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Kargil War
Part of the Indo-Pakistani Wars
Date May–July 1999 Location Kargil district, Kashmir, India Result U.S intervention for a truce; India regains control; Pakistan withdrew from occupied Kashmir to pre-war Line of Control. Territorial changes Status quo ante bellum
Belligerents
Republic of India	Islamic Republic of Pakistan Kashmiri Freedom fighters
Commanders and leaders
Ved Prakash Malik	Pervez Musharraf
Strength
30,000	5,000
Casualties and losses
Indian Official Figures: 587 killed 1,363 wounded 1 POW 2 Fighter aircrafts shot down (Mig-21 and Mig-27) 1 Mi-8 Helicopter shot down	Pakistani Estimates: 453 — 4,000 killed 665+ wounded 8 POW

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The Kargil War (Template:Lang-hi kārgil yuddh),(Template:Lang-ur kārgil jang), also known as the Kargil conflict, was an armed conflict between Republic of India and Islamic Republic of Pakistan that took place between May and July 1999 in the Kargil district of Kashmir and elsewhere along the Line of Control (LOC). The conflict is also referred to as Operation Vijay (Victory in Hindi) which was the name of the Indian operation to clear the Kargil sector.

The cause of the war was the infiltration of Pakistani soldiers and Kashmiri militants into positions on the Indian side of the LOC, which serves as the de facto border between the two states. During the initial stages of the war, Pakistan blamed the fighting entirely on independent Kashmiri insurgents, but documents left behind by casualties and later statements by Pakistan's Prime Minister and Chief of Army Staff showed involvement of Pakistani paramilitary forces, led by General Ashraf Rashid. The Indian Army, later on supported by the Indian Air Force, recaptured a majority of the positions on the Indian side of the LOC infiltrated by the Pakistani troops and militants. With international diplomatic opposition, the Pakistani forces withdrew from the remaining Indian positions along the LOC.

The war is one of the most recent examples of high altitude warfare in mountainous terrain, which posed significant logistical problems for the combating sides. This was only the second direct ground war between any two countries after they had developed nuclear weapons; it is also the most recent. (India and Pakistan both test-detonated fission devices in May 1998, though the first Indian nuclear test was conducted in 1974.) The conflict led to heightened tension between the two nations and thus consequential increase of defence spending by India.

Location

Before the Partition of India in 1947, Kargil was part of the Baltistan district of Ladakh, a sparsely populated region with diverse linguistic, ethnic and religious groups, living in isolated valleys separated by some of the world's highest mountains. The First Kashmir War (1947–48) concluded with the LOC bisecting the Baltistan district, with the town and district of Kargil lying on the Indian side in the Ladakh subdivision of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. After Pakistan's defeat in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, the two nations signed the Simla Agreement promising not to engage in armed conflict with respect to that boundary.

The town of Kargil is located 205 km (120 miles) from Srinagar, facing the Northern Areas across the LOC. Like other areas in the Himalayas, Kargil has a temperate climate. Summers are cool with frigid nights, while winters are long and chilly with temperatures often dropping to −48 °C (−54 °F).

An Indian national highway (NH 1D) connecting Srinagar to Leh cuts through Kargil. The area that witnessed the infiltration and fighting is a 160 km long stretch of ridges overlooking this only road linking Srinagar and Leh. The military outposts on the ridges above the highway were generally around 5,000 metres (16,000 ft) high, with a few as high as 5,485 metres (18,000 ft). Apart from the district capital, Kargil, the populated areas near the front line in the conflict included the Mushko Valley and the town of Drass, southwest of Kargil, as well as the Batalik sector and other areas, northeast of Kargil.

One of the reasons why Kargil was targeted was that the terrain surrounding it, lent itself to pre-emptive seizure of unoccupied military positions. With tactically vital features and well-prepared defensive posts atop the peaks, a defender of the high ground would enjoy advantages akin to a fortress. Any attack to dislodge a defender from high ground in mountain warfare requires a far higher ratio of attackers to defenders, and the difficulties would be exacerbated by the high altitude and freezing temperatures.

Kargil is just 173 km (108 mi) from the Pakistani-controlled town of Skardu, which was capable of providing logistical and artillery support to Pakistani combatants.

Background

After the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, there had been a long period with relatively few direct armed conflicts involving the military forces of the two neighbors - notwithstanding the efforts of both nations to control the Siachen Glacier by establishing military outposts on the surrounding mountains ridges and the resulting military skirmishes in the 1980s. During the 1990s, however, escalating tensions and conflict due to separatist activities in Kashmir, some of which were supported by Pakistan, as well as the conducting of nuclear tests by both countries in 1998, led to an increasingly belligerent atmosphere. In an attempt to defuse the situation, both countries signed the Lahore Declaration in February 1999, promising to provide a peaceful and bilateral solution to the Kashmir conflict.

During the winter of 1998 -1999, some elements of the Pakistani Armed Forces were covertly training and sending Pakistani troops and paramilitary forces, some allegedly in the guise of mujahideen, into territory on the Indian side of the LOC. The infiltration was code named "Operation Badr"; its aim was to sever the link between Kashmir and Ladakh, and cause Indian forces to withdraw from the Siachen Glacier, thus forcing India to negotiate a settlement of the broader Kashmir dispute. Pakistan also believed that any tension in the region would internationalise the Kashmir issue, helping it to secure a speedy resolution. Yet another goal may have been to boost the morale of the decade-long rebellion in Indian Administered Kashmir by taking a proactive role. Some writers have speculated that the operation's objective may also have been as a retaliation for India's Operation Meghdoot in 1984 that seized much of Siachen Glacier.

According to India's then army chief Ved Prakash Malik, and many other scholars, much of the background planning, including construction of logistical supply routes, had been undertaken much earlier. On several occasions during the 1980s and 1990s, the army had given Pakistani leaders (Zia ul Haq and Benazir Bhutto) similar proposals for infiltration into the Kargil region, but the plans had been shelved for fear of drawing the nations into all-out war.

Some analysts believe that the blueprint of attack was reactivated soon after Pervez Musharraf was appointed chief of army staff in October 1998. After the war, Nawaz Sharif, Prime Minister of Pakistan during the Kargil conflict, claimed that he was unaware of the plans, and that he first learned about the situation when he received an urgent phone call from Atal Bihari Vajpayee, his counterpart in India. Sharif attributed the plan to Musharraf and "just two or three of his cronies", a view shared by some Pakistani writers who have stated that only four generals, including Musharraf, knew of the plan. Musharraf, however, asserted that Sharif had been briefed on the Kargil operation 15 days ahead of Vajpayee's journey to Lahore on February 20.

