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Battle of The Lower Dnieper
Part of World War II
Soviet soldiers crossing the Dnieper on self-made rafts.
Date 24 August, 1943 — 23 December, 1943 Location Dnieper river, USSR Result Decisive Soviet Victory
Belligerents
Axis	Soviet Union
Commanders and leaders
Erich von Manstein	Konstantin Rokossovsky, Ivan Konev
Strength
1,250,000 men 12,600 guns 2,100 tanks 2,000 planes	2,650,000 men 51,000 guns 2,400 tanks 2,850 planes
Casualties and losses
Low est.: 500,000+ killed and wounded High est.: 1,250,000 killed and wounded	300,000+ killed, 900,000+ wounded

The World War II Battle of the Lower Dnieper of 1943 (also: Battle of the Dnieper, Battle for Dnieper, in Russian: Битва за Днепр) is considered to be one of the largest battles in world history, involving almost 4,000,000 men on both sides and stretching on a front 1400 kilometers wide. During a four-month campaign, Soviet troops liberated the left shore of the Dnieper River from German occupation, crossed it in force, and created several bridgeheads on the right shore, liberating Kiev as well.

It is also considered one of the bloodiest battles, with estimates ranging from 1,700,000 to 2,700,000 casualties on both sides. Since the area involved was huge, some historians do not consider it a discrete "battle", and grant the Battle of Stalingrad the title of the bloodiest battle in history.

Background

After the Battle of Kursk, the Wehrmacht's ability to regain the initiative on the Eastern Front (World WarII) was severely diminished. Its losses had been considerable and many of its best men had fallen in the Battle of Stalingrad. Despite considerable numbers, the Wehrmacht could only react and defend. Hitler ordered the construction of a series of fortifications to slow down the Red Army and demanded that the Wehrmacht defend its positions on the Dnieper at all costs.

On the Soviet side, Stalin was determined to pursue his liberation of occupied territories, begun earlier in the year. The Ukrainian industrial region was the first priority, since it was a densely populated area and its coal mines and other ores would provide precious resources for the Soviet Union. Therefore, the main axis of the attack was in a southerly direction; the northern regions were largely neglected in the Soviet offensive.

Start of the Soviet Offensive

German defensive setup

Hitler's order to construct the Dnieper defense complex, known as the Ostwall or Eastern Wall was issued on 11 August 1943 and immediately executed. Fortifications were erected up and down the Dnieper, but with the Soviet Army's rapid advance this large undertaking could not be completed in time. The Eastern Wall was not uniform, but heaviest in areas where large Soviet crossings were most likely, such as near Kremenchug, Zaporizhzhia and Nikopol.

Additionally, on 7 September 1943, the Wehrmacht and Waffen-SS forces were ordered to commence scorched earch tactics against the area they were retreating from to slow the Soviet advance and deny it supplies.

Offensive on the left shore

On 24 August 1943, the Soviet divisions began moving on a 1400 kilometer front stretching between Smolensk and the Azov Sea. The operation staged was huge, mobilizing 2,650,000 men, 51,000 guns, 2,400 tanks and 2,850 planes, and involving 5 fronts:

• Central Front (known as the Bielorussian Front after 20 October 1943)
• Voronezh Front (known as the 1st Ukrainian Front after 20 October 1943)
• Steppe Front (known as the 2nd Ukrainian Front after 20 October 1943)
• Southwest Front (known as the 3rd Ukrainian Front after 20 October 1943)
• South Front (known as the 4th Ukrainian Front after 20 October 1943)

Overall, the operation was executed by 36 rifle armies, 4 Tank and 5 Air armies.

Despite a great superiority in numbers, the offensive was by no means easy. German opposition was ferocious and fights raged for every town and city. One tactic widely used by the Wehrmacht was to leave some troops in each city and on each hill to slow the Soviet offensive.

