful Operation Medak pocket in 1993 caused sharp reactions of countries and organizations that had anti-Croatian and pro-Serb attitude during the war. This led the Croatian army to undertaking no offensive action during the subsequent 12 months. The ICTY later indicted Croatian officers Janko Bobetko, Rahim Ademi, Mirko Norac and others for the alleged crimes committed during this operation. Norac was later found guilty by the Croatian court. On September 11, while Medak pocket fighting was in progress, Zagreb was targeted by two 9K52 Luna-M rockets, each carrying some 1,100 pounds (500 kilograms) of explosives, both hitting Lučko, six miles southwest of the city centre.

    There were many UN resolutions that required Croatia to retreat to previous positions and that Croatia must restrain from military operations. Some Croat elements felt aggrieved, as no such resolutions had prevented the Serbian forces from attacking Croatia in the earlier stages of the war (when the disturbances were considered national, not international). In October 1993, the United Nations Security Council affirmed for the first time that the United Nations Protected Areas were an integral part of the Republic of Croatia. On February 18, 1993 Croatian authorities signed the Daruvar Agreement with local Serb leaders in Western Slavonia. The Agreement was kept secret and was aimed towards normalizing life for the locals on the battlefield line. However, the Knin authorities learned of the deal and arrested the Serbian leaders responsible for it. Instead, in June 1993, Serbs began voting in a referendum on merging Krajina territory with Republika Srpska. A letter dated April 3, 1993 from, inter alia, Milan Martić as Minister of the Interior to the Assembly of the Republika Srpska, written on behalf of "the Serbs from the Republic of Serbian Krajina", advocated a joinder of the "two Serbian states as the first stage in the establishment of a state of all Serbs". On January 21, 1994, during the election campaign for the Krajina presidential elections, Martić stated that he would "speed up the process of unification and pass on the baton to all Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević".

    During 1992 and 1993, an estimated 225,000 Croats, as well as refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina and others from Serbia settled in Croatia. A notable number of Bosniaks also fled to Croatia, which was the initial destination for most of Bosniak refugees. Croatian volunteers and some conscripted soldiers participated in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. During the same period, Croatia accepted 280,000 Bosniak refugees from the Bosnian War. The large number of refugees was significantly straining Croatian economy and infrastructure. The American Ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, tried to put the number of Muslim refugees in Croatia into a proper perspective in an interview on November 8, 1993. He said the situation would be the equivalent of the USA taking in 30,000,000 refugees.

    1994: Erosion of support for Krajina

    Further information: Washington Agreement and Operation Winter '94
    Map of the Bihac enclave

    In 1992, the Croats and Bosniaks started the Croat-Bosniak conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, just as each was fighting with the Bosnian Serbs. The war was originally fought between HVO and Croatian volunteer troops, but by 1994, Croatian Army was involved in the fighting with estimated 3,000 to 5,000 troops. In late February of 1994, the belligerents, under pressure from the United States, agreed on a truce, followed by a meeting of Croatian, Bosnian and Bosnian Croat representatives with US Secretary of State Warren Christopher in Washington, D.C. on February 26, 2010. On March 4, Franjo Tuđman endorsed the agreement providing for creation of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and alliance between Bosnian government forces and Bosnian Croat forces. The agreement also provided for creation of a loose confederation between Croatia and the new federation, permitting Croatia to send troops into Bosnia and Herzegovina. This led to the dismantling of Herzeg-Bosnia and reduced the number of warring factions in Bosnia and Herzegovina from three to two.

    In late 1994, the Croatian Army intervened several times in Bosnia: on November 1–3, in the operation Cincar near Kupres, and on November 29 - December 24 in the Winter '94 operation near Dinara and Livno. These operations were undertaken in order to detract from the siege of the Bihać region and to approach RSK capital Knin from the north, de facto isolating it from three sides.

    During this time, unsuccessful negotiations were under way between Croatian and RSK governments mediated by the UN. The disputes included opening the Serb-occupied part of the Zagreb–Slavonski Brod motorway near Okučani to transit traffic, as well as the putative status of majority Serbian areas within Croatia. Even though the motorway initially reopened at the end of 1994, it would soon be closed again due to security issues. Repeated failures of resolving the two disputes would serve as triggers for major Croatian offensives in 1995.

