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It has been suggested that this article be merged into Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. (Discuss)

The Zarqawi PSYOP program refers to a US Psychological operations program, or propaganda campaign exaggerating the importance of Al Zarqawi in Al Qaeda and the Iraq insurgency.

The program was allegedly primarily aimed at, but not limited to, the "Iraqi and Arab media" along with the "U.S. Home Audience," which was part of a "broader propaganda campaign." The article goes on to explain:

That slide, created by Casey's subordinates, does not specifically state that U.S. citizens were being targeted by the effort, but other sections of the briefings indicate that there were direct military efforts to use the U.S. media to affect views of the war.

The goal of the program was to alienate local citizens from him by portraying him as a foreigner and key actor in the insurgency. However, Sidney Blumenthal reported that, according to a "military source," Rumsfeld and the White House resisted degrading Zarqawi's image for "domestic political reasons,"

Program

The Washington Post reported on April 10, 2006, that the role of Zarqawi was magnified by the Pentagon in a psychological operations campaign started in 2004. In the words of the Washington Post:

For the past two years, U.S. military leaders have been using Iraqi media and other outlets in Baghdad to publicize Zarqawi's role in the insurgency. The documents explicitly list the "U.S. Home Audience" as one of the targets of a broader propaganda campaign.

The article goes on to explain that a slide created for a briefing by Army Gen. George W. Casey Jr,

describes the "home audience" as one of six major targets of the American side of the war.

Nevertheless, the slide did not specifically assert the program targeted U.S. citizens. Although other parts of the briefings did suggest it was directed at the U.S. media to alter the view of the war.

Another slide in the briefing noted a "selective leak" to New York Times reporter Dexter Filkins, about a letter boasting of suicide attacks in Iraq and allegedly written by Zarqawi. Contacted by the Post Filkins commented he was skeptical at the time, and still is, about the document's authenticity.

Responding to the articles reported psychological operations aimed at Americans, Army Col. James A. Treadwell, commander of the U.S. military psyops unit in Iraq but no longer present as the program was started, said that "It is ingrained in U.S.: You don't psyop Americans. We just don't do it,". Another officer commented in the Post that, although all material provided was in Arabic, the campaign probably "probably raised his profile in the American press's view." The Post continues that, according to an officer familiar with the case, this program was not related to another program which was linked to the Lincoln Group.

By focusing on his terrorist activities and status as a foreigner the US tried to inflame Iraqi citizens against him. Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, the senior commander in charge, remarked, according to the Washington Post:

"The Zarqawi PSYOP program is the most successful information campaign to date."

Rise to power

Prior to the involvement of Zarqawi in the Iraqi insurgency, he was jailed in Jordan for attempting to overthrow the government. He was arrested while in possession of explosives and given a 5 year sentence. Upon release from the Jordanian prison in 1999, Zarqawi's involvement in an attempt to blow up the Radisson SAS hotel in Jordan was exposed and he fled the country. According to court testimony by Zarqwai followers he was able to secure funds from al-Qaeda to setup a training camp near Herat.

Several incidents turned him from an unknown and unimportant indicidual into the well-known voice of Al Qaeda in Iraq. Following the allegation he was a link between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda, by Colin Powell before the UN Security Council in 2003, he became the embodiment of resistance against the US in the Muslim world. Then the invasion of Iraq by the Bush administration became another boost for his popularity. After the capture of Saddam Hussein the Bush administration accused him of being behind the continuing mishaps in Iraq, or, as Patrick Cockburn commented in an editorial for Counterpunch Newsletter:

"No sooner had Saddam Hussein been captured than the US spokesmen began to mention al-Zarqawi's name in every sentence."

Articles in the Wahington Post, Newsweek and Counterpunch Newslewtter suggest his increased notoriety was the resilt of an orchestrated effort involving psychological operations.

In the wake of his assasination, which had erroneously been reported several times before, the United States military produced a video showing him to be the opposite of what the media previously advocated him to be.

Quotes

The Washington post cites Col. Derek Harvey who said at a meeting by the Army in Fort Leavenworth:

"Our own focus on Zarqawi has enlarged his caricature, if you will - made him more important than he really is, in some ways."

See also

• Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
• Doublespeak
• Iraq war
• Newspeak
• Propaganda
• Psychological operations (United States)
• Psychological warfare
• PSYOP
• War on Terrorism

References

1. ^ Military Plays Up Role of Zarqawi - Jordanian Painted As Foreign Threat To Iraq's Stability By Thomas E. Ricks, The Washington Post, April 10, 2006
2. ^ "Mission Accomplished" in a business suit - Ignoring U.S. intelligence, Bush inflated Zarqawi, then made a pointless trip to Iraq to pose as a heroic dragon slayer. It doesn't work anymore by Sidney Blumenthal, Salon, June 15, 2006
3. ^ Was There a Legal Basis for His Assassination? The Story Behind Zarqawi's Death by Jennifer van Bergen, CounterPunch, June 12, 2006
4. Who was Abu Musab al Zarqawi? by Michel Chossudovsky, Global Research, June 09, 2006,
5. ^ America Put Him in the Big Time The Short, Strange Career of Abu Masab al-Zarqawi by Patrick Cockburn, Counterpunch, June 9, 2006
6. Who is behind "Al Qaeda in Iraq"? Pentagon acknowledges fabricating a "Zarqawi Legend" by Michel Chossudovsky, GlobalResearch, April 18, 2006
7. ^ Hyping Zarqawi by Tim Dickinson, Rolling Stone, April 11, 2006
8. "Al-Zarqawi's Biography". Washington Post. June 8, 2006. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
9. ^ The Myth of Al Qaeda Before 9/11, Osama bin Laden’s group was small and fractious. How Washington helped to build it into a global threat By Michael Hirsh, Newsweek, June 30, 2006

• Psychological warfare
• Propaganda
• Counter-terrorism
• Anti-terrorism policy of the United States
• George W. Bush administration controversies
• 2003 Iraq conflict
• Iraqi insurgency