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Talk:Truth/insults?

Propositional attitudes

I agree with Nathan - this section is not relevant. Bring it to talk, folks. Banno 05:47, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

Agreed insofar as the section is relevant only to caution the reader that not all statements should be taken on their literal face value (also covered in the meaning of "proposition"). And we even forgot to mention the propositional attitudes such as "express as sarcasm" and "express as parody" and other such forms, potentially resulting in an endless section. I am going to collapse this section by removing the least directly relevant portions, and will not object to further collapsing of its content to reflect its placement in the introduction to the major theories of truth... Kenosis 18:37, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

I have removed this material and shortened this section to two paragraphs, with the brief third paragraph currently serving as a way of separating our those who take belief and thought as the locus, and those who take sentences and propositions as the locus ... Kenosis 19:07, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

"Deviations of observations from expectations are commonly perceived as surprises, phenomena that call for explanations to reduce the shock of amazement. Deviations of observations from intentions are commonly experienced as problems, situations that call for plans of action to reduce the drive of dissatisfaction. Either type of discrepancy forms an impulse to inquiry (Awbrey & Awbrey 1995)." ...19:07, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

Article is now too Abstract/Advanced

I could have sworn I wrote the following to this page a little while ago but its not here an not even in the history. Spooky. Anyway, this is what I said:

I've been away for a month and the article has totally changed. Some changes are for the better, but most have made it unreadable to the Misplaced Pages audience. Only someone with a master's degree (at least) in philosophy can understand most of it. Remember who we are writing for. This is someone who has looked up "Truth" in the encyclopedia because he doesn't initially know anything about it. Another problem is that Jon Awbrey's style is very abstract. Even I can't figure out what some of the sentences mean, because the terminology is so airy and vague. We need to use concrete terms. Finally, so of what's been added is of dubious relevance to the topic. I'm going to try to correct these problems but keep the good stuff Jon A. has added. --Nate Ladd 05:58, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

Comportment

JA: Nathan, there is no excuse for wholesale blanking of text. There is no excuse for putting messages on my personal user page, and my name is Jon, not Jim. I am giving you the benefit of the doubt only because it is late on a Friday night. Any other time this would be a Test0 situation at the very minimum. This is an article that has been gone over with a fine-toothed comb by many editors for months now. Their work deserves a modicum of respect. Maybe you've been away for a while and don't know that. I am doing my best to imagine extenuating circumstances for you. I have told you three times to bring your criticisms to the talk page. That is the way that we've been operating here for quite a while now. I suggest that everybody go take a nap to clear their heads, and we will go through it all again as carefully as need be, but tomorrow, as there is no particular hurry about truth. Jon Awbrey 06:12, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

NL: I think you have badly overreacted. (1) I'm not doing any "wholesale blanking". I give reasons for my rewrites and a reason for my removal of one section. Another editor has already endorsed my removal of it. (2) Leaving messages on a user page is a standard way of communicating on wiki. (Or am I thinking of the user's talk page? Its been so long since I did it, I've forgotten.) (3) Sorry, about the name. I corrected it as soon as I realized my mistake. (4) What is a "Test0 situation"? (5) This article has been "gone over" for a lot longer than "months", and for a long time before you came along. Quite a bit of the article as it stood a month ago was my writing. I'm respectful of your contributions (see below and my note on your page), so I expect you to be respectful of my work too. (6) I don't need extenuating circumstances, since I've done nothing wrong. (7) I was so busy editing, that I didn't notice your reverts or your request that I come to the talk page until your 4th revert. I did try to put a comment here at that time, but there must have been an edit collision, because it disappeared. I've re-added it above. (8) I LIKE a lot of what you've done and I think in the future you and I will be allies against the barbarians. But I think most of your writing belongs somewhere else, directed to a more philosophically educated audience. Perhaps you could move it to a series of advanced philosophical topics and then we can have links to those on the Truth page? Nap time... --Nate Ladd 06:37, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