    A destroyed T-34-85 tank in Karlovac

    At the same time, the Krajina army continued the Siege of Bihać together with the Army of Republika Srpska from Bosnia. Michael Williams, a spokesman for the United Nations peacekeeping force, said that the village of Vedro Polje west of Bihać had fallen to a Croatian Serb unit in late November 1994 indicating that the siege entered the final stage. He added that heavy tank and artillery fire against the town of Velika Kladuša in the north of the Bihać enclave was coming from the Croatian Serbs. Moreover, Western military analysts said that among the impressive array of Serbian surface-to-air missile systems that surround the Bihac pocket on Croatian territory, there is a modernized SAM-2 system whose degree of sophistication suggests that it was probably brought there recently from Belgrade.

    By 1995, the Croatian Army would develop into an effective fighting force centered on the elite Guard Brigades (eight) and comparably less effective Home Defence Regiments and regular brigades (most of which were reorganized into regiments in 1992). This organization meant that in later campaigns, the Croatian army would pursue a variant of blitzkrieg tactics, with the Guard brigades taking the role of punching through the enemy lines, while the other units simply held the lines at other points and completed the encirclement of enemy units.

    1995: End of the war

    Further information: Operation Flash, Operation Summer '95, Operation Storm, Erdut Agreement, and UNTAES

    Beginning of 1995 saw renewal of tension as Croatia sought to put increasing pressure on Serb forces occupying a large portion of its territory. On January 12, Franjo Tuđman formally told the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, in a five page letter, that Croatia is ending the agreement permitting stationing of UNPROFOR in Croatia, effective March 31. The move was motivated by continued efforts of Serbia and Serb dominated Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to provide assistance to Serb occupation of Croatia and possibly integrate the occupied areas into Yugoslav territory. The situation was also noted and addressed by the UN General Assembly.

    "...regarding the situation in Croatia, and to respect strictly its territorial integrity, and in this regard concludes that their activities aimed at achieving the integration of the occupied territories of Croatia into the administrative, military, educational, transportation and communication systems of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) are illegal, null and void, and must cease immediately."

    — The United Nations General Assembly resolution 1994/43, regarding to the occupied territories of Croatia
    Map of Operation Storm

    Even so, international peacemaking efforts continued, as a new peace plan, called Z-4 plan was presented to Croatian and Krajina authorities. Even though there was no initial Croatian response, Serbs flatly refused the proposal. As the deadline for UNPROFOR to pull out set by Croatia neared, a new UN peacekeeping mission was proposed with an increased mandate to patrol Croatian internationally recognized borders. Initially, Serbs were opposing the move, responding with movement of tanks from Serbia into eastern Croatia. Finally, the settlement was reached and the new UN peacekeeping mission was approved by United Nations Security Council Resolution 981 on March 31. Name of the mission was subject of a last-minute dispute, as Croatian foreign minister Mate Granić insisted that term Croatia is added to the force name. Finally, name United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO) was approved.

    In early May 1995, violence again erupted. RSK lost support from the Serbian government in Belgrade, partly in response to international pressure. At the same time, the Croatian army reclaimed all of what was previously occupied territory in Western Slavonia during Operation Flash. In retaliation, Serb forces attacked Zagreb with rockets, killing 7 and wounding over 175 civilians. Yugoslav army also responded to the offensive with a show of force, moving tanks towards Croatian border, in an apparent effort to stave off possible attack on the occupied area in Eastern Slavonia.

    During the following months, international efforts mainly concerned largely unsuccessful United Nations Safe Areas set up in Bosnia and Herzegovina while trying to set up a more lasting ceasefire in Croatia. The two issues virtually merged by July 1995 when a number of the safe areas in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina were overrun and another one in the west of the country, Bihać, was threatened. In 1994, Croatia already signaled that it would not allow Bihać to be captured, and new confidence of Croatian military in respect of recapturing occupied areas brought about a demand from Croatian authorities that no further ceasefires are to be negotiated, rather re-integration of the occupied territory into Croatia. These developments and the Washington Agreement led to another meeting of presidents of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina on July 22, when the Split declaration was adopted. In it, Bosnia and Herzegovina invited Croatia to provide military and other assistance, particularly in Bihać area, which Croatia accepted, committing itself to an armed intervention.

