Misplaced Pages

Biological warfare

Article snapshot taken from Wikipedia with creative commons attribution-sharealike license. Give it a read and then ask your questions in the chat. We can research this topic together.

This is an old revision of this page, as edited by 68.71.131.146 (talk) at 18:49, 4 April 2012. The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

Revision as of 18:49, 4 April 2012 by 68.71.131.146 (talk)(diff) ← Previous revision | Latest revision (diff) | Newer revision → (diff) For the use of biological agents by terrorists, see bioterrorism.
Weapons of mass destruction
By type
By country
Proliferation
Treaties

Biological warfare (also known as germ warfare) is the use of biological toxins or infectious agents such as bacteria, viruses, and fungi with intent to kill or incapacitate humans, animals or plants as an act of war. Biological weapons (often termed "bio-weapons" or "bio-agents") are living organisms or replicating entities (viruses) that reproduce or replicate within their host victims. Entomological (insect) warfare is also considered a type of biological warfare.

Biological weapons may be employed in various ways to gain a strategic or tactical advantage over an adversary, either by threats or by actual deployments. Like some of the chemical weapons, biological weapons may also be useful as area denial weapons. These agents may be lethal or non-lethal, and may be targeted against a single individual, a group of people, or even an entire population. They may be developed, acquired, stockpiled or deployed by nation states or by non-national groups. In the latter case, or if a nation-state uses it clandestinely, it may also be considered bioterrorism.

There is an overlap between biological warfare and chemical warfare, as the use of toxins produced by living organisms is considered under the provisions of both the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. Toxins and Psychochemical weapons are often referred to as midspectrum agents. Unlike bioweapons, these midspectrum agents do not reproduce in their host and are typically characterized by shorter incubation periods.

Overview

Offensive biological warfare, including mass production, stockpiling and use of biological weapons, was outlawed by the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The rationale behind this treaty, which has been ratified or acceded to by 163 countries as of 2009, is to prevent a biological attack which could conceivably result in large numbers of civilian fatalities and cause severe disruption to economic and societal infrastructure. Many countries, including signatories of the BWC, currently pursue research into the defense or protection against biological warfare, which is not prohibited by the BWC.

A nation or group that can pose a credible threat of mass casualty has the ability to alter the terms on which other nations or groups interact with it. Biological weapons allow for the potential to create a level of destruction and loss of life far in excess of nuclear, chemical or conventional weapons, relative to their mass and cost of development and storage. Therefore, biological agents may be useful as strategic deterrents in addition to their utility as offensive weapons on the battlefield.

As a tactical weapon for military use, a significant problem with a biological warfare attack is that it would take days to be effective, and therefore might not immediately stop an opposing force. Some biological agents (especially smallpox, plague, and tularemia) have the capability of person-to-person transmission via aerosolized respiratory droplets. This feature can be undesirable, as the agent(s) may be transmitted by this mechanism to unintended populations, including neutral or even friendly forces. While containment of biological warfare transmission is less of a concern for certain criminal or terrorist organizations, it remains a significant concern for the military and civilian populations of virtually all nations.

History

Main article: History of biological warfare
Part of a series on
War
(outline)
History
Military
Battlespace
Weapons
TacticsList of military tactics
Operational
StrategyList of military strategies and concepts
Grand strategy
Administrative
Organization
Personnel
Logistics
Science
Law
Theory
Non-warfare
Culture
Related
Lists

Rudimentary forms of biological warfare have been practiced repeatedly throughout history. Many examples are recorded from Antiquity. During the 6th century BC, the Assyrians poisoned enemy wells with a fungus that would render the enemy delirious. In 184 BC, Hannibal of Carthage had clay pots filled with venomous snakes and instructed his soldiers to throw the pots onto the decks of Pergamene ships.

The epidemic of Black death dates 1346-1347 and is reported to be brought into Italy by Italian merchant ships (carried by fleas on rats) from Crimea escaping Mongol invasion. The disease first appeared among Mongol siegers and then spread into the city. The last known incident of using plague corpses for biological warfare purposes occurred in 1710, when Russian forces attacked the Swedes by flinging plague-infected corpses over the city walls of Reval (Tallinn).

The Native American population was decimated after contact with the Old World due to the inadvertent introduction of many fatal infectious diseases. The British army at least once attempted to use smallpox as a weapon, when they gave contaminated blankets to the Lenape during Pontiac's War (1763–66). It is suspected, but not confirmed, that biological warfare was used against the Indians at other times as well.

