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Talk:Truth/insults?

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Weird Section

Alright, I know I'm not the only one who found this section weird and unhelpful. I leave it here on the off-chance there is anything of value in it. Feel free to revert... _talk 06:40, 30 June 2006 (UTC)

==Additional observations about truth==

Honest intentions play a unique role in the ethics of epistemology. Jurgen Habermas understands truthfulness to be one of the dimensions of valid speech. The moral importance of honest intent is underscored by the remarks of Buddha: “Herein someone avoids false speech and abstains from it. He speaks the truth, is devoted to truth, reliable, worthy of confidence, not a deceiver of people. Being at a meeting, or amongst people, or in the midst of his relatives, or in a society, or in the king's court, and called upon and asked as witness to tell what he knows, he answers, if he knows nothing: "I know nothing," and if he knows, he answers: "I know"; if he has seen nothing, he answers: "I have seen nothing," and if he has seen, he answers: "I have seen." Thus he never knowingly speaks a lie, either for the sake of his own advantage, or for the sake of another person's advantage, or for the sake of any advantage whatsoever.” In its most extreme form, the obligation to tell the truth may manifest itself as a strong form of evidentialism, which holds that "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything on insufficient evidence".

It reads like an elephant took a rather large dump. •Jim62sch• 00:16, 2 July 2006 (UTC)

Correspondence theory

Is this sentence related to some form of new-age mysticism? "Correspondence theory traditionally operates on the assumption that there is an objective truth with which humans are capable of being properly aligned." Properly aligned? What role does astrology and pyramid power play? OK seriously, this sentence and those that follow will not be of any help to most of our audience. In addition, parts of it seem to be OR. I think the best approach may be to start over -- put each section in talk and let the group of us discuss the best way to get the point across, and, frankly, forget about what is already written.
As part of my job, I edit the work of others -- this section would be one I'd delete and send back for a major rewrite. •Jim62sch• 17:01, 30 June 2006 (UTC)

OK, let's get started. ... Kenosis 17:07, 30 June 2006 (UTC)

Made a minor change in first paragraph. First sentence of second paragraph now reads like this:

• Correspondence theory traditionally operates on the assumption that truth is a matter of accurately copying "objective reality" and then representing it in thoughts, words and other symbols. ... The footnote cites to:See, e.g., Bradley, F.H., "On Truth and Copying", in Blackburn, et al (eds., 1999),Truth, 31-45.

The last sentence of the second paragraph refers to proponents of constructivist, consensus and pragmatic theory, all of which focus on the human role in forming conceptions of truth. Correspondence theory does not make these points of emphasis. Though some versions no doubt try to incorporate them, that is not the view of correspondence theory. (That was the point of the part of the paragraph about language translation too--if the translations are not exact, we get different so-called "objective" relationships.) Will try to find a cite for that.

Anything else? ... Kenosis 17:22, 30 June 2006 (UTC)

The first paragraph looks great! I just edited the second -- revert it if you hate it.
One thing, I don't know what to do with this, it doesn't really fit: Commentators and proponents of several of the other theories introduced below also have asserted that correspondence theory neglects the role of the persons involved in the "truth relation."
Also, Kant has to go: synthesize it and use it (the whole quote) as a ref (footnote). •Jim62sch• 17:30, 30 June 2006 (UTC)

How about something like: "Proponents of several of the additional theories below have gone farther to assert that there are yet additional issues, such as interpersonal power struggles and other factors involved in deciding what is seen as truth." ... Kenosis 17:43, 30 June 2006 (UTC)

Will get to Kant. Need some time to synthesize without sacrificing the basic observations about circularity, if at all possible. That helps to set the reader up for Pragmatic theory, among others. ... Kenosis 17:43, 30 June 2006 (UTC) ... Jim (and anyone else), I'm forced to break from this for now and will get back to the task of synthesizing Kant blockquote a bit later, along with any other relevant issues. Kudos; thanks boss. ... Kenosis 17:48, 30 June 2006 (UTC)

Yes, that's a great rewrite. Should we include "personal bias" in there as one of the other factors?