War progress

There were three major phases to the Kargil War. First, Pakistan infiltrated forces into the Indian-controlled section of Kashmir and occupied strategic locations enabling it to bring NH1 within range of its artillery fire. The next stage consisted of India discovering the infiltration and mobilizing forces to respond to it. The final stage involved major battles by Indian and Pakistani forces resulting in India recapturing some territory held by Pakistani forces and the subsequent withdrawal of Pakistani forces back across the Line of Control after international pressure.

Occupation by Pakistan

During the winter season, due to extreme cold in the snow-capped mountainous areas of Kashmir, it was a common practice for both the Indian and Pakistan Armies to abandon some forward posts on their respective sides of the LOC and to reduce patrolling of areas that may be avenues of infiltration. When weather conditions became less severe, forward posts would be reoccupied and patrolling resumed.

During February 1999, the Pakistan Army began to re-occupy the posts it had abandoned on its side of the LOC in the Kargil region, but also sent forces to occupy some posts on the Indian side of the LOC. Troops from the elite Special Services Group as well as four to seven battalions of the Northern Light Infantry (a paramilitary regiment not part of the regular Pakistani army at that time) covertly and overtly set up bases on the vantage points of the Indian-controlled region. According to some reports, these Pakistani forces were backed by Kashmiri guerrillas and Afghan mercenaries.

Pakistani intrusions took place in the heights of the lower Mushkoh Valley, along the Marpo La ridgeline in Dras, in Kaksar near Kargil, in the Batalik sector east of the Indus River, on the heights above of the Chorbatla sector where the LOC turns North and in the Turtok sector south of the Siachen area.

India discovers infiltration and mobilizes

Initially, these incursions were not detected for a number of reasons: Indian patrols were not sent into some of the areas infiltrated by the Pakistani forces and heavy artillery fire by Pakistan in some areas provided cover for the infiltrators. But by the second week of May, the ambushing of an Indian patrol team led by Capt Saurabh Kalia, who acted on a tip-off by a local shepherd in the Batalik sector, led to the exposure of the infiltration. Initially, with little knowledge of the nature or extent of the infiltration, the Indian troops in the area assumed that the infiltrators were jihadis and claimed that they would evict them within a few days. Subsequent discovery of infiltration elsewhere along the LOC, and the difference in tactics employed by the infiltrators, caused the Indian army to realize that the plan of attack was on a much bigger scale. The total area seized by the ingress is generally accepted to between 130 km² - 200 km²;

The Government of India responded with Operation Vijay, a mobilisation of 200,000 Indian troops. However, because of the nature of the terrain, division and corps operations could not be mounted; subsequent fighting was conducted mostly at the regimental or battalion level. In effect, two divisions of the Indian Army, numbering 20,000, plus several thousand from the Paramilitary forces of India and the air force were deployed in the conflict zone. The total number of Indian soldiers that were involved in the military operation on the Kargil-Drass sector was thus close to 30,000. The number of infiltrators, including those providing logistical backup, has been put at approximately 5,000 at the height of the conflict. This figure includes troops from Pakistan-administered Kashmir who provided additional artillery support.

The Indian Air Force launched Operation Safed Sagar in support of the mobilization of Indian land forces, but its effectiveness during the war was limited by the high altitude and weather conditions, which in turn limited bomb loads and the number of airstrips that could be used.

The Indian Navy also prepared to blockade the Pakistani ports (primarily Karachi port) to cut off supply routes. Later, the then-Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif disclosed that Pakistan was left with just six days of fuel to sustain itself if a full-fledged war had broken out.

India attacks Pakistani positions

It has been suggested that Operation Vijay (1999) be merged into this article. (Discuss) Proposed since October 2009.

The terrain of Kashmir is mountainous and at high altitudes; even the best roads, such as National Highway 1D from Leh to Srinagar, are only two lanes. The rough terrain and narrow roads slowed traffic, and the high altitude, which affected the ability of aircraft to carry loads, made control of NH 1D (the actual stretch of the highway which was under Pakistani fire) a priority for India. From their observation posts, the Pakistani forces had a clear line-of-sight to lay down indirect artillery fire on NH 1D, inflicting heavy casualties on the Indians. This was a serious problem for the Indian Army as the highway was its main logistical and supply route. The Pakistani shelling of the arterial road posed the threat of Leh being cut off, though an alternative (and longer) road to Leh existed via Himachal Pradesh.

The infiltrators, apart from being equipped with small arms and grenade launchers, were also armed with mortars, artillery and anti-aircraft guns. Many posts were also heavily mined, with India later stating to having recovered more than 8,000 anti-personnel mines according to an ICBL report. Pakistan's reconnaissance was done through unmanned aerial vehicles and AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder radars supplied by the US. The initial Indian attacks were aimed at controlling the hills overlooking NH 1D, with high priority being given to the stretches of the highway near the town of Kargil. The majority of posts along the Line of Control were adjacent to the highway, and therefore the recapture of nearly every infiltrated post increased both the territorial gains and the security of the highway. The protection of this route and the recapture of the forward posts were thus ongoing objectives throughout the war.

The Indian Army's first priority was to recapture peaks that were in the immediate vicinity of NH 1D. This resulted in Indian troops first targeting the Tiger Hill and Tololing complex in Dras, which dominated the Srinagar-Leh route. This was soon followed by the Batalik-Turtok sub-sector which provided access to Siachen Glacier. Some of the peaks that were of vital strategic importance to the Pakistani defensive troops were Point 4590 and Point 5353. While 4590 was the nearest point that had a view of NH 1D, point 5353 was the highest feature in the Dras sector, allowing the Pakistani troops to observe NH 1D. The recapture of Point 4590 by Indian troops on June 14 was significant, notwithstanding the fact that it resulted in the Indian Army suffering the most casualties in a single battle during the conflict. Though most of the posts in the vicinity of the highway were cleared by mid-June, some parts of the highway near Drass witnessed sporadic shelling until the end of the war.

Once India regained control of the hills overlooking NH 1D, the Indian Army turned to driving the invading force back across the Line of Control. The Battle of Tololing, among other assaults, slowly tilted the combat in India's favor. The Pakistani troops at Tololing were aided by Pakistani fighters from Kashmir. Some of the posts put up a stiff resistance, including Tiger Hill (Point 5140) that fell only later in the war. Indian troops found well-entrenched Pakistani soldiers at Tiger Hill, and both sides suffered heavy casualties. After a final assault on the peak in which 10 Pakistani soldiers and 5 Indian soldiers were killed, Tiger Hill finally fell. A few of the assaults occurred atop hitherto unheard of peaks – most of them unnamed with only Point numbers to differentiate them – which witnessed fierce hand to hand combat.

As the operation was fully underway, about 250 artillery guns were brought in to clear the infiltrators in the posts that were in the line-of-sight. The Bofors FH-77B field howitzer played a vital role, with Indian gunners making maximum use of the terrain that assisted such an attack. However, its success was limited elsewhere due to the lack of space and depth to deploy the Bofors gun.