    On July 25-30, Croatian Army and HVO troops attacked serb held territory north of Dinara Mountain, capturing Bosansko Grahovo and Glamoč during Operation Summer '95. That offensive paved the way for military recapture of occupied territory around Knin, as it severed the last efficient resupply route between Banja Luka and Knin. On August 5, Croatia started Operation Storm aimed at recapturing all of the occupied territory in Croatia, except for a comparatively small strip of land, located along the Danube, at a considerable distance from the bulk of the contested land. The offensive involved 100,000 Croatian soldiers, and thus became the largest single land battle fought in Europe since the World War II. Operation Storm achieved its declared goals and was declared completed on August 8.

    The document issued by the Supreme Defence Council of the RSK on 4 August 1995 ordering the evacuation of civilians from its territory.

    Large number of civilian population of the occupied areas fled during the offensive or immediately after its completion, in what was later described in various terms, ranging from expulsion to planned evacuation. Krajina Serb sources (Documents of HQ of Civilian Protection of RSK, Supreme Council of Defense published by Kovačević, Sekulić, Vrcelj,) have confirmed that evacuation of Serbs was organized and planned beforehand. According to Amnesty International, the operation led to the ethnic cleansing of up to 200,000 Croatian Serbs, as well as murder and torture of Serbs, soldiers and civilians, as well as plunder of the Serb civilian property. The BBC noted 200,000 Serb refugees at one point. However, Croatian refugees, exiled in 1991, were finally allowed to return to their homes. In 1996 alone, about 85,000 displaced Croats were already able to return to the former Krajina and western Slavonia, according to estimates of the Office for Displaced Persons and Refugees.

    In the months that followed, there was still some intermittent, mainly artillery, attacks from Serb-held areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina on Dubrovnik area and elsewhere. The remaining Serb-held area in Croatia, in the Eastern Slavonia, was faced with possibility of military confrontation with Croatia. Such possibility was repeatedly stated by Franjo Tuđman only weeks after completion of Operation Storm. The threat was underlined by movement of troops to the region in mid-October, as well as a repeat of earlier threat to intervene militarily—specifically saying that the Croatian Army could intervene if no peace agreement was reached by the end of the month. Further combat was averted on November 12, when Erdut Agreement was signed. The agreement determined that the remaining occupied area was to be returned to Croatia, with a two-year transitional period. The agreement also required removal of the UNCRO mission and that a new UN peacekeeping mission be set up to implement the agreement. It was established as United Nations Transitional Authority for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1037 of January 15, 1996.The transitional period was subsequently extended by a year, and on January 15, 1998, the UNTAES mandate ended and Croatia regained full control of the area.

    Type and name of the war

    Monument to the defenders of Dubrovnik, 2009.

    Even though standard term applied to the war translated from Croatian language directly is Homeland war (Template:Lang-hr), Croatian War of Independence gradually became standard term that replaced references to war in Yugoslavia in that part which was related to Croatia. Naturally, English language sources, as well as sources in other languages, also use a substantial number of descriptive or general terms to refer to the war. Those changed as the political and military conflict progressed and transformed, and included War in Croatia, Serbo-Croatian War, and a number of euphemisms such as Conflict in Yugoslavia.

    The same English language term is used in translations of text originally written in Croatian. However, different translations of the Croatian name of the war are also sometimes used, e.g. Patriotic War, although such use by native speakers of English is rare. Even though the official term used in Croatian language is also the most widespread form of the name used in Croatia to refer to the war, other terms are also used. One such example is Greater-Serbian Aggression (Template:Lang-hr). The term was much more widely used by media during the war, but it is still sometimes used by media and other speakers. That particular term is not exclusive to Croatian language, as there are examples of its use translated in English.

    Two conflicting views exist as to whether the war was a civil or an international war. Since neither Croatia or Yugoslavia declared war on each other, a prevailing view in Serbia was that it was a civil war between Croats and Serbs in Croatia. By contrast, the prevailing view in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia and most of the governments of the Western World aligned with the United States is that the war was a war of aggression from Serbia and Montenegro against Croatia, supported by local rebel Serbs.