Synthesising Kant might be the biggest challenge of this entire article...it should be all downhill from there (of course, there's still Pierce to contend with!) •Jim62sch• 17:55, 30 June 2006 (UTC)

I like the illustration of "geist" even better (Is it "mind" or "spirit"), but that one will work quite well. Gottago for now... Kenosis 18:08, 30 June 2006 (UTC)

Thanks. Well, I tackled Kant - I hope I didn't bruise him too much. Feel free to comment, change it, take it out and shoot it, etc. •Jim62sch• 19:26, 30 June 2006 (UTC)

Back briefly. I should pull that stuff about Kant's view for the present. The way I see it, the real purpose of that paragraph's insertion was to prove to readers why philosophers have so often not been content to rest with correspondence theory, maybe to set up for explaining just how complicated it got a century after Kant. Trust me, it got so complicated that this section is not the place to present that material. It can be done in a separate section such as, say, "More on correspondence theory". You should also know that Correspondence theory includes Tarski's semantic theory and other notable slants, and Tarski was one of the ones seeking a language-independent truth predicate--it's an acknowledged classic among philosophers. Making this and other things understandable will be a challenge that will last for awhile, but it can be done in the end, or at least reasonably summarized in plain English with "main article" links as we do around here with highly complex slants on subjects of common interest. Some of these are soooo complicated they should be left out of the article on truth for sure, since we're not writing for professional philosophers here... Kenosis 20:04, 30 June 2006 (UTC) I should add a qualifier to what I just said, lest a troll happen by and notice a fine detail. Tarski has traditionally been classed under correspondence theory discussions, but since deflationary theory became known as deflationary theory, he has one leg in each camp (posthumously--rolling over until each leg gets its own tombstone). That's one reason (in addition to readability) why it's quite sensible that his theory goes after the deflationary theories are introduced. Could be done differently, but that's a sensible way of organizing. ... Kenosis 20:22, 30 June 2006 (UTC)

Looks and sounds good to me. •Jim62sch• 00:17, 2 July 2006 (UTC)

Section 1.2: Truth as expressed more generally

This section appears to be the source of the OR problem. It rambles quite a bit, and contains no citations. Semeiotic is specific to Charles Sanders Peirce; but the links to Hermeneutics and Semiotics could be re-worked into another section - the part of the intro that talks about truth and meaning, perhaps? Cybernetics (the article) says nothing about truth; Physical symbol system is a stub, and again says nothing about truth.

Is there anything worth keeping here? Banno 23:38, 1 July 2006 (UTC)

Certainly not the way it's currently written. •Jim62sch• 00:24, 2 July 2006 (UTC)

Indeed this section does seem to constitute OR, but it raises the question of how to integrate philosophical notions of truth that do not fit well into the pre-given categories (thinking here particularly of thinkers like Nietzsche, Foucault, Heidegger, and Nishida) — and indeed, earlier theories of truth (particularly Aquinas whose verum est adaequatio intellectus et rei which is only formally similar to correspondence theory). Any thoughts? _talk 03:30, 2 July 2006 (UTC)

Aquinas actually did use the Latin word correspondentia to refer to a relationship between thought and reality, at least in one place. Although, as I indicated already within the various protracted discussions now archived, Russell was responsible for making the term widely known as such in the context of establishing correspondence and coherence as competing tensions. Kant did use a term readily translatable as "correspondence" too, though was not exactly, shall we say, popular reading. There's a place for all of this if priorities are kept in a reasonable sequence for the article. I suspect someday it'll be either a fairly lengthy article and/or have many linked offshoots and a reasonable way of giving readers a pathway to their particular foci. The section currently being discussed (Truth#Truth as expressed more generally) might be a reasonable place to start with such views as just mentioned by lg0774 (and Banno in next talk section below). Just vaguely hypothesizing here, perhaps Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, Derrida could be one thread. For now, how about starting by slightly retitling this section and begin briefly summarizing some of these views subsectioned by author, then see where it goes? ... Kenosis 04:26, 2 July 2006 (UTC)