It was in this type of terrain that aerial attacks were used with limited effectiveness. The IAF lost a MiG-27 strike aircraft which it attributed to an engine failure as well as a MiG-21 fighter which was shot down by Pakistan; initially Pakistan said it shot down both jets after they crossed into its territory and one Mi-8 helicopter to Stinger SAMs. Years later, a retired Pakistani Officer confirmed that the MiG-27 was lost to technical failure. Also, French made Mirage 2000H of the IAF were tasked to drop laser-guided bombs to destroy well-entrenched positions of the Pakistani forces.

On May 27, 1999, Flt. Lt. Nachiketa developed engine trouble in the Batalik sector and bailed out of his craft. Sqn Ldr Ajay Ahuja went out of his way to locate his comrade but was shot down by a shoulder-fired Stinger missile. According to reports, he had bailed out of his stricken plane safely but was apparently killed by his captors as his body was returned riddled with bullet wounds.

In many vital points, neither artillery nor air power could dislodge the outposts manned by the Pakistani soldiers, who were out of visible range. The Indian Army mounted some direct frontal ground assaults which were slow and took a heavy toll given the steep ascent that had to be made on peaks as high as 18,000 feet (5,500 m). Since any daylight attack would be suicidal, all the advances had to be made under the cover of darkness, escalating the risk of freezing. Accounting for the wind chill factor, the temperatures were often as low as −15 °C to −11 °C (12 °F to 5 °F) near the mountain tops. Based on military tactics, much of the costly frontal assaults by the Indians could have been avoided if the Indian Military had chosen to blockade the supply route of the opposing force, virtually creating a siege. Such a move would have involved the Indian troops crossing the LoC as well as initiating aerial attacks on Pakistan soil, a manoeuvre India was not willing to exercise fearing an expansion of the theatre of war and reducing international support for its cause.

Two months into the conflict, Indian troops had slowly retaken most of the ridges that were encroached by the infiltrators; according to official count, an estimated 75%–80% of the intruded area and nearly all high ground was back under Indian control.

Withdrawal and final battles

Following the outbreak of armed fighting, Pakistan sought American help in de-escalating the conflict. Bruce Riedel, aide to then President Bill Clinton reported that the US intelligence had imaged Pakistani movements of nuclear weapons to forward deployments for fear of the Kargil hostilities escalating into a wider conflict between the two countries. However, President Clinton refused to intervene until Pakistan had removed all forces from the Indian side of the Line of Control. Following the Washington accord on July 4, where Sharif agreed to withdraw Pakistani troops, most of the fighting came to a gradual halt, but some Pakistani forces remained in positions on the Indian side of the LOC. In addition, the United Jihad Council (an umbrella for extremist groups) rejected Pakistan's plan for a climb-down, instead deciding to fight on.

The Indian army launched its final attacks in the last week of July; as soon as the Drass subsector had been cleared of Pakistani forces, the fighting ceased on July 26. The day has since been marked as Kargil Vijay Diwas (Kargil Victory Day) in India. By the end of the war, India had resumed control of all territory south and east of the Line of Control, as was established in July 1972 as per the Simla Agreement.

World opinion

Pakistan was criticised by other countries for instigating the war, as its paramilitary forces and insurgents crossed the Line of Control. Pakistan's primary diplomatic response, one of plausible deniability linking the incursion to what it officially termed as "Kashmiri freedom fighters", was in the end not successful. Veteran analysts argued that the battle was fought at heights where only seasoned troops could survive, so poorly equipped "freedom fighters" would neither have the ability nor the wherewithal to seize land and defend it. Moreover, while the army had initially denied the involvement of its troops in the intrusion, two soldiers were awarded the Nishan-E-Haider (Pakistan's highest military honour). Another 90 soldiers were also given gallantry awards, most of them posthumously, confirming Pakistan's role in the episode. India also released taped phone conversations between the Army Chief and a senior Pakistani general where the latter is recorded saying: "the scruff of necks is in our hands," although Pakistan dismissed it as a "total fabrication". Concurrently, Pakistan made several contradicting statements, confirming its role in Kargil, when it defended the incursions saying that the LOC itself was disputed. Pakistan also attempted to internationalize the Kashmir issue, by linking the crisis in Kargil to the larger Kashmir conflict but, such a diplomatic stance found few backers on the world stage.

As the Indian counter-attacks picked up momentum, Pakistani prime minister Nawaz Sharif flew to meet U.S. President Bill Clinton on July 4 to obtain support from the United States. Clinton rebuked Sharif, however, and asked him to use his contacts to rein in the militants and withdraw Pakistani soldiers from Indian territory. Clinton would later reveal in his autobiography that "Sharif's moves were perplexing" since the Indian Prime Minister had travelled to Lahore to promote bilateral talks aimed at resolving the Kashmir problem and "by crossing the Line of Control, Pakistan had wrecked the talks." On the other hand, he applauded Indian restraint for not crossing the LoC and escalating the conflict into an all-out war.

G8 nations supported India and condemned the Pakistani violation of the LOC at the Cologne summit. The European Union also opposed Pakistan's violation of the LOC. China, a long-time ally of Pakistan, insisted on a pullout of forces to the pre-conflict positions along the LoC and settling border issues peacefully. Other organizations like the ASEAN Regional Forum too supported India's stand on the inviolability of the LOC.

Faced with growing international pressure, Sharif managed to pull back the remaining soldiers from Indian territory. The joint statement issued by Clinton and Sharif conveyed the need to respect the Line of Control and resume bilateral talks as the best forum to resolve all disputes.

Gallantry awards

A number of Indian soldiers earned awards for gallantry during the campaign.

• Grenadier Yogendra Singh Yadav, 18 Grenadiers, Param Vir Chakra,
• Lieutenant Manoj Kumar Pandey, 1/11 Gorkha Rifles, Param Vir Chakra, Posthumous
• Captain Vikram Batra, 13 JAK Rifles, Param Vir Chakra, Posthumous
• Captain Anuj Nayyar,17 JAT Regiment, Maha Vir Chakra, Posthumous
• Major Saravanan, 1 Bihar, Vir Chakra, Posthumous
• Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja, Indian Air Force, Vir Chakra, Posthumous
• Rifleman Sanjay Kumar, 13 JAK Rifles, Param Vir Chakra
• Major Rajesh Singh Adhikari, 18 Grenadiers, Maha Vir Chakra , Posthumous

Two Pakistani soldiers received the Nishan-e-Haider.

