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The Kurdistan Workers Party (Kurdish: Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan or PKK), also known as KADEK and Kongra-Gel, is a militant organization, dedicated to creating an independent Kurdish state in a territory (sometimes referenced as Kurdistan) that consists of parts of southeastern Turkey, northeastern Iraq, northeastern Syria and northwestern Iran. Its current ideological foundation is revolutionary Marxism-Leninism and Kurdish nationalism. It is an ethnic secessionist organization using force and threat of force against both civilian and military targets for the purpose of achieving its political goal. The PKK is defined as a terrorist organisation internationally by a number of states and organisations. Also the Kurdish rebel leader of the group, Abdullah Öcalan, has declared his own guerrillas as "murderers" .

The PKK emerged as an organization during the 1970s and developed into a formidable paramilitary organisation which rendered much of southeastern Turkey a war zone in the late 1980s and 1990s. Its actions have mainly taken place in Turkey and against Turkish targets in other countries, although it has on occasions co-operated with other Kurdish nationalist paramilitary groups in neighbouring states, such as Iraq and Iran. The PKK argued that its violence was justified by the need to defend Kurds in the context of what it saw as massive cultural suppression of Kurdish identity and cultural rights carried out by governments in the region. However, in its campaign, the PKK has been accused of atrocities against both Turkish and Kurdish civilians. Its actions, along with those of the Turkish state have been criticised by human rights groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch.

The degree of support for the PKK among Turkish Kurds is disputed. In some of the strongholds of Kurdish nationalism in the Tigris valley and mountainous regions on the Iranian border, PKK-linked parties have consistently polled close to or over 50% of votes cast in elections. However, PKK-linked parties have polled at most approximately one-third of the Kurdish vote (between 5% and 8% of the total Turkish vote), with the majority of Kurds voting for mainstream parties. In some of the more assimilated Kurdish areas, claimed by the PKK as part of 'Kurdistan', support for PKK-linked parties is at 10% or less. There is some electoral support for PKK-linked parties among Kurdish migrants in cities in Western and Southern Turkey such as Adana, Mersin and İzmir.

Resource

The organisation's budget has been estimated at $86 million USD.

The PKK owes its continued existence to its ability to sustain itself while in hiding. They also conduct material raids on villages and small towns. PKK is thought to have raised these funds by a variety of methods, mainly illegal including drugs trafficking, arms dealing, human trafficking (people smuggling), extortion (from locally based businesspeople and other individuals, and other wealthy Kurds around the world). As with many militant groups, the PKK receives a portion of its funding in the form of private donations, from both individuals and organizations from around the world. Parties and concerts are organized by branch groups. Additionally, it is believed that the PKK makes money through the sale of various publications, as well as receiving revenues from legitimate businesses owned by the organisation.

At the height of its campaign, the PKK received support from other countries, most notably Syria, but also Greece, Iran and the Soviet Union. The PKK also developed links with paramilitary groups among other ethnic groups which harboured historic grievances against Turkey such as the ethnic Armenian ASALA , as well as groups which shared its left-wing nationalist ideology such as the Palestine Liberation Organisation, ETA, and to a lesser degree the Provisional Irish Republican Army. Through the large Kurdish immigration in Germany, it also formed close contacts with violent left-wing political groups in that country. From early 1979 to 1999 Syria provided valuable safe haven to PKK under its controlled region Beqaa Valley. During 1990s, Iran provided resupply with weapons and funds. Greece has allowed PKK camps to function on its soil. In addition the retired Greek army general Dimitris Matafias has paid numerous visits and offered assistance. Currently Syria implemented restraints over PKK on its soil, after the undeclared war with Turkey. Turkey is expecting positive developments within the long term, but even during 2005, there were Syrian nationals operating in Turkey for the PKK. Iran listed PKK as a terrorist organization after Iran's supply of resources began to used in its soil.

On 30 September, 1995 Damascus opened a gate to contacts with high ranking German CDU MP Heinrich Lummer and German intelligence officials. The PKK has also strong ties with influential persons around the world. Danielle Mitterrand, the wife of the former President of France has active connections with elements of the PKK's leadership.

Activities

Activities of Kurdistan Workers Party
			Region
Target	Activity Category		Turkey	Northern Iraq	Western Europe
Government	Demonstrations/Protests
	Riots
	Kidnapping
	Assassination
	Sabotage
	Chemical warfare
	Bombing Attacks	Post/Train/Power
		Police
		Outposts
	Armed Attacks	Military
		Police
		Village Guards
Civilian	Kidnapping
	Assassination
	Bombing Attacks	Villages
		Touristic Facilities
		Commercial Units
Organized Crime	Extortion
	Drug Trafficking		Transit	Transit	Destination
	Human Trafficking		Origin	Origin

The PKK operates in Turkey, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. One pattern is apparent after 1984, PKK began to use Maoist theory of people's war . There are three phases in this theory. The militant base during the initial years was coming from different sources, so the first two phases were diffused to each other.

In the first phase (1978-1984), the PKK try gain the support of the population. It attacked the machinery of government and the distribute propaganda in the region. PKK tactics were based on ambush, sabotage, riots, protests, and demonstrations against the Turkish government. PKK have also been accused of violent attacks on individual civilians or residential areas (Kurds and non-Kurds alike), who refused to cooperate with the PKK or were suspected of collaborating with the Turkish authorities. During these years PKK fought a gang fight against other dominantly Kurdish organizations in Turkey. PKK effectively used the prison force to gain appeal among the population.

In the second phase (1984-1999), which is called terrorism stage, escalating attacks were made on the government's military and vital institutions all over the country. Objective was to destabilize Turkish authority through long, low-intensity confrontation. In addition skirmishing with Turkish military and police forces, and the local village guards, PKK have conducted suicide bombing on government and police installations, as well as local tourist sites. Kidnapping and assassination against government officials and Kurdish tribal leaders who were named as puppets of the state were performed. Widespread sabotages were continued from the first stage. PKK had performed kidnapping western tourists, primarily in Istanbul but also at different resorts. PKK have also attacked Turkish diplomatic and commercial facilities across Western Europe.

In the third phase, which is called guerrilla stage, conventional fighting is used to seize cities, overthrow the government and take control of the country. PKK seized cities, during the highest activity period and it affected the parliament through Turkey's own election system, but there is no case that during an active conflict PKK sustained its flag in a region within the borders of Turkey.

Tactics

Template:Tactics of Kurdistan Workers Party

The areas in which the group operates are generally mountainous rural areas and dense urban areas. The mountainous terrain offers an advantage to members of the PKK by allowing them to hide in a network of caves and making military air operations, especially helicopter use, hazardous for the Turkish government. While in urban areas, PKK members are often able to blend in with the local population.

The group has been accused of planting mines (Russian-made anti-vehicle mines and Russian- and Italian-made anti-personnel mines. Use of these mines has led to civilian deaths, in part due to triggering by trucks and buses rather than the intended military armoured vehicles.

Template:Kurdistan Workers Party/Timeline

History

The PKK's core was originally a group called the "Ankara Democratic Patriotic Association of Higher Education" or Apocus, which was made up largely of students, lead by Abdullah Öcalan. Although originally from Ankara, the group soon moved its focus to south-east Turkey, and its large Kurdish population, where they began organising. With the official release of the "Proclamation of Independence of PKK" on 27 October, 1978, the group became known as the Kurdistan Workers Party. With its largely communist ideology, the PKK soon found itself in conflict with right-wing entities.

In 1979 Mehmet Celal Bucak was condemned for "exploiting the peasants," and "collaborating". The PKK attempted to assassinate him, but failed. This was the first violent high pitch public action taken by the PKK, and it marked a period of intense urban warfare between radical political elements in Turkey. From 1978 to 1982, the Turkish National Security Council recorded 43,000 incidents it described as terrorism. As part of the conflict, ex-prime minister Nihat Erim was assassinated in 1980. The military coup that same year largely ended the conflict, with members of the PKK going to prison, or fleeing to Syria.

Starting in 1984, the PKK transformed itself into a paramilitary organisation (largely based in and supported by Iran,Iraq and Syria), as it launched conventional attacks as well as bombings against Turkish government, military and civilian targets, many of them connected to the Southeastern Anatolia Project. The PKK also moved to a less centralized format, taking up operations in a variety of European and Middle Eastern countries.

Following the collapse of the USSR, the PKK largely abandoned its communist roots, attempting to better accommodate Islamic beliefs. In the mid 1990s, they also began to shift from conventional bombing to suicide bombing, launching fifteen such attacks between 1995 and 1999. Interestingly, the majority (11 of 15) of the suicide bombers were women.

In the late 1990s, the Turkish army began to gain the upper hand in the ground war with the PKK and post-Cold War changes in international politics resulted in the group losing much of its support from other states. With the decreased security concerns, the Turkish parliament began a controlled process of dismantling the legal control, using the term "normalization" or "rapprochement" depending of the sides of the issue. Ban on publishing using Kurdish language (1983) was dropped in 1991, with more thoroughgoing reforms, such as broadcasting, adopted in the 2000s with the decrease in PKK's activities .

In 1999 Turkish authorities captured Öcalan while he was being transferred by the Greek security system from Greek Embassy in Kenya to a local airport, in a joint operation between the CIA, Turkey's MIT, and Mossad. He was tried in Turkey and sentenced to life imprisonment.

Following a call by the captured Öcallan for a peaceful solution, the PKK found itself blacklisted in many countries. Consequently, the PKK went through a series of name changes and implemented a unilateral truce, which ended in 2004. On 2 April of that year, the Council of the European Union added the PKK to its list of terrorist organisations. Later in 2004, the US Treasury moved to freeze assets of branches of the PKK.

Effects

After 30 years, Turkey is at a point where it can objectively compare the results of claims and actions of PKK through regional, national and international comparisions.

As a revolutionary left-wing organization PKK claimed there was a "mass violence by Turkish state on the Kurd identity" to justify its activities. In its activities main goal was to alienate the people from the state through pushing security forces into more and more overt and repressive countermeasures. So that PKK can claim itself as defenders of the people against the overwhelming power ("mass violence") of state. The Political-Justice section extends the results of this ideology and methods to the democratic processes and justice system in Turkey. In a democratic system, an ideology that questions the state's legitimacy, will of its population and its security apparatus was a hard to be accepted political view, which was shaped under HEP/DEP/HADEP story. Turkish governments did not negotiate with organization, so regional NGOs were channels between all the sides. Ill formed language act ban of 1983 and Terrorism law of 1991 were significant events. Also, amnesties were interesting during the conflict time, as each amnesty gave more human resource to the organization. The prison as a rehabilitation concept was a failure. The people who were jailed for non-violent activities were becoming militants during their jail time. Government's military operations against the prisons were the highest point in this failure.

As a revolutionary left-wing organization, the PKK perceived Turkish society as deformed by capitalism and imperialism. The PKK unleashed its aggression on enemies spanning all classes (farmers, business, etc.) and those that it considered puppets of the state (Kurds who do not join or support the PKK). The cost of PKK's actions are significant. PKK had drastic effects on regional economy, as targeted infrastructure of the region. Regions' inability to join the economical activities were associated with the work force, costs (insurance premiums, facility costs, lost of trained personal, etc.) , and productivity (lost of work time, travel restrictions, inability to move in time, etc). The region had very high historical tourism potential, which has been dormant under the terrorism threat for many years.

The integration into social and economical activities are developed within the education system. Educational activities were targeted by PKK. Given the fact that the majority of the people are very resilient to the effects of the political violence, the young people whom their stable personality did not develop forms a high risk group. The effect of political violence on the coming generations is an important issue within this period as there is a new generation that has no life experience of normal conditions. The effects of violence are experienced with the increased probability of bullying in classrooms, sexual harassment, gangs in schools, violence against instructors (authority). The tendency toward increased antisocial and externalising behaviour in young people growing up in situations of violence is very real. The parliamentary groups dealing with street boys or young girl suicides are only dealing with the secondary results of antisocial and externalising behaviours and without extensive educational programs with ethnic targeting, issue can not be solved. In this dimension "Kurdish Reality" is very real.

As a revolutionary left-wing organization PKK promoted concepts of change (separation) with the theme of isolation instead of integration. This propaganda had effects on the way of life in the region. PKK specifically targeted its activities among intelligent, young and inexperienced, whom through analytically thinking could reach a conclusion that a small group, nuclei, can make a change. When these ideas were falsified, either this realization pushes the young to become a member of the activity group (risk seeking) or generate tendencies towards suicide, feelings of insecurity, problems with authority and lack of social integration. All of these behaviours are apparent in the region, and reported through NGOs. It is claimed that crimes toward the females are part of this reality. Another side of isolationist propaganda gets apparent when the agent of PKK is tried to be regained to the society. It does not matter where this agent is located, when the`agent is not linked to glory, honour, friendship and martyr-veneration, it is hard for the agent to establish lasting relationships or isolate him/herself from treating the fellow-humans brutally. These issues and PTSD is covered under psychological effects.

International politics

As a descendant of the Ottoman Empire, one of the biggest characteristics of Turkey is its multicultural structure. From a threat perspective; supporting Kurdish separationist movement could ignite a balkanization process in Turkey, such as Yugoslavia. Support on PKK also associated with freshwater disputes between Turkey-Syria-Iraq. It is also claimed that PKK was acquired support from other contries (including Russia, Greece, Cyprus, Bulgaria) during the cold war as a proxy war between west and east. PKK was associated with energy politics through oil pipelines and pipeline projects.

European Union has used Turkey's reaction to the PKK as an argument for rejecting Turkey's application for membership in the EU. An interesting issue was revealed during capture and trial of Öcalan. The trial subjected the European Union's opinions or judgments about "human rights" and "international law" to scrutiny by exposing the intricate relationships between EU member states and the PKK in areas such as military training, infrastucture, and arms support. The trial also raised questions regarding the EU's usage of secondary arguments (such as Turkey's supposed human rights failings) instead of developing direct and open policies toward potential Turkish membership. EU requirements for "democratization" of Turkey in order to meet European standards argued on the basis that integration with the EU cannot be done without risking the stability and integrity of the country (CDU), are absurd given the CDU's history with the PKK .

EU dysfunction on PKK creates grounds for PKK activity, which the consequences are reflected as increase political violence. Political killings of the Kurds that have different voices are attributed to the PKK's grasp on political processes to keep it under its own control, when there is a push on more representational politics from southeast after post-Öcalan area.

Kurdish problem

With the turn of the century, there is a tendency to associate PKK with the word "Kurdish problem", with its positive and negative contentions.

The groups who classify PKK as terrorist, sees the problem as the ability in free expression, aligned with the 1970s view point. They claim PKK represent the culture of violence and is a barrier against the democratic paths. Their solution is aligned with implementation of the "culture of freedom", without PKK and/or war economy controlling.

The groups who classify PKK as a freedom movement, perceive the problem as breaking the state into federations, as a step toward the building the great Kurdistan in the borders of Iran, Iraq, Syria, Turkiye (Turkey) and Armenia.

Current status

After the capture of leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999, he urged the PKK to work for its objectives through peaceful means, and the PKK began a ceasefire in that year. It changed its name to KADEK to reflect a move towards peaceful politics and co-operation with a wider range of ideologies, but it is claimed that this change was aimed to escape from legal results of being listed among terrorist organizations. A PKK/KADEK spokesman stated that its armed wing, The People’s Defense Force, would not disband or surrender its weapons for reasons of self-defense. PKK/KADEK avowing not lay down its arms underscores that the organization maintains its capability to carry out terrorist operations.

The refusal of the Turkish government to issue a general amnesty to PKK operatives, the failure of the PKK-linked Democratic People's Party to make an electoral breakthrough and profound ideological disputes within the movement led to the ceasefire becoming ragged in 2003, before breaking down completely in 2004. Since the declaration of cease-fire on August 2004, aside from a few isolated incidents armed conflict came to a complete halt. Recently however there has been increase in PKK activity. There is an increase in PKK attacks on Turkish military, police, and governmental targets near the Iraqi border in the last weeks. While PKK claims it is only acting in self-defense, Ankara is increasing its pressure to the US for a military strike to the PKK in northern Iraq.

With the end of its unilateral cease-fire in August 2004 (the cease-fire had lasted for five years), on the claims that Ankara's reforms are "cosmetic", PKK leaders seem to favour a return to armed guerilla warfare. The increase in PKK attacks on Turkish military, civilians, police and governmental targets seem to further prove this fact. The PKK claims it is only acting in self-defense and for the protection for the Kurds.

During the period 2003-2004-2005 period; the total security personal lost (soldier, police (21), village guard (22)) is 246. The total number of disabled personal is 147. The total armed militant captured: 1325 (359 dead, 377 live, 589 amnesty) (116 among 377 through exchange of criminals with Iran, Iraq, Syria, Greece, Azerbaijan and Ukraine). The TBMM report also expects an increase in the section captured through exchange of criminals in the coming years. These numbers are presented as part of fight on terror activities. Report also mentions groving efforts in mobilizing the criminal information exchange.

The amont of militants who used "Etkin Pismanlik" (5237 - 221/ 2) law is reached to 67 within the 6 months from its onset at 6 2005. The law by itself is not an amnesty. It is designed as a way to help a militant who did not involve into active fight, join to the society. Among the militants, Kerem Işık was a very interesting case as he had been working within the organization since 1989. Given the fact there there is no activity record in the Turkish criminal database, Turkish authorities did not used his wound on his neck against him.

See also

• Operation Gladio
• Village guards
• Roj TV

Footnotes

• "Ocalan renounces armed struggle". Retrieved December 14. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
• Iraq and the War of Sanctions: Conventional Threats and Weapons of Mass Destruction, by Anthony H Cordesman
• "Turkish General Election Results 2002". Retrieved November 3. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
• "Section based on material published by the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs unless specified otherwise". Retrieved December 1. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
• "Counter-Terrorism Studies". Retrieved November 3. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
• The Kurdish Question and Turkey: An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict, by Gareth M Winrow, Kemal Kirisci
• Turkey: Facing a New Millennium: Coping with Intertwined Conflicts, by Amikam Nachmani
• Turkey in World Politics: An Emerging Multiregional Power, the section: Turkey-Greece Relations
• The Land of Many Crossroads: The Kurdish Question in Turkish Politics, by Svante E. Cornell, in Foreign Policy Research Institute (2001)
• The Roots of Islamic Terrorism: How Communists Helped Fundamentalists, by Antero Leitzinger (2005)
• Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism, by Daniel Byman
• The most prominent communication is covered under the undeclared war.
• The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the 1990s, edited by Robert Olson
• "The Threat Posed from the Convergence of Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking, and Terrorism , by Frank Cilluffo (2000)". Retrieved April 1. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
• The rise and fall of the PKK , By Michael Radu, Orbis (Winter 2001)
• The politics of the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party): a balance sheet, By Ute Reissner and Justus Leicht, World Socialist (1999)
• Immigration Appeals: 2nd - 3rd Quarter (2004), by Great Britain Immigration Appeal Tribunal
• Kurdish intellectuals are worried, Hasan CEMAL (milliyet on 07/16/2005 analysis on Hikmet Fidan)
• The Kurdish Conflict in Turkey: Obstacles and Chances for Peace and Democracy, by Ferhad Ibrahim, Gulistan Gurbey
• "Kongra-Gel, KADEK, PKK: globalsecurity". Retrieved April 1. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)

Sources

• http://www.guardian.co.uk/international/story/0,3604,1482808,00.html
• http://www.ict.org.il/organizations/orgdet.cfm?orgid=20
• www.ag.gov.au 15 December 2005 - PKK LISTED AS TERRORIST ORGANISATION
• http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/358115.stm

Ocalan: Greeks supplied Kurdish rebels 

Aka other countries aid PKK

• http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/535312.stm

From his prison cell, he has issued a series of orders to his Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).

• http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4305692.stm
• Enis Berberoglu, who has written several books on the subject, agrees: "Turkey was deeply involved in drug smuggling in the mid 1990s. There was a very strong mafia here at that time and the PKK (the Kurdish rebel group the Kurdistan Workers Party) used to take protection money in return for letting them operate in the east," he said.

Drug ties

• http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/234429.stm

Kurdish rebel leader Abdullah Ocalan has called his own guerrillas "murderers" and says he wants nothing more to do with their tactics. In an interview with a Turkish newspaper on Sunday, Mr Ocalan also blamed his former right-hand man Semdin Sakik for PKK atrocities. In particular he absolved himself of responsibility for the killings of Turkish primary school teachers in southeastern Anatolia. No comment. PKK millitants are murderers according to their own leader. Also acknowleges the killings of teachers. Thourgh BBC I am citing PKK as referance btw not Turkish or UK gov.

• http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3200907.stm

The main militant Kurdish group in Turkey says it is ending a unilateral ceasefire declared after the capture of its leader, Abdullah Ocalan, four years ago.

• http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4688575.stm

An explosion on a minibus in the Turkish Aegean resort of Kusadasi has killed at least five people, including one British and one Irish woman Their overall aim is to force the Turkish government to grant autonomy to the predominantly Kurdish south-east of the country, but the means to that end appears to be to strike at the tourism industry - the life blood of the Turkish economy, our correspondent says.

External links

• See External links on Kurdistan Workers Party

• Armed leftist groups
• Kurdistan Workers Party
• Secessionist organizations
• 1978 establishments