The advent of the germ theory and advances in bacteriology brought a new level of sophistication to the theoretical use of bio-agents in war. There is no evidence that anthrax was used in WW1 (by Germany) or WW2 even though research was carried out on animals and humans by allies. Use of poisonous gases and such bioweapons was banned in international law by the Geneva Protocol of 1925. (The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) extended the ban to almost all production, storage and transport. However, both the Soviet Union and Iraq, at a minimum, secretly defied the treaty and continued research and production of offensive biological weapons, despite being signatories to it. Major public proof of the Soviet program, called Biopreparat, came when Dr. Kanatjan Alibekov, its first deputy director, defected to the U.S. in 1992.)

During the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) and World War II (1939–1945), the Special Research Units of the Imperial Japanese Army, such as Unit 731, conducted human experimentation on thousands of Chinese, among others. In its military campaigns, the Japanese used biological warfare on Chinese soldiers and civilians. This employment has been largely viewed as ineffective due to inefficient delivery systems. However, firsthand accounts testify that the Japanese infected civilians through the distribution of plagued foodstuffs and newer estimates suggest over 580,000 victims, largely due to plague and cholera outbreaks.

In response to suspected biological warfare development in Nazi Germany, the U.S., U.K., and Canada initiated a biological warfare development program in 1941 that resulted in the weaponization of anthrax, brucellosis, and botulism toxin. (Fear of the German program turned out to be vastly exaggerated.) The center for U.S. military biological warfare research was Fort Detrick, Maryland. The biological and chemical weapons developed during that period were tested at the Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah. Research carried out in the U.K. during World War II left Gruinard Island in Scotland contaminated with anthrax for the next 48 years.

Considerable research into biological warfare was undertaken throughout the Cold War era (1947–1991) by the U.S., U.K. and U.S.S.R., and probably other major nations as well, although it is generally believed that such weapons were never used. This view was challenged by China and North Korea, who accused the U.S. of large-scale field testing of biological warfare against them during the Korean War (1950–1953), but this claim has been discredited as wartime propaganda. The U.S. maintained a stated national policy of never using biological warfare under any circumstances since an Executive Decision in November 1969, by President Richard Nixon. In 1972, the U.S., U.K., U.S.S.R., and many other nations signed the BWC, which banned "development, production and stockpiling of microbes or their poisonous products except in amounts necessary for protective and peaceful research." By then, the U.S. and U.K. had transparently destroyed all their bioweapons stockpiles. By 2011, 165 countries had signed the treaty.

Today, according to the U.S. Department of Defense, more than ten countries are suspected to have continuing offensive biological warfare programs, including Russia, Israel, China, Syria and North Korea. Offensive biological warfare programs in Iraq were dismantled after the first Gulf War (1990–1991). Libya dismantled and disavowed its biological warfare program in 2003. The fate of the vast network of clandestine sites comprising the old Soviet biological warfare program, as well as its many tons of weaponized smallpox, remains undocumented.

Modern biological warfare operations

Offensive

It has been argued that rational people would never use biological weapons offensively. The argument is that biological weapons cannot be controlled: the weapon could backfire and harm the army on the offensive, perhaps having even worse effects than on the target. An agent like smallpox or other airborne viruses would almost certainly spread worldwide and ultimately infect the user's home country. However, this argument does not necessarily apply to bacteria. For example, anthrax can easily be controlled and even created in a garden shed. Also, using microbial methods, bacteria can be suitably modified to be effective in only a narrow environmental range, the range of the target that distinctly differs from the army on the offensive. thus only the target might be affected adversely. The weapon may be further used to bog down an advancing army making them more vulnerable to counter attack by the defending force.

Anti-personnel

The international biological hazard symbol

Ideal characteristics of a biological agent to be used as a weapon against humans are high infectivity, high virulence, non-availability of vaccines, and availability of an effective and efficient delivery system. Stability of the weaponized agent (ability of the agent to retain its infectivity and virulence after a prolonged period of storage) may also be desirable, particularly for military applications.

The primary difficulty is not the production of the biological agent, as many biological agents used in weapons can often be manufactured relatively quickly, cheaply and easily. Rather, it is the weaponization, storage and delivery in an effective vehicle to a vulnerable target that pose significant problems.