• Captain Karnal Sher Khan, Nishan-e-Haider, Posthumous
• Havaldaar Lalak Jan, Northern Light Infantry, Nishan-e-Haider, Posthumous

Impact and influence of media

The Kargil War was significant for the impact and influence of the mass media on public opinion in both nations. Coming at a time of exploding growth in electronic journalism in India, the Kargil news stories and war footage were often telecast live on TV, and many websites provided in-depth analysis of the war. The conflict became the first "live" war in South Asia; it was given such detailed media coverage that one effect was the drumming up of jingoistic feelings.

The conflict soon turned into a news propaganda war, in which press briefings given by government officials of each nation produced conflicting claims and counterclaims. The Indian government placed a temporary news embargo on information from Pakistan, banning the telecast of the state-run Pakistani channel PTV and blocking access to online editions of the Dawn newspaper. The Pakistani media criticized this apparent curbing of freedom of the press in India, while India media claimed it was in the interest of national security. The Indian government ran advertisements in foreign publications including The Times and The Washington Post detailing Pakistan's role in supporting extremists in Kashmir in an attempt to garner political support for its position.

As the war progressed, media coverage of the conflict was more intense in India than in Pakistan. Many Indian channels showed images from the battle zone in a style reminiscent of CNN's coverage of the Gulf War (one of the shells fired by Pakistan troops even hit a Doordarshan transmission centre in Kargil while coverage continued). Reasons for India's increased coverage included the greater number of privately owned electronic media in India compared to Pakistan and relatively greater transparency in the Indian media. At a seminar in Karachi, Pakistani journalists agreed that while the Indian government had taken the press and the people into its confidence, Pakistan had not.

The print media in India and abroad was largely sympathetic to the Indian cause, with editorials in newspapers based in the west and other neutral countries observing that Pakistan was largely responsible for the conflict. Some analysts believe that Indian media, which was both larger in number and more credible, may have acted as a force multiplier for the Indian military operation in Kargil and served as a morale booster. As the fighting intensified, the Pakistani version of events found little backing on the world stage. This helped India gain valuable diplomatic recognition for its position.

WMDs and the nuclear factor

Since Pakistan and India each had weapons of mass destruction, many in the international community were concerned that if the Kargil conflict intensified, it could lead to nuclear war. Both countries had tested their nuclear capability in 1998 (India conducted its first test in 1974 while it was Pakistan's first-ever nuclear test). Many pundits believed the tests to be an indication of the escalating stakes in the scenario in South Asia. When the Kargil conflict started just a year after the nuclear tests, many nations desired to end it before it intensified.

International concerns increased when Pakistani foreign secretary Shamshad Ahmad made a statement on May 31 warning that an escalation of the limited conflict could lead Pakistan to use "any weapon" in its arsenal. This was immediately interpreted as a threat of nuclear retaliation by Pakistan in the event of an extended war, and the belief was reinforced when the leader of Pakistan's senate noted, "The purpose of developing weapons becomes meaningless if they are not used when they are needed." Many such ambiguous statements from officials of both countries were viewed as warnings of an impending nuclear crisis where the combatants would consider use of their limited nuclear arsenals in 'tactical' nuclear warfare in the belief that it would not have ended in mutual assured destruction, as could have occurred in a nuclear conflict between the United States and the USSR. Some experts believe that following nuclear tests in 1998, the Pakistani military was emboldened by its nuclear deterrent to markedly increase coercion against India.

The nature of the India-Pakistan conflict took a more sinister turn when the U.S. received intelligence that Pakistani nuclear warheads were being moved towards the border. Bill Clinton tried to dissuade Pakistan prime minister Nawaz Sharif from nuclear brinkmanship, even threatening Pakistan of dire consequences. According to a White House official, Sharif seemed to be genuinely surprised by this supposed missile movement and responded that India was probably planning the same. In an article in May 2000 Dr Sanjay Badri-Maharaj claimed that India too had readied at least five nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles, but could not back up this claim with any official proof.

Sensing a deteriorating military scenario, diplomatic isolation, and the risks of a larger conventional and nuclear war, Sharif ordered the Pakistani army to vacate the Kargil heights. He later claimed in his official biography that General Pervez Musharraf had moved nuclear warheads without informing him. Recently however, Pervez Musharraf revealed in his memoirs that Pakistan's nuclear delivery system was not operational during the Kargil war; something that would have put Pakistan under serious disadvantage if the conflict went nuclear.

The threat of WMD included chemical and even biological weapons. Pakistan accused India of using chemical weapons and incendiary weapons such as napalm against the Kashmiri fighters. India, on the other hand, showcased a cache of gas masks, among other firearms, as proof that Pakistan may have been prepared to use non-conventional weapons. US official and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons determined that Pakistani allegations of India using banned chemicals in its bombs were unfounded.

Aftermath

India

From the end of the war until February 2000, the Indian stock market rose by over 30%. The next Indian national budget included major increases in military spending.

There was a surge in patriotism, with many celebrities expressing their support for the Kargil cause. Indians were angered by media reports of the death of pilot Ajay Ahuja, especially after Indian authorities reported that Ahuja had been murdered and his body mutilated by Pakistani troops. The war had produced higher than expected fatalities for the Indian military, with a sizeable percentage of them including newly commissioned officers. One month after conclusion of the Kargil war, the Atlantique Incident - where a Pakistan Navy plane was shot down by India - briefly reignited fears of a conflict between the two countries.

After the war, the Indian government severed ties with Pakistan and increased defence preparedness. India increased its defence budget as it sought to acquire more state of the art equipment. Media reported about military procurement irregularities and criticism of intelligence agencies like Research and Analysis Wing, which failed to predict the intrusions or the identity/number of infiltrators during the war. An internal assessment report by the armed forces, published in an Indian magazine, showed several other failings, including "a sense of complacency" and being "unprepared for a conventional war" on the presumption that nuclearism would sustain peace. It also highlighted the lapses in command and control, the insufficient troop levels and the dearth of large-calibre guns like the Bofors. In 2006, retired Air Chief Marshal, A.Y. Tipnis, alleged that the Indian Army did not fully inform the government about the intrusions, adding that the army chief Ved Prakash Malik, was initially reluctant to use the full strike capability of the Indian Air Force, instead requesting only helicopter gunship support. Soon after the conflict, India also decided to complete the project - previously stalled by Pakistan - to fence the entire LOC.

The end of the Kargil conflict was followed by the 13th Indian General Elections to the Lok Sabha, which gave a decisive mandate to the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government. It was re-elected to power in September–October 1999 with a majority of 303 seats out of 545 in the Lok Sabha. On the diplomatic front, Indo-U.S. relations improved, as the United States appreciated Indian attempts to restrict the conflict to a limited geographic area. Relations with Israel – which had discreetly aided India with ordnance supply and matériel such as unmanned aerial vehicles and laser-guided bombs, as well as satellite imagery – also were bolstered.