JA: Nathan, it is simply not permissible to alter the text of a sourced quotation, and it is extremely poor scholarly practice to alter arbitrarily a close paraphrase of a cited source text. But that is precisely what you are doing with the Dissoi Logoi material that is closely paraphrased from Kneale & Kneale. This violates all sorts of WP:VERIFY principles. Jon Awbrey 06:28, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

NL: Did I do that? I don't think so. Since the original was Greek, "initiate" is a translation of a Greek word that could be more clearly (for our audience) with "beginner". I don't understand your remarks about paraphrase. I edited something and gave reasons why. What's the problem? --Nate Ladd 06:37, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

RN: In Greek, "initiate" and "beginner" are not synonyms -- not even close.

NL: They are not "in" Greek. They are in English. And when "initiate" is a noun it means the same thing as "beginner." See below. (I can't imagine what you even intended to say. There's only ONE Greek word at issue here, so the question of whether two Greek words are synonyms does not arise.) --Nate Ladd 21:28, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

Stop reverting

Folks, stop the revert war or I will lock the article. Play nice. Banno 06:33, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

Thanks, Banno. (But please note, I haven't been reverting. JA was, but I didn't realize it for a long time.) --Nate Ladd 06:43, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

Debatable sentence removed for rewriting and placement elsewhere as appropriate

Last sentence of reflection and quotation section placed here for rewriting and placement in the Formal definitions section or elsewhere as appropriate...Kenosis 15:45, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

It is hardly an accident, then, that matters of numbering phrases, quotation, and reflection are bound up with each other in mathematical logic and computation theory." ... 15:45, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

Of course, you realize that taking the above quote out of context commits the very act that the section in question discusses. However, the sentence in question totally misrepresents Gödel number, so I agree with its removal. Rick Norwood 19:24, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

Understood Rick. Now I imagine we will be required to quote it and reflect, part of which involves quoting the word quotation within a quotation now taken out of its original context ;-) ... Kenosis 19:38, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

Minor modification to Truthbearer section

I removed "the linguistic turn in ..." changed to "modern", because the analysis of propositions did not start with the linguistic turn, but with the advent of analytic philosophy. Further, the dissecting of syntax and linguistic interpretation did not begin with Derrida et al, but has been a gradual trend leading up to the linguistic turn anyway. May as well keep it simple as reasonably possible in the intro section...Kenosis 19:33, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

Major problem with intro section of Philosophy of truth

This section began as an attempt to introduce the concept of truth predicate, and has since fallen into nearly complete explanatory disarray. I missed it until Nathan Ladd called it to my attention. I have no problem with the first paragraph. The second paragraph doesn't say anything meaningful and is in several respects wrong as it's currently written. Theories of truth can not be classified according to the schema presented, indeed most of the substantive theories (possibly excepting the Pragmatic theory of Charles Peirce and the Russell version of correspondence theory) do not fit into this classification. Even the linguistic-analytic new kids on the block are not necessarily explained effectively by these three criteria. That renders the attempt at explaining semiotics excessive in this introductory section. I wish there were a way to get this in early in the article, but it's just too much for both the writers and the readers to expect at this introductory stage of the article. I think all but the first paragraph should be removed and rewritten to be used somewhere else. In particular, the last two paragraphs have something meaningful to contribute, but not as part of the intro. I will therefore remove it until some better sense can be made of this relatively recent development in the article. Personally I would be comfortable with just moving right into truthbearers here and presenting the analytic-linquistic and semiotic material in a separate section where Kripke and Semantic theory is currently introduced ... Kenosis 20:52, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

It is conventional to refer to a philosophical treatment of a particular subject matter as a theory, whether or not it qualifies as a theory by either empirical or logical criteria. Most of the discussion below follows this convention.

Theories of truth can be classified according to the following features:

• Primary subjects. What kinds of things are potentially meaningful enough to be asserted or not, believed or not, or considered true or false?
• Relevant objects. What kinds of things, in addition to primary subjects, are pertinent to deciding whether to assert them or not, believe them or not, or consider them true or false?
• Value predicates. What kinds of things are legitimate to say about primary subjects, either in themselves, or in relation to relevant objects?

