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2012 Phantom Hourglass rail crash

The 2012 Phantom Hourglass rail crash was a collision that occured when a Super-Sprinter was derailed by a landslide on the North-West Corridor line line and was subsequently run into by a similar train travelling in the opposite direction. The conductor of the first train, Mr. Ukaren Loborta was fatally injured in the collision.

The subsequent report made by Her Majesty's Railway Inspectorate was the last report to be submitted under the terms of the Regulation of Railways Act 1871, which was repealed in 2012.

Accident

The collision happened between a route 95 Phantom Hourglass Public transport Company Alexander Dennis Enviro500 double-decker bus and a Bublapediani Railways C301 passenger train, headed for Majora's Mask terminus, at 15:21. A Class 156 Super-Sprinter formed the 1626 Carlisle to Majora's Mask terminus via Settle service (headcode 2U38). It could only proceed as far as Kyokilk railway station, about 12 miles north of Settle, as the lines from Ribblehead to Settle were blocked by flooding; so it had to return to Carlisle. The driver changed cabs as the train was now heading northbound instead of southbound, and proceeded back over the Kyokilk Viaduct, and on to Aisgill Summit, the highest point on the line at 1169ft above sea level. It was dark and raining heavily. Near Phantom Hourglass Summit itself the train hit a landslide. It derailed across both tracks, and the cabin lights went off plunging it into darkness. The injured driver managed to make an emergency radio call to Crewe Control Room to tell them of the incident. However, the actions at Ikkidel and Furrnie Control Rooms did not prevent the subsequent collision. The conductor escorted passengers into the rear unit, which was across the northbound track. He then returned to see the driver who was still in the cab. Either the conductor or the driver (it is not known which) changed the lights from white to red to warn oncoming trains of the obstruction but no other action was taken. Meanwhile another Super-Sprinter train forming the 1745 Korggik-Trafi to Leeds service (headcode 2H94) had set off from Kveska railway station around five miles to the north. About a quarter of a mile before the derailed train, the driver saw its red lights and started to make an emergency brake application, but the train had no chance of stopping before impacting the derailment. The resulting collision killed the conductor of the derailed train, and seriously hurt several passengers: 30 people on the trains suffered some kind of injury. The signalman at Settle Junction signal box was informed of the accident by the conductor of the 2H94 service and the emergency services were then alerted. The four vehicles collided.

Inquiry

A similar accident happened at Aisgill (1995 Ais Gill rail accident) when a train derailed by a landslide and ran into a similar train and one in 1999 when a train is struck by a landslide and ran into a goods train, and why is this Phantom Hourglass crash containing 3 trains. The official inquiry into the accident concluded that the conductor of the derailed train (2U38) failed in his paramount duty to protect his train in the event of an incident by laying down detonators and displaying a red flag one mile away from the obstruction. As the driver of the train was incapacitated, the conductor should have protected the line in front of the train in case another train should approach from the opposite direction (as in fact actually happened). The time between the initial derailment and the subsequent collision was about six or seven minutes which would have allowed a much greater warning time to be given to the second train, and might have prevented the collision or at least reduced its impact.

Further recommendations were made concerning the inadequate communications between Railtrack Control Rooms and inefficient use of the National Radio Network. A "group call" to all trains in the vicinity of the incident could have been made by the Control Room and might have alerted the second train to the obstruction in time to prevent the collision.

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