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Template:Totally disputed The Palestinian Exodus (Arabic: الهجرة الفلسطينية al-Hijra al-Filasteeniya) refers to the refugee flight of Palestinian Arabs during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. It is called the Nakba (Arabic: النكبة), meaning "disaster" or "cataclysm", by Palestinians.

During the war of 1948, many fled or were expelled from their homes in the part of Palestine that would become the State of Israel to other parts of Palestine (region) or to neighbouring countries.

The UN estimates their number at 711,000 while the Israeli estimate of the refugees is 520,000 and the Palestinian estimate is 900,000.

The degree to which the flight of the refugees was voluntary or involuntary is hotly debated. Some cases of expulsion are well-documented, such as in Lydda and Ramle. So is the attempt by some Jewish leaders in Haifa to stem the flight , and that some Arab leaders called for evacuation of civilian Arabs from the war zone. How much each factor has contributed is disputed.

In 1949 at the Lausanne conference, Israel proposed allowing 100,000 refugees to return, this number including an alleged 25,000 who had already returned surreptitiously and 10,000 projected family-reunion cases. The offer was conditional on a full peace treaty that would allow Israel to keep all the territory it had captured and on the Arab states agreeing to absorb the remaining refugees. The offer was rejected by the Arab states.

Demographics

The current refugee population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is 1.65 million according to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) , with the entire local population estimated at 3.76 million by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. Although there is no accepted definition of who can be considered a Palestinian refugee for legal purposes, UNRWA defines them as "persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948, who lost both their homes and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict. UNRWA's definition of a refugee also covers the descendants of persons who became refugees in 1948. The number of registered Palestine refugees has subsequently grown from 914,000 in 1950 to more than four million in 2002, and continues to rise due to natural population growth." Under UNRWA's definition the total number of Palestinian refugees is estimated at 4.9 million , one third of whom live in the West Bank and Gaza; slightly less than one third in Jordan; 17% in Syria and Lebanon (Bowker, 2003, p. 72) and around 15% in other Arab and Western countries. Approximately 1 million refugees have no form of identification other than an UNWRA identification card. (Bowker, 2003, pp. 61-62).

The Refugee situation is complicated by the fact that "Palestinians" are barred from achieving citizenship in all Arab nations save Lebanon and Jordan, a ploy by Arab nations to keep them from resettling elsewhere.

The Nakba and its role in the Palestinian narrative

The Nakba or Al-Nakba (Arabic: النكبة, pronounced An-Nakba) is a term meaning "cataclysm" or "catastrophe". It is the term with which Palestinians usually refer to the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, or more specifically, the Palestinian exodus.

The term Nakba was coined by Constantin Zureiq, a professor of history at the American University of Beirut, in his 1948 book Ma'na al-Nakba (The Meaning of the Disaster). After the Six Day War in 1967 Zureiq wrote another book, The New Meaning of the Disaster, but the term Nakba is reserved for the 1948 war.

Together with Naji al-Ali's Handala (the barefoot child always drawn from behind), and the symbolic key for the house in Palestine carried by so many Palestinian refugees, the Nakba is perhaps the most important symbol of Palestinian discourse.

May 15th, (the day Israel declared independence, known as Nakba Day to Palestinians) is considered an important day in the Palestinian calendar, and is traditionally observed as a day of remembrance.

According to Palestinian author Dr. Ghada Karmi: "the majority of accounts of the Holocaust are in English, as opposed to accounts of the Palestinian Nakba, or “Catastrophe” (the creation of Israel in 1948) which are written mostly in Arabic. This ensures that everyone in the world knows about the pain and suffering of the Jewish people during World War II, whether they are in Europe, America, or even Asia, because English is the language of the decision-makers in the world. The number of Palestinian narratives that are written in English, on the other hand, can be literally counted on the fingers of one hand”. . At the controversial 2001 World Conference Against Racism in Durban, prominent Palestinian scholar and activist Hanan Ashrawi referred to the Palestinians as

...a nation in captivity held hostage to an ongoing Nakba , as the most intricate and pervasive expression of persistent colonialism, apartheid, racism, and victimization. More than half a century ago , the Palestinians as a people were slated for national obliteration, cast outside the course of history, their identity denied, and their very human cultural and historical reality suppressed. We became victims of the myth of a land without a people for people without a land whereby the West sought to assuage its guilt over its horrendous anti-Semitism by the total victimization of a whole nation.