In some discussions of meaning and truth that consider forms of expression well beyond the limits of literally-interpreted linguistic forms, potentially meaningful elements are called representations, or signs for short, taking these words in the broadest conceivable senses.

Most treatments of truth make an important distinction at this point, though the language in which they make it may vary. On the one hand there is a type of very basic sign that is said to be true or false of various objects. For example, in logic there are terms such as "man" or "woman" that are true of some things and false of others, and there are predicates such as "__is a man" or "__is a woman" that are true or false in the same way. On the other hand there is a type of complete sign (or representation) that expresses what grammarians traditionally call a complete thought. Here one speaks of sentences and propositions. Some considerations of truth admit both types of signs, terms and sentences, while others admit only the bearers of complete thoughts to judgments of truth or falsity. Recent literature in linguistic-analytic philosophy uses the term truthbearers to describe the vehicles of complete thoughts, but with no intention of prejudging whether they bear truth or falsehood. ... 20:52, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

Use "beginner" not "initiate"

The English word "initiate" when used as a noun means beginner. So whatever Greek word is being translated as "initiate" we can also translate as "beginner". And since the latter is a more familiar term, it makes the the article more readable to use it. To the editor who wrote an edit annotation that "In Greek "initiate" and "beginner" mean different things" (and who then added a snotty remark.): You are confused. These two words are English words, so it makes no sense to say "In Greek" they mean different things. What matters is that in English they mean the same thing. --Nate Ladd 21:23, 13 May 2006 (UTC)--Nate Ladd 21:23, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

How about "I am a novice"? I don't see the importance...Kenosis 21:35, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

The point is that the passage in question is a translation from the Greek. "Initiate" does not mean "beginner" in English either, but the difference is more important in Greek, where an "initiate" was one who was formally initiated into a mystery cult. Only initiates were privy to the secrets of the cult. The formal status of an initiate is important to the point being made, a point lost if the word "beginner" is used, which has no formal status -- that is, there is no point at which one officially becomes a beginner or officially stops being a beginner. I am sorry that you find the use of correct language "snotty", but there it is. Rick Norwood 21:38, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

It was your annotation, not your language, that I called snotty. The formal status of an intiate is NOT relevant to the point being made. In fact, waat the sentence means doesn't matter. All that matters to the point being made is that the sentence is true when one person says it but false when another does. That's because the subject is "I" and the predicate is not universally true of everyone. I'm going to rewrite the whole thing plainer. We don't need to quote an obscure Greek source to make such a pedestrian point. --Nate Ladd 21:53, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

The point is not the question that is being raised, which is today a commonplace, but that this document is the first extant document that raises the question. Second, it is important that the predicate, "... is an initiate." apply to some people but not to others. The predicate "... is a beginner." is vague enough to apply to anyone. In any case, the first example known to raise this question should be quoted correctly, not incorrectly. Rick Norwood 23:19, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

Thanks for clarifying, but please note that the passage did not say anywhere that this was the earliest known time the point was made. --Nate Ladd 23:42, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

The bibiography is bloated and inappropriate

The bibliography is filled with references to works that are not cited in the text. Also, most of them are inappropriately advanced for our audience. And there is no guidance as to what a beginner to the subject of truth should turn to next. There are also a lot of references to articles in other encyclopedias. Surely, that is an implied admission that we have failed to do explain the subject adequately ourselves. The bibliography should be limited to (1) Introductory (but longer than an encyclopedia article) texts, (2) A handful of classic works on truth, and (3) works actually cited in the text. (Also, for no apparent reason, the header "For further reading" appears in the middle of all this.)--Nate Ladd 22:21, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

The "Further reading" section is, or should have been, limited to works not cited in the body text of the article. Works cited should all be in the "Referrences", except those which used footnotes...Kenosis 22:36, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

I think most of the entries in the References section are not cited in the text. --Nate Ladd 23:03, 13 May 2006 (UTC)

Move Bib to Talk for Case-by-Case Re-Exam

• Beaney, Michael (ed., 1997), The Frege Reader, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK.