For example, Bacillus anthracis is considered an effective agent for several reasons. First, it forms hardy spores, perfect for dispersal aerosols. Second, this organism is not considered transmissible from person to person, and thus rarely if ever causes secondary infections. A pulmonary anthrax infection starts with ordinary influenza-like symptoms and progresses to a lethal hemorrhagic mediastinitis within 3–7 days, with a fatality rate that is 90% or higher in untreated patients. Finally, friendly personnel can be protected with suitable antibiotics.

A large-scale attack using anthrax would require the creation of aerosol particles of 1.5 to 5 microns. Too large and the particles would not reach the lower respiratory tract. Too small and the particles would be exhaled back out into the atmosphere. At this size, conductive powders tend to aggregate because of electrostatic charges, hindering dispersion. So the material must be treated to insulate and neutralize the charges. The weaponized agent must be resistant to degradation by rain and ultraviolet radiation from sunlight, while retaining the ability to efficiently infect the human lung. There are other technological difficulties as well, chiefly relating to storage of the weaponized agent.

Agents considered for weaponization, or known to be weaponized, include bacteria such as Bacillus anthracis, Brucella spp., Burkholderia mallei, Burkholderia pseudomallei, Chlamydophila psittaci, Coxiella burnetii, Francisella tularensis, some of the Rickettsiaceae (especially Rickettsia prowazekii and Rickettsia rickettsii), Shigella spp., Vibrio cholerae, and Yersinia pestis. Many viral agents have been studied and/or weaponized, including some of the Bunyaviridae (especially Rift Valley fever virus), Ebolavirus, many of the Flaviviridae (especially Japanese encephalitis virus), Machupo virus, Marburg virus, Variola virus, and Yellow fever virus. Fungal agents that have been studied include Coccidioides spp..

Toxins that can be used as weapons include ricin, staphylococcal enterotoxin B, botulinum toxin, saxitoxin, and many mycotoxins. These toxins and the organisms that produce them are sometimes referred to as select agents. In the United States, their possession, use, and transfer are regulated by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Select Agent Program.

Anti-agriculture

Anti-crop/anti-vegetation/anti-fisheries:
Biological warfare can also specifically target plants to destroy crops or defoliate vegetation. The United States and Britain discovered plant growth regulators (i.e., herbicides) during the Second World War, and initiated an herbicidal warfare program that was eventually used in Malaya and Vietnam in counter insurgency. Though herbicides are chemicals, they are often grouped with biological warfare as bioregulators in a similar manner as biotoxins. Scorched earth tactics or destroying livestock and farmland were carried out in the Vietnam war (cf. Agent Orange) and Eelam War in Sri Lanka.

The United States developed an anti-crop capability during the Cold War that used plant diseases (bioherbicides, or mycoherbicides) for destroying enemy agriculture. It was believed that destruction of enemy agriculture on a strategic scale could thwart Sino-Soviet aggression in a general war. Diseases such as wheat blast and rice blast were weaponized in aerial spray tanks and cluster bombs for delivery to enemy watersheds in agricultural regions to initiate epiphytotics (epidemics among plants). When the United States renounced its offensive biological warfare program in 1969 and 1970, the vast majority of its biological arsenal was composed of these plant diseases.

Biological weapons also target fisheries as well as water-based vegetation.

Anti-livestock:
In 1980s Soviet Ministry of Agriculture had successfully developed variants of foot-and-mouth disease, and rinderpest against cows, African swine fever for pigs, and psittacosis to kill chicken. These agents were prepared to spray them down from tanks attached to airplanes over hundreds of miles. The secret program was code-named "Ecology".

Attacking animals is another area of biological warfare intended to eliminate animal resources for transportation and food. In the First World War, German agents were arrested attempting to inoculate draft animals with anthrax, and they were believed to be responsible for outbreaks of glanders in horses and mules. The British tainted small feed cakes with anthrax in the Second World War as a potential means of attacking German cattle for food denial, but never employed the weapon. In the 1950s, the United States had a field trial with hog cholera. During the Mau Mau Uprising in 1952, the poisonous latex of the African milk bush was used to kill cattle.

Unconnected with inter-human wars, humans have deliberately introduced the rabbit disease Myxomatosis, originating in South America, to Australia and Europe, with the intention of reducing the rabbit population - which had devastating but temporary results, with wild rabbit populations reduced to a fraction of their former size but survivors developing immunity and increasing again.