Three weeks after the start of the offensive, and despite heavy losses on the Soviet side, it became clear that the Wehrmacht could not contain the Soviets in the flat, open terrain of the steppes, where the Red Army's numerical strength would prevail. General Manstein asked for as many as 12 new divisions in hopes of containing the Soviet offensive – but German reserves were perilously thin. Years later, Manstein wrote in his memoirs:

After analysing this situation, I concluded that we can't keep the Donbass with the forces that we already possess, and that even a greater danger for the whole Eastern Front is being created on the north flank of the group. The 8th and 4th armies won't be able to contain the Soviet offensive for very long.

On 15 September 1943, Hitler ordered Army Group South to retreat to the Dnieper defense line.

The fight for the city of Poltava was especially bitter, having been well fortified and its garrison well prepared. After a few days of inconclusive urban warfare Marshal Konev bypassed the city and rushed towards the Dnieper, although the German garrison fell shortly after.

Towards the end of September 1943, Soviet forces reached the lower part of the Dnieper.

Airborne operation

In order to soften the defenses on Dnieper's right shore, the Soviet command decided to attempt a paradrop on the right shore. On 24 September 1943 the Dnieper airborne operation was launched. The Soviet paratroopers' objective was to secure a bridgehead until reinforcements could arrive.

The operation was an almost complete failure. Because pilots were completely unfamiliar with the area, the first wave of paratroopers was dropped on Soviet lines or in the Dnieper, while the second wave of 5,000 troops were scattered over several dozen square kilometers. Moreover, because of a poor reconnaissance that failed to spot German mechanized forces, most troops, lacking anti-tank weapons, were overwhelmed shortly after their landing. The others, having lost all radio link with their HQ, tried to attack German supply depots or join partisan forces.

Despite heavy losses, it is estimated that the Dnieper airborne operation, which attracted the attention of a significant number of German mechanized troops, allowed a Soviet crossing in better conditions. Nevertheless, after the failure of the Vyazma and Dnieper paradrops, the STAVKA refused to use massive airborne operations again.

Soviet Crossing of the Dnieper

Tactical considerations

The Dnieper is the third largest river in Europe, second only to the Volga and the Danube. In its lower part, its width can easily reach 3 kilometers, and the fact that it was dammed in several places made it even larger. Moreover, its right shore — the one still to be retaken — was much higher and steeper than the left one and had been transformed into a vast complex of defenses and fortifications by the Wehrmacht.

The Soviet commanders were faced with two options. The first was to give themselves time to regroup their forces, find a weak point or two to exploit (not necessarily in the lower part of the Dnieper), stage a breakthrough and encircle the German defenders, rendering the defense line next to useless (similar to when German Panzers bypassed the Maginot line in 1940). This, however, would give the Germans time to get more reserves and futhermore, would expose Soviet troops to mechanized attacks on their flanks, every Soviet commander's nightmare since 1941. The second option was to stage a massive assault without waiting, and forge the Dnieper on a large front. This option left no additional time for the German defenders, but would lead to much larger casualties.

For political reasons, Stalin wanted Kiev to be retaken on 7 November). The second option was chosen.

The assault would be staged on a 300-kilometer front almost simultaneously. All available means of transport would be used to transport the attackers to the opposite shore, including small fishing boats and improvised rafts of barrels and trees (see photograph). The crucial issue would be transporting heavy equipment, without which the bridgeheads would not stand for long.

The crossing

The first bridgehead on the Dnieper's right shore was established on 22 September 1943 at the confluence of the Dnieper and Pripyat rivers, in the northern part of the front. On 24 September, another bridgehead was created near Dneprodzerzhinsk, another on 25 September near Dnepropetrovsk and yet another on 28 September near Kremenchug. By the end of the month, 23 bridgeheads were created on the right shore, some of them 10 kilometers wide and 1-2 kilometers deep.

By all accounts, the crossing of the Dnieper can be described as an "attack rage". Soldiers used every available floating device to cross the river, under heavy German fire and taking heavy losses.

Soviet troops dug in to the clay ravines composing Dnieper's right shore.

Securing the bridgeheads

German troops soon launched heavy counterattacks on almost every bridgehead, hoping to annihilate them before heavy equipment could be transported across the river.

The Borodaevsk bridgehead, mentioned by Marshal Konev in his memoires, was under a heavy armored and air assualt. Konev complained at once about a lack of organized air support and set up air patrols to prevent bombers from approaching the bridgeheads and ordered forward more artillery to counter tank attacks from the opposite shore. With improved air support and Katyusha rocket barrages, the situation began to improve and the bridgehead was eventually preserved.

Such heavy fighting was commonplace on every bridgehead, and while Soviet forces managed to preserve every one, most divisions were at only 25 to 50% of their nominal strength.

== Right Shore Campaign ==

Lower Dnieper offensive

By mid-October, the forces accumulated on the lower Dnieper bridgeheads were strong enough to stage a massive attack to better secure the Dnieper's right shore in the southern part of the front. A vigorous attack was staged on the Kremenchug-Dnepropetrovsk line. Simultaneously, a major diversion was conducted further south to draw German forces away both from the Lower Dnieper and from Kiev.

At the end of the offensive, Soviet forces controlled a bridgehead that was in some places 300 kilometers wide and up to 80 kilometers deep. In the south, the Crimea was now cut off from the rest of the German forces.

Liberation of Kiev

Criticism of Stalin's Tactics

Stalin's desire to retake Kiev before 7 November has raised criticism from some historians. A common historical perspective of the battle is that bridgeheads on the Lower Dnieper were deliberately "left alone" in order to draw German forces from Kiev, resulting in heavy Soviet losses.

Aftermath

The Battle of the Dnieper was another stinging defeat for the Wehrmacht. The Red Army, which Hitler hoped to contain at the Dnieper, broke through the Wehrmacht's defenses. Kiev was liberated and German troops lacked the forces needed to halt the Soviet advance across the Lower Dnieper. For the time being, the right shore was still largely in German possession, but General Manstein's counterattacks in late 1943 and early 1944 failed to turn the tide.

The Battle of the Dnieper demonstrated the strength of the Soviet partisan movement. The "rail war" operation staged during September and October 1943 struck German logistics very hard, creating heavy supply issues.

The Soviet advances during this period, along with other major advances during 1943 gained Stalin considerable influence in negotations at the first formal Allied conference, held in Teheran between 28 November and 1 December, 1943.

Casualties Debate

Casualties during the Battle of the Dnieper are a subject of heavy debate and estimates vary widely. Some sources put the figures at 200,000 to 300,000 total casualties. Given the duration of the campaign and the huge area involved, more than one historian argues that the losses involved were huge, easily reaching or even surpassing those at the Battle of Stalingrad, but going "unnoticed" due to that battle's aura of fame and the Dniepper conflict having been spread across such a vast area of operations. The numbers also depend on the time frame considered and whether statistics from the 1943 Smolensk battle (which was used as a kind of deceptive manoeuvre by the Soviets to aid the Dnieper campaign) are included.

Nikolaï Shefov in his Russian fights puts Soviet casualties at 373,000 KIA and more than 1,500,000 total casualties. British historian John Erickson in his Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies puts Soviet KIA at 173,201 during a time frame of 26 September to 20 December 1943, hence not taking into account the period from 24 August to 26 September.

Shefov and other Soviet/Russian historians quote German casualties as high as 1,500,000.

References

• Nikolaï Shefov, Russian fights, Lib. Military History, Moscow, 2002
• History of Great Patriotic War, 1941 — 1945. Мoscow, 1963
• John Erickson, Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies, Edinburgh University Press, 1994
• Marshal Konev, Notes of a front commander, Science, Moscow, 1972.
• Erich von Manstein, Lost Victories, Мoscow, 1957.

• World War II operations and battles of Europe
• Battles of Germany
• Battles of the Soviet Union