History

The history of the Palestinian Exodus is closely tied to the events of the war in Palestine, which lasted from 1947 to 1949. Many factors played a role in bringing it about. What exactly those factors were, and how each of them contributed to the course events took, remains a hotly debated issue.

For more information on the historical context, see 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Zionism, Palestinian nationalism, and Jewish exodus from Arab lands.

First stage of the flight, December 1947 - March 1948

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During these months the climate in Palestine became volatile. Hostilities between Jews and Arabs increased and general lawlessness spread as the British declared that their mandate would end in May 1948. War appeared inevitable. Middle and upper-class Palestinian families from urban areas withdrew to settle in neighbouring countries such as Transjordan and Egypt. Perhaps as many as 70,000 left in those months. . There was also cases of outright explusions such as in Qisarya where roughly 1000 Palestinian Arabs were evicted in February. Irgun and Lehi played an important role in intimidating the Palestinian Arab population.

Most of the refugees from this period probably thought that they soon would return, just as they had done after the Great Arab Uprising of 1936-1939, and were assured of this by Arab radio broadcasts by the agressor Arab states.

Second stage of the flight, April 1948 - June 1948

The fighting in these months was concentrated in the Jerusalem - Tel Aviv area, where consequently, most depopulations took place. The Deir Yassin massacre in early April, and the exaggerated rumours that followed it, helped spread fear and panic among the Palestinians.

By the estimates of Morris, 250,000 to 300,000 Palestinians became refugees during this stage.

Third stage of the flight, July-October 1948

The largest single expulsion of the war began in Lydda and Ramla July 14. 60,000 inhabitants of the two cities were forcibly expelled on the orders of Ben-Gurion and Yitzhak Rabin. Rabin wrote in his memoirs:

What would they do with the 50,000 civilians in the two cities ... Not even Ben-Gurion could offer a solution, and during the discussion at operation headquarters, he remained silent, as was his habit in such situations. Clearly, we could not leave hostile and armed populace in our rear, where it could endanger the supply route advancing eastward. ... Allon repeated the question: What is to be done with the population? Ben-Gurion waved his hand in a gesture which said: Drive them out! ... 'Driving out' is a term with a harsh ring ... Psychologically, this was one of the most difficult actions we undertook. The population of did not leave willingly. There was no way of avoiding the use of force and warning shots in order to make the inhabitants march the 10 to 15 miles to the point where they met up with the legion. (Soldier of Peace, p. 140-141)

Additionally, widespread looting and several cases of rape (12 total throughout the war, per Benny Morris) took place during the evacuation. In total, about 100,000 Palestinians became refugees in this stage according to Morris.

Fourth stage of the flight, October 1948 - November 1948

This period of the exodus was characterized by Israeli military accomplishments which were met with resistance from the Palestinian Arabs who were to become refugees. The Israeli military activities were confined to the Galilee and the sparsely populated Negev desert. It was clear to the villages in the Galilee, that if they left, return was far from imminent. Therefore far fewer villages were spontaneously depopulated than previously. Most of it was due to a clear, direct cause: expulsion and deliberate harassment.

Operation Hiram, which was the Israeli military operation that conquered the upper Galilee, is one of the examples in which a direct expulsion order was given to the commanders:

Do all you can to immediately and quickly purge the conquered territories of all hostile elements in accordance with the orders issued. The residents should be helped to leave the areas that have been conquered. (October 31, 1948, Moshe Carmel)

Altogether 200,000 to 230,000 Palestinians left in this stage, according to Morris.

Aftermath of the war

After the war ended, the territory that had been Palestine belonged to the nations of Israel, Iraq, Transjordan, and Egypt. Despite this, the three Arab nations denied their "refugees" citizenship, rejected Israel's offers for refugee retursn, and instead stuffed them into refugee camps contingent on "returning" them to their homes after projected future wars to destroy the Jewish state.

What generated the Palestinian exodus

Historians have given over the years different reasons and assigned different responsibilities to the Palestinian exodus. This topic remains controversial today, more than half a century after the events. The answers given to these questions could have important consequences for the future of these refugees and their descendants, as well as to other Arabs and Jews in Israel and Palestine.

The following paragraph introduces the different historians' analysis:

• The 'Alleged Transfer principle' section details the reasoning of historians (mainly Benny Morris) who believe that displacement of population is a consequence of a common line of thought in Zionist politics that emphasized the transfer of Arabs as a precondition to the establishment of a Jewish state.
  • The 'Alleged Master Plan' section details an elaboration of this thesis by Palestinian Walid Khalidi, which claims that the Palestinian exodus was planned and organised by Jewish authorities
• The 'Arab leaders endorsment of the refugee flight' section summarizes the official line taken by the governments of Israel, which assigns responsibility for the exodus to the calls of local and foreign Arab leaders.
• 'The two-stage explanation' presents Prof. Yoav Gelber's theory, which distinguishes between two phases of the exodus. Before the Arab invasion, it explains the exodus as a result of the crumbling Arab social structure, and after the invasion - as a result of actions by the Israeli army during the campaign in the Galilee and Negev.