• Dewey, John (1900–1901), Lectures on Ethics 1900–1901, Donald F. Koch (ed.), Southern Illinois University Press, Carbondale and Edwardsville, IL, 1991.

• Dewey, John (1932), Theory of the Moral Life, Part 2 of John Dewey and James H. Tufts, Ethics, Henry Holt and Company, New York, NY, 1908. 2nd edition, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1932. Reprinted, Arnold Isenberg (ed.), Victor Kestenbaum (pref.), Irvington Publishers, New York, NY, 1980.

• Dummett, Michael (1991), Frege and Other Philosophers, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.

• Dummett, Michael (1993), Origins of Analytical Philosophy, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

• Foucault, Michel (1997), Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–1984, Volume 1, Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, Paul Rabinow (ed.), Robert Hurley et al. (trans.), The New Press, New York, NY.

• Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1986), The Idea of the Good in Platonic–Aristotelian Philosophy, P. Christopher Smith (trans.), Yale University Press, New Haven, CT. 1st published, Die Idee des Guten zwischen Plato und Aristoteles, J.C.B. Mohr, Heidelberg, Germany, 1978.

• Grover, Dorothy (1992), A Prosentential Theory of Truth, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

• Habermas, Jürgen (1979), Communication and the Evolution of Society, Thomas McCarthy (trans.), Beacon Press, Boston, MA.

• Habermas, Jürgen (1990), Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Christian Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen (trans.), Thomas McCarthy (intro.), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

• Habermas, Jürgen (2003), Truth and Justification, Barbara Fultner (trans.), MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

• Kirkham, Richard L. (1992), Theories of Truth, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

• Kripke, Saul A. (1975), "An Outline of a Theory of Truth", Journal of Philosophy 72 (1975), 690–716.

• Kripke, Saul A. (1980), Naming and Necessity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

• Lewis, C.I. (1946), An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, 'The Paul Carus Lectures, Series 8', Open Court, La Salle, IL.

• Linsky, Leonard (ed., 1971), Reference and Modality, Oxford University Press, London, UK.

• Martin, Robert L. (ed., 1984), Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.

• Moody, Ernest A. (1953), Truth and Consequence in Mediaeval Logic, North-Holland, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 1953. Reprinted, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1976.

• Nietzsche, Friedrich (1968). "Uber Wahrheit und Lüge im aussermoralischen Sinn", ("On Truth and Lying in an Extra-moral Sense"), in Jürgen Habermas (ed.), Erkenntnistheoretische Schriften, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, Germany.

• Putnam, Hilary (1981), Reason, Truth, and History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.

• Quine, W.V. (1982), Methods of Logic, 4th edition, Harvard Unversity Press, Cambridge, MA.

• Quine, W.V. (1992), Pursuit of Truth, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990. Revised edition, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1992.

• Quine, W.V., and Ullian, J.S. (1978), The Web of Belief, Random House, New York, NY, 1970. 2nd edition, Random House, New York, NY, 1978.

• Rawls, John (2000), Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, Barbara Herman (ed.), Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA.

• Rescher, Nicholas (1973), The Coherence Theory of Truth, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.

• Rorty, Richard (1991), Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers, Volume 1, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.

• Russell, Bertrand (1913), Theory of Knowledge (The 1913 Manuscript), Elizabeth Ramsden Eames (ed.), Kenneth Blackwell (collab.), George Allen & Unwin, 1984. Reprinted, Routledge, London, UK, 1992.

• Russell, Bertrand (1940), An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, 'The William James Lectures for 1940 Delivered at Harvard University', George Allen & Unwin, 1950. Reprinted, Thomas Baldwin (intro.), Routledge, London, UK, 1992.

• Salmon, Nathan, and Soames, Scott (eds., 1988), Propositions and Attitudes, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.