    The armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia started shortly after the date on which Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence on June 25, 1991 between the military forces of the SFRY and Slovenia and Croatia. Such armed conflict should of course be characterized as internal because the declarations of independence were suspended in consequence of the proposal of the EC for three months. After the expiration of the three months’ period, on 7 October 1991, Slovenia proclaimed its independence with effect from that date, and Croatia with effect from 8 October 1991. So the armed conflict in the former Yugoslavia should be considered international as from 8 October 1991 because the independence of these two States was definite on that date.

    — The ICTY indictment, in the Duško Tadić case

    All acts and omissions charged as Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 occurred during the international armed conflict and partial occupation of Croatia...Displaced persons were not allowed to return to their homes and those few Croats and other non-Serbs who had remained in the Serb-occupied areas were expelled in the following months. The territory of the RSK remained under Serb occupation until large portions of it were retaken by Croatian forces in two operations in 1995. The remaining area of Serb control in Eastern Slavonia was peacefully re-integrated into Croatia in 1998.

    — The ICTY indictment, in the Slobodan Milošević case

    Impact and aftermath

    Casualties and refugees

    War memorial in Vukovar
    Former Stajićevo camp in Serbia.
    Bombardment damage in Osijek.

    Most sources place the total amount of deaths on both sides at around 20,000. Croatian casualties are estimated at around 12,000 to 13,000 killed and missing. According to the head of the Croatian Commission for Missing Persons Colonel Ivan Grujić, 12,000 were killed or went missing including some 6,788 soldiers and 4,508 civilians. Official figures from Croatia from 1996 lists 12,000 killed, 35,000 wounded, 180,000 destroyed apartments, 25% of its economy destroyed, and 27 billion US dollars of material damage. Europe Review of 2003 estimated the war damage to 37 billion US dollars, while GDP dropped 21% in the period. Around 196,000 to 221,000 Croats were displaced during the war. Other sources, like United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), listed some 500,000 Croats and other non-Serbs as refugees after being expelled from Croatian territory overrun by Serb rebels. According to the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 2006, 221,000 were displaced of which 218,000 had returned. The majority were displaced during the initial fighting and the JNA offensives of 1991 and 1992. Some 150,000 Croats from Republika Srpska and Serbia have obtained Croatian citizenship since 1991.

    The Belgrade based non-government organization Veritas lists 6,780 killed and missing from the Republic of Serbian Krajina including 4,324 combatants and 2,344 civilians. Most of them were killed or missing in 1991 (2,442) and during 1995 (2,394). Most deaths occurred in Northern Dalmatia (1,632). The JNA officially acknowledged 1,279 killed in action during the entire war, although the actual number was probably considerably greater, since casualties were consistently underreported during the war. For example, in the case of a brigade, where official reports spoke of two lightly wounded after an engagement, the actual number was 50 killed and 150 wounded according to the unit's intelligence officer.

    According to Serbian sources some 447,316 Serbs were displaced during the war of which 120,000 were displaced in 1991–1993 and 250,000 were displaced after Operation Storm. Most international sources place the number of Serbs displaced at around 300,000. According to Amnesty International 300,000 were displaced from 1991–1995 of which 117,000 are officially registered as having returned as of 2005. According to the OSCE 300,000 were displaced during the war of which 120,000 are officially registered as having returned as of 2006. However, it is believed the number does not reflect the de facto number of returnees because many return to Serbia, Montenegro, or Bosnia and Herzegovina after officially registering in Croatia. According to the UNHCR in 2008, 125,000 are registered as having returned to Croatia, of whom 55,000 remain permanently.

    Many Croatian cities were shelled or bombed by RSK or JNA forces from rebel Serb-controlled areas, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia. The most shelled cities were: Vukovar, Slavonski Brod (from the mountain of Vučjak), and Županja (for more than 1,000 days), Vinkovci, Osijek, Nova Gradiška, Novska, Daruvar, Pakrac, Šibenik, Sisak, Dubrovnik, Zadar, Gospić, Karlovac, Biograd na moru, Slavonski Šamac. Cities that were also shelled were: Ogulin, Duga Resa, Otočac, Ilok, Beli Manastir, Zagreb and others. The artillery attacks on Vukovar were particularly severe, as the city sustained more than a million artillery strikes during the Battle of Vukovar, but the other cities also suffered considerable attacks. For instance, Slavonski Brod was never directly attacked by tanks or infantry, but the city and the surrounding villages were hit by more than 11,600 artillery shells and 130 aircraft bombs in 1991 and 1992.