"Transfer principle"

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Zionist Jews strove to create a Jewish state built on Jewish traditions and culture in Palestine, which Jews considered their ancestral homeland and where a Jewish minority had lived for centuries. The demographic reality of Palestine, in which most residents were non-Jewish Arabs, was for them a major obstacle to the establishment of such a state.

The most important means to achieve a demographic shift was through aliyah, Jewish immigration to the land of Israel. However, the Palestinian Arab population had a much higher birthrate than the Jewish counterpart, as well as some immigration . Even with Jewish immigration, the Arab population greatly outnumbered the Jewish one. It was therefore clear that it would not be possible to bring about a Jewish majority in any part of Palestine, with the exceptions of the Haifa area, Jerusalem, and some northern districts. Furthermore, Jewish immigration was restricted by both the Ottoman Empire and the British Mandate, and relatively few diaspora Jews actually wished to, or were able to, immigrate to Palestine, most preferring to move to North America.

While a few Palestinian Arabs were amenable to Jewish immigration, most were not, and incidences of violence between the communities occurred, including the Riots in Palestine of 1929 and the bombing campaigns of the Irgun the decade after. Prior to, during and after World War II, when Jews were desperate to flee the resurgence of European anti-Semitism culminating in the ascention of Nazi Germany and Hitler's "final solution", their attempts to immigrate to Palestine were frustrated by the British mandatory authorities. The Arabs were adamant that the Jews not be permitted establish a state in the region, while the Zionists were determined to do so. The only viable solution, according to the United Nations, seemed to be a partition of Palestine. Yet however the land was partitioned, the part belonging to Jews would probably contain an Arab majority or at least a very large Arab minority. For some of the Zionist leadership, the "transfer" of a large Arab population appeared to be the only solution.

In 1937 the Peel Commission placed transfer on the political agenda. The commission recommended that Britain should withdraw from Palestine and that the land be partitioned between Jews and Arabs. It called for a "transfer of land and an exchange of population", including the removal of 225,000 Palestinian Arabs from what would become the Jewish state, along the lines of the exchange between the Turkish and Greek populations after the Greco-Turkish War of 1922. This was a huge step forward for the Zionists. David Ben-Gurion did not spare the superlatives when he wrote in his diary:

... and greater than this has been done for our case in our time . ... And we did not propose this - the Royal Commission ... did ... and we must grab hold of this conclusion as we grabbed hold of the Balfour Declaration, even more than that - as we grabbed hold of Zionism itself we must cleave to this conclusion, with all our strength and will and faith (quoted in Morris, 2001, p. 42)

Clearly, the idea of transfer was not, in 1947-1949, a new one. Benny Morris writes "many if not most of Zionism's mainstream leaders expressed at least passing support for the idea of transfer during the movement's first decades. True, as the subject was sensitve they did not often or usually state this in public" (Morris, 2001, p. 41; see Masalha, 1992 for a comprehensive discussion).

Despite the fact that the notion of transfer or population exchange had been proposed by the Peel Commission and that David Ben-Gurion had spoken in favor of it at the plenum of the Zionist Congress, the subject was still very sensitive with respect to the Palestinian Arabs . There were attendees at the Twentieth Zionist Congress in 1937 who opposed it , but the final resolutions of the Congress noted the "historic connexion of the Jewish people with Palestine, and its inalienable right to its homeland" and affirmed "that the field in which the Jewish National Home was to be established was understood at the time of the Balfour Declaration to be the whole of the historic Palestine, including Transjordan" ('Zionists And Palestine Decision To-Day, For And Against Partition', The Times, Wednesday, 11 August, 1937; p. 12; Issue 47760; col C).

According to Morris, Ben-Gurion, while in favor of the Peel plan, considered it important that it be publicized as a British plan and not a Zionist plan. At a meeting of the Jewish Agency Executive on 7 May 1944 to consider the British Labour Party Executive's resolution supporting transfer as a solution to the problems of Palestine Ben-Gurion said

When I heard these things ... I had to ponder the matter long and hard ... I reached the conclusion that this matter remain ... Were I asked what should be our program, it would not occur to me to tell them transfer ... because speaking about the matter might harm ... in world opinion, because it might give the impression that there is no room in the Land of Israel without ousting the Arabs ... it would alert and antagonize the Arabs ... (quoted in Morris, 2001, p. 46-47, citing Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem, S100/42b, protocol of JAE meeting).