And yes, I am in favor of jettisoning that whole meandering beginning to "Truth as expressed more generally". There are plenty of ways of summarizing the "realist" vs. "anti-realist" distinction without getting bogged down in it. ... Kenosis 07:30, 2 July 2006 (UTC)

My point about Aquinas is not so much about the particular words used as the meaning of those particular words within context — for example, Aquinas admits something like revelation as a basis of truth (as opposed to the expression of correspondence theory on this page — the correspondence with fact). That said, I would favor eliminating the section under question, as it is just as much a straight-jacket on notions of truth currently not included in the "Major theories of truth", as, (1) it focuses exclusively on truth in sign relations and (2) it seems to develop no new ideas of what truth is itself. As to the single thread, I am not so sure how well that would work. For example, Heidegger takes one notion of truth from Aristotle and applies it to Nietzsche; Foucault takes Nietzschean truth in a different direction. _talk 04:18, 4 July 2006 (UTC)

Agreed lg, yes Aquinas was variously on both sides of that "fence". Personally I think it's time to begin including some of these views you just mentioned, And this section seems a reasonable place to add this type of material, organizing as necessary along the way. ... Kenosis 16:48, 4 July 2006 (UTC)

Removal

I've deleted the section. Here is the dif: . Banno 21:44, 4 July 2006 (UTC)

• The discussion of "realist" theories is unsupported by citations, and appears to cross over with the previous discussion of the distinction between substantive and robust theories.
• Much of the writing is confused - for example, "meaning-bearing element" is unexplained, and precedes the introduction of signs in the section Approaches relating to signs in general
• look, I could go on, and will if need be; but basically the whole section sucks.

My recommendation is to re-insert anything of use into other parts of the article. Banno 21:51, 4 July 2006 (UTC)

This removed from first paragraph of Pragmatic theory:

• The most critical differences involve the role of rationalism and realism within pragmatism. ... 04:19, 5 July 2006 (UTC)

The link to rationalism directs the reader to a poorly developed article, and the idea of summarizing "realist" approaches to truth is at least postponed for the present. I assume at some point we'll get back to a brief synopsis of how this concept of "realist" cuts across the various theories according to a number of writers, but for now it's here for future reference. Or, with a rewrite, this whole discussion of "realism" could very reasonably be worked into the article on truth theory. For now, in my estimation of it, the current article reasonably covers the basic concept with its references to "objective", especially with respect to correspondence and pragmatic theory. ... Kenosis 04:19, 5 July 2006 (UTC)

Truth and Power

A section is needed on Nietzsche and Foucault (at the least). Banno 23:44, 1 July 2006 (UTC)

Nietzsche! Nietzsche! Nietzsche! (OK, he's one of my favourites.  ;) •Jim62sch• 00:25, 2 July 2006 (UTC)

In keeping with our pragmatic observations of truth issues in WP, Nietzsche has some things to contribute to our theoretical understanding I would think. I have a couple old papers of mine about him somewhere. Suggestions? Does he go under social constructivism? Separate section? ... Kenosis 00:47, 2 July 2006 (UTC)

I think we need a new section on truth and power - I guess this summarises the approach of non-English speaking non-analytic philosophers, but no doubt I am wrong about that. There is an excellent commentary on Nietzsche and truth on ABC Radio National. The links to Foucault should pose a niece counterpoint to the analytic stuff. Banno 01:48, 2 July 2006 (UTC)

Buddhism

I started a section on Buddhism...it's still under construction. •Jim62sch• 10:34, 3 July 2006 (UTC)

OK, for now it's "done", but feel free to edit, comment, add to it, etc. (Probably when I look at it later I'll notice something that needs to be changes. •Jim62sch• 14:21, 3 July 2006 (UTC)