• Smart, Ninian (1969), The Religious Experience of Mankind, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, NY.

• Tarski, Alfred (1944), "The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of Semantics", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (3), 341-376.

• Wallace, Anthony F.C. (1966), Religion, An Anthropological View, Random House, New York, NY.

• Williams, Bernard (2002), Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.

Proposed merge of Truth and Truth theory

The article Truth theory has been created and edited by a single user. The subject matter does not appear to differ substantially from this pre-existing article. Strongly recommend merging any usable material to here and making Truth theory a re-direct. Comments? Banno 05:18, 15 May 2006 (UTC)

JA: All articles in WikiPedia are created by single users and edited by single users until such time as other users take part in their development.

JA: The article Truth theory is still a Wikiwork-in-Progress, as all pages in WikiPedia are. The use of the epithet "theory" follows a very common practice in WP for indicating that it covers the more abstract, advanced, technical, theoretical aspects of the subject in a more complete and comprehensive detail. Indeed, the division of the same subject matter into different levels of treatment is such a routine practice that there are several sets of templates already in use for handling this very common type of situation, and there is one of them, {{seeintro}} in use at the top of the Truth theory article.

JA: Per talk page discussion at Truth, it has become evident at this point that there will be no such advanced, comprehensive, or technical development of the subject matter of theories of truth in the introductory article Truth, and so there is no conflict between the two levels of treatment.

JA: I am following the model of numerous other (Introductory, Comprehensive) article pairings in WikiPedia, for instance, the following:

JA: ∴ Oppose Merge. Jon Awbrey 07:00, 15 May 2006 (UTC)

Comment. But that implies something about theory. Are not { definition, observation, generalization, theory etc } members of some {set}, with an ecology and interrelation? What does this imply for the role of the observer, critic, etc. Are we talking about a community or ecology of ideas? I am sure that this is published ground, and is not original research. Do you have names for the scholars? End of comment. --Ancheta Wis 11:03, 15 May 2006 (UTC)

JA: Ancheta, I'm sorry, but your comment is obviously way over my head. Perhaps there needs to be some third level of discussion page where it could be taken up? Alas, tertium non datur so farum. Jon Awbrey 12:24, 15 May 2006 (UTC)

Mission control we have a bit of a problem. I've only been involved as a registered user for three months now, though I have had an opportunity to watch the development of the Intelligent design article and a few others very closely and with great interest for at least the last year and a half. That's enough time to develop some sense of what OR, NPOV, and other basic foundational precepts of Misplaced Pages is about when set in the context of controversy. What is now presented to the various editors is an article titled Truth theory which is mistitled. This article should under no circumstances be merged, but rather should:

• (1) be immediately removed, written at home, office, or the local Starbucks, and after the author is satisfied with the content, be submitted to a web or paper journal for possible publication, after which it can be cited and included as Awbrey's theory of truth;
• (2) Retitled to reflect its content, which is something like A unique synthesis of carefully selected theories of truth in light of Charles Peirce's theory of semiotics, set in the context of formal logic and neo-positivism; or,
• (3) rewritten so it is not a repository for one editor's miscellaneous research on the subject, and split (with reasonably accurate reflection of the actual content) into several articles that might perhaps be something like Semiotic theory of truth, Analytic-linguistic theories of truth, etc.

Under no circumstances should the current article on Truth theory be merged. ... Kenosis 14:42, 15 May 2006 (UTC) Without offering a detailed analysis, the last of these three would be my preference. I apologize for getting angry...Kenosis 15:02, 15 May 2006 (UTC)

JA: Kenosis, your speculations about many things are of course your own. Like many speculations that people get away with on mere talk pages, they are unfounded, unqualified, unsourced, and unsupported by empirical data. There are definite protocols for deleting articles, procedures that are based on specific criteria, and these criteria must be applied across the board to all pages in WikiPedia, or else WikiProtocols give up their right to be called legitimate. Jon Awbrey 15:16, 15 May 2006 (UTC)

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