At the same meeting Moshe Sharett, director of the Jewish Agency's Political Department, declared:

Transfer could be the crowning achievements, the final stage in the development of policy, but certainly not the point of departure. By we could mobilizing vast forces against the matter and cause it to fail, in advance. ... What will happen once the Jewish state is established - it is very possible that the result will be the transfer of Arabs. (quoted in Morris, 2001, p. 46)

The other members of the JAE Yitzhak Gruenbaum (later Israel's first interior minister), Eliahu Dobkin (director of the immigration department), Eliezer Kaplan (Israel's first finance minister), Dov Joseph (later Israel's justice minister) and Werner David Senator (a Hebrew University executive) all spoke favorably of the transfer transfer principle (Morris, 2001, p. 47).

In his speech to the UN General Assembly's Political and Security Committee on May 12, 1947, Ben Gurion said:

The mandatory power was charged by the League of Nations with the carrying out of a definite settlement... The terms of that settlement as decreed by the conscience and the law of nations, are common knowledge. It is the restoration of Palestine to the Jewish people...

Palestine, which for the Jewish people has always been and will always remain the Land of Israel was in the course of centuries conquered and invaded by many alien peoples, but none of them ever identified its national faith with Palestine. The Jewish nation in Palestine is rooted not only in past history but in a great living work of reconstruction and rebuilding, both of a country and of a people...

We are told that the Arabs are not responsible for the persecution of the Jews in Europe, nor is it their obligation to relieve their plight. I wish to make it quite clear that it never entered our minds to charge the Arabs with solving the Jewish problem, or to ask Arab countries to accept Jewish refugees. We are bringing our homeless and persecuted Jews to our own country and settling them in Jewish towns and villages. There are Arab towns and villages in Palestine - Nablus, Jenin, Ramleh, Narnucka, Libia, Terschicha. You will not find a single Jewish refugee in any of them. The Jews who have returned to their country are settled in Petah Tiqva, Rishon le Zion, Tel Aviv, Haifa, Jerusalem, Daganiya, the Negev, and other Jewish towns and villages built by us.

A Jewish-Arab partnership, based on equality and mutual assistance, will help to bring about the regeneration of the whole Middle East. We Jews understand and deeply sympathize with the urge of the Arab people for unity, independence and progress, and our Arab neighbors, I hope, will realize that the Jews in their own historic homeland, can under no conditions be made to remain a subordinate, dependent minority as they are in all other countries of the Diaspora. (New York Times, 13 May, 1947, pp. 12-13)

Moshe Sharett also spoke at the same meeting of the UN; in his address he stated that:

Jews must be allowed to resettle in Palestine in unlimited numbers, provided only they do not displace or worsen the lot of the existing inhabitants who are also there as of right... Were it not for the presence in Palestine today of over 600,000 Jews who refuse to be left in the minority position under Arab domination; were it not for the urge to settle in Palestine, of hundreds of thousands of homeless and uprooted Jews in Europe, in the Orient, and elsewhere; were it not for the hopes and efforts of millions of Jews throughout the world to re-establish their national home and build it up into a Jewish state, then the United Nations would not be faced with the problem of Palestine as it is now... they (Arab leaders) say that the Jews have settled in Palestine at the expense of the Arabs. That debit item, too, we cannot admit. There has been no receiving of Jewish immigrants by Arabs nor any settlement of Jews at the expense of the Arabs...

But a Jewish minority in an Arab State will have no such security at all. It will be at the mercy of the Arab majority, which would be free from all restraints... The question of our living with the Arab peoples and the relationship of a Jewish State with them is, of course, the dominant question of the future... From personal observation and direct experience accumulated over a period of forty-one years' residence in Palestine, I can affirm that there is nothing inherent in the nature of either the native Arab or the immigrant Jew which prevents friendly co-operation. On the contrary, considering the admitted great difference of background, they mix remarkably well. By mixing I do not mean assimilation, for the Jew does not come to Palestine to assimilate to the Arab, but to develop his own distinctive individuality. Nor does he expect the Arab to assimilate to him. What I mean is co-operation between a self-respecting Jew and a self-respecting Arab, and between the two communities.(New York Times, 13 May, 1947, p. 12)