Kargil Review Committee

Soon after the war the Atal Behari Vajpayee government set up an inquiry into its causes and to analyze perceived Indian intelligence failures. The high-powered committee was chaired by eminent strategic affairs analyst K. Subrahmanyam and given powers to interview anyone with current or past associations with Indian security, including former Prime Ministers. The committee's final report (also referred to as the 'Subrahmanyam Report') led to a large-scale restructuring of Indian Intelligence. It, however, came in for heavy criticism in the Indian media for its perceived avoidance of assigning specific responsibility for failures over detecting the Kargil intrusions. The Committee was also embroiled in controversy for indicting Brigadier Surinder Singh of the Indian Army for his failure to report enemy intrusions in time, and for his subsequent conduct. Many press reports questioned or contradicted this finding and claimed that Singh had in fact issued early warnings that were ignored by senior Indian Army commanders and, ultimately, higher government functionaries.

In a departure from the norm the final report was published and made publicly available. Some chapters and all annexures, however, were deemed to contain classified information by the government and not released. K. Subrahmanyam later wrote that the annexures contained information on the development of India's nuclear weapons program and the roles played by Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi, P. V. Narasimha Rao and V P Singh.

Pakistan

Faced with the possibility of international isolation, the already fragile Pakistani economy was weakened further. The morale of Pakistani forces after the withdrawal declined as many units of the Northern Light Infantry suffered heavy casualties. The government refused to accept the dead bodies of many officers, an issue that provoked outrage and protests in the Northern Areas. Pakistan initially did not acknowledge many of its casualties, but Sharif later said that over 4,000 Pakistani troops were killed in the operation and that Pakistan had lost the conflict. Responding to this, Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf said, "It hurts me when an ex-premier undermines his own forces," and claimed that Indian casualties were more than that of Pakistan.

Many in Pakistan had expected a victory over the Indian military based on Pakistani official reports on the war, but were dismayed by the turn of events and questioned the eventual retreat. The military leadership is believed to have felt let down by the prime minister's decision to withdraw the remaining fighters. However, some authors, including ex-CENTCOM Commander Anthony Zinni, and ex-PM Nawaz Sharif, state that it was General Musharraf who requested Sharif to withdraw the Pakistani troops. With Sharif placing the onus of the Kargil attacks squarely on the army chief Pervez Musharraf, there was an atmosphere of uneasiness between the two. On October 12, 1999, General Musharraf staged a bloodless coup d'état, ousting Nawaz Sharif.

Benazir Bhutto, an opposition leader and former prime minister, called the Kargil War "Pakistan's greatest blunder". Many ex-officials of the military and the Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan's principal intelligence agency) also believed that "Kargil was a waste of time" and "could not have resulted in any advantage" on the larger issue of Kashmir. A retired Pakistani Army General, Lt Gen Ali Kuli Khan, lambasted the war as "a disaster bigger than the East Pakistan tragedy", adding that the plan was "flawed in terms of its conception, tactical planning and execution" that ended in "sacrificing so many soldiers." The Pakistani media criticized the whole plan and the eventual climbdown from the Kargil heights since there were no gains to show for the loss of lives and it only resulted in international condemnation.

Despite calls by many, no public commission of inquiry was set up in Pakistan to investigate the people responsible for initiating the conflict. The Pakistan Muslim League (N) (PML(N)) published a white paper in 2006, which stated that Nawaz Sharif constituted an inquiry committee that recommended a court martial for General Pervez Musharraf, but Musharraf "stole the report" after toppling the government, to save himself. The report also claims that India knew about the plan 11 months before its launch, enabling a complete victory for India on military, diplomatic and economic fronts. A statement in June, 2008 by a former Pakistan Army X Corps Core-commander and Director-General of Military Intelligence (M.I.) that time, Lieutenant-General (retired) Jamshed Gulzar Kiani said that As Prime minsiter, Nawaz Sharif "was never briefed by the army" on the Kargil attack, reignited the demand for a probe of the episode by legal and political groups.

Though the Kargil conflict had brought the Kashmir dispute into international focus – which was one of the aims of Pakistan – it had done so in negative circumstances that eroded its credibility, since the infiltration came just after a peace process between the two countries was underway. The sanctity of the LOC too received international recognition. President Clinton's move to ask Islamabad to withdraw hundreds of armed militants from Indian-administered Kashmir was viewed by many in Pakistan as indicative of a clear shift in US policy against Pakistan.

After the war, a few changes were made to the Pakistan army. In recognition of the Northern Light Infantry's performance in the war - which even drew praise from a retired Indian Lt. General - the regiment was incorporated into the regular army. The war showed that despite a tactically sound plan that had the element of surprise, little groundwork had been done to gauge the politico-diplomatic ramifications. And like previous unsuccessful infiltrations attempts, such as Operation Gibraltar, which sparked the 1965 war, there was little coordination or information sharing among the branches of the Pakistani Armed Forces. One U.S. Intelligence study is reported to have stated that Kargil was yet another example of Pakistan's (lack of) grand strategy, repeating the follies of the previous wars.

Casualties

Casualties for both sides were heavy. Pakistani claims gave two figures. The figure of 357 soldiers dead was challenged by some Pakistani officials, who claimed that 4,000 Pakistani soldiers were killed in the conflict. Pakistan also confirmed that more than 665 Pakistani troops were wounded and 8 were captured. According to India, Indian losses stand at 527 soldiers killed, 1,363 wounded, and 1 captured.

Pakistan army losses have been difficult to determine, partly because Pakistan has not published an official casualties list. The US Department of State had made an early, partial estimate of close to 700 fatalities. According to numbers stated by Nawaz Sharif there were over 4,000 fatalities. His PML (N) party in its "white paper" on the war mentioned that more than 3,000 Mujahideens, officers and soldiers were killed. Another major Pakistani political party, the Pakistan Peoples Party, also says that "thousands" of soldiers and irregulars died. Indian estimates stand at 1,042 Pakistani soldiers killed. Musharraf, in his Hindi version of his memoirs, titled "Agnipath", differs from all the estimates stating that 357 troops were killed with a further 665 wounded. Apart from General Musharraf's figure on the number of Pakistanis wounded, the number of people injured in the Pakistan camp is not yet fully known although they are at least more than 400 according to Pakistan army's website. One Indian Pilot was officially captured during the fighting, while there were eight Pakistani soldiers who were captured during the fighting, and were repatriated on 13 August 1999;

Kargil War in the arts

The brief conflict provided considerable dramatic material for filmmakers and authors in India. Some documentaries which were shot on the subject were used by the ruling party coalition, led by Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), in furthering its election campaign that immediately followed the war. The following is a list of the major films and dramas on the subject.