    The Croatian Association of Prisoners in Serbian Concentration Camps was founded in order to help victims of prison abuse. The Croatian war veterans in general are organized into numerous non-governmental organizations, the most prominent of which is the Croatian Disabled Homeland War Veterans Association.

    War crimes and the ICTY

    Further information: International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and List of indictees of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

    The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established by UN Security Council Resolution 827, which was passed on May 25, 1993. The indictees by ICTY ranged from common soldiers to Prime Ministers and Presidents. Some "high level" indictees included Slobodan Milošević (President of Socialist Republic of Serbia and Republic of Serbia), Milan Babić (President of the Republika Srpska Krajina), Ratko Mladić (General of the JNA) and Ante Gotovina (General of the Croatian Army).

    Between 1991 and 1995, Martić held positions of Minister of Interior, Minister of Defence and President of the self-proclaimed "Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina" (SAO Krajina), which was later renamed "Republic of Serbian Krajina" (RSK). He was found to have participated during this period in a joint criminal enterprise which included Slobodan Milošević, whose aim was to create a unified Serbian state through commission of a widespread and systematic campaign of crimes against non-Serbs inhabiting areas in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina envisaged to become parts of such a state.

    — International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, in its verdict against Milan Martić
    Vukovar, after the capture by the Serb forces and Yugoslav Army

    A significant number of Croat civilians in hospitals and shelters marked with a red cross were targeted by Serb forces. In 2007, two former Yugoslav army officers were sentenced for the Vukovar massacre at the ICTY in The Hague. Veselin Šljivančanin was sentenced to 17 years and Mile Mrkšić to 20 years in prison. Prosecutors say that after the capture of Vukovar, the JNA handed over several hundred Croats to rebel Serbian forces. Of these, at least 264 (including injured soldiers, women, children and the elderly) were murdered and buried in mass graves in the neighborhood of Ovčara on the outskirts of Vukovar. The city's mayor Slavko Dokmanović was also brought to trial at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, but committed suicide in 1998 in captivity before proceedings began.

    Apart from the atrocities committed after capture of Vukovar, there were numerous well documented war crimes against civilians and prisoners of war perpetrated by Serb and Yugoslav forces in Croatia. Most of them were processed by the ICTY or national judiciaries. They include: Borovo Selo killings, Dalj killings, Dalj massacre, Lovas massacre, Široka Kula massacre, Baćin massacre, Ethnic cleansing of Lipovaca, Vukovići and Saborsko, Škabrnja massacre, Voćin massacre, Bruška massacre, and Zagreb rocket attack.

    Croatian forces also committed a number of war crimes, such as Gospić massacre and others, likewise prosecuted by Croatian courts or the ICTY. Infamous prisons for Croatian POWs and civilians once included the Sremska Mitrovica camp, the Stajićevo camp and the Begejci camp in Serbia and the Morinj camp in Montenegro. The Croatian Association of Prisoners in Serbian Concentration Camps was later founded in order to help the victims of prison abuse. The Croatian Army also established detention camps, like Lora prison camp in Split.

    Between October 1991 and February 1992, the Croatian government reportedly funded a covert unit under the command of Tomislav Merčep that committed several crimes, involving the killing of prisoners, mostly ethnic Serbs, in a field near Pakrac, in what would later become known as the "Pakračka poljana" case. The killings were initially covered up, but a decade later, five members of this unit, Munib Suljić, Igor Mikola, Siniša Rimac, Miro Bajramović and Branko Šarić, were indicted on several criminal charges related to these events, and later convicted. Tomislav Merčep was arrested for these crimes in December 2010.

    The ICTY indicted Croatian officers Janko Bobetko, Rahim Ademi, Mirko Norac and others for the alleged crimes committed during Operation Medak pocket. Norac was later found guilty by the Croatian court. ICTY's indictment against general Ante Gotovina cited at least 150 Serb civilians killed in the aftermath of Operation Storm. Croatian Helsinki Committee registered 677 killed Serb civilians in the operation. Louise Arbour, prosecutor of the ICTY, made it clear that the legality, the legitimacy of the Operation itself is not the issue, but it is required to investigate whether crimes were committed during the campaign. The Trial Chamber reiterated that the legality of Operation Storm is "irrelevant" for the case at hand, since the ICTY is only interested in processing war crimes.