"Alleged Master Plan"

Based on the aforementioned alleged prevalent idea of transfer, and on actual expulsions that took place in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Walid Khalidi, a Palestinian historian, introduced in 1961 a thesis according to which the Palestinian Exodus was planned in advance by the Zionist leadership. He based that thesis on Plan D, a plan devised by the Haganah high command in March 1948, and which stipulated, among other things that if Palestinians in villages controlled by the Jewish troops resist, they should be explled (Khalidi, 1961). Plan D was aimed to establish Jewish sovereignty over the land allocated to the Jews by the United Nations (Resolution 181), and to prepare the ground toward the expected invasion of Palestine by Arab states after the imminent establishment of the state of Israel; In addition, it was introduced while Jewish-Palestinian fighting was already underway and while thousands of Palestinians had already fled. Nevertheless, Khalidi argued that the plan was a master-plan for the expulsion of the Palestinians from the territories controlled by the Jews. He argued that there was an omnipresent understanding during the war that as many Palestinian Arabs as possible had to be transferred out of the Jewish state, and that that understanding stood behind many of the expulsions that the commanders on the field carried out.

Khalidi and Ilan Pappé (A history of modern Palestine, p. 131) are the only historians to defend this thesis. Other historians are skeptical of their conclusion: they emphasize that no central directive has surfaced from the archives and that if such an omnipresent understanding had existed, it would have left a mark in the vast amounts of documentation the Zionist leadership produced at the time. Furthermore, Yosef Weitz, who was strongly in favor of expulsion, had explicitly asked Ben-Gurion for such a directive and was turned down. Finally, settlement policy guidelines drawn up between December 1947 and February 1948, meant to handle the absorption of the anticipated first million immigrants, planned some 150 new settlements, about half of them in the Negev, with the rest along the lines of the UN partition map (29 November, 1947) for the north and centre of the country.

Benny Morris, in particular, disagrees with the "Master Plan" theory. He writes:

My feeling is that the transfer thinking and near-consensus that emerged in the 1930s and early 1940s was not tantamount to pre-planning and did not issue in the production of a policy or master-plan of expulsion; the Yishuv and its miltary forces did not enter the 1948 War, which was initiated by the Arab side, with a policy or plan for expulsion. (Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, p. 60)

Supporters of the "Master Plan" theory argue that the missing central directives have not been found because they were deliberately omitted or because the understanding of the significance of explusion was so widespread that no directive was necessary. They claim that the Zionist leadership in general and Ben-Gurion in particular were well aware of how historiography worked. What would be written about the war and what light Israel would be presented in was so important that it was worth making an intentional effort to hide those of their actions that might seem reprehensible.

Arab leaders' alleged endorsment of refugee flight

Israeli official sources have long claimed that the refugee flight was in large part instigated by Arab leaders. For example, Yosef Weitz wrote in October 1948:

The migration of the Arabs from the Land of Israel was not caused by persecution, violence, expulsion deliberately organised by the Arab leaders in order to arouse Arab feelings of revenge, to artificially create an Arab refugee problem. (Jewish National Fund official Yosef Weitz, 1948)

During the period preceding the 1948 war, and particularly during the invasion of Palestine by Arab armies, it is claimed that the Arab High Command called for elements of the Palestinian population to leave their homes.

At the same time, it turns out that there was a series of orders issued by the Arab Higher Committee and by the Palestinian intermediate levels to remove children, women and the elderly from the villages. So that on the one hand, the book reinforces the accusation against the Zionist side, but on the other hand it also proves that many of those who left the villages did so with the encouragement of the Palestinian leadership itself. Benny Morris - From an Ha'aretz interview prior to the publication of Morris' latest findings in The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, 2003.

The claim that Arab leaders endorsed the refugee flight has always been rejected by Palestinian writers and by some Israeli and Jewish writers. In the 1980s, when the Israeli archives about the war were opened to researchers, the Israeli New Historians also began to question the theory. For example, concerning the alleged evacuation order, or orders, issued by Arab leaders, Benny Morris wrote in 1990:

Had such a blanket order (or series of orders) been given, it would have found an echo in the thousands of documents produced by the Haganah's Intelligence Service, the IDF Intelligence Service, the Jewish Agency's Political Department Arab Division, the Foreign Ministry Middle East Affairs Department; or in the memoranda and dispatches of the various British and American diplomatic posts in the area (in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Haifa, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, and Cairo); or in the various radio monitoring services (such as the BBC's). Any or all of these would have produced reports, memoranda, or correspondence referring to the Arab order and quoting from it. But no such reference to or quotation from such an order or series of orders exists in the contemporary documentation. This documentation, it should be noted, includes daily, almost hourly, monitoring of Arab radio broadcasts, the Arab press inside and outside Palestine, and statements by the Arab and Palestinian Arab leaders. (Tikkun, Jan/Feb 1990, p80)