• "Lord John Marbury (The West Wing)" (1999), 11th episode of the first season depicts a fictionalized representation of the Kargil conflict.
• Pentagram's single, 'Price Of Bullets', released in 1999 dealt with the Kargil War.
• LOC: Kargil (2003), a Hindi movie which depicts many incidents from the war was one of the longest in Indian movie history, running for more than four hours.
• Lakshya (2004), another Hindi movie portraying a fictionalised account of the conflict. Movie critics have generally appreciated the realistic portrayal of characters. The film also received good reviews in Pakistan because it portrays both sides fairly.
• Sainika (2002), the Kannada film directed by Mahesh Sukhdhare depicted the life of a soldier with Kargil war as one of the events. Starring C.P.Yogishwar and Sakshi Shivanand.
• Dhoop (2003), directed by national award winner Ashwini Chaudhary, which depicted the life of Anuj Nayyar's parents after his death. Anuj Nayyar was a captain in the Indian army and was awarded Maha Vir Chakra posthumously. Om Puri plays the role of S.K. Nayyar, Anuj's father.
• Mission Fateh - Real Stories of Kargil Heroes, a TV series telecast on Sahara channel chronicling the Indian Army's missions.
• Fifty Day War - A theatrical production on the war, directed by Aamir Raza Husain, the title indicating the length of the Kargil conflict. This was claimed to be the biggest production of its kind in Asia, budget of Rs. 1.5 crore, involving real aircraft and explosions in an outdoor setting.
• Kurukshetra(2008) - A Malayalam film directed by a former Indian Army Major - major Ravi (Retd) based on his actual experience of Kargil War.

Many other movies like Tango Charlie drew heavily upon the Kargil episode, which still continues to be a plot for mainstream movies with a Malayalam movie Keerthi Chakra. The impact of the war in the sporting arena was also visible during the India-Pakistan clash in the 1999 Cricket World Cup, which coincided with the Kargil timeline. The game witnessed heightened passions and was one of the most viewed matches in the tournament.

Notes

1. Government of India site mentioning the Indian casualties, Statewise break up of Indian casualties statement from Indian Parliament
2. "Breakdown of casualties into Officers, JCOs, and Other Ranks". Parliament of India Website. Retrieved 2009-05-20.
3. "Complete Roll of Honour of Indian Army's Killed in Action during Op Vijay". Indian Army. Archived from the original on December 22, 2007. Retrieved 2009-05-20.
4. "Official statement giving breakdown of wounded personnel". Parliament of India Website. Archived from the original on February 16, 2008. Retrieved 2009-05-20.
5. Indian artillery inflicted maximum damage to Pak during Kargil
6. "Pakistan Army admits to Kargil martyrs". NDTV. Retrieved 2010-11-19.
7. ^ "President Musharaffs disclosure on Pakistani Casualties in his book". Indian Express. Retrieved 2009-05-20.
8. ^ "Over soldier's killed in Kargil: Sharif". The Hindu. Retrieved 2009-05-20.
9. ^ "Tribune Report on Pakistani POWs". Retrieved 2009-05-20.
10. It is also sometimes referred to as Operation Vijay Kargil so as to distinguish it from Operation Vijay (1961), the operation by the Military of India that led to the capture of Goa, Daman and Diu and Anjidiv Islands.
11. ^ "1999 Kargil Conflict". GlobalSecurity.org. Retrieved 2009-05-20.
12. Tom Clancy, Gen. Tony Zinni (Retd) and Tony Koltz (2004). Battle Ready. Grosset & Dunlap. ISBN 0-399-15176-1.
13. "Pak commander blows the lid on Islamabad's Kargil plot". June 12, 2009. Retrieved 2009-06-13.
14. "Sharif admits he let down Vajpayee on Kargil conflict". The Hindu. Chennai, India. 2007-09-10. Retrieved 2007-10-06.
15. Nawaz, Shuja, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within, p. 420 (2007)
16. Hussain, Javed (2006-10-21). "Kargil: what might have happened". Dawn. Retrieved 2009-05-20.
17. Cheema, Pervaiz Iqbal (2003). The Armed Forces of Pakistan. Allen & Unwin. ISBN 1865081191. Pg 4
18. Profile of Kargil District Official website of Kargil District
19. "Climate & Soil conditions". Official website of Kargil District. Retrieved 2009-05-20.
20. ^ "War in Kargil - The CCC's summary on the war" (PDF). Retrieved 2009-05-20.
21. Chandran, Suba (2004). "Limited War with Pakistan: Will It Secure India's Interests?". ACDIS Occasional Paper. Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS), University of Illinois. Retrieved 2009-05-20.
22. Against the accepted 3:1 ratio for attacking troops vs defending troops, the ratio over mountain terrain is estimated at 6:1.Men At War India Today
23. Acosta, Marcus P., CPT, U.S. Army, High Altitude Warfare- The Kargil Conflict & the Future, June 2003. Alternate Link
24. "The Coldest War". Outside Magazine. Retrieved 2009-05-20.
25. ^ Kargil: where defence met diplomacy - India's then Chief of Army Staff VP Malik, expressing his views on Operation Vijay. Hosted on Daily Times; The Fate of Kashmir By Vikas Kapur and Vipin Narang Stanford Journal of International Relations; Book review of "The Indian Army: A Brief History by Maj Gen Ian Cardozo" - Hosted on IPCS
26. Robert G. Wirsing (2003). Kashmir in the Shadow of War: regional rivalries in a nuclear age. M.E. Sharpe. ISBN 0-7656-1090-6. Pg 38
27. Ludra, Kuldip S. (2001). Operation Badr:Mussharef's contribution to Pakistan's thousand years war against India. Institute for Strategic Research and Analysis Chandigarh. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
28. Low Intensity Conflicts in India By Vivek Chadha, United Service Institution of India Published by SAGE, 2005, ISBN 0-7619-3325-5
29. ^ Hassan Abbas (2004). Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror. M.E. Sharpe. ISBN 0-7656-1497-9.
30. Musharraf advised against Kargil, says Benazir, ‘Musharraf planned Kargil when I was PM' : Bhutto - Previous interview to Hindustan Times on November 30, 2001
31. Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within by Shuja Nawaz Oxford University Press
32. Kapur, S. Paul (2007). Dangerous Deterrent. Stanford University Press. p. 118. ISBN 0804755507. {{cite book}}: Cite has empty unknown parameter: |coauthors= (help)
33. "Nawaz blames Musharraf for Kargil". The Times of India. 2006-05-28. Retrieved 2009-05-20.
34. "I learnt about Kargil from Vajpayee, says Nawaz". Dawn. 2006-05-29. Retrieved 2006-05-29.
35. ^ Qadir, Shaukat (April 2002). "An Analysis of the Kargil Conflict 1999" (PDF). RUSI Journal. Retrieved 2009-05-20.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: year (link)
36. "Kargil planned before Vajpayee's visit: Musharraf". Indian Express. 2006-07-13. Retrieved 2009-05-20.
37. "How I Started A War". Time. 1999-07-12. Retrieved 2009-05-20.
38. ^ Pervez Musharraf (2006). In the Line of Fire: A Memoir. Free Press. ISBN 0-7432-8344-9.
39. "The Northern Light Infantry in the Kargil Operations". Retrieved 2009-05-20. by Ravi Rikhye 1999 August 25, 2002 - ORBAT
40. ^ It is estimated that around 2,000 "Mujahideen" might have been involved as Musharraf stated on July 6, 1999 to Pakistan's The News; online article in the Asia Times quoting the General's estimate. An Indian Major General(retd) too puts the number of guerrillas at 2,000 apart from the NLI Infantry Regiment.
41. Saurabh Kalia's parents waging a lone battle to highlight war crimes
42. War in Kargil (PDF) Islamabad Playing with Fire by Praful Bidwai - The Tribune, 7 June 1999
43. Gen VP Malik. "Lessons from Kargil". Retrieved 2009-05-20.
44. Grare, Frédéric. "The Resurgence of Baluch nationalism" (PDF). Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved 2009-05-20.
45. "Exercise Seaspark—2001". Defence Journal. April 2001. Retrieved 2009-05-20. {{cite web}}: |first= missing |last= (help)CS1 maint: year (link)
46. ^ "Indian general praises Pakistani valour at Kargil". Daily Times, Pakistan. 2003-05-05. Retrieved 2009-05-20.
47. Kashmir in the Shadow of War By Robert Wirsing Published by M.E. Sharpe, 2003 ISBN 0-7656-1090-6 pp36
48. Landmine monitor - India
49. Indian Army gets hostile weapon locating capability
50. Managing Armed Conflicts in the 21st Century By Adekeye Adebajo, Chandra Lekha Sriram Published by Routledge pp192,193
51. Swami, Praveen (2004-06-30). "Commander ordered capture of Point 5353 in Kargil war". The Hindu. Chennai, India. Retrieved 2009-05-20.
52. The State at War in South Asia By Pradeep Barua Published by U of Nebraska Press Page 261
53. SA-7 GRAIL 9K32M Strela-2, Anza MKI - Pakistan
54. India loses two jets
55. "Himalayan Showdown" - Air Commodore Kaiser Tufail, Air Forces Monthly, June 2009
56. "Bitter Chill of Winter". Tariq Ali, London Review of Books. Retrieved 2009-05-20.
57. Colonel Ravi Nanda (1999). Kargil : A Wake Up Call. Vedams Books. ISBN 81-7095-074-0. Online summary of the Book
58. Pakistan 'prepared nuclear strike'
59. "Pakistan and the Kashmir militants". BBC News. 1999-07-05. Retrieved 2009-05-20.
60. Hassan Abbas (2004). Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, The Army, And America's War On Terror. M.E. Sharpe. ISBN 0-7656-1497-9. Pg 173; Revisiting Kargil: Was it a Failure for Pakistan's Military?, IPCS
61. "Lesson learnt?". dawn. 2006-07-24. Retrieved 2009-08-02.
62. "Transcripts of conversations between Lt Gen Mohammad Aziz, Chief of General Staff and Musharraf". India Today. Archived from the original on July 1, 2008. Retrieved 2009-05-20.
63. U.S. brokers Kargil peace but problems remain
64. ^ "ASEAN backs India's stand". The Tribune. 2006-07-24. Retrieved 2009-05-20.
65. Bill Clinton (2004). My Life. Random House. ISBN 0-375-41457-6., Pg 865
66. Dialogue call amid fresh fighting - - BBC News
67. "India encircles rebels on Kashmir mountaintop". CNN. Archived from the original on June 14, 2008. Retrieved 2009-05-20.CNN
68. "Text of joint Clinton-Sharif statement". CNN. Archived from the original on May 16, 2008. Retrieved 2009-05-20.
69. "Disarmament Diplomacy - Complete texts of Indian and Pakistani statements following Pakistan's decision to withdraw its troops in Kargil". Retrieved 2009-05-20.
70. Indian Army Param Vir Chakra Winners
71. http://www.shaheedfoundation.org/NishaneHaider.asp
72. India's Nuclear Bomb By George Perkovich University of California Press, 2002 ISBN 0-520-23210-0, Page 473
73. Sachdev, A.K. "Media Related Lessons From Kargil - Strategic Analysis: January 2000 (Vol. XXIII No. 10)". Retrieved 2009-05-20.
74. "Centre bans PTV". Retrieved 2009-05-20.Indian Express June 3, 1999
75. Delhi lifts ban on Dawn website, PTV broadcasts Dawn wire service 17 July 1999
76. A different view of Kargil by Rasheeda Bhagat Volume 16 - Issue 19, Sep. 11 - 24, 1999 The Frontline
77. Pak TV ban gets good response
78. Pak media lament lost opportunity - Editorial statements and news headlines from Pakistan hosted on Rediff.com
79. The role of media in war - Sultan M Hali, Press Information Bureau, India
80. Quoted in News Desk, “Pakistan May Use Any Weapon,” The News, May 31, 1999.
81. Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program (PDF)
82. Options Available to the United States to Counter a Nuclear Iran By George Perkovich - Testimony by George Perkovich before the House Armed Services Committee, February 1, 2006
83. India had deployed Agni during Kargil, Article from "Indian Express" 19/6/2000
84. "Musharraf moved nuclear weapons in Kargil war". The Nation. Archived from the original on 2007-12-23. Retrieved 2009-05-27.
85. NTI: Country Overview - Nuclear Threat Initiative
86. The Spoils of War, India backs its 'boys'
87. Centre files second affidavit in Kargil scam The Financial Express April 14, 2005
88. Kargil coffin scam
89. War Against Error, Cover story on Outlook, February 28, 2005 (Online edition)
90. Army was reluctant to tell govt about Kargil: Tipnis 7 October 2006 - The Times of India
91. Fencing Duel - India Today
92. India Changes Course By Paul R. Dettman Published by Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001, ISBN 0-275-97308-5, Page 117-118
93. News reports from Daily Times (Pakistan) and BBC mentioning the Israeli military support to India during the conflict.
94. "Kargil : Subrahmanyam Committee's Report". Indian News. Retrieved 2009-10-20.
95. "Kargil report shows the way". Indian Express. Retrieved 2009-10-20.
96. Pg 56-60 Dixit, JN, "India-Pakistan in War & Peace", Routledge, 2002
97. "The sacking of a Brigadier". Frontline. Retrieved 2009-10-20.
98. "Scapegoat for the system". The Hindu. Chennai, India. 2001-07-01. Retrieved 2009-10-20.
99. "Army's Kargil inquiry indicts Brig Surinder Singh". Rediff. Retrieved 2009-10-20.
100. "THE KARGIL STORY". The Hindu. Retrieved 2009-10-20.
101. "P.V. Narasimha Rao and the Bomb". The Tribune. Retrieved 2009-10-20.
102. "Narasimha Rao and the Bomb". informaworld. Retrieved 2009-10-20.
103. ^ Samina Ahmed. "Diplomatic Fiasco: Pakistan's Failure on the Diplomatic Front Nullifies its Gains on the Battlefield" (Belfer Center for International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government)
104. Multiple views and opinions on the state of Pakistan's economy, the Kashmir crisis and the military coup, The Promise of Contemporary Pakistan by Faisal Cheema
105. Samina Ahmed. "A Friend for all Seasons." (Belfer Center for International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government)
106. "Pakistan refuses to take even officers' bodies"
107. "press release issued in New Delhi regarding bodies of two Pakistan Army Officers"
108. Second-Class Citizens by M. Ilyas Khan, The Herald (Pakistan), July 2000. Online scanned version of the article(PDF)
109. Musharraf and the truth about Kargil - The Hindu 25 September 2006
110. President Musharraf reacts to Nawaz Sharif's Pakistan's casualty claims in Kargil
111. Pakistani opposition presses for Sharif's resignation By K. Ratnayake 7 August 1999, Can Sharif deliver?, Michael Krepon. "The Stability-Instability Paradox in South Asia" - Hosted on Henry L. Stimson Centre.
112. Tom Clancy, Gen. Tony Zinni (Retd) and Tony Koltz (2004). Battle Ready. Grosset & Dunlap. ISBN 0-399-15176-1.
113. Musharraf Vs. Sharif: Who's Lying?
114. Kargil Was Success Only For Pervez
115. Select Media Reports from Urdu Media in Pakistan (PDF)
116. ^ Kargil was a bigger disaster than 1971 - Interview of Lt Gen Ali Kuli Khan.
117. Review of Musharraf's memoirs by S. A. Haleem Jang, October 19, 2006
118. Victory in reverse: the great climbdown, For this submission what gain? by Ayaz Amir - Dawn (newspaper)
119. PML-N issues white paper on Kargil operation - The News International
120. Ill-conceived planning by Musharraf led to second major military defeat in Kargil: PML-N Pak Tribune, August 6, 2006
121. Call for Musharraf treason trial By M Ilyas Khan BBC NewsJune 3, 2008
122. Lawmakers demand probe into Kargil debacle Associated Press of Pakistan June 3, 2008
123. MNAs seek probe into Kargil debacle By Naveed Butt The Nation
124. Analysis: Shift in US Kashmir stance?, BBC 1999-06-17
125. Kargil: the morning after By Irfan Husain 29 April 2000 Dawn
126. EDITORIAL: Kargil: a blessing in disguise? July 19, 2004 Daily Times, Pakistan
127. Ill-conceived planning by Musharraf led to second major military defeat in Kargil: PML-N August 6, 2006, PakTribune
128. "Indo-Pak summit 2001". Pakistan Peoples Party. 2007-10-12. Archived from the original on 2007-10-12. Retrieved 2009-05-27.
129. Indian Army rubbishes Musharraf's Kargil claims
130. Pakistan army publishes list of army regulars who died in various conflicts, November 2010
131. LOC: Kargil main page on the website IMDb.
132. A collection of some reviews on the movie "Lakshya" at Rotten Tomatoes
133. Bollywood's Kargil —Ihsan Aslam Daily Times
135. Dhoop at IMDb
136. "The larger than life director". Financial Express. February 19, 2000.
137. Tango Charlie at IMDb
138. Keerthi Chakra at IMDb