Entomological warfare

Main article: Entomological warfare

Entomological warfare (EW) is a type of biological warfare that uses insects to attack the enemy. The concept has existed for centuries and research and development have continued into the modern era. EW has been used in battle by Japan and several other nations have developed and been accused of using an entomological warfare program. EW may employ insects in a direct attack or as vectors to deliver a biological agent, such as plague or cholera. Essentially, EW exists in three varieties. One type of EW involves infecting insects with a pathogen and then dispersing the insects over target areas. The insects then act as a vector, infecting any person or animal they might bite. Another type of EW is a direct insect attack against crops; the insect may not be infected with any pathogen but instead represents a threat to agriculture. The final method uses uninfected insects, such as bees, to directly attack the enemy.

Defensive

Main article: Biodefense

Research and development into medical counter-measures

This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it. (December 2011)

Role of public health and disease surveillance

It is important to note that all classical and modern biological weapons organisms are animal diseases, the only exception being smallpox. Thus, in any use of biological weapons, it is highly likely that animals will become ill either simultaneously with, or perhaps earlier than humans.

Indeed, in the largest biological weapons accident known– the anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg) in the Soviet Union in 1979, sheep became ill with anthrax as far as 200 kilometers from the release point of the organism from a military facility in the southeastern portion of the city (known as Compound 19 and still off limits to visitors today, see Sverdlovsk Anthrax leak).

Thus, a robust surveillance system involving human clinicians and veterinarians may identify a bioweapons attack early in the course of an epidemic, permitting the prophylaxis of disease in the vast majority of people (and/or animals) exposed but not yet ill.

For example in the case of anthrax, it is likely that by 24–36 hours after an attack, some small percentage of individuals (those with compromised immune system or who had received a large dose of the organism due to proximity to the release point) will become ill with classical symptoms and signs (including a virtually unique chest X-ray finding, often recognized by public health officials if they receive timely reports). By making these data available to local public health officials in real time, most models of anthrax epidemics indicate that more than 80% of an exposed population can receive antibiotic treatment before becoming symptomatic, and thus avoid the moderately high mortality of the disease.

Identification of bioweapons

The goal of biodefense is to integrate the sustained efforts of the national and homeland security, medical, public health, intelligence, diplomatic, and law enforcement communities. Health care providers and public health officers are among the first lines of defense. In some countries private, local, and provincial (state) capabilities are being augmented by and coordinated with federal assets, to provide layered defenses against biological weapons attacks. During the first Gulf War the United Nations activated a biological and chemical response team, Task Force Scorpio, to respond to any potential use of weapons of mass destruction on civilians.

The traditional approach toward protecting agriculture, food, and water: focusing on the natural or unintentional introduction of a disease is being strengthened by focused efforts to address current and anticipated future biological weapons threats that may be deliberate, multiple, and repetitive.

The growing threat of biowarfare agents and bioterrorism has led to the development of specific field tools that perform on-the-spot analysis and identification of encountered suspect materials. One such technology, being developed by researchers from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), employs a "sandwich immunoassay", in which fluorescent dye-labeled antibodies aimed at specific pathogens are attached to silver and gold nanowires.

In the Netherlands, the company TNO has designed Bioaerosol Single Particle Recognition eQuipment (BiosparQ). This system would be implemented into the national response plan for bioweapons attacks in the Netherlands.

Researchers at Ben Gurion University in Israel are developing a different device called the BioPen, essentially a "Lab-in-a-Pen", which can detect known biological agents in under 20 minutes using an adaptation of the ELISA, a similar widely employed immunological technique, that in this case incorporates fiber optics.

Synthetic biological warfare

Theoretically, novel approaches in biotechnology, such as synthetic biology could be used in the future to design novel types of biological warfare agents. Special attention has to be laid on future experiments (of concern) that :

  1. Would demonstrate how to render a vaccine ineffective;
  2. Would confer resistance to therapeutically useful antibiotics or antiviral agents;
  3. Would enhance the virulence of a pathogen or render a nonpathogen virulent;
  4. Would increase transmissibility of a pathogen;
  5. Would alter the host range of a pathogen;
  6. Would enable the evasion of diagnostic/detection tools;
  7. Would enable the weaponization of a biological agent or toxin

Most of the biosecurity concerns in synthetic biology, however, focused on the role of DNA synthesis and the risk of producing genetic material of lethal viruses (e.g. 1918 Spanish flu, polio) in the lab.