After the war, a few Arab leaders tried to present the Palestinian exodus as a victory by claiming to have planned it. None of them provided any evidence for this claim. An oft-quoted example from the untranslated Arabic memoirs of Khalid al-`Azm, who was prime minister of Syria from December 17, 1948 to March 30, 1949 (after most of the exodus had already taken place), gives a different explanation, however. In his memoirs, Al-Azm listed a number of reasons for the Arab defeat in an attack on the Arab leaders, including his own predecessor, Jamil Mardam Bey:

Fifth: the Arab governments' invitation to the people of Palestine to flee from it and seek refuge in adjacent Arab countries, after terror had spread among their ranks in the wake of the Deir Yassin event. This mass flight has benefited the Jews and the situation stablized in their favor without effort.
...
Since 1948 we have been demanding the return of the refugees to their homeland, while it is we who constrained them to leave it. Between the invitation extended to the refugees and the request to the United Nations to decide upon their return, there elapsed only a few months.
-Al-`Azm, Mudhakarat (al-Dar al Muttahida lil-Nashr, Beirut, 1972), Volume I, pp 386-7. scan

However, as Yehoshua Porath, Professor Emeritus of Middle East History at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, argues "Neither . . . is the admission of the Syrian leader Khalid al-Azm that the Arab countries urged the Palestinian Arabs to leave their villages until after the victory of the Arab armies final proof that the Palestinian Arabs in practice heeded that call and consequently left." . In his re-examination of the Palestinian exodus Benny Morris is even more skeptical, concluding:

The former Prime Minister of Syria, Khalid al'Azm, in his memoirs Mudhakkirat Khalid al'Azm, I, 386, wrote: 'We brought destruction on 1 million Arab refugees by calling upon them and pleading with them repeatedly to leave their lands and homes and factories.' (I am grateful to Dr Gideon Weigart of Jerusalem for this reference.) But I have found no contemporary evidence of such blanket, official 'calls' by any Arab government. And I have found no evidence that the Palestinians or any substantial group left because they heard such 'calls' or orders by outside Arab leaders. The only, minor, exceptions to this are the traces of the order, apparently by the Syrians, to some of the inhabitants of Eastern Galilee to leave a few days prior to, and in preparation for, the invasion of 15-16 May. This order affected at most several thousand Palestinians and, in any case, 'dovetailed' with Haganah efforts to drive out the population in this area. (Morris, 2003, p. 269).

Morris goes on to speculate that, although al-`Azm may have been referring to the minor Syrian order mentioned above, it is more probable that "he inserted the claim to make some point within the context of inter-Arab polemics (i.e., blaming fellow Arab leaders for the exodus)."

The Two-Stage Theory

Prof. Yoav Gelber , from the Department of Land Israel Studies at Haïfa University, has a different approach. First he underlines the importance of the consequences of the debate nowadays:

"Since the abortive talks at Camp David in July 2000, the Palestinian refugee problem has re-emerged as the hard core of the Arab-Israeli conflict. For five decades, the Israelis have swept the problem under the carpet, while the Palestinians have consistently developed their national ethos around their Right of Return".

He also describes as propaganda the master plan thesis and the call of flight from arab leadership :

Palestinian historians "have composed a false narrative of deliberate expulsion, stressing the role of Deir Yassin and Plan Dalet in their exodus." (...)

"Later, this guess would become the official line of Israeli diplomacy and propaganda. However, the documentary evidence clearly shows that the Arab leaders did not encourage the flight".

Gelber distinguishes two main phases during the exodus : before and after the "invasion" of Arab armies in May 1948.

First Stage: The Crumbling of Arab Palestinian social structure (before May 1948)

Gelber describes The exodus during as being mainly due to the weakness of the Palestinian social structure to withstand a state of war:

"Mass flight accompanied the fighting from the beginning of the civil war. In the absence of proper military objectives, the antagonists carried out their attacks on non-combatant targets, subjecting civilians of both sides to deprivation, intimidation and harassment. Consequently, the weaker and backward Palestinian society collapsed under a not-overly-heavy strain. Unlike the Jews, who had nowhere to go and fought with their back to the wall, the Palestinians had nearby shelters. From the beginning of hostilities, an increasing flow of refugees drifted into the heart of Arab-populated areas and into adjacent countries."

"The Palestinians’ precarious social structure tumbled because of economic hardships and administrative disorganization. Contrary to the Jews who built their “State in the Making” during the mandate period, the Palestinians had not created in time substitutes for the government services that vanished with the British withdrawal. The collapse of services, the lack of authority and a general feeling of fear and insecurity generated anarchy in the Arab sector."

According to him the disparition of the civil structure built by the British Mandate amplified the problem :

"Thousands of Palestinian government employees — doctors, nurses, civil servants, lawyers, clerks, etc. — became redundant and departed as the mandatory administration disintegrated. This set a model and created an atmosphere of desertion that rapidly expanded to wider circles. Between half to two-thirds of the inhabitants in cities such as Haifa or Jaffa had abandoned their homes before the Jews stormed these towns in late April 1948."

Second Stage: Israeli army victories and actions towards the Palestinians (after May 1948)

During the second phase of the war, after the Arab invasion, Gelber considers the exodus is a result of Israeli army's victory and the expulsion of Palestinians :

"The position of these new escaping or expelled Palestinians was essentially different from that of their predecessors of the pre-invasion period. Their mass flight was not the result of their inability to hold on against the Jews. The Arab expeditions failed to protect them, and they remained a constant reminder of the fiasco. These later refugees were sometimes literally deported across the lines. In certain cases, IDF units terrorized them to hasten their flight, and isolated massacres — particularly during the liberation of Galilee and the Negev in October 1948 — expedited the flight."

Morris agrees that such explusions occured in some cases. For exemple, concerning whether in Operation Hiram there was a comprehensive and explicit expulsion order he replied :

Yes. One of the revelations in the book is that on October 31, 1948, the commander of the Northern Front, Moshe Carmel, issued an order in writing to his units to expedite the removal of the Arab population. Carmel took this action immediately after a visit by Ben-Gurion to the Northern Command in Nazareth. There is no doubt in my mind that this order originated with Ben-Gurion. Just as the expulsion order for the city of Lod, which was signed by Yitzhak Rabin, was issued immediately after Ben-Gurion visited the headquarters of Operation Dani .

Other historians, such as Karsh, deny the expulsion , but they refer only to the first phase of the war which is not contested by Gelber or Morris.

Gelber also underlines that Palestinian had certainly in mind the opportunity they would have to return their home after the conflict and that this hope must have eased their flight:

"When they ran away, the refugees were confident of their eventual repatriation at the end of hostilities. This term could mean a cease-fire, a truce, an armistice and, certainly, a peace agreement. The return of escapees had been customary in the Middle East's wars throughout the ages.".

Contemporary mediation

The United Nations was involved in the conflict from the very beginning. In the autumn of 1948 the refugee problem was a fact and possible solutions were discussed. Count Folke Bernadotte said on September 16:

No settlement can be just and complete if recognition is not accorded to the right of the Arab refugee to return to the home from which he has been dislodged. It would be an offence against the principles of elemental justice if these innocent victims of the conflict were denied the right to return to their homes while Jewish immigrants flow into Palestine, and indeed, offer the threat of permanent replacement of the Arab refugees who have been rooted in the land for centuries.

UN General Assembly Resolution 194 which was passed on December 11 1948 and reaffirmed every year since, was the first resolution that called for Israel to let the refugees return:

the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.

"Absentee" property

In 1950, the Absentee Property Law was passed in Israel. It provided for confiscation of the property and land left behind by departing Palestinians, the so-called "absentees". Even Arabs who never left Israel, and received citizenship after the war, but stayed for a few days in a nearby village had their property confiscated. About 32,000 Palestinians became "present absentees" - persons that were present at the time but considered absent.

How much of Israel's territory consists of land confiscated with the Absentee Property Law is uncertain. According to the Israeli Custodian of Absentee Property, it could amount to 70% of the territory:

The Custodian of Absentee Property does not choose to discuss politics. But when asked how much of the land of the state of Israel might potentially have two claimants - an Arab and a Jew holding respectively a British Mandate and an Israeli deed to the same property - Mr. Manor believes that 'about 70 percent' might fall into that category (Robert Fisk, The Land of Palestine, Part Eight: The Custodian of Absentee Property, The Times, December 24, 1980)

The Jewish National Fund's estimate was considerably higher at 88%:

Of the entire area of the State of Israel only about 300,000-400,000 dunums...are state domain which the Israeli government took over from the mandatory regime. The JNF and private Jewish owners possess under two million dumums. Almost all the rest belongs at law to Arab owners, many of whom have left the country. The fate of these Arabs will be settled when the terms of the peace treaties between Israel and her Arab neighbours are finally drawn up. The JNF, however, cannot wait until then to obtain the land it requires for its pressing needs. It is, therefore, acquiring part of the land abandoned by the Arab owners, through the government of Israel, the sovereign authority in Israel. (Jewish National Fund, Jewish Villages in Israel, p.xxi, quoted in Lehn and Davis, The Jewish National Fund, Keegan Paul International, 1988, page 132; parenthetical comments by Lehn & Davis)

The absentee property played an enormous role in making Israel a viable state. In 1954, more than one third of Israel's Jewish population lived on absentee property and nearly a third of the new immigrants (250,000 people) settled in urban areas abandoned by Arabs. Of 370 new Jewish settlements established between 1948 and 1953, 350 were on absentee property. (Peretz, Israel and the Palestinian Arabs, 1958)

Treatment of Palestinian refugees by Arab nations

In February 1954, Jordan amended its Nationality Law to include "any Arab person born in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan or in the occupied part of Palestine and emigrated from the country or left — including the children of this emigrant wherever they were born — who would submit a written application and renounce their former nationality" (quoted in Plascov, 1981, p. 47). The Arab League promoted the extension of full civil rights to Palestinian refugees but advised that host governments should not offer nationality because this could weaken the political rights of refugees (Schulz, 2003, p. 235).

To date, no Arab country with the exception of Jordan has granted citizenship to Palestinian refugees living on its soil or their descendants. In Lebanon, Palestinians largely continue to live in refugee camps, often under harsh conditions, denied any benefits of citizenship and subject to restrictions on employment.

References

• Arzt, Donna E. (1997). Refugees into Citizens: Palestinians and the End of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Council on Foreign Relations. ISBN 087609194X
• Bowker, Robert (2003). Palestinian Refugees: Mythology, Identity, and the Search for Peace. Lynne Rienner Publishers. ISBN 1588262022
• Finkelstein, Norman (2003). Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict, 2nd Ed. Verso. ISBN 1859844421
• Kanaaneh, Rhoda A. (2002). Birthing the Nation: Strategies of Palestinian Women in Israel. University of California Press. ISBN 0520229444
• Khalidi, Walid (1959). Why Did the Palestinians Leave? Middle East Forum, July 1959. Reprinted as Why Did the Palestinians Leave Revisited, 2005, Journal of Palestine Studies, XXXIV, No. 2., pp. 42-54.
• Khalidi, Walid (1961). Plan Dalet, Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine. Middle East Forum, November 1961.
• Lehn, Walter & Davis, Uri (1988). "The Jewish National Fund". London : Kegan Paul.
• Morris, Benny (2001). Revisiting the Palestinian exodus of 1948. In The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948 (pp. 37-59). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521794765
• Morris, Benny (2003). The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521009677
• Masalha, Nur (1992). Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of "Transfer" in Zionist Political Thought, 1882-1948. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies. ISBN 0887282350
• Peretz, Don (1958). "Israel and the Palestinian Arabs". Washington: Middle East Institute.
• Plascov, Avi (1981). Palestinian Refugees in Jordan, 1948-1957. London: Routledge. ISBN 0714631205
• Rogan, Eugene L., & Shlaim, Avi (Eds.). (2001). The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521794765
• Schulz, Helena L. (2003). The Palestinian Diaspora. London: Routledge. ISBN 0415268214

See also

• 1948 Arab-Israeli War
• History of Palestine#Post-Mandate
• Jewish exodus from Arab lands
• Jewish refugees
• List of villages depopulated during the 1948 Arab-Israeli war
• New Historians
• Palestinian infiltration
• Palestinian refugee
• Plan Dalet

External links

• The Peel Commission Report from the United Nations
• Interview with Israeli historian Benny Morris
• UN report on pre-war non-Jewish population
• 50th anniversary of the Nakba (Palestinian cataclysm) Website
• Detailed information incl. maps in Hebrew
• 'San Francisco Chronicle' article describing two Palestinian friends' differing opinions on the 'Right of Return'
• Link to commentaries by Efraim Karsh, an opponent of the Israeli New Historians, in which he disputes the accuracy of the Palestinian refugee narrative.
• History of zionism, including internal debate on the Arab of Palestine issue

• 1948 Arab-Israeli War
• Arab-Israeli conflict
• Forced migration
• Israeli-Palestinian conflict
• Refugees