I was wondering when someone would start this. The issue of truth is conspicuously dealt with in "right speech", one of the eight of the path, and also in one of the five precepts of "right action". Along with many commentaries on the issue in both Teravada and Mahayana literature. Important to mention, I'd think.Thanks. ... Kenosis 15:17, 3 July 2006 (UTC) I do think we need to be cautious about confusing things called truths with an analysis of truth. though. This seems to be one of many such encounters with the distinction. If we attempt to include things called truths beyond a quick reference here and there, the article might turn into an article about everything we know, and everything to which the words "true", "truth", and "is true" or "was true" or "will be true" are attached. Buddhism has some fine analyses of truth throughout its literature (can't cite for you at the moment). The precept "do not lie", for example, is a stricter proscription than the Judeo-Christian equivalent ("do not bear false witness against neighbors"). There's some good explanatory material about the concept of truth in there somewhere. ... Kenosis 15:29, 3 July 2006 (UTC)

Not knowing how far we'd want to go with this was part of my rationale for stopping when I did. •Jim62sch• 19:25, 3 July 2006 (UTC)

Hinduism

I started a section on truth in Hinduism...it's still under construction. •Jim62sch• 14:21, 3 July 2006 (UTC)

I second the motion. If the "Truth in religion" section gets too long, it can readily be chopped down and delegated to a topic fork, and in turn to yet other topic forks, and in turn to yet other... assuming Intel keeps doing in the future what it's been doing in the past. ... Kenosis 06:58, 6 July 2006 (UTC)

Notable?

The new heading seems to imply that Quine, Kripke and co. are not notable, because they are not in this section... ;-)

Can we pin down the key difference between the analytic approach expounded at the start of the article and the synthetic(?) approach of the new section? I would have thought that the key difference was that the latter were most interested in the relation between truth and power - this from my reading of Nietzsche and Foucault; while the former were more interested in definitions. Banno 21:33, 4 July 2006 (UTC)

This would be a tough gig on this, Banno. The dividing lines aren't clear at all. And in general (please don't hold me too strictly to these generalizations) but in general: Correspondence is not limited to only analytic; some versions of correspondence theory acknowledge the interactivity of the subject and are thus synthetic to an extent; coherent schemas in mathematics, physics and certain areas of logic are arguably outside of what's generally understood as analytic philosophy; pragmatic theory took a good beating from analytics in its early decades, and as a general trend does lie outside analytic philosophy; pragmatic and certain versions of constructivism are synthetic; and, well, in general the distinction just is not as clear as we'd like it to be. A major part of the purpose for jumping into the five theories (or four if you lump consensus theory with constructivist theory), was to avoid this whole mess at the outset of the article. It's not impossible to rationally discuss, but I believe it takes the better part of a whole book to describe the lay of the land with regard to that distinction-- (or an article like truth theory?). ... Kenosis 04:41, 5 July 2006 (UTC)

(I do support the inclusion of this new section). Banno 21:53, 4 July 2006 (UTC)

Truth theory

We should also look again at how truth relates to the orphaned truth theory. Banno 21:57, 4 July 2006 (UTC)

That article certainly needs a major rewrite. When Jon Awbrey made his arguments that there was a place for the more complex material, I was persuaded that the argument was reasonable. Then I felt somewhat betrayed at the further overwhelming of this article on truth with the various obscurities we've seen. But I think in due course it's possible something can be made of that other article. Some of the material you just removed might be suited for that article, such as semiotiics and other more obscure slants. It's not that much server space, so I'm inclined to hope that it can be developed by, say a few grad students here and there, maybe a pro willing to give something to the public domain, etc., into a useful place for the more complex info. We've seen some WP articles change rather dramatically on a number of occasions after having languished for some time. I definitely wouldn't wanna guarantee it, but I think it's OK to just 'play it as it lies'. Just one opinion. ... Kenosis 22:28, 4 July 2006 (UTC)

1. Habermas, Jurgen, Habermas, Jürgen (1976), "What Is Universal Pragmatics?", 1st published, "Was heißt Universalpragmatik?", Sprachpragmatik und Philosophie, Karl-Otto Apel (ed.), Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main. Reprinted, pp. 1–68 in Jürgen Habermas, Communication and the Evolution of Society, Thomas McCarthy (trans., 1979)
2. Right Speech, Right Action, Right Livelihood
3. Clifford, William K., The Ethics of Belief (1877).
4. See, e.g., Bradley, F.H., "On Truth and Copying", in Blackburn, et al (eds., 1999),Truth, 31-45.

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