List of biological warfare institutions, programs, projects and sites by country

According to the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (since disbanded), 17 countries were believed to possess biological weapons in 1995: Libya, North Korea, South Korea, Iraq, Taiwan, Syria, Israel, China, Egypt, Vietnam, Laos, Cuba, Bulgaria, India, South Africa, and Russia. Today, according to the U.S. Department of Defense, more than ten countries are suspected to have continuing offensive biological warfare programs, including Russia, Israel, China, Syria and North Korea. Offensive biological warfare programs in Iraq were dismantled after the first Gulf War (1990–1991). Libya dismantled and disavowed its biological warfare program in 2003.

United States

Main article: United States biological weapons program

United Kingdom

Main article: United Kingdom and weapons of mass destruction § Biological weapons

Soviet Union and Russia

Main article: Soviet biological weapons program

Japan

Main article: Special Research Units

Iraq

Main articles: Iraqi biological weapons program and Iraq and weapons of mass destruction (passim)

South Africa

Main article: South Africa and weapons of mass destruction § Biological and chemical weapons

List of people associated with biological warfare

Bioweaponeers:

Writers and activists:

See also

References

  1. Wheelis, Mark (2006), Deadly Cultures: Biological Weapons Since 1945, Harvard University Press, pp. 284–293, 301–303, ISBN 0674016998 {{citation}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  2. Gray, Colin. (2007). Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare. Page 265 to 266. Phoenix. ISBN 0304367346.
  3. http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p_mla_apa_research_citation/0/7/3/6/4/p73644_index.html
  4. http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/content~content=a714004040&db=all
  5. Mayor, Adrienne (2003), Greek Fire, Poison Arrows & Scorpion Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare in the Ancient World, Woodstock, N.Y.: Overlook Duckworth, ISBN 978-1-58567-348-3
  6. http://www.defencejournal.com/dec98/anthrax.htm
  7. Koenig, Robert (2006), The Fourth Horseman: One Man's Secret Campaign to Fight the Great War in America, PublicAffairs.
  8. Ken Alibek and K Handelman (1999), Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World Trade From the Inside by the Man Who Ran It, New York, NY: Random House.
  9. Covert, Norman M. (2000), "A History of Fort Detrick, Maryland", 4th Edition: 2000.
  10. ^ Kenneth Alibek and S. Handelman. Biohazard: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World - Told from Inside by the Man Who Ran it. 1999. Delta (2000) ISBN 0-385-33496-6 . Cite error: The named reference "Alibek" was defined multiple times with different content (see the help page).
  11. Potential bioweapons
  12. "Vietnam's war against Agent Orange". BBC News. 14 June 2004. Retrieved 17 April 2010.
  13. Verdourt, Bernard (1969), Common poisonous plants of East Africa, London: Collins, p. 254 {{citation}}: Unknown parameter |coauthors= ignored (|author= suggested) (help)
  14. "An Introduction to Biological Weapons, Their Prohibition, and the Relationship to Biosafety", The Sunshine Project, April 2002, accessed December 25, 2008.
  15. Lockwood, Jeffrey A. Six-legged Soldiers: Using Insects as Weapons of War, Oxford University Press, USA, 2008, pp. 9–26, (ISBN 0195333055).
  16. Physorg.com, "Encoded Metallic Nanowires Reveal Bioweapons", 12:50 EST, August 10, 2006.
  17. BiosparQ features
  18. Iddo Genuth and Lucille Fresco-Cohen, "BioPen Senses BioThreats", The Future of Things, November 13, 2006
  19. Kelle A (2009) Security issues related to synthetic biology. Chapter 7. In: Schmidt M, Kelle A, Ganguli-Mitra A, de Vriend H (eds) Synthetic biology. The technoscience and its societal conse- quences. Springer, Berlin
  20. Garfinkel, M., Endy, D., Epstein, G., and Friedman, R. (2007). In Synthetic Genomics: Options for Governance. Available at: http://www.jcvi.org/cms/research/projects/syngen-options/overview/.
  21. National Security Advisory Board on Biotechnology (NSABB) (2010). Addressing Biosecurity Concerns Related to Synthetic Biology. Available at: http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/pdf/NSABB%20SynBio%20-DRAFT%20Report-FINAL%20(2)_6-7-10.pdf. Accessed September 4, 2010.