Footnotes

• ^ Note (I): Names for the conflict: There have been various names for the conflict. During the actual fighting in Kargil, the Indian Government was careful not to use the term "war", calling it a "war-like situation", even though both nations indicated that they were in a "state of war". Terms like Kargil "conflict", Kargil "incident" or the official military assault, "Operation Vijay", were thus preferred. After the end of the war however, the Indian Government increasingly called it the "Kargil War", even though there had been no official declaration of war. Other less popularly used names included "Third Kashmir War" and Pakistan's codename given to the infiltration: "Operation Badr".

References

• The Cause and Consequences of the 1999 Limited War in Kargil the CCC Kargil Project.
• Kargil Conflict (GlobalSecurity.org)
• Limited Conflict Under the Nuclear Umbrella (RAND Corporation)
• War in Kargil (Center for Contemporary Conflict) PDF download
• Essay on the outcomes of the Kargil War
• Stephen P. Cohen (2004). The Idea of Pakistan. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 0-8157-1502-1.
• Kargil Review Committee (2000). From Surprise to Reckoning: The Kargil Review Committee Report. SAGE Publications. ISBN 0-7619-9466-1. (Executive summary of the report, Online)
• Limited War with Pakistan: Will It Secure India's Interests? ACDIS Occasional Paper by Suba Chandran, Published 2004 by Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS), University of Illinois.
• An Analysis of the Kargil Conflict 1999, by Shaukat Qadir, RUSI Journal, April 2002 (PDF)
• V.P. Malik (2006). Kargil; From Surprise to Victory. Harper Collins, New Delhi, India.

Further reading

• M. K. Akbar (1999). Kargil Cross Border Terrorism. South Asia Books. ISBN 81-7099-734-8.
• Amarinder Singh (2001). A Ridge Too Far: War in the Kargil Heights 1999. Motibagh Palace, Patiala. ASIN: B0006E8KKW.
• Jasjit Singh (1999). Kargil 1999: Pakistan's Fourth War for Kashmir. South Asia Books. ISBN 81-86019-22-7.
• J. N. Dixit (2002). India-Pakistan in War & Peace. Books Today. ISBN 0-415-30472-5.
• Muhammad Ayub. An Army; Its role and Rule (A History of the Pakistan Army From Independence to Kargil 1947–1999). Rosedog Books, Pittsburgh. Pennsylvania, USA. ISBN 0-8059-9594-3.

External links

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2. Part 2

• Indian Armed Forces site on Kargil
• Animated timeline and other Kargil stories - India Today
• Impact of the conflict on civilians - BBC
• The Day A Nuclear Conflict Was Averted – YaleGlobal Online
• Kargil Debacle: Musharraf's Time Bomb, Waiting to Explode
• Brief analysis of the Kargil conflict by Center for Strategic and International Studies (PDF)
• Kargil--nine years onThe News International, Pakistan
• POSTCARD USA: Kargil, Kargil everywhere - Pakistan's Daily Times
• Pakistan's lessons from its Kargil War
• Video of Pakistani PoWs from the conflict
• Video - Tiger hill, Kargil hill's turning point
• Video of Indian army handling over bodies of Pakistani soldiers to Pak army

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