    Serbia's role

    During the war

    See also: Serbia in the Yugoslav Wars and Role of the media in the Yugoslav wars

    "Borders are always dictated by the strong, never by the weak... We simply consider it as a legitimate right and interest of the Serb nation to live in one state."

    Slobodan Milosevic, 16 March 1991, on the breakup of Yugoslavia
    Territories controlled by Serbian forces during the Yugoslav Wars. It is widely believed that Milošević tried to create Greater Serbia, which would unite all Serbs across a collapsing Yugoslavia.
    "Ovčara Massacre Memorial" in Vukovar, where Serbian president Boris Tadić expressed his "apology and regret" for 1991 Vukovar massacre.

    During Slobodan Milošević trial at The Hague, the ICTY revealed and brought to the public numerous declassified documents of Belgrade's involvement in wars in Croatia and Bosnia. Evidence introduced at trial showed exactly how those in Belgrade and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia financed the war; how they provided weapons and material support to Bosnian and Croatian Serbs; and the administrative and personnel structures set up to support the Bosnian Serb and Croatian Serb armies.

    Among others, it was established that Belgrade, through the federal government, financed more than 90 percent of Krajina budget in 1993; that the Supreme Defense Council decided to hide aid to Republika Srpska and Krajina from the public; that the National Bank of Krajina operated as a branch office of the National Bank of Yugoslavia; that by March 1994 FR Yugoslavia, Krajina and Republika Srpska used a single currency; numerous documents demonstrated that branches of the Krajina Public Accountancy Service were incorporated into Serbia's accountancy system in May 1991; that the financing of Krajina and Republika Srpska caused hyperinflation in FR Yugoslavia;

    Evidence also showed that the JNA, the Serbian Ministry of Interior and other entities (including Serb civilian groups and police) armed Serb civilians and local territorial defense groups in Krajina and Bosnia before the conflicts erupted; Milan Babić testified that in 1991, after he had a meeting with Milosevic and the Serbian Interior Minister, Serbia's Ministry of the Interior distributed arms to Krajina from the warehouses of the Territorial Defense units in Serbia. The Serbian Ministry of Defence also supported the Krajina Army. In 1993, the US State Department reported that right after the Maslenica and Medak pocket operations, the authorities in Serbia dispatched substantial numbers of "volunteers" to Serb held territories in Croatia to fight against the Croats. A former secretary of Arkan testified at the Haague, confirming that the paramilitary leader took his orders, and his money, directly from the secret police run by Slobodan Milosevic.

    After the war

    See also: Croatia–Serbia relations and Croatia-Serbia genocide case

    The end of the armed conflict in 1995 came about when Serbia (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) directly signed the Erdut Agreement. After the successful implementation of the Agreement, the relations between Croatia and Serbia gradually improved. Croatia and Serbia established diplomatic relations in 1996. In a case before the International Court of Justice, Croatia filed the suit against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on July 2, 1999, citing Article IX of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. With the transformation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia into Serbia and Montenegro and the dissolution of that country in 2006, Serbia is considered its legal successor. The application was filed for Croatia by the American lawyer David Rivkin. Serbia reciprocated with the genocide lawsuit against the Republic of Croatia on January 4, 2010. The Serbian application covers missing people, killed people, refugees, expelled people and all military actions and concentration camps with historical account of World War II persecution of Serbs committed by the Independent State of Croatia during the World War II.

    By 2010, Croatia and Serbia further improved their relations through an agreement to resolve the remaining refugee issues, and visits of Croatian president Ivo Josipović to Belgrade, and of the Serbian president Boris Tadić to Zagreb and Vukovar. During their meeting in Vukovar, president Tadić gave a statement expressing his "apology and regret", while president Josipović said "that no crimes committed at the time would go unpunished." The statements were made during joint visit to Ovčara memorial centre, site of Vukovar massacre.

    In popular culture

    • Harrison's Flowers (2000), directed by Elie Chouraqui. When a Newsweek photojournalist disappears in war-torn Vukovar, his wife travels to find him.
    • The Death of Yugoslavia (1995). A BBC series with extensive interviews of prominent Croat and Serb protagonists.
    • Truth (director unknown). A Serbian-produced documentary with a brief history of the war from a Serb point of view, while examining in detail atrocities committed against Serbs.
    • Hrvatska Ljubavi Moja/Croatia, My Love, a movie by Jakov Sedlar showing accounts by Jews and American officials about the Oluja and the war as a whole.
    • ER. The character of Dr. Luka Kovač, played by Goran Višnjić, who first appeared on the series in 1999 and is still a main character as of 2007, lost his wife and children in the war. They were killed when a grenade shell hit their house.
    • Zaustavljeni glas/Suspended Voice (2010) by Višnja Starešina. A documentary about the siege of Vukovar and the death of reporter Siniša Glavašević at Ovčara.
    • Glave dole, ruke na leđa/Heads Down, Hands on Back (2003) - A Serbian documentary by Danica Vučenić about the Begejci camp
    • Jedinica/The Unit (2006), a Serbian documentary by Filip Švarm about the secret unit "Red Berets".

    See also

    Annotations

    1. The Serb-controlled units of the JNA from Serbia and Montenegro continued to fight throughout 1991 and up to May 1992 in support of the Republic of Serbian Krajina, but no longer as an officially separate combatant authority.
    2. As determined by the Badinter Arbitration Committee, SFR Yugoslavia dissolved during the war. At the beginning of the war, Croatia was legally a part of the SFR Yugoslavia, declaring its independence on June 25, 1991, and putting the independence decision into force on October 8, 1991 following a three-month moratorium. After all former Yugoslav federal republics, except Serbia and Montenegro declared independence, the pair declared creation of a new country - the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on April 27, 1992.
    3. Initially, SAO Krajina, SAO Western Slavonia and SAO Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Syrmia were separate entities and fought individually against the Croatian government. From 19 December 1991, the SAOs became part of RSK.
    4. On June 25, 1991 Croatian parliament declared independence of Croatia following a referendum held in May. The decision was however suspended for three months, and on October 8, 1991 the declaration became effective and Croatia was no longer a part of Yugoslavia.
    5. In 1992-1994, Republika Srpska was intermittently involved in Croatian military operations, mostly through provision of military and other aid to the RSK, occasional air raids launched from Mahovljani airbase near Banja Luka and most significantly through artillery attacks against a number of cities in Croatia, especially Slavonski Brod, Županja and Dubrovnik.
    6. ^ Bosnia and Herzegovina was particularly significant for the war in late 1994 and in 1995. Pursuant to the Washington Agreement, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was formed as a subunit of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (RBiH) representing both Bosnian Croat and Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) ethnic groups. Most significantly, the Washington Agreement specifically permitted Croatian Army to enter Bosnia and Herzegovina, thereby allowing operations Cincar and Winter '94 against the army of Republika Srpska, outflanking RSK capital Knin and creating a new strategic situation before the decisive battles of the war.
    7. The AP Western Bosnia, led by Fikret Abdić saw only a peripheral involvement in the Croatian War of Independence. Its focus was directed at securing and holding territory around Velika Kladuša, and in late 1994 and 1995 at capturing Bihać with help from its RSK allies. This alliance was the main facet of involvement in the Croatian War of Independence, since it may have permitted the RSK to release some troops from frontline or occupation duties around Bihać pocket and use those troops to fight advancing Croatian Army. Significance of that type of contribution however remains difficult to assess. The AP Western Bosnia dissolved during the Operation Storm.
    8. There was no formal declaration of the war. The first armed clash of the war was Pakrac clash on March 1, 1991, followed by Plitvice Lakes incident on March 31, 1991 when the first fatalities of the war occurred. The last major combat operation of the war was Operation Storm, on August 5-8, 1995. Formally, hostilities ceased when the Erdut Agreement was signed, on November 12, 1995.
    9. There were also some conflicts at the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, particularly at the end of the war in late 1994 and the first half of 1995. Most significant to the course of the war among those were Cincar, and Operation Winter '94.
    10. Three months after the military defeat of the RSK in Operation Storm, the UN-sponsored Erdut Agreement between the FR Yugoslav/Serbian and Croatian authorities was signed on November 12, 1995. The agreement provided for a two-year transitional period, later extended by a year, during which the remaining occupied territory of Croatia was to be transferred to control of the Croatian government. The agreement was implemented by UNTAES and successfully completed by 1998.

    Notes

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