  22. M.Buller, The potential use of genetic engineering to enhance orthopox viruses as bioweapons. Presentation at the International Conference ‘Smallpox Biosecurity. Preventing the Unthinkable’ (21–22 October 2003) Geneva, Switzerland
  23. Kelle A. 2007. Synthetic Biology & Biosecurity Awareness In Europe . Bradford Science and Technology Report No.9
  24. Tumpej TM et al. 2005. Characterization of the Reconstructed 1918 Spanish Influenza Pandemic Virus. Science Vol. 310(5745):77-80
  25. Cello, J., Paul, A. V., and Wimmer, E. (2002). Chemical synthesis of poliovirus cDNA: generation of infectious virus in the absence of natural template. Science 297, 1016–1018.
  26. Wimmer, E., Mueller, S., Tumpey, T. M., and Taubenberger, J. K. (2009). Synthetic viruses: a new opportunity to understand and prevent viral disease. Nat. Biotechnol. 27, 1163–1172.
  27. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks, Office of Technology Assessment, August 1993, OTA-ISC-559, archived from the original on December 30, 2006, retrieved 2007-05-27
  28. Fenton, Ben (2005-09-20). "Trawler steamed into germ warfare site and no one said a word". London: Daily Telegraph. Retrieved 26 May 2010.
  29. Rebecca Maksel (14 January 2007). "An American waged germ warfare against U.S. in WWI". SF Gate. Retrieved 7 March 2010.
  30. "Dr. Ira Baldwin: Biological Weapons Pioneer". HistoryNet. American History. Retrieved 8 March 2009.
  31. http://profiles.NLM.NIH.gov/BB/ search for document "bbacqq"
  32. For a more complete discussion, see: http://www.estherlederberg.com/EImages/Archive/Oparin/Anecdotes/Anecdote4/Andromeda%20Strain.html
  33. Sharad S. Chauhan (2004), Biological Weapons, APH Publishing, p. 194, ISBN 8176487325
  34. "US welcomes 'Dr Germ' capture". BBC. 13 May 2003. Retrieved 8 March 2010.
  35. "Anthrax attacks". Newsnight. BBC. 14 March 2002. Retrieved 16 March 2010.
  36. "Interview: Dr Kanatjan Alibekov". Frontline. PBS. Retrieved 8 March 2010.
  37. "Obituary: Vladimir Pasechnik". London: Daily Telegraph. 29 November 2001. Retrieved 8 March 2010.
  38. "Interviews With Biowarriors: Sergei Popov", (2001) NOVA Online.
  39. Ute Deichmann, Biologists under Hitler, trans Thomas Dunlap (Harvard 1996). http://books.google.com.bz/books?id=gPrtE4K0WC8C&pg=PA173&dq=kurt+blome&hl=en&ei=P3o3TOLMBMKCnQe39rTVAw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CCYQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=kurt%20blome&f=false
  40. B. Leyendecker and F. Klapp, "Human Hepatitis Experiments in the Second World War". U.S. Library of Medicine, National Institutes of Health, 1989. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/2698560
  41. Office of U.S. Chief of Counsel for the American Military Tribunals at Nurember, 1946. http://www.mazal.org/NO-series/NO-0124-000.htm
  42. Paul Maddrell, "Operation Matchbox and the Scientific Containment of the USSR", in Peter J. Jackson and Jennifer L. Siegel (eds) Intelligence and Statecraft: The Use and Limits of Intelligence in International Society. Praeger, 2005.http://books.google.com/books?id=I3Q3_Ww-5SMC&pg=PA194&dq=erich+traub&hl=en&ei=DyJ_TPDPI4vEsAOvq_nwCg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=10&ved=0CE4Q6AEwCQ#v=onepage&q=erich%20traub&f=false
  43. "Matthew Meselson - Harvard - Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs". Harvard. Retrieved 8 March 2010.
  44. "MIT Security Studies Program (SSP): Jeanne Guillemin". MIT. Retrieved 8 March 2010.
  45. Lewis, Paul (4 September 2002). "Sheldon Harris, 74, Historian Of Japan's Biological Warfare". The New York Times. Retrieved 8 March 2010.

Further reading

External links

This article's use of external links may not follow Misplaced Pages's policies or guidelines. Please improve this article by removing excessive or inappropriate external links, and converting useful links where appropriate into footnote references. (August 2009) (Learn how and when to remove this message)
Biological warfare and bioterrorism
Modern incidents
Prevention
and response
Biological agents
Related concepts
International law
Toxicology
Fields
Concepts
Treatments
Incidents
Related topics

Template:Link